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Preface

The research projects reported in this book were initiated because of the
painful realization in 1992 that there was an enormous vacuum of solid empir
ical knowledge about the reasons for the unexpected explosion in the size of
the Social Security Administration's (SSA's) disability programs an explo
sion that led the Trustees to project near-term insolvency for the Disability
Insurance (DI) Trust Fund in the absence of corrective action. The policy
response to that crisis included the short-term fix of reallocating Old Age and
Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund contributions to the DI Fund, as well
as the initiation of a set of studies that are reflected in this volume.
The bulk of the original work forming the basis of this book was carried
out between 1992 and 1995, culminating in a conference in 1995. Some of
the papers were slightly updated subsequent to the 1995 conference, but most
of the empirical work and the discussion of policy issues reflect the authors'
understanding of the subject matter as of 1995. Some do not completely
reflect post-1995 developments, not due to ignorance on the part of the
authors, but simply as a result of not having had a good-quality crystal ball at
the time of the substantive completion of the various contributions! Some of
the papers include discussions of policy changes being actively considered in
1995 that have since been made and are currently being implemented.
Much changed between 1992 and the 1995 conference, and much more
has changed since then. In particular, 1992 reflected a situation that we sus
pected all along was near the peak of unusually strong growth in the size of
both the DI and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) disability program rolls,
as a result of the previous recession and a host of other, primarily program
matic, developments. Good economic times followed, with a period of sus
tained growth, accompanied by both low inflation and low unemployment,
lasting through the time that this book is going to press, in early 1998. There
were other, more complex, programmatic and policy changes affecting the
growth of SSA's disability program rolls, many of them taking effect after the
1995 conference. Many of these changes were in some sense policy responses
to the previous explosion in the disability rolls, just as our research effort has
been. They also, however, reflected continued and broader societal and politi
cal concerns with the appropriate balance between a safety net for the truly
needy, personal responsibility, and the financial interests of taxpayers.
A series of legislative developments culminated in the passage of the Per
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996. This act and separate
1996 legislation focusing on drug addicts and alcoholics have several impor-
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tant provisions directly affecting important segments of SSA's disability pro
gram target populations, including children and noncitizens. This legislation
also has potentially sweeping indirect effects on the disability programs as a
result of the replacement of the sixty-year-old Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program with block grants for Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF). Many of the contributors to this volume, including
the co-editors, are deeply involved in major policy evaluation efforts directly
focusing on such post-1995 developments.
Early on in this effort we often joked about the possibility that policy
research may be a lagging, rather than a leading, indicator of major program
developments. Empirical trends since 1992 seem to confirm that the research
program reflected in this volume is a lagging indicator of program change,
just as a previous flurry of empirical research on disability caseload growth
that began in 1975 followed a rapid caseload expansion in preceding years. In
1992 and 1993 we often argued that, given this perhaps inherently lagging
nature of policy evaluation, one of the key potential uses of quick-turnaround
research studies lagging as they may be might be to help prevent policymakers from overreacting to cyclical factors or other developments that might
produce one-time shocks with either temporary or permanent effects on pro
gram caseloads. But we also hoped that such research would demonstrate
timely, empirically solid results and eventually result in a more proactive role
of policy evaluation in the arsenal of policymakers. One focal area of the
research appears to have been particularly timely given subsequent policy
developments: the interactions of SSA's disability programs with other social
safety net programs, such as AFDC/TANF, Medicaid, and General Assis
tance. The subsequent passage of the historic welfare reform legislation
makes our findings in this area more significant although there is much yet
to learn.
The collaboration between the co-editors of this volume goes back to the
early stages of this research effort. One of us (Rupp) was assigned in 1992 at
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Planning and Evaluation (ASPE) of the
Department of Health and Human Services to design the research program
reflected in this volume. ASPE and SSA collaborated in the planning and
funding of these studies, and Rupp was assigned to work with SSA officials
and staff in creating this research effort. Many high-level DHHS and SSA offi
cials were highly supportive of this effort at this critical early stage and in sub
sequent stages of the expansion of our project. Richard Eisinger, Christy
Schmidt-Bayne, Wendell Primus, Gil Fisher, Larry Thompson, and David Ellwood were especially supportive. Much of the research reflected in this vol
ume was carried out through task-order contracts between ASPE and LewinVHI (now The Lewin Group); Rupp was the ASPE Project Officer and Staple-
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ton was the Lewin Project Director for all of these contracts. In these capaci
ties we have established a productive working relationship focusing on
creating analytic designs that are truly responsive to major policy concerns
and are implemented in a technically sound manner. Our frequent and sub
stantive interactions produced numerous ideas that shaped the overall research
program in fundamental ways.
We also had the privilege of collaborating with several colleagues who
played substantial roles in designing and implementing these studies and in
providing support in the dissemination of the results. Peggy Trout (now
Fisher) and Mindy Upp were SSA's co-project officers on the various Lewin
contracts. Peggy was extremely useful and efficient in representing SSA and
in coordinating the work of SSA staff involved in providing input to study
design, administrative data, and analytic feedback.
We have dedicated this volume to the memory of Mindy Upp, who worked
with us from the early stages of this research effort through the conference and
the subsequent dissemination of the research results in the policy community,
virtually up until her death at the end of 1996. Mindy played an enormous role
in advocating the importance of this research within both SSA and the broader
policy community. In particular, we are heavily indebted to Mindy's ideas,
enthusiasm, and advocacy of using a case-study approach to complement the
quantitative analysis, and in initiating and planning a separate section on pol
icy and programmatic perspectives on program growth at the 1995 conference.
It was Mindy's idea to include "The View from the Trenches" (the phrase
itself is vintage Mindy), the representation of local practitioners with handson field experience in addition to the usual "suspects" high-ranking officials
and prominent policy experts on panels of this kind. Mindy also had the pri
mary responsibility for writing the subsequent SSA report to Congress, and
she displayed enormous enthusiasm and skill in advocating the use of empiri
cal results in this important document that reflected the relevant findings from
these studies.
On a more personal note, Mindy was the one member of our core team who
struggled with serious disabilities throughout our work together. Her courage
in facing severe health problems, and eventually the very real possibility of
death, has been an inspiration to all of us who have had the privilege to know
her. The combination of her commitment to the civil rights of people with dis
abilities and her no-nonsense perspective on the dilemmas facing people with
severe disabilities and those who care about them brought a very credible and
fundamental human perspective to our research and shaped our thinking about
the analytic and policy issues in subtle yet important ways. We hope that our
association with Mindy made us more responsible human beings and
researchers. Up to the final days of her life, Mindy took great pride in her

work; we hope that our collaboration with her contributed to her sense of pos
itive accomplishment and perhaps may have eased the substantial pain she
must have experienced throughout this period.
Steven Sandell has provided support in his various capacities as friend,
wise colleague, and DHHS and SSA official. We are especially thankful to
Steve for encouraging the early dissemination of research results through a
January 1995 conference session of the Society of Government Economists
(SGE), and the subsequent publication of a summary article by the co-edi
tors of this volume in the Social Security Bulletin. Pete Wheeler, the Asso
ciate Commissioner of the Office of Research, Evaluation and Statistics at
SSA, has been very supportive of the early dissemination of the research
results through the Social Security Bulletin and also contributed to this vol
ume.
Among the many colleagues who played major roles in this effort, we
would like to highlight the contribution of a few who were helpful in strate
gic ways. Alan Shafer and Charlie Scott played the key role of assembling
the SSA administrative records databases that formed the basis of analysis
of applications and awards (Shafer) and duration on the disability rolls
(Scott). Rick Foster, currently Chief Actuary of the Health Care Financing
Administration, but at the time the Deputy Chief Actuary of SSA, provided
substantial support and encouragement as a reviewer of several key design
documents and as a reviewer of early output from our research including
his role of helpful discussant (with Pamela Loprest of the Urban Institute) of
several papers presented at the January 1995 SGE meeting. Lewin's Gina
Livermore played a significant role in conducting all of the work performed
under the contracts to Lewin and also helped significantly in the prepara
tion of this volume. Among our many colleagues who contributed to the
design of the studies reflected in this volume, we would like to express our
special thanks to Burt Barnow of Lewin and The Johns Hopkins University
and John Bound of the University of Michigan. Finally, but not least impor
tant, we would like to express our thanks to those who made it possible to
publish this volume as an Upjohn Institute book. Allan Hunt has been a vig
orous and enthusiastic supporter of publishing this volume, and the editors
are indebted to both him and two anonymous reviewers for numerous ideas.
We are also indebted to Judy Gentry, our manuscript editor, for efficient
expert assistance in the publication process, and for making this volume
more readable in ways that are very real, but may be apparent only to those
few who have seen both the draft we submitted to the Institute and this final
product.
The views and opinions expressed in this volume do not necessarily repre
sent the official positions of the Social Security Administration, The Lewin
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Group, or any of the organizations that any of the authors, including the coeditors, are currently affiliated with, or any they have been affiliated with at
any time in the past.
February 5, 1998
Kalman Rupp, Ph.D.
Senior Economist
Office of Research, Evaluation and Statistics
Social Security Administration
Washington, D.C.
David C. Stapleton, Ph.D.
Senior Vice President
The Lewin Group
Fairfax, Virginia
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1 Introduction
Kalman Rupp
Social Security Administration

David C. Stapleton
The Lewin Group

This book is about the growth in income entitlement benefits for dis
ability in the United States provided under two federal programs
administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA): the Social
Security Disability Insurance (DI) program under Title II of the Social
Security Act, and the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program
(Title XVI). Both programs use the same definition of disability, but
other eligibility criteria differ. DI is a social insurance program with
disabled worker eligibility conditioned on sufficient employment in
jobs covered by Social Security. SSI is means-tested, requiring benefi
ciaries to satisfy income and asset criteria. DI beneficiaries whose
incomes, including DI benefits, are below the SSI benefit level may
concurrently receive SSI payments to make up the difference, and
many low-income DI applicants receive SSI benefits during the fivemonth postemployment DI waiting period. DI benefits are converted to
Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) benefits at age 65. SSI dis
ability recipients may continue to receive benefits past age 65,
although SSI benefits are also available to the nondisabled elderly
meeting the income and asset tests. Children with qualifying disabili
ties are eligible for SSI payments in their own right subject to income
and asset eligibility requirements.
SSA's disability programs have evolved into major pillars of the
social safety net in the United States. While the basic design of DI has
not changed since the program was created in 1956, changes in the def
inition of the target population, program administration, eligibility cri
teria, work incentives, and eligibility reviews have expanded the
program. The SSI disability program replaced federal-state Aid to the
Permanently and Totally Disabled and Aid to the Blind programs in
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1974, and since then has expanded at a faster pace than DI. In 1995,
4.2 million DI disabled worker beneficiaries and their dependents
received $40.9 billion in benefits, and 4.9 million disabled SSI benefi
ciaries received $19.5 billion in federal payments. 1 The combined
value of benefits from the programs in 1995, $60 billion, is more than
2.5 times as large as combined federal and state spending on AFDC
benefits in the same year. The importance of both DI and SSI has
increased enormously during recent years as the real value of medical
benefits that most recipients are entitled to Medicare (for DI recipi
ents after a two-year waiting period) and Medicaid (for SSI recipi
ents) increased tremendously. In 1995, Medicare paid $12.5 billion
in benefits for DI beneficiaries, and Medicaid paid about $40 billion in
benefits for SSi-disability recipients.2
Much has changed in the broader environment of SSA's disability
programs as well. The passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990, and more recently, the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, are major federal laws affect
ing people with disabilities. Changes in family structure, population
health trends, economic restructuring, and increases in female labor
force participation all affect the nature and growth of SSA's disability
programs.
A substantial amount of recent research and policy discussion has
focused on various aspects of the disability programs and their interac
tion with the broader environment of our economy and society. A
recently published Upjohn Institute volume, Disability, Work and Cash
Benefits, is a compendium of studies by leading experts in disability,
income security, labor economics, and rehabilitation (Mashaw et al.
1996) and represents the range of program design and institutional
issues raised by the programs. Other recent work focuses on narrower,
but fairly important aspects of program design, such as work incentives
and vocational rehabilitation, as represented by a series of papers pub
lished in the August 1996 issue of the Journal of Vocational Rehabili
tation (Prero 1996). SSA's Disability Evaluation Study is a major
ongoing data collection effort designed to develop a better understand
ing of SSA's eligibility screening processes and the potential to
improve this critically important aspect of the program.
This book focuses on the factors affecting the growth of the disabil
ity programs both understanding the causes of growth and their pol-
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icy implications. Changes in program design and in the environment of
SSA's disability programs are both very important in explaining and
understanding program growth. The patterns and causes of program
growth point to critically important aspects of program design and the
changing role of SSA's disability programs in the social safety net.
In the next section we discuss the motivation and objectives of this
book in somewhat more detail. We then provide an overall conceptual
framework underlying the studies in the book, an overview of the
major issues, and a brief sketch of the organization of the volume.

MOTIVATION AND OBJECTIVES
The last time the growth of income entitlements to persons with
severe disabilities was subject to intense scrutiny by economists was
during the mid 1970s, following acceleration in the growth of DI
awards (Exhibit 1.1) and deterioration in the balance of the DI Trust
Fund. Researchers concluded that the 1975 recession was the primary
cause of that situation and that the anticipated recovery would turn the
trends around (Lando 1974; Hambor 1975; Thompson and Van de
Water 1975). The DI program was viewed by many as a potential tool
of countercyclical macroeconomic policy an automatic stabilizer
that, like many other government programs, came to the aid of those
most hurt by a recession while stimulating much needed demand for
goods and services. An important policy implication was that Trust
Fund balances needed to be built up when the economy was strong in
order to compensate for higher benefit payments during recessions.
Once again, a major upsurge in income entitlements to persons with
severe disabilities has resulted in intense scrutiny of the DI program;
this time the scrutiny extends to SSI, which was in its infancy at the
federal level during the earlier period. This upsurge also coincided with
a major recession, in 1991, but analysts were skeptical that it was the
primary cause, despite the earlier findings. The "double-dip" recession
of 1980-1982 was not accompanied by acceleration in program
growth, and there are competing explanations of the recent growth
most notably changes in the program itself, the aging of the baby
boomers, and declines in the value of and access to benefits from state

Exhibit 1.1 DI and SSI Disability Awards
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and local programs. Other changes in the economy and society, such as
the decline in manufacturing jobs, growth in female labor force partici
pation, growth in health care costs, changes in the structure of families,
immigration, and changes in the prevalence of disabling health condi
tions, represent another layer of factors that could have a bearing on
recent program growth.
Again, policymaker scrutiny of the programs has generated a sub
stantial research effort. While some policymakers argued that growth
would subside of its own accord once the economy turned around, and
others saw no end to the rapid growth without a significant change in
program policy, many believed that research on the causes of program
growth was needed to inform the policy debate. Some of us thought the
research was not only overdue, but perhaps a little too late; the research
during the mid 1970s was initiated at the peak of growth and therefore
was a lagging indicator rather than a proactive agent of change. Per
haps, again, "the damage was already done," in part because of the lack
of serious research attention to this topic during intervening years.
Growth now appears to be subsiding, and it may be that, once again,
the attention of policymakers will turn to other hot topics of the day.
Stanford Ross (Chapter 11) provides an intriguing perspective on
the initiation of this research from the point of view of a public mem
ber of the Board of Trustees for OASDI. As Ross explains, in April of
1992 the Trustees were obligated to report to Congress, warning that
reserves were projected to fall below 20 percent of annual disburse
ments. This was the first time that this official "alarm bell," enacted in
1983 as Section 709 of the Social Security Act, was set off.
In response to the Section 709 mandate and recognizing the impor
tance of developing a better understanding of the factors affecting
caseload growth, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
and SSA prepared a report (DHHS 1992) summarizing existing knowl
edge about the growth of the DI program and providing a comprehen
sive list of various demographic, economic, and programmatic factors
that were hypothesized to affect caseload growth. This "709 Report"
called for additional research to assess the causal role of various fac
tors, and to quantify their effects.
A short-term fix to the impending insolvency was proposed in 1992:
reallocation of a small portion of OASI Trust Fund contributions to the
DI Fund. As Ross describes (Chapter 11), the Public Trustees refused

6

Rupp and Stapleton

to accept the proposal unless a research agenda was pledged by the Exofficio Trustees. The Public Trustees argued that the short-term pallia
tive of a reallocation should not take place without providing the Con
gress and the public with information that would permit a more
fundamental look at the program and could lead to appropriate
reforms. Around this time, Congress mandated an examination of the
reasons for the rise in the number of applications and awards and for
the decreased rates of benefit terminations. SSA was to report the find
ings from this examination to Congress by October 1995.
In response, SSA and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Plan
ning and Evaluation (ASPE) of DHHS initiated a series of projects.
Two of the papers in this volume are summaries of research conducted
by staff at Lewin-VHI, Inc., under contract to SSA and ASPE. Three
other research papers were written by academics under subcontract to
Lewin-VHI, and two were written by SSA staff. The papers focus on
adult program participation, but some papers also address participation
of children with disabilities in SSL
Concerned that lessons learned from the current round of research
would be neglected by the policy community, SSA and ASPE spon
sored a two-day conference in Washington, D.C. entitled The Social
Security Administration's Disability Programs: Explanations of Recent
Growth and Implications for Disability Policy on July 20-21, 1995.
The purpose of the conference was to present and discuss findings of
the research on caseload growth. The conference also featured panel
discussions by regional and state program administrators on their first
hand experience, adding a human dimension to the numbers, and by
well-known experts in the field of disability policy on the policy impli
cations of the research findings and potential future directions for the
federal programs. This volume is based on the research findings,
administrator observations, and policy discussions featured at the July
1996 conference.
In the decade and a half between the two periods of rapid program
growth there has been a marked shift in attitudes toward entitlement
programs from the benign Great Society view that such programs
assist the less fortunate in our society, especially during economic hard
times, toward alarm over growth in program participation and spend
ing. Many fear that such programs are undermining the nation's eco
nomic strength. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
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Act of 1996 reflects concerns about both the economic effects of previ
ous welfare legislation and the effects on the moral fabric of our soci
ety.
Cash assistance for persons with severe disabilities has long enjoyed
fundamental political support because the intended recipients were
viewed as "deserving." Early recommendations for a radical restructur
ing of welfare programs from entitlement to temporary support based
on individual responsibility and the objective of encouraging work
called for exemptions for those with severe disabilities (see, for
instance, Ellwood 1988). The political backlash following the tighten
ing of eligibility for the federal disability programs initiated during the
early Reagan years confirmed the notion that disability programs were
"different" from other cash assistance programs because they provided
support for a group that should not be expected to work.
Much of the recent growth in program participation, however, has
been among beneficiaries who might be seen as "not deserving." There
is increasing concern about the ability of the program to identify those
who truly "cannot work" in the face of strong economic incentives and
procedural barriers working in the opposite direction. The critics argue
that the federal programs create a class of long-term beneficiaries who
could and would work were it not for the increasingly strong economic
incentives to get and stay on the rolls. The especially rapid growth of
young beneficiaries and of beneficiaries with certain mental disor
ders especially addiction disorders and affective disorders are cited
as prime examples. The now defunct Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program is usually held up as the prime example of a
program dominated by the long-term dependence of a subset of benefi
ciaries, but average duration on the disability program rolls is longer
(Rupp and Scott 1995).
Critics have called for policies restricting entry to, and encouraging
exit from, the disability rolls. Congress has responded, initially by
mandating time-limited benefits for persons whose drug addiction and
alcoholism (DA&A) contributed to their disability, and subsequently
by requiring the removal of DA&A cases from the rolls and denial of
disability benefits to future applicants for whom DA&A is judged to be
material to the determination of disability. The Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 also tightened eligibility for dis-
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abled children, ended SSI eligibility for aliens, and increased the
resources devoted to Continuing Disability Reviews (CDRs).
The extent to which changes in the nature of the disability programs
contributed to accelerated growth has been a major challenge for the
research reported in this volume. The policy discussions, in turn,
reflect a range of views on the nature of the disability programs, and on
the extent to which work options are feasible tools for containing
undesired program growth and dependence.
The provisions of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportu
nity Reconciliation Act of 1996 that are directed at benefits for poor
families with children have opened a new source of potential growth in
the disability programs. It is possible that replacement of the AFDC
program by block grants to the states for Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) will become a new source of growth in the
disability programs, as disabled individuals no longer eligible for
AFDC, some with access to more restrictive TANF programs, seek
new sources of support, assisted by state governments that have
increased financial incentives to shift welfare spending to the federal
government.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Caseload growth is affected by both economic and noneconomic
factors. Demographic and epidemiological factors, as well as the crite
ria for determining disability status and their implementation are, at
least in a proximate sense, noneconomic factors that might affect case
load growth, often substantially. Other factors, such as the value of
potential cash benefits relative to wages, the value of complementary
or substitute program benefits, and business conditions are clearly in
the domain of economics. The economic perspective emphasizes the
role of opportunity costs individuals making choices comparing vari
ous alternatives and is particularly useful in understanding how eco
nomic and noneconomic forces interact in shaping decisions such as
applying for and being awarded disability benefits, as well as decisions
concerning leaving the disability rolls.
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From the economic perspective, program participation is an out
come of the interaction of the "demand" for program benefits by indi
viduals and the "supply" of program benefits by the government. On
the demand side, the number of applications (representing the demand
for awards) in part depends on
the relative benefits of working and not working;
the availability of substitute forms of public assistance, such as
General Assistance (GA), TANF, or AFDC;
complementary benefits provided to those receiving disability
benefits especially health insurance benefits (Medicare for DI
and Medicaid for SSI beneficiaries); and
various features of the DI and SSI programs the costs of apply
ing for benefits, the probability of receiving an award, and how
long benefits are expected to continue.
The supply side is influenced by legislative factors, as well as adminis
trative procedures, judicial rulings, and the resources available for
making award decisions.
Once persons with disabilities begin receiving DI and/or SSI bene
fits, their continued "demand" for benefits is influenced by
the duration of these benefits over time, a beneficiary's poten
tial earnings decline as their human capital depreciates due to
separation from the labor force;
programmatic disincentives to work with limited exceptions, DI
beneficiaries who engage in "substantial gainful activity" (i.e.,
earn over $500 per month) subsequent to a nine-month trial work
period lose all their disability benefits, while, apart from certain
disregards, SSI beneficiaries lose a dollar of benefits for every
two dollars of earnings;
changes in their health and disability status; and
changes in the labor market.
The "supply" of disability benefits for those on the rolls is affected by
the number of CDRs i.e., determining if the beneficiary's medi
cal condition has improved (with benefit termination for those
with sufficient improvement). The number of CDRs conducted
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depends both on the availability of administrative resources and
the political will to conduct these often unpopular reviews;
changes in rules concerning the effects of work on program eligi
bility and benefits, especially for the SSI program; and
the availability of vocational rehabilitation services and incen
tives and requirements to use them.
While as a first cut the factors affecting initial awards and length of
stay can be seen as sequential, changes at the "back end" of the process
have potential feedback effects as well. For example, anticipated
reconsideration and administrative law judge (ALJ) decisions may
affect initial eligibility determination decisions by the state Disability
Determination Services, as well as applicant decisions to ask for the
reconsideration of unfavorable decisions and to exercise appeal rights.
The perceived strictness of the disability determination process might
affect applications, too. Perceptions about SSA's termination and sus
pension policies might affect work activities, and therefore continued
eligibility, among beneficiaries.
Although the economic perspective focuses on choices made by dis
abled individuals, other parties often have a significant interest in this
choice and may actively try to influence it. An important example is
state and local governments, which have an interest in shifting the costs
of welfare and health expenditures to the federal government. Other
interested parties include family members, employers, health care pro
viders, and private insurers.
All of these factors are addressed to some degree in the studies and
commentaries presented at the conference and contained in this vol
ume. Below, we describe the major issues and the overall contribution
of the papers in this book to addressing those issues.

OVERVIEW OF MAJOR ISSUES

Growth in disability applications, awards, and program caseloads is
affected by a host of complex factors. In this section we provide an
overview of the major factors and how the contributions in this volume
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fit into the literature on these factors. The factors are grouped as fol
lows:
population characteristics,
labor market factors,
other programs and policies, and
features of SSA's disability programs and related supply factors.
We conclude the section with an overview of major themes from the
discussion of policy implications.
Population Characteristics

The role of demographics, particularly the aging of the baby boom
generation, has long been understood as important in shaping program
growth, and actuarial projections explicitly consider the role of these
variables. What this volume adds is a systematic accounting of the
effects of demographics on applications and awards (Stapleton et al.,
Chapter 2), and on duration (Rupp and Scott, Chapter 4) over various
periods of interest, when considered in the context of a broader range
of factors. The effects of population aging on applications and awards
on the one hand, and on expected duration on the other hand, are oppo
site. Rupp and Scott demonstrate that the net result of the contrasting
effects of the aging of the baby boom generation on caseloads as
measured by expected benefit years is positive, but smaller than
could be expected based on the effects on awards alone, due to the
moderating influence of reduced expected duration associated with
increased age at entry.
While changes in the size and age-gender composition of the popu
lation provide the simplest explanation of changes in DI and SSI appli
cations and awards, they do not translate directly into changes in the
target populations for the two disability programs; program eligibility
requirements the presence of qualifying disabilities and economic
eligibility form essential intervening links. The disability criteria are
identical for DI and SSI, while economic eligibility is tied to disabilityinsured status satisfaction of past work requirements for DI and to
a means test for SSI. All three of these criteria are influenced by factors
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external to the DI and SSI programs, as well as by legislative, adminis
trative, and judicial variables.
Three target populations can be visualized as being determined by
various combinations of disability-insured status, meeting the SSI
means test, and having a qualifying disability. Persons with qualifying
disabilities who are disability-insured but do not meet the means test
are eligible for DI only, those who are disability-insured and meet the
SSI means test qualify for both programs (concurrent eligibility), and
those who meet the SSI means test but are not disability-insured are
eligible for SSI only.
Unfortunately, available data do not permit the observation of time
series for these three target populations; in fact, there are no cross-sec
tional data available on a reasonable proxy of the population satisfying
the disability criteria in any year. SSA's Disability Evaluation Study is
expected to provide detailed cross-sectional information on the most
important variables affecting the disability determination process, but
it will be some time before results are available from this effort.
Some information on the prevalence of self-reported disabilities is
available from various surveys, such as the National Health Interview
Survey (NHIS), the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP), and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). While some of
the surveys (such as the HRS) incorporate a panel design, and others
(NHIS) incorporate repeated cross sections over several years, the
validity of longitudinal comparisons are seriously hampered by a vari
ety of difficulties. Measurement of the prevalence of mental disorders
raises complex methodological issues, and the reliable estimation of
the prevalence of a number of physical and nonphysical conditions
related to important impairments in general surveys is hampered by the
small number of disabled respondents to each survey. Finally, the mea
surement of some impairments, most notably HIV-related conditions,
has evolved through time, as these conditions became increasingly
important sources of disability applications and awards, thereby mak
ing precise measurement of time trends difficult or impossible.
Better data are available for the measurement of trends in the DI
insured population, although when it comes to survey data, reliable
individual-level indicators are often not available. The measurement of
trends in the SSI financial eligibility variables is more problematic, pri
marily because of the absence of good longitudinal data on assets.
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Ongoing work at the Office of Research, Evaluation, and Statistics of
SSA is expected to produce substantial advances in data availability,
primarily through the creation of SIPP data files matched to SSA
administrative records (Lahiri, Vaughan, and Wixon 1995).
Due to these data limitations, the studies incorporated in this vol
ume relied on a patchwork of data pieces for examining the evidence
concerning the effect of trends in SSA's target populations on disabil
ity applications, awards, and duration. Even with limited and imper
fect data, some interesting analyses were feasible. Stapleton et al.
(Chapter 2) incorporates quantitative analyses of the role of factors
such as changes in the size of the Dl-insured population, the poverty
rate, the percentage of children living in single-family homes, and
AIDS/HIV incidence rate. Rupp and Scott (Chapter 4) demonstrate the
profound effect of demographic trends and impairments in affecting
duration, as well as the interaction of demographics, Dl-insured status,
and SSI financial eligibility in affecting awards, and duration. They
also calculate the net effects on expected benefit years. Daly (Chapter
5) provides important insights into the dynamics of SSI and DI eligi
bility by providing longitudinal information on the changing charac
teristics of awardees during the five years prior to benefit receipt,
based on information from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics.
Labor Market Factors
One of the key issues that motivated the initiation of the research
studies presented in this book was the urgent need to clarify the role of
the business cycle in affecting disability applications and awards dur
ing the early 1990s. Some hoped that much of the unexpected upsurge
in disability applications was the result of the recession, and therefore
temporary in nature. Others were concerned that the upsurge was pri
marily the result of other factors responsible for more permanent and
lasting shifts in the nature of SSA's disability programs. The authors of
the "709 Report" recognized that several factors probably made impor
tant contributions. For many analysts, the real question about the busi
ness cycles and other factors was not whether they had an effect, but
how much. The answer to these questions had major implications both
from a short-term budgetary perspective, especially as it relates to the
allocation and management of funds for program administration, and
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from the point of view of the assessment of the long-run financial
health and viability of the disability programs.
While there have been numerous previous econometric studies esti
mating the effects of the business cycle on DI applications, awards, and
caseloads, previous studies have suffered from various specification
problems or low statistical power, or both. The aggregate time-series
approach used in most previous studies has difficulty disentangling the
effects of program changes, business cycles, and other factors, while
the cross-sectional approach used in some studies had to rely on crossstate or county variation in labor market measures that is confounded
with cross-state/county variation in many unmeasurable factors.
An important methodological contribution of the research effort
reflected in this book is the use of state-level pooled cross-section/
time-series methods to address the seemingly intractable problem of
business cycle effects. This approach, presented in detail by Stapleton
et al. in Chapter 2, controls for permanent differences among the states
endemic to cross-sectional analyses of state data and eliminates the
confounding effect of national changes endemic to time-series studies.
As a result, the findings are much stronger and more credible than
those obtained previously. Because of the importance of this contribu
tion, we compare the findings presented in Chapter 2 to those from the
previous literature here (Exhibit 1.2).
The new results provide strong evidence to support the conclusions
from those previous studies that found significant business cycle
effects. The new estimates are, however, somewhat sensitive to the
data, specification, and time period chosen for the analysis, as dis
cussed in Chapter 2.
The importance of business cycles and economic restructuring is
further supported by the qualitative evidence presented in Chapters 6
(Muller and Wheeler) and Chapter 8 (Livermore, Stapleton, and
Zeuschner), and by the first-hand observations of Massanari and of
Hemingson (Chapter 10). An important conclusion from the five case
studies conducted by Lewin researchers (Chapter 8) is that the regres
sion estimates of the impact of the recession are probably conservative,
because the models failed to capture important subtleties of the busi
ness cycle that, according to interviewees, significantly influence appli
cations and awards.

Exhibit 1.2 Estimates of the Effect of a 1 Percentage Point Rise in the Unemployment Rate on Disability Program
Growth for Adults
Study
Hambor 1975
Lando 1974
Lando, Coate, and Kraus 1979
Halpern 1989
Muller 1982
Levy and Krute 1983
Hambor 1992
Stapleton et al., Chapter 2

Stapleton et al., Chapter 2

Data type
Applications
Quarterly, national
Quarterly, national
Quarterly, national
Quarterly, national
Annual, individual, cross-section
Annual, individual, cross-section
Annual, national
Annual, pooled crosssection/time-series

Period
1964-71
1962-73
1964-78
1964-78
1972
1978
1970-91
1988-92

Initial Determinations
Annual, pooled cross1980-93
section/time-series
(SSI-only includes children)

Estimated effect of a 1 percentage point
increase in unemployment
7% for DI
2-4% for DI
2-7% for DI
Negligible for DI
Negligible for DI
Negligible for DI
Negligible for DI
4% for Dl-only,
4% for Dl-concurrent,
2% for SSI
Dl-only:

Concurrent:

SSI-only:

2% in year of change
3% after one year
5% after two years
2% in year of change
4% after one year
5% after two years
0% in year of change
1 % after one year
3% after two years

Exhibit 1.2 (continued)
Awards
Hambor 1975
Lando 1974
Muller 1982
Levy and Krute 1983
Hambor 1992
Stapleton et al., Chapter 2

Stapleton et al., Chapter 2

Thompson and Van de Water
1975
Cromwell, Hurdle, and Wedig
1986

Quarterly, national
1964-71
Annual, state-level cross-section
1975
Annual, individual, cross-section
1972
Annual, individual, cross-section
1978
Annual, national
1970-91
Annual, pooled, state-level crosssection disaggregated by age, gender,
1988-92
and impairment
Initial Allowance Rate
Annual, pooled cross1980-93
section/time-series
(SSI-only includes children)

Beneficiaries
1963-74
Quarterly, national
Quarterly, pooled, state-level
cross-section

2-4% for DI
5-6% for DI
Negligible for DI
Negligible for DI
Negligible
4% for DI,
l%forSSI
Dl-only: 0 points in year of change
-1 point after one year
-1 point after two years
Concurrent: 0 points in year of change
-1 point after one year
-2 points after two years
SSI-only: 0 points in year of change
-1 point after one year
-2 points after two years
l%forDI

1975-83
Negligible for SSI Medicaid enrollees
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Other Programs and Policies
An important focus of this book is how interactions with other cash
and in-kind programs affect the growth of SSA's disability programs.
Economic theory suggests that the availability of benefits through other
programs and their relative value should affect the decision to apply for
disability benefits. This is an important topic, particularly in light of
substantial secular changes in the relative value of public benefits such
as general assistance the generic term for welfare programs funded
entirely by state and local governments, TANF (and the previous
AFDC program it replaced), Medicaid, and Medicare.
Other programs can be classified as either "substitutes" or "comple
ments" for DI and/or SSI, in the economic sense of these terms. Substi
tute programs are those for which an expansion in the value of benefits
reduces applications and awards for the SSA programs; benefit expan
sion for complementary programs increases applications and awards.
GA and TANF/AFDC benefits are substitutes for SSI; they result in a
dollar-for-dollar reduction of SSI benefits. Decreases in the relative
value or availability of GA or TANF/AFDC benefits are expected to
increase SSI applications and awards the extent depending on the
prevalence of severe disabilities among GA or TANF/AFDC beneficia
ries. Medicaid and Medicare are clearly complements of SSI and DI,
respectively because the later programs are gateways for those with
disabilities to the former. Increases in the value of Medicaid and Medi
care benefits increase the relative attractiveness of SSA's disability pro
grams, and hence the demand for their benefits. Expansion of Medicaid
to persons with disabilities who are not sufficiently poor to qualify for
SSI or some form of universal health insurance coverage would reduce
or eliminate the complementarity between medical insurance and the
disability programs.
This book includes econometric analyses of the effects of GA pro
gram cuts and the relative value of AFDC benefits, Medicaid benefits,
and SSI state supplements on applications and awards using pooled
state data (Stapleton et al., Chapter 2), an econometric analysis of the
impact of health care costs and Medicaid on SSI participation based on
Current Population Survey data for 1987 to 1992 (Yelowitz, Chapter
4), and an in-depth analysis of the impact of the termination of Michi
gan's GA program on SSI application and award growth (Bound, Kos-
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soudji, and Ricart-Moes, Chapter 7). The pioneering quantitative
analyses in these studies are supplemented by valuable qualitative
information gained through SSA's field manager survey (Muller and
Wheeler, Chapter 6), case studies conducted in five states (Livermore,
Stapleton, and Zeuschner, Chapter 8), research conducted by the Gen
eral Accounting Office (Bordelon's comments on Chapters 6-8), and
the experiences of administrators (Chapter 10, Massanari, Hemingson,
Jones) including Charles Jones, who was the director of the Michi
gan Disability Determination Service when Michigan's GA program
ended.
Overall, both the quantitative and qualitative evidence supports the
notion that such program interactions are extremely important in
understanding the growth of the SSA disability caseload. In some
areas, most notably with respect to the effects of the GA program cuts,
the quantitative estimates show a consistent pattern of strong effects.
Point estimates of the effects of changes in Medicaid and AFDC bene
fits are much more tentative, and the studies point to a wide range of
complex data and methodological problems to be explored in subse
quent work.
The recent passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor
tunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 increases the importance of this line
of work for the timely understanding and, potentially, the anticipation
of the impact of welfare program changes on the disability programs.
Some provisions of the legislation directly restrict eligibility for SSA
disability benefits (among children and immigrants), and related legis
lation limits the access of persons with drug addiction and alcoholism
to disability benefits. These changes alone will reduce the number of
beneficiaries, although the extent of their impact will depend on how
many of the individuals affected are able to obtain benefits anyway
(e.g., by becoming citizens in the case of immigrants, and by qualify
ing under a different impairment category for others.)
Other provisions of the Act, however, will almost certainly contrib
ute to DI and SSI program growth potentially more than offsetting
the reductions caused by the provisions concerning the SSA disability
programs. The replacement of the federal match of state AFDC fund
ing by federal block grants to states for TANF greatly, and immedi
ately, increases the financial incentives of the states for cost-shifting.
The new emphasis on temporary assistance, the expectation that TANF
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recipients will become self-supporting or seek other sources of assis
tance, eligibility restrictions, time limits, work requirements, benefit
reductions, and other conditions states may impose will increase the
incentives to apply for SSI and/or DI among those beneficiaries with
disabilities. Because states are charged with the responsibility for
designing their own TANF programs, substantial state-to-state varia
tions are likely in these effects. Moreover, the full effects of the
changes may not be realized for several years, due to the time needed
to redesign state systems, the likely trial and error character of reform,
the inherently dynamic nature of some policy tools (e.g., time limits),
and lags in behavioral responses.
The studies included in this volume suggest that the empirical study
of the effect of changes in non-SSA components of the social safety
net on SSA caseloads, albeit difficult, is not impossible. Moreover, the
one area where this research probably made the most headway toward
solid empirical estimates, the effect of the elimination or reduction in
GA programs, is probably the most instructive for the study of the indi
rect effects of the welfare reform legislation, because the incentives
related to GA cuts in many respects are analogous to the incentives that
apply to TANF. Given the large magnitude of the estimated GA cut
back effects, the GA experience points to the potential for large TANF
effects, especially in states embarking on radical restrictions of TANF
eligibility and substantial reductions in benefit levels. Although the
incidence of severe disabilities is presumably much lower among
TANF recipients than among GA recipients, the number of TANF
recipients is much larger.
Features of SSA's Disability Programs and Related Supply Factors
Features of SSA's disability programs such as the real value of bene
fits, legislative and administrative actions affecting eligibility determi
nation, work incentive provisions, CDRs, and SSA outreach activities
might substantially affect applications, awards, and duration on the
rolls. Other supply factors, such as judicial rulings on appealed cases,
also play a role. Research on the effects of these factors is, unfortu
nately, extremely difficult to perform: first, because there is only lim
ited variation in the data; second, because most changes that do occur
tend to affect the whole program, so there are no natural comparison
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groups; and/or third, because it is extremely difficult to disentangle the
effect of programmatic factors from potential confounding factors.
Supply factors can affect applications, awards, and duration on the
rolls. This volume contains contributions in each of these areas. The
most salient overall econometric evidence of the importance of the
contribution of supply factors to recent growth is the fact that the
demand factors in the application and award models estimated by Sta
pleton et al. (Chapter 2) account for proportionately more application
growth than award growth, but total award growth was proportionately
greater than application growth; i.e., the demand factors predict an
allowance rate decline, but in fact allowance rates increased. The pro
portionately smaller effect of demand factors on awards implies that, in
a broad sense, SSA's disability determination process screens out mar
ginally qualified applicants. The only plausible explanation for the
increase in allowance rates despite the decline implied by demand fac
tors is an upward shift in supply. The fact that the largest increases in
application and award growth occurred in impairment categories that
would most likely be affected by some of the administrative changes
that occurred over the period mental and musculoskeletal impair
ments reinforces this interpretation.
A crucial piece of previous research highlighting the importance of
supply factors was a study by Parsons (1991) estimating the effect of
denial rates on subsequent applications. Stapleton et al. (Chapter 2)
confirm the importance of the perceived "tightness" of eligibility deter
mination, albeit on a lesser scale than was indicated by Parsons' work.
The importance of supply factors in affecting applications and
awards is further highlighted by the results of SSA's field manager sur
vey reported by Muller and Wheeler (Chapter 6), case studies in five
states (Livermore, Stapleton, and Zeuschner, Chapter 8), and the obser
vations of administrators (Chapter 10, Massanari, Hemingson, Jones).
Field office managers display a high degree of awareness of supply
factors, such as court cases, congressional mandates, outreach activi
ties, and changes in medical standards. Changes that appear to have
had an impact include the 1985 changes to the mental impariment list
ings, increased emphasis on source evidence, increased consideration
of pain and other symptoms, SSI outreach, the decline in CDRs, court
decisions (especially Sullivan v. Zebley, for child SSI applicants), and
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changes in the adjudicative climate. The relative importance of these
factors is unknown.
Several supply factors are relevant primarily through their actual or
potential effects on duration on the rolls. The potential of policies
designed to reduce duration on the rolls is highlighted by the analysis
of Rupp and Scott (Chapter 4), who show that expected lifetime dura
tion on the rolls is extremely long for both DI and SSI, and is increas
ing as a result of the decline in the average age at first award for both
programs. The results are particularly striking for SSI, where the
means test provides a potentially important supply constraint; although
a high proportion of SSI disability awardees leave the rolls as a result
of the means test, many of them return, and overall total duration
among working-age SSI awardees before age 65 is roughly comparable
for SSL and DI.
Work incentives and vocational rehabilitation on the one hand, and
CDRs on the other hand, represent two generic approaches to reducing
duration. The first of these approaches are voluntary mechanisms,
while the latter, as well as time-limited benefits briefly experimented
with in the context of DA A cases, represents the mandatory removal of
cases no longer deemed to qualify. Policymakers and analysts find that
the experience with both strategies has been disappointing to date.
While CDRs were successful in removing many people from the dis
ability rolls during the Reagan years, many returned; a substantial
political backlash, followed by a reversal of CDR policies, was the
result. Whether the recent allocation of more resources for CDRs will
result in substantial and marked reduction in the disability rolls
remains to be seen. The evidence to date suggests that the liberalization
of work incentives under SSA's disability programs during the 1980s,
if anything, increased duration on the rolls. Vocational rehabilitation
has affected only a small fraction of beneficiaries to date.
Rupp and Scott (Chapter 4) provide part of the explanation for the
failure of past policies to reduce duration. The DI and SSI data reveal
that a substantial share of both DI and SSI awardees face very high
mortality risk. Data from other sources (e.g., the recently completed
Project NetWork baseline survey of both disability beneficiaries who
volunteer for vocational rehabilitation and those who do not) suggest
that disability beneficiaries, as a group, face enormous health problems
that limit the ability to work and daily functioning. Many respondents
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reported substantial bed-days during the previous year, and close to
half scored depressed on the CES-D depression screener (Rupp, Wood,
and Bell 1996). Thus, it appears, that the tightness of SSA's disability
determination screen limits the potential for back-end interventions.
Other explanations for the poor performance of past policies include
the fact that program incentives to demonstrate inability to work at the
front end of the process are extremely strong, and that the health and
human capital of beneficiaries are likely to deteriorate as they continue
on the rolls.
As Daly (Chapter 5) shows, SSI recipients tend to have an extremely
weak attachment to the labor market to start with, a factor also reduc
ing the potential for back-end labor market interventions. The contribu
tion by Craig Thornton (in Chapter 12) based on the results of the
Transitional Employment Training Demonstration shows some success
with vocational rehabilitation strategies, but on a very limited scale.
While the net impact results from the Project NetWork experiments are
not available yet, the degree of participation has been modest (Rupp,
Wood, and Bell 1996).
Policy Implications

The policy discussions cover a broad range of issues, but a number
of clear themes emerge. These themes for the most part reflect recogni
tion of the importance of economic factors in determining program
participation and concern over growth in program participation espe
cially among young adults. All of these themes first appear in the con
tribution of SSA's Gil Fisher and Mindy Upp (Chapter 9), the first
chapter in Part III.
There is a clear consensus among the diverse authors that the dis
ability programs do not distinguish between those who are able to
work and those who are not (as required by the Social Security Act),
but rather between those who are expected to work and those who are
not. Some point out that the "can/cannot work" dichotomy of the pro
grams is fundamentally in conflict with the growing acceptance of the
idea that people with disabilities can work and should be afforded the
opportunity to work, as embodied in the Americans with Disabilities
Act (see Chapter 11, S. Ross, J. Ross, Weaver). Several authors discuss
a "continuum" of ability to work and the need to "make work pay" for
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people with disabilities (Chapter 11, Batavia, Goldman, J. Ross,
Weaver). In recognition of this continuum, some recommend consider
ation of policies such as partial disability categories, subsidies for work
(e.g., the Disabled Workers' Tax Credit), and improved access to health
insurance for disabled workers (Chapter 11, J. Ross; Chapter 12,
Daniels and West, Burkhauser).
A number of authors address the temporal dimension of disability
(Chapter 11, Batavia, Goldman, J. Ross, Weaver; Burkhauser, Chapter
13). The DI program was originally established as an "early retire
ment" program, primarily for older workers whose physical disabilities
forced them to leave the labor force prematurely and permanently.
Although this scenario applies to some beneficiaries today, many who
have entered beneficiary status more recently have been younger adults
who are expected to remain beneficiaries for many years. These
authors express great concern about growth in long-term dependency.
Some conclude that many have been enticed into a lifetime of depen
dency and poverty by the program's promise of income security a
promise that is increasingly difficult to keep as program growth strains
federal resources and taxpayers begin to question whether some bene
ficiaries are deserving of support (Chapter 11, Batavia, Weaver;
Burkhauser, Chapter 13).
Many young beneficiaries have chronic health conditions that, with
proper treatment, may be controlled sufficiently to allow them to work.
The most frequently cited examples of such conditions are affective
and anxiety disorders. Two authors propose time-limited benefits for
selected groups of beneficiaries to address this problem (Chapter 11,
Batavia, Weaver), but another author argues that specific time limits
would lead to untimely, harmful terminations for many and suggests,
instead, more rigorous enforcement of current review policies, which
would hold harmless those who have not recovered (Chapter 11, Gold
man).
Substantial discussion focuses on employment strategies. Several
authors call for more emphasis on front-end interventions, shortly after
the onset of the disability, instead of on back-end interventions that are
used only after an individual has had to demonstrate inability to work
in order to obtain program benefits (Chapter 11, J. Ross, Weaver;
Chapter 12, Daniels and West, Burkhauser; Burkhauser, Chapter 13).
One author suggests following the prevention and early-intervention
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approaches of private disability insurers and disability management
service providers (Chapter 12, Owens). Another suggests expansion of
the role of the private sector in the provision of rehabilitation services
(Chapter 11, J. Ross). Others emphasize the importance of customer
choice in the purchase of rehabilitation and other services (Chapter 12,
Daniels and West). The need for ongoing employment support for
those with chronic conditions and strategies to improve employment
outcomes for those with childhood disabilities are also discussed
(Chapter 11, Goldman; Chapter 12, Thornton).
The abundance of sentiment for fundamental changes in federal dis
ability policy is striking. Yet, while many of the authors express sup
port for such changes, they also urge caution in moving ahead. The
need for incremental change, even if radical, is most clearly expressed
by Stan Ross (in Chapter 11), who points to the vulnerability of the
population that the programs serve, the difficulties that large adminis
trative agencies have in implementing change, and the resources
needed to effect change as reasons to pursue a cautious, bipartisan
approach. The international experience with disability programs is also
a cautionary tale (Chapter 12, Burkhauser). Any changes must be con
sidered in the broader context of conflicting political pressures to
reduce budgets, devolve programs to states, expect personal responsi
bility and enforce civil rights.

ORGANIZATION OF THE VOLUME

The book is organized into three parts. Part I contains empirical
analyses of the national experience. The analyses in these chapters are
primarily, though not exclusively, based on quantitative studies. Chap
ter 2, the longest in the book, and the richest in empirical detail, sum
marizes the results of the econometric analyses of application and
award growth that have been conducted by the Lewin team. Chapter 3,
by Aaron Yelowitz, provides an econometric analysis of the impact of
health care costs and Medicaid on SSL In Chapter 4, Kalman Rupp and
Charles Scott analyze trends in duration in SSA's disability programs
based on the rich administrative data sources that have been created to
track monthly payments in the DI and SSI programs over the years. In
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Chapter 5, Mary Daly looks at the experience of SSI and DI recipients
during the five years prior to program participation, using data from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
Part II of the book provides a closer, more qualitative, look at state
and local experiences. Chapter 6, by L. Scott Muller and Peter
Wheeler, provides an in-depth analysis of the perceptions of SSA field
office managers based on a detailed survey. Chapter 7, by John Bound,
Sherrie Kossoudji, and Gema Ricart-Moes, is a detailed case study of
the effects of the elimination of general assistance in Michigan on SSI,
utilizing both qualitative and quantitative information including data
obtained from a match of Michigan GA records to SSA records.
Finally, Chapter 8, by Gina Livermore, David Stapleton, and Andrea
Zeuschner, summarizes the results of case studies in five states con
ducted by the Lewin research team.
Part III of the book provides perspectives on program growth and
policy by various actors in the disability community. In Chapter 9, Gil
bert Fisher and Melinda Upp provide a perspective from the central
office of SSA. This is followed by Chapter 10, presenting the perspec
tives of regional and state SSA and Disability Determination Services
officials Larry Massanari, Celeste Hemingson, and Charles Jones. In
Chapter 11, five opinion leaders in the national disability policy analy
sis community Stanford Ross, Andrew Batavia, Howard Goldman,
Jane Ross, and Carolyn Weaver discuss the implications of the
research findings for disability policy. Four additional papers by policy
experts Susan Daniels and Jane West, Richard Burkhauser, Patricia
Owens, and Craig Thornton focus on employment policies in Chap
ter 12. Richard Burkhauser's summation and reflections on the past
and future of the disability programs concludes the volume.

Notes
1.

2.

The SSI beneficiary number does not include 0.2 million disabled beneficiaries
who received state supplement payments only, and the expenditure figure does not
include $0.2 billion in state supplements. (Social Security Bulletin, 1996 Annual
Statistical Supplement.)
The Medicaid figure is an estimate because exact figures for Medicaid enrollees
who are SSI-disability recipients are not reported. SSI-disability recipients are
included in a larger class of "disabled" Medicaid enrollees, for whom Medicaid
paid $49.4 billion in benefits in 1995. The $40 billion estimate assumes that the
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share of this spending that is for SSI-disability recipients equals the ratio of SSIdisability recipients (4.9 million) to disabled Medicaid enrollees (5.9 million).
(Social Security Bulletin, 1996 Annual Statistical Supplement.)
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2 Empirical Analyses
of DI and SSI Application
and Award Growth
David Stapleton
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From 1988 to 1992, the number of adults applying for and receiving
benefits from the Social Security Administration's two disability pro
grams greatly exceeded expectations. There were 330,000 more Social
Security Disability Insurance (DI) applications in 1992 than in 1988,
an average annual growth rate of 8.9 percent. Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) applications increased by 430,000 over the same period,
an annual growth rate of 10.5 percent. Awards grew even faster: an
average of 10 percent per year for DI and 12 percent for SSI. One
important feature of application and award growth during this period is
that it was much higher in two major impairment categories mental
and musculoskeletal impairments than in others.
In this chapter, we summarize findings from two related studies that
analyze the determinants of the substantial growth experienced during
the 1988 to 1992 period. We also summarize findings from a third
study that examines program growth over the longer period from 1980
to 1993. 1
We analyze the issue of growth in the disability programs from an
economic perspective. As discussed in Chapter 1, this perspective
emphasizes the importance of individual choices in determining indi
vidual behaviors, such as applying for disability benefits. An individ
ual's decision to apply for benefits will be influenced by a variety of
factors, including the costs and benefits of working versus leaving the
labor force to apply for disability benefits, the availability of potential
sources of nonlabor income, the availability of health insurance and
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noncash benefits, and the costs associated with the application process.
The analysis presented here, while not directly modeling the individ
ual's decision to apply for benefits, examines factors hypothesized to
affect that decision process and therefore affect application and award
growth experienced by the federal disability programs.
The major economic factors hypothesized to have an impact on
growth in disability applications and awards that we examine in this
analysis include
Business Cycles: During times of economic downturn, persons
with disabling health conditions may lose, or find it especially
difficult to find, employment. Income from other sources may
also decline. Disability benefits may become more attractive as
an alternative source of income.
Economic Restructuring: Changes in the types of jobs available
in the economy, such as a reduction in the number of manufactur
ing jobs and an increase in service occupations, may affect dis
ability applications if those who lose their jobs are unable to
adapt to the market changes and to impairments that may qualify
them for disability benefits.
State and Local Program Interactions: State and local cash and
noncash support programs offer an alternative source of income
for some individuals who might otherwise qualify for disability
benefits. As these programs face budget reductions or political
pressure to reduce their caseloads, program administrators and
beneficiaries may seek other sources of support more actively,
including federal disability benefits.
"Supply" Changes: In addition to demand factors, the "supply"
of disability benefits will also impact program growth. The sup
ply of benefits will be affected by changes in the eligibility crite
ria, changes in the implementation of the criteria, outreach efforts
by SSA, and changes in the political and adjudicative environ
ment surrounding the disability programs.
In addition to the economic factors described above, we also exam
ine health and demographic factors that may affect disability applica
tions and awards. Population growth and aging, the increase in female
labor force participation, and changes in the prevalence of disabling
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health conditions, such as AIDS/HIV, may have substantial impacts on
disability application and award growth.
The analysis conducted uses a methodology that has not been previ
ously applied to the analysis of disability program participation:
"pooled" cross-section time-series analysis of state-level data. Past
analyses have used either national time-series or cross-section data
alone. The time-series analyses have been plagued by the difficulty of
separating the effects of major program changes from the effects of
other factors. The pooled methodology allows us to control for such
changes to the extent that they affect all states equally, resulting in
more definitive estimates for the effects of factors that vary by state.
Analyses that rely on a single cross section are problematic because the
effects of unmeasured determinants of program participation that vary
across states (e.g., the prevalence of chronic health conditions and
impairments) are confounded with the effects of measured determi
nants. The pooled methodology allows us to control for unmeasured
determinants that vary across states, but not over time, in a very simple
way.
The possibility remains that the estimated effects of state variables
included in our models are confounded with the effects of supply fac
tors that vary across states and the effects of unmeasured state vari
ables that vary across states and over time. Nonetheless, we believe
that the estimates obtained using the pooled methodology provide a
much more accurate picture of the importance of the state-level factors
included in the models than has been obtained previously. Further,
national growth not accounted for by the state-level variables in the
model is a more accurate reflection of the impact of program changes
than national growth alone.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: In the next
section, we describe the application and award data used in the analysis
and discuss the trends in disability application and award growth that
occurred over the 1980 to 1994 period. This is followed by a descrip
tion of the methodology employed to analyze the aggregate application
and award data and define the independent variables used in the analy
sis. In the next four sections, we discuss the individual factors hypothe
sized to affect disability application and award growth. In each of these
sections, we provide a description of the factor, discuss reasons why it
is believed to have an impact on disability program growth, and sum-
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marize the findings for the specific factor. Subsequent sections are
devoted to population changes, to business cycles and economic
restructuring, to other income support programs, and to supply factors.

APPLICATION AND AWARD GROWTH
In this paper we focus on application and award growth from 1980
to 1993, with a more detailed analysis of the period from 1988 to 1992.
For the full period we analyzed the number of initial (medical) deter
minations and allowances made by state Disability Determination Ser
vices, and for the 1988-1992 period we examined applications filed
and final awards. We describe significant features of these data below. 2
The 1980-94 Period
The Initial Determination Data
Initial determinations are the sum of initial allowances and denials
made by state Disability Determination Services (DDS) for medical
reasons. We use initial determinations and initial allowances when ana
lyzing the full period because state-level application and final award
data are not available in the early part of this period. Initial determina
tions are lower than applications because denials for nonmedical rea
sons made before the initial medical determination are not counted.
Initial allowances are lower than final allowances because the latter
include allowances made on appeal.
One important feature of the initial determination data used for this
report is that they are broken down into three program groups: those
made on claims filed for DI benefits only (Dl-only), those made on
claims filed for both DI and SSI (concurrent), and those made on
claims filed for SSI only (SSi-only). There are several reasons for ana
lyzing these three groups, rather than analyzing total DI and total SSI
initial determinations independently. First, the analysis of the three
groups explicitly recognizes the overlap between the two programs.
Second, concurrent initial determinations have grown at a substantially
faster rate than either Dl-only or S Si-only initial determinations. Third,
applicants in the three groups are from three distinct groups with
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respect to attachment to the labor force: Dl-only applicants usually
have had a strong attachment to the labor force with relatively high
earnings; concurrent applicants have had a sufficiently strong attach
ment to the labor force to be covered by the DI program ("disability
insured"), but relatively low earnings; and SSI-only applicants have
had at most a limited attachment to the labor force. Finally, a large
share of those receiving awards for both programs only receive SSI
benefits until their five-month DI waiting period ends; once they
receive DI benefits they no longer pass the SSI means test. Rupp and
Scott (Chapter 4) estimate that 75 percent of concurrent awardees
receive SSI benefits for less than twelve months.
There are two important limiting features of the initial determina
tions data. First, they are not disaggregated by sex. As we discuss fur
ther below, data are available by sex for 1988-1992, and we found very
large differences in the results for men and women. Second, SSI-only
initial determinations include initial determinations for children. For
analysis purposes it would be much better to separate child and adult
initial determinations, but separate data were not available. We know
from the national data that child growth dominates the growth in this
series from 1990 on, and that the causes of this growth are primarily
the 1990 Supreme Court decision in the case of Sullivan v. Zebley and
1991 changes in the child listings for mental disorders (GAO 1994).
Initial Determination Growth
It is useful to divide the period from 1980 to 1994 into three distinct
subperiods (Exhibit 2.1). From 1980 to 1984, initial determinations
declined sharply, continuing a more gradual decline that began in 1977.
The decline is usually attributed to aggressive legislative and adminis
trative efforts to reduce the size of the beneficiary population, which
presumably discouraged many from applying. One notable feature of
this period is that the decline occurred in the midst of a slumping econ
omy. There was a recession in 1980, and before the economy fully
recovered there was a second recession in 1981-82. If these recessions
had a positive impact on initial determinations, it was masked by the
response to tightening of eligibility.
The 1984 amendments to the Social Security Act reversed efforts to
reduce program caseloads, and in 1985 new impairment listings that
made it much less difficult to obtain benefits for mental disorders were
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Exhibit 2.1 Initial Determinations for Applicants to SSA's Disability
Programs, 1980-1994

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

SOURCE SSA, Office of Disability.
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implemented. Initial determinations grew sharply from 1985 to 1986,
stayed at a high level in 1987, and then declined through 1989.
Since 1989, initial determinations have grown rapidly. While growth
in initial determinations for children from 1991 was greater than for
adults, initial determinations for adults also grew .extremely rapidly,
especially in 1991 and 1992. The recession in 1990-1991 may explain
some of this growth, but this is not clear from the national data because
the recession of 1981-82, which was much stronger than the more
recent recession, had no apparent impact.
Initial Allowance Rates
Initial allowance rates for the full period have an overall upward
trend for all program groups (Exhibit 2.2). There are three notable
deviations from the long-term trends: the sharp but temporary drop
from 1980 to 1982, during the period of administrative tightening; the
sharp increase from 1985 to 1986, after the new mental disorder list
ings were implemented, again followed by a decline; and a second
sharp increase from 1989 to 1992, followed by a decline in 1993 and
1994.
With one exception, allowance rates for the three program groups
move parallel to each other throughout the period. The exception is for
the SSi-only allowance rate, which grew more rapidly than the other
two allowance rates from 1989 to 1991 during the dramatic increase in
initial determinations for children caused by Zebley and the new men
tal impairment listings for children. As a general rule, it would seem
that the dominant determinants of initial allowance rates are quite sim
ilar for all three program groups.

The 1988-1992 Period
Disability Research File Data
SSA provided state-level tabulations of applications and awards for
the 1988-92 period from its new Disability Research File (DRF), a
micro database on all disability applications filed from 1988 on. The
tabulations for both programs include application and award tables for
each year and state, cross-classified by gender, age (five age groups),
and impairment. All the DRF-based estimates in this report are for
those age 18-64 only, including SSI-only estimates. The classification

Exhibit 2.2 Initial Allowance Rates for Applicants to SSA's Disability Programs, 1980-1994
50%
45% 40%
35% .
30%.
25% 20%
15%
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
•Dl-only
SOURCE: SSA, Office of Disability

—- — -Concurrent

• • - SSI-only

•Total
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of applications and awards into Dl-only, concurrent, and SSI-only
groups is more difficult than the classification of initial determinations
and allowances because applications for the two programs are not
always filed at the same time or even in the same state. For this study,
the state-level DI application and award data are classified by whether
the DI applicant applied for SSI, regardless of where or when ("DIconcurrent" versus "Dl-only"). We did not obtain state-level SSI data
disaggregated in a symmetric way (i.e., "SSi-concurrent" versus "SSIonly"). It appears likely, though, that analysis of analogously defined
SSI-concurrent data would yield results similar to those reported here
for Dl-concurrent applications and awards. National level SSI-concur
rent and SSI-only data are available. We report national trends in SSIonly applications later in this section, but omit SSI-concurrent trends
because they are very similar to those in the Dl-concurrent category. 3
The DRF award data include allowances made at all levels, not just
initial allowances. They are dated by the year the application was filed,
which is often earlier than the year that the allowance was actually
made. Thus, "1992 awards" means awards for applications filed in
1992.4 Many 1992 applications still had award decisions pending as of
July, 1993, the closing date for the initial state tabulations. We subse
quently analyzed updated state tabulations by gender and program, but
not by age, gender, impairment, and program. Hence, we only report
estimates of award models at the gender/program level, using the
revised data.
Applications and awards in the DRF data are classified on the basis
of the primary impairment listed in the administrative record for the
highest level at which the application was considered. For the statelevel analysis we used only four impairment groups in order to insure
adequate numbers of cases in individual state/program/age/sex cells,
but we report national trends in six categories: mental illness, mental
retardation, musculoskeletal, circulatory, respiratory, and a combined
category of all other impairments that includes neoplasms, nervous and
sensory impairments, diseases of the endocrine system, genito-urinary
conditions, diseases of the skin, blood, and digestive tract, infectious
diseases, and a small number of unclassified cases. The categories used
for the state-level analysis are: mental disorders (mental illness and
mental retardation); musculoskeletal; infectious diseases and unclassi
fied cases; and a residual category that we call "internal organ" disor-
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ders, in which circulatory impairments, respiratory impairments, and
neoplasms are the dominant disorders.
Application Growth
Application growth for the 1988 to 1992 period was very rapid
(Exhibit 2.3), essentially following the pattern of initial determination
growth examined previously; changes in application growth rates occur
somewhat earlier than changes in initial determination growth rates
because of the processing time between the filing of an application and
the initial determination.
While the distribution of applications by impairment changed only
moderately from 1988 to 1992, these changes reflect much larger vari
ation in rates of application growth across categories (Exhibit 2.3).
Within each program category, the fastest growing application catego
ries are mental illness, mental retardation, and musculoskeletal, while
the slowest growing categories are circulatory and respiratory illnesses.
There is also substantial variation in growth rates across subcategories of mental and musculoskeletal impairments (Exhibit 2.4). For
mental disorders, growth in the addiction and affective disorder subcategories was much more rapid than in other subcategories for all pro
gram groups; SSI-only applications in the addiction disorder category
increased by 200 percent over the period. Growth in the anxiety disor
ders subcategory was also high. Growth in the schizophrenia subcategory was remarkably low almost no change at all for the three
categories combined. In the musculoskeletal category, growth in the
back disorders subcategory, which accounts for over half of all applica
tions in the category, was much higher than in all other subcategories.
Allowance Rates
As with initial allowance rates, final allowance rates increased sub
stantially over this period (Exhibit 2.5). The increase is observed in all
impairment group categories and for all program groups; patterns of
change across program groups and impairments are much less evident
than application patterns. Across program groups, the change ranges
from 5.9 percentage points for SSI-only to 4.6 percentage points for
Dl-concurrent. The increase in the allowance rate is greatest in the
mental illness and circulatory impairment categories for all three pro-

Exhibit 2.3 Application Growth by Impairment, 1988 to 1992
Dl-only
Impairment

1988

1992

Number (OOOs)

421.2

536.8

Mental illness

10%

12%

1%

2%

Mental retardation

SSI-only

Dl-concurrent

1988

1992

27

400.4

6095

45

18%

20%

59

3%

9%

41

21%

22%

% change

1988

1992

52

393.8

636.0

62

69

20%

23%

79

86

9%

9%

58

63

13%

15%

80

% change

% change

Musculoskeletal

27%

30%

Circulatory

17%

13%

2

12%

10%

17

10%

8%

30

Respiratory

5%

4%

5

4%

4%

25

4%

4%

44

40%

39%

26

42%

40%

50

44%

41%

57

All other

SOURCE- SSA, Disability Research File, and Lewm-VHI calculations.
NOTE: Dl-only and Dl-concurrent applications sum to total DI applications, but SSI-only and Dl-concurrent applications do not sum to total SSI applica
tions All data are for adults age 18-64 See the text for further discussion.

Exhibit 2.4 Application Growth in the Mental Impairment and Musculoskeletal Categories, by Specific
Impairment, 1988-1992
Dl-only
Impairment

1988

1992
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Dl-concurrent
% change
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46
15%
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8%
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1

22%
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44%
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Musculoskeletal
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% change
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76

46%

53%

105

Other

42%

39%
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47%
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SOURCE- SSA, Disability Research File, and Lewm-VHI calculations.
NOTE: Dl-only and Dl-concurrdnt applications sum to total DI applications, but SSI-only and Dl-concurrent applications do not sum to total SSI applica
tions. All data are for adults age 18-64. See the text for further discussion.
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gram groups. For other impairment groups, the change varies consider
ably across program groups.
While allowance rate increases were greatest in the mental illness
category in general, increases varied substantially across subcategories
(Exhibit 2.6). The largest increases by far were for addiction disor
ders approximately 20 percentage points in each of the three program
groups. The next highest increases were for anxiety disorders
approximately 10 percentage points in each program group.

METHODOLOGY
The findings reported on here are primarily based on two sets of
econometric models that were estimated with the state-level data
described in the previous section. The first set uses 1980-1993 initial
determination and allowance data, and the second set uses the 19881992 application and award data. The econometric methodology used is
essentially the same for both sets. We describe this methodology below,
discuss the main explanatory variables used in the analysis, and
describe simulations conducted with the estimated models in order to
interpret the findings. A more technical description of the econometric
methodology appears in the appendix to this chapter, along with
selected regression and simulation results.
The findings reported here also draw on several other activities we
conducted in order to better design, interpret, and validate the econo
metric analysis. These include
a national-level actuarial analysis of the impact of growth and
changes in the age/sex distribution of the disability insured popu
lation on DI application and award growth
a substantial review of relevant literature
interviews with a series of government and academic experts on
disability
interviews with 17 state Disability Determination Service admin
istrators
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case studies of application and award growth in California, Flor
ida, New York, Texas, and Michigan
The findings of the case studies are reported more fully in Chapter 8.
Econometric Model
For the 1980-1993 analysis we estimated a single initial determina
tion and allowance rate equation for each of three program groups: DIonly, concurrent, and SSI-only.5 The dependent variable in each equa
tion is the logarithm of either initial determinations per capita or the
initial allowance rate (initial allowances divided by initial determina
tions). In assessing the findings from this analysis, it is important to
keep in mind that children are included in the SSI-only category.
For the 1988-1992 analysis we estimated forty application equa
tions for each program (DI and SSI). The dependent variable in each
equation is the logarithm of either an application or incidence rate for a
specific age/sex/impairment group (five age categories, two sex catego
ries, and four impairment categories). For DI, we also estimated sepa
rate Dl-only and Dl-concurrent equations. For the award analysis, we
estimated male and female equations for each program group.
It is important to keep in mind differences in the dependent variable
data when comparing the findings from the analyses of the two periods.
Three critical differences are 1) the 1980-1993 data for SSI-only
include children, while the SSI data for 1988-1992 do not; 2) the
dynamics of the series are different in a systematic way because of the
processing lag between the date of application filing and the date the
initial determinations are made; and 3) awards for the 1988-1992 anal
ysis include allowances made at all levels, whereas those for the 19801993 analysis refer to initial allowances only.
Explanatory Variables
Explanatory variables that appear in the final models include
the expected application rate, based on 1990 national application
rates by age group and the age-distribution of the state's popula
tion in the current year to capture the effect of the aging of the
population
the unemployment rate to represent the business cycle
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• the labor force participation rate—to capture the negative, cycli
cal effect of discouraged workers leaving the labor force during
recessions. For DI, this variable may also capture the long-term
positive effect of growth in the share of women who are disabil
ity-insured
• the share of employment in manufacturing—to capture the effect
of economic restructuring
• GA program cuts—to proxy for the effects of state and local
shifting efforts (especially for SSI)
• the poverty rate—to capture changes in poverty that are not
picked up by other variables in the model
• the mean AFDC payment for a two-person household relative to
mean earnings—to capture the value of AFDC benefits
• the mean SSI payment, including state supplement payments, rel
ative to mean earnings—to capture the value of SSI benefits
• AIDS/HIV incidence—to account for the effects of the AIDS epi
demic on the incidence and prevalence of disability
• the number of immigrants granted legal alien status under the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)—unlike most other
immigrants, those granted legal alien status under IRCA were
immediately eligible to apply for SSI
• the percentage of children living in single-family homes—to
proxy for the effects of the number of households headed by sin
gle parents on applications and awards (particularly for SSI)
• a dummy variable for each year—to control for national factors
There are two important general differences between the explana
tory variable specifications used for the two sets of analyses. First, for
the 1988-1992 analysis, which was conducted first, we related currentyear changes in explanatory variables to current-year changes in appli
cation and incidence rates. For the 1980-1993 analysis we also exam
ined the impact of prior year ("lagged") changes in the explanatory
variables on current-year initial determinations and allowance rates
and found substantial lagged impacts for two variables: the unemploy
ment rate and the labor force participation rate. Second, the expected
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application rate was used only in the 1980-1993 analysis in order to
capture effects of changes in the age distribution of the population. In
the 1988-1992 analysis these effects were captured through disaggregation of the analysis by age (as well as sex and impairment).
Other differences in the explanatory variables for the two sets of
analyses are due to data availability and statistical significance. We
found that several explanatory variables that were significant for the
longer period were not significant in the 1988-1992 analysis, appar
ently because the variability of these variables was low during the
shorter period.
Simulations

In order to interpret the findings from the econometric analyses, we
used the estimated models to conduct a number of counterfactual simu
lations. For the 1980-1993 analysis, we simulated the impact of all
explanatory variables in the model on initial determinations and allow
ance rates holding all "national factors" (the factors represented by the
year variables) constant at their 1989 levels. Comparisons of the simu
lated and actual series show how much of the historical variation in
these series is accounted for by the state-level variables and how much
is left unaccounted for—due to national factors as well as to state-level
factors that were not fully captured in the analysis. For initial determi
nations, we also compare the simulated and actual series to expected
initial determinations; i.e., to the estimate of the number of applica
tions expected based on national application rates by program and age
for 1990 and the current year population in the state by age.
For the 1988-1992 analysis, we simulated the impact of the 19881992 change in each individual explanatory variable on application and
award growth, holding all other variables constant at their 1988 levels.
This was supplemented with the findings from the national-level actu
arial analysis of the disability-insured population to get estimates of
the marginal impact of the growth in the share of the working-age pop
ulation (especially women) that is disability-insured.
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POPULATION CHANGES
Population growth
Changes in the size and age/gender composition of the population
provide the simplest and most direct explanation of changes in the
number of DI and SSI applications and awards. The size of the work
ing-age "SSA area" population grew steadily from 1975 to 1992 and is
expected to continue growing steadily in the near future. The baby
boom generation, born between 1946 and 1964, was still entering the
working-age population in 1975. As it did, the average age of the work
ing-age population declined, but this decline was eventually reversed
as the generation aged. Both the growth in the size of the working-age
population and the aging of the baby boom generation have contributed
substantially to recent growth in applications and awards for SSA's dis
ability programs.
The SSA area population between the ages of 15 and 64 grew at an
average annual rate of 1.1 percent from 1975 to 1992, but the growth in
recent years has been much slower than in earlier years. From 1975 to
1980 the average annual growth rate was 1.5 percent, while it was only
0.6 percent from 1988 to 1992. During the later period, however,
changes in the age distribution of the working-age population substan
tially offset the effect of slowing population growth.
The expected initial determination variables used in the 1980-1993
analysis are intended to capture the combined effects of growth and
aging of the population on initial determinations. The contribution of
these variables to the acceleration in application and award growth
experienced from 1988 on can be seen by comparing their annual
growth for the latter period to their annual growth in the 1980-1988
period. For all three program groups, this variable grows at a faster
annual rate from 1988 to 1993 than from 1980 to 1988. For Dl-only,
the annual rate of growth increases from 0.8 percent to 1.3 percent; for
concurrent, the increase is from 1.3 to 1.4 percent; and for SSI-only,
the increase is from 0.6 to 1.2 percent. The very small increase for the
concurrent category is apparently explained by the fact that a relatively
large share of applicants in the concurrent category are young. Thus,
these factors help explain the acceleration in growth in the Dl-only and
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SSI-only categories, but not in the concurrent category. It should also
be noted that the acceleration in the growth rates of these variables
themselves occurred before 1988, and thus does not coincide with the
acceleration of applications that began in 1989.
Target populations
The number of DI and SSI applications and awards should be influ
enced by changes in the size of the population eligible for either or
both programs, i.e., each program's target population. The most impor
tant eligibility factors are the presence of qualifying disabilities and
economic eligibility. The disability criteria are identical for the two
programs, while economic eligibility is tied to disability-insured status
for DI and to a means test for SSI. For simplicity of discussion, those
satisfying the SSI means test will be called "poor" below, although the
official poverty population is an imperfect proxy for SSI eligibility.
Our focus here is on exogenous changes in the size of the relevant tar
get populations given program rules; we defer the discussion of supply
factors affecting the size and composition of the eligible population
until later.
The three program groups can be visualized as being determined by
various combinations of the target populations defined by disabilityinsured status, meeting the SSI means test, and having a qualifying dis
ability. To be eligible for DI, a person has to satisfy the insured status
and disability requirements. SSI eligibility requires meeting the means
test and the disability requirement. Persons with qualifying disabilities
who are disability-insured but not poor are eligible for DI only, those
who are poor qualify for both programs (concurrent eligibility), and
those who are poor but not disability insured are eligible for SSI only.
Existing data do not permit observation of trends in the three main
target populations directly, and indeed not even cross-sectional data are
available on a reasonable proxy of the population satisfying the disabil
ity criteria in the general population. Therefore we must rely on an
item-by-item examination of evidence on trends in these three target
populations.
Based on estimates from SSA's actuaries, the share of the population
that is disability-insured grew at an average annual rate of 1.2 percent
from 1975 to 1992. The rate of growth was much higher for women
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(2.6 percent) than for men (0.2 percent), reflecting growth of female
labor force participation rates. The narrowing of gender differences
also suggests that this source of growth is approaching exhaustion.
We performed an actuarial analysis of the contribution of growth
and changes in the age and gender distribution of the disability insured
population on DI applications from 1988 to 1992 and found an average
annual contribution of 2.1 percentage points. This is almost 0.8 per
centage points greater than the estimated impact of population growth
and aging alone, with almost all of the added contribution due to
changes in the disability-insured status of women. Results for awards
were almost identical. It is important to note that the growth in the pro
portion of the disability-insured population suggests an increase in the
share of SSI eligibles concurrently qualifying for DI, thereby depress
ing the growth of the SSI-only group, particularly for women.
Change in the age and gender composition of the disability-insured
population will also have an impact on application growth in specific
impairment categories. The large increase in the proportion of the pop
ulation in their thirties and forties suggests a corresponding increase in
disability applications based on impairments most likely to occur in
middle age, and less growth for impairments that typically occur either
earlier or later in life. Our actuarial analysis of DI application growth
from 1988 to 1992 found that growth due to change in the disabilityinsured population was greatest in the musculoskeletal impairment cat
egory, and smallest for the internal organ category. These findings are a
result of the fact that applications based on musculoskeletal impair
ment (most commonly back strains and injuries) represent a larger
share of applications among younger and middle-aged applicants than
among older applicants. Applications in internal organ categories
(heart disease, respiratory disease, cancer, etc.) are a larger share of
applications from older persons, which partially accounts for the rela
tively slow growth rate in the internal organ category.
From 1979 to 1992 the poverty rate for the working-age population
grew at an average annual rate of 1.6 percent. Growth was highest for
persons age 18 to 24 and in the subperiods 1979-1983 and 1988-1992,
both periods of slow economic growth or even decline; in the latter
period, the average annual growth rate of the pretransfer poverty rate
was 3.5 percent. If we assume that increases in the poverty rate directly
translate into increases in SSI applications on top of the effects of pop-
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ulation growth and aging, these factors together account for 4.7 per
centage points of the average annual growth in SSI applications over
this period, or about 45 percent of the average annual growth of 10.5
percent.
We included the poverty rate as an explanatory variable in our SSI
regressions, but found in general that it did not have a statistically sig
nificant effect on applications and awards; marginally significant, posi
tive coefficients were obtained in analysis of initial determination data
for the 1980-1987 subperiod alone. The weak findings might be attrib
utable to substantial measurement errors in state-level poverty rate esti
mates. Another explanation is that important determinants of the
poverty rate, especially unemployment and the age distribution of the
population, are included separately in all of the analyses, so only varia
tion in the poverty rate that is not explained by other explanatory vari
ables is being used to identify the impact of poverty.
One of the other determinants of poverty is the growth in the num
ber of female-headed households. We included the percent of children
living with only one parent to capture this factor. More generally, this
variable serves as a proxy for changes in family structure that could
have an impact on applications, especially declines in marriage rates
that have left many individuals with limited family sources of financial,
in-kind, and emotional support. In the 1988-1992 analysis this variable
was very significant for the SSI and Dl-concurrent equations for both
men and women. We found that this variable accounts for about 5 per
cent of annual SSI application growth during the period. Effects were
somewhat larger for women than for men, were larger for younger age
groups than for older age groups, and were concentrated in the mental
disorders category. We also found strong evidence of a positive impact
on initial determinations in the SSI-only and concurrent categories. 6
These findings suggest that declines in the availability of financial,
in-kind, and emotional support from spouses are making a substantial
contribution to growth in applications and awards. They also help
explain the rapid growth in the mental impairment category. A negative
association between severe mental illness and marriage has been docu
mented in the mental health literature; empirical evidence shows that
individuals who are mentally ill are less likely to marry than others,
and are more likely to get divorced if they do marry (see B artel and
Taubman 1986). Thus, the prevalence of mental illness is relatively
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high in the population that is "on the margin" of marriage, so declines
in marriage may result in more applications from this group. It could
also be that expanded availability of disability benefits for those with a
mental illness has contributed to the decline in marriage rates, by offer
ing an alternative source of support to some who would otherwise be
married.
The data available to study the prevalence of disabling health condi
tions is limited, especially for analyzing trends. Long-term trends in
the prevalence of disabling conditions may be influencing long-term
growth in applications and awards (in some cases negatively), but with
one exception (AIDS/HIV) we did not find convincing evidence of
health trends explaining the recent acceleration of application and
award growth. The incidence of AIDS/HIV grew at an annual rate of
9.3 percent from 1988 to 1992. Our regression estimates for 19881992 along with counts of the number of applications in the AIDS/HIV
impairment category suggest that AIDS/HIV accounts for between 0.6
and 0.9 percentage points of both DI and SSI application growth over
this period.
SSI applications from legal aliens and those living in the United
States under the color of law grew much more rapidly than those from
citizens from 1988 to 1992—at an average annual rate of 17.4 percent
versus 9.8 percent for citizens—although the share of all applications
that are from this group is still small (6.8 percent in 1992). We previ
ously have hypothesized that the Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986 (IRCA) explained the relatively rapid growth among applica
tions from this population. National time-series of IRCA legalizations
show a striking resemblance to national time-series for SSI applica
tions from legal aliens (Lewin-VHI 1994). Because IRCA legalizations
are concentrated in a relatively few states, we expected that any impact
of IRCA legalizations would be clearly distinguished in the application
and award analysis for 1988-1992. In fact, however, the findings were
very weak. To verify the econometric findings, we asked SSA to tabu
late the number of annual SSI awards to IRCA immigrants in a 10 per
cent sample of all SSI applications for the period from 1989 (the first
year of IRCA legalizations) to 1993. The number identified as IRCA
immigrants turned out to be very small—peaking at an estimated 3,200
of the 88,500 applications from all legal aliens in 1993.7 Thus, the rapid
growth in legal alien applications over this period appears to be primar-
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ily due to the same factors that are behind growth in applications from
citizens. While applications from legal aliens grew at a somewhat
faster rate than those from citizens, evidence from the case studies sug
gests that this is because the recession had a larger impact on legal
aliens than on citizens.
Thus, IRCA is apparently not responsible for the relatively rapid
growth of applications from noncitizens. In the analysis of the 19801993 data we examined whether growth in the number of legalized
immigrants who have satisfied the three-year waiting period could
explain this phenomenon, but again found no significant results. Evi
dence from the case studies (Chapter 9) suggests that the recession had
a much larger impact on the immigrant population than on citizens, but
we have not tested this hypothesis empirically. It is also known that
middleman fraud has played a role in helping immigrants in some
areas obtain awards, but the extent of the fraud is not known. 8
An important feature of our findings concerning population factors
is that they explain why growth in concurrent applications and awards
has been greater than growth in applications and awards for either pro
gram alone, and especially why concurrent application and award
growth has greatly exceeded that in the Dl-only category. Female and
young DI applicants are more likely to meet the SSI means test than
older male DI applicants, and growth in the disability insured popula
tion has been greatest for women and for young to middle-age groups.
The effects of poverty and changes in family structure have roughly
equal impacts on concurrent and SSI-only applications and awards, but
at most small impacts on Dl-only applications and awards. Finally, the
effect of AIDS/HIV on concurrent applications and awards has been
substantially greater than its effects on those in either the Dl-only or
SSI-only categories.

BUSINESS CYCLES AND ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING
Regression Estimates of Business Cycle Effects
There have been numerous previous econometric studies estimating
the effect of the business cycle on DI applications, awards, and case-
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loads. Most of the previous studies used aggregate time-series meth
ods, although some work has been conducted using state- or
individual-level cross-sectional estimates (see Exhibit 1.2 in Chapter 1,
pp. 15-16). The point estimates vary across individual studies, but no
study finds substantial effects in a direction opposite from the predic
tions of economic theory. Previous studies have suffered from various
specification problems, low statistical power, or both.
One of the key results from our work using annual pooled cross-sec
tion/time-series data for states relates to our estimates of business cycle
effects. Our ability to control for permanent differences among the
states and to eliminate the confounding effect of national changes
endemic to time-series studies makes the results obtained from our
analysis methodologically much stronger and more credible. Strong
results were found in both the 1980-1993 analysis of initial determina
tions and the 1988-1992 analysis of applications (see Exhibit 1.2 in
Chapter 1). In general we found stronger effects for DI than for SSI
and for initial determinations and applications than for initial allow
ances and final awards. The estimated effects on allowance rates are
negative.
In the 1980-1993 analysis of initial determinations we found that the
impact of a change in unemployment begins in the year of the change,
but is greatest two years after the change. Such "lagged" effects are pre
sumably greater for initial determinations than for applications because
of the substantial lag between filing and the initial determination, but
nonetheless could be very significant. We did not examine lagged
effects in the 1988-1992 application analysis, and this may explain the
somewhat stronger findings in the 1980-1993 analysis.
We were also able to extend our DI initial determination analysis
back to 1976, and found remarkably stable unemployment effects for
DI in each of three subperiods: 1976-1979, 1980-1987, and 19881993 (see the appendix to this chapter). We also found that unemploy
ment effects for SSi-only initial determinations were essentially as
large as for Dl-only and concurrent initial determinations in the 19801987 period, whereas we found no unemployment effect for SSI-only
initial determinations in the 1988-1993 period. The difference may be
related to the fact that the SSI-only data include children, and growth
in this category during the latter period is dominated by growth for
children.
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In the initial determination analysis we also found evidence of a
"discouraged worker" effect—holding the unemployment rate con
stant, a decline in labor force participation as individuals give up their
search for work during a recession is associated with a significant
increase in initial determinations.
Simulated Business Cycle Effects
One especially notable finding in the simulations for the 1980-1993
period is that the short recession of 1980 combined with the more
severe recession of 1981-1982 had a large impact on initial determina
tions during that period, even though initial determinations declined
(Exhibit 2.7).9
Tightening of eligibility standards during that period (see p. 63, The
Supply of Benefits) evidently discouraged applications sufficiently to
more than offset the impact of the recession. According to the simula
tions, the effect of the 1981-1982 recession was much larger than the
substantial simulated effect for the 1990-1991 recession.
Based on simulations using the 1988-1992 model estimates,
changes in the unemployment rate over this period account for substan
tial fractions of the total growth in applications, especially for DI.
Changes in unemployment account for 1.7 percentage points of the 8.9
percentage point annual growth in total DI applications, a 19 percent
share. For SSI, changes in the unemployment rate account for 1.1 per
centage points of the 10.5 percentage point annual growth rate, a 10
percent share.
Changes in the unemployment rate account for much more of the
growth in DI and SSI applications for men than for women from 1988
to 1992. For example, the unemployment rate accounts for 2.2 percent
age points of the 7.9 percentage point annual increase in total DI appli
cations by men, a 28 percent share, but only 0.9 percentage points of
the 10.5 percentage point annual increase in total DI applications by
women, a 9 percent share. One reason changes in the unemployment
rate account for a greater share of the total growth in DI applications
by men is because the models do not take into account changes in the
disability-insured population. It is likely that this omission results in an
underestimate of the effect of the unemployment rate on DI applica
tions by women.

Exhibit 2.7 Actual and Simulated Initial Determinations for DI and SSI, 1980-1993
2,600,000
2,400,000
2,200,000 •
2,000,000 1,800,000
1,600,000 •
1,400,000
1,200,000
1,000,000

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Simulated3

Actual

Actual (adults only)

SOURCE Lewm-VHI analysis of SSA data on initial disability determinations.
aThe simulated series is based on regression results reported in Exhibit IV.A 1, and shows the path initial determinations would have
followed had they been affected solely by state-level factors The actual and simulated series are normalized to equal one another in 1989
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In award simulations for 1988-1992, the unemployment rate
accounts for 1.0 percentage points of the 10.0 percent annual growth of
DI awards and 0.7 percentage points of the 12.0 percent annual growth
of SSI awards, respectively; i.e., it accounts for 10 percent of DI award
growth and 6 percent of SSI growth. These findings, and the findings
from the 1980-1993 analysis of initial allowances, indicate that the
marginal applicant who is induced to apply by a recession is less likely
to obtain an award than the average applicant. Put another way, the
recessions have a negative effect on allowance rates. This finding is
especially important in view of the large increases in allowance rates
that were observed during and shortly after the 1990-1991 recession.
We return to this point later.
The findings from the five case studies add credibility to the econo
metric findings about business cycles, suggesting, if anything, that they
are conservative. It is clear from the case studies that subtleties of busi
ness cycles not captured by the unemployment rate are relevant to a
recession's impact—the industrial distribution of job losses, the per
ceived permanence of layoffs, and key characteristics of workers who
lose their jobs (age, sex, prior earnings, skills, etc.). In effect, the
unemployment rate is a crude proxy for the business cycle. As is well
known by statisticians, estimated effects that rely on proxy variables
tend to understate the effect of the factor they are meant to capture.
We know relatively little about the mechanisms through which busi
ness cycles have an impact on program growth. We cannot determine,
for instance, the extent to which our results reflect the effects of state
and local fiscal responses to recessions as opposed to job losses and
pay reductions among workers with serious disabilities or spouses of
persons with serious disabilities. The weaker findings for SSI-only
applications and awards suggest, however, that much of the effect is
due to job losses. Findings from the case studies support that interpre
tation as well, but they also provide evidence of a significant role for
state and local fiscal responses to revenue losses, a subject we will
return to later.
The dynamic aspects of business cycle impacts are also poorly
understood. The considerable lagged effects found in the initial deter
mination analysis suggest that many individuals who are induced to
apply by a recession only do so after an extensive search for other
sources of support.
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Economic Restructuring
Many have hypothesized that economic restructuring—the replace
ment of high-paying manufacturing jobs with relatively low-paying
service sector jobs—has had an impact on application and award
growth. The short-term effect of economic restructuring is thought to
be positive, because disabled workers who lose their manufacturing
jobs may choose to apply for disability benefits rather than find new
work in the service sector. The long-term effect may be negative, how
ever, because service sector workers are less susceptible to disabling
injuries and illnesses (see Loprest, Rupp, and Sandell 1995). The longterm effect may vary by impairment group; for instance, some have
suggested that it is negative for physical impairments but positive for
mental impairments.
We have previously speculated that the large business cycle effects
found in the 1988-1992 application analysis may partly reflect the
short-term, positive impact of economic restructuring (Lewin-VHI
1995b). In the 1980-1993 initial determination analysis we tried to
capture this effect using the percent of employment in manufacturing
as an additional explanatory variable. We did find the expected nega
tive effect for the Dl-only category, but it was small and not replicated
for other program categories. We also developed two indices of jobrelated injuries and illnesses to capture the longer-term impact of eco
nomic restructuring, but found no significant results. While it may be
that measurement and other specification errors account for the insig
nificant findings, it would appear that business cycle effects overwhelm
the effects of economic restructuring in the periods we have examined.

OTHER SUPPORT PROGRAMS
The Potential for Program Interactions
Just as economic theory suggests that the relative value of disability
cash benefits to potential earnings affects the decision to apply, it is
reasonable to expect that the availability and relative value of benefits
through other programs should also affect the decision to apply. This is
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an important topic, particularly in light of substantial secular changes
in the relative value of public benefits such as General Assistance
(GA—the generic term for welfare programs funded entirely by state
and local governments), Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC—a state/federal program that primarily provides support for
low-income single-parent households), Medicaid, and Medicare.
Other programs can be classified as either "substitutes" or "comple
ments" for DI and/or SSI, in the economic sense of these terms. Substi
tute programs are those for which an expansion in the value of benefits
reduces applications and awards for the SSA programs; benefit expan
sion for complementary programs increases applications and awards.
GA and AFDC are examples of substitute programs for SSI; individu
als who receive SSI benefits are not eligible for GA or AFDC. Tighten
ing of eligibility rules and reductions in benefits for GA or AFDC are
expected to increase SSI participation. State supplements to SSI are
clear complements to SSI; reductions in state supplements are
expected to reduce SSI participation.
Medicaid and Medicare are also complements of SSI and DI,
respectively; most SSI recipients are automatically eligible for Medicaid, while DI beneficiaries receive Medicare coverage after a two-year
waiting period. Increases in the cash value of Medicaid and Medicare
benefits increase the relative attractiveness of the disability programs,
and hence the demand for their benefits. Changes in eligibility rules for
other programs can change the degree to which they are substitutes or
complements for the SSA disability programs. For example, expansion
of Medicaid to individuals who are not sufficiently poor to qualify for
SSI, or the introduction of universal health insurance coverage, would
reduce or eliminate the complementarity between medical insurance
and income support programs.
General Assistance and Aid to Families with Dependent Children

In our state-level analysis for the 1988 to 1992 period we found
strong evidence of effects of cuts in state and local GA programs on
both applications and awards. GA cuts in seven states and the District
of Columbia had highly significant, positive effects on SSI applications
and awards for both men and women, and for concurrent applications
and awards among men. Estimated effects on applications and awards
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were nearly identical, and the elasticities were often large, particularly
for younger men, and especially for applications and awards in the
mental disorders category. We later found similar results for initial
determinations in both the 1980-1987 and 1988-1993 periods. For the
1980-1987 period we also found evidence that reductions in AFDC
benefits increase SSI-only initial determinations, but these findings
were not replicated in the 1988-1993 analysis. The lack of findings for
the later period may simply reflect a lack of large changes in AFDC
benefits, the dominance of growth in initial determinations for chil
dren, and/or the confounding effects of Zebley and the new mental dis
order listings for children.
These findings are the only direct econometric evidence we are
aware of demonstrating that changes in other income and in-kind trans
fer programs have an impact on SSI applications and awards, but the
lack of evidence may simply reflect the difficulty of measuring such
effects. The lack of evidence may also reflect a widely prevailing view
that anyone who is eligible for SSI as well as either AFDC or GA
would already have applied for SSI because SSI benefits are greater. As
several welfare administrators and other welfare experts have told us,
however, this reasoning neglects the fact that the SSI application and
appeals process is prohibitively difficult for many who can much more
readily qualify for GA or AFDC—especially those with mental disor
ders.
A primary objective of the case studies was to learn more about the
impact of changes in state and local welfare programs on SSI applica
tions and awards. As described in detail in Chapter 8 of this volume,
we found that cuts in GA benefits during the 1988-1992 period repre
sent only a fraction of state and local efforts to shift welfare recipi
ents—primarily GA recipients—onto SSI. It appears that the
econometric models may substantially understate the impact of the
combination of GA cuts and other state and local shifting efforts. The
reason for this is methodologically the same as the reason that our
business cycle estimates may understate the magnitude of business
cycle effects: the GA cuts variable used for the analysis is a crude
proxy for general state and local efforts; its estimated coefficient prob
ably understates the impacts of these changes because it fails to capture
the effects of shifting efforts that don't involve cuts in GA benefits.
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While the findings from the case studies and econometric analysis
provide much less support for the impact of AFDC benefit changes on
SSI, the AFDC findings for 1980-1987 along with the long-term
decline in the value of AFDC benefits relative to SSI benefits (from
1975 to 1992 the level of median AFDC benefits for a family of four
declined by 37 percent relative to the value of federal SSI benefits for
couples), and evidence that a substantial share of AFDC mothers have
disabilities (see Adler 1993), suggest that AFDC program changes
have contributed to long-term SSI application and award growth. Pro
posed future reforms to both AFDC and GA programs could have a
substantial positive impact on SSI caseloads.
As stated above, the econometric analysis for the 1988-1992 period
shows that GA cuts had an especially strong impact on applications
and awards in the mental impairment category. Evidence from our
interviews of DDS administrators and the case studies supports this
finding and suggests that, in general, state and local shifting efforts
over this period can help explain the exceptionally rapid application
and award growth in the mental impairment categories. Several people
we interviewed argued that the success of state and local shifting
efforts would not have been possible were it not for the changes in eli
gibility requirements for mental disorders.
State SSI Supplements
Many states supplement federal SSI benefits with a state payment.
We expect increases in total benefits (state plus federal) relative to
earnings to increase applications. In the 1980-1993 analysis of initial
determinations, we used the sum of the federal payment and state sup
plements to individuals living independently divided by earnings per
worker in the state as an explanatory variable in the S Si-only and con
current initial determination equations.
The findings were quite strong. We estimate that the elasticity of
SSI-only initial determinations with respect to the sum of the state and
federal benefit is 0.8. This estimate is very significant statistically and
is robust to the subperiod used. 10 For concurrent initial determinations
the point estimate of the elasticity is smaller (0.4) and is less robust to
the choice of subperiod, but is still significant. 11
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Medicaid
We also attempted to estimate the impact of the rising value of Med
icaid benefits on SSI applications and awards, but were not successful
in identifying an impact. It seems likely, however, that the absence of a
positive finding reflects the difficulty of measuring the value of the
benefits. Welfare administrators and other experts generally attest to
the importance of Medicaid benefits to SSI applicants, and recent
research on the related topics of "continuation of coverage" mandates
(Gruber and Madrian 1993), and the effects of Medicaid on AFDC
caseloads (Moffit and Wolfe 1992; Congressional Budget Office 1993;
Yelowitz 1994) confirm the importance of medical benefits to labor
force and program participation decisions. In addition, as discussed
further in Chapter 9, the growing burden of health care costs for indi
gent patients on state and local governments and health care providers
is an important factor behind state and local shifting efforts.
Medicaid reform or general health care reform could have a signifi
cant impact on SSI caseloads. Medicaid block grants, which would
result in federal payments to states that are not tied directly to Medicaid enrollment, would significantly reduce the incentives to shift state
and local welfare recipients onto SSI. Cutbacks in Medicaid benefits
could also have a negative effect. Making Medicaid benefits available
to disabled persons independently of SSI, or otherwise increasing their
access to health insurance, would also be likely to reduce SSI caseload
growth.

THE SUPPLY OF BENEFITS
Features of SSA's disability programs such as the real value of bene
fits, legislative and administrative actions affecting eligibility determi
nation, work incentive provisions, and SSA outreach activities might
substantially affect applications and awards. Other supply factors, such
as court decisions on appealed cases, also play a role. Research on the
effects of these factors is extremely difficult to perform for three rea
sons: there is only limited variation in the data; most changes that do
occur tend to affect the whole program, precluding natural comparison
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groups; and it is extremely difficult to disentangle the effect of pro
grammatic factors from potential confounding factors.
In this section we first briefly discuss the contributions of our work
to existing literature on the impact of increases in the value of benefits
and on exogenous shifts in denial rates. We then turn to a more indepth discussion of supply changes that occurred from 1980 to 1993
and evidence from our simulations concerning their collective impact.
The Value of Benefits
Previous econometric work has addressed some programmatic fac
tors. Most important, there is a considerable body of econometric work
since the pioneering work of Parsons (1980) and Leonard (1984)
focusing on the effect of wage replacement rates on labor force and
disability program participation. This body of econometric work has
been plagued by serious identification problems, and has produced a
wide range of estimates. An alternative quasi-experimental approach
using rejected applicants as a comparison group (Bound 1989) raised
fundamental questions about the validity of these estimates, but relies
on somewhat questionable assumptions as well.
With one exception, we did not analyze the impact of changes in the
value of benefits because benefits only change at the federal level, i.e.,
the value of federal benefits is a national factor that does not vary at the
state level. The exception is the estimated positive effect on SSI initial
determinations of the sum of federal and state SSI benefits relative to
earnings, discussed in the previous section. The effect estimated is
identified only through variation in the value of the state benefit and
variation in earnings. Hence, caution should be exercised in using it to
infer the effect of a change in the federal benefit on initial determina
tions.
Denial Rates
Economic theory suggests that the expected probability of award
and future benefit streams should affect applications, and therefore
changed eligibility rules and their enforcement might be important in
determining the number of applicants. Two pioneering studies on this
issue used state-level analysis for the 1970s that is similar methodolog-
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ically to our own analysis for later years. These studies focused on the
impact of changes in initial denial rates on DI applications and labor
force participation, taking advantage of what appears to have been
exogenous changes in state denial rates from 1978 to 1979. Parsons
(1991) estimated that a 10 percent administrative increase in denial
rates reduces applications by 4.5 percent. One limitation of Parson's
work is that he did not control for changes in unemployment or demo
graphics at the state level during this period. Gruber and Kubik (1995)
use data from the same period to estimate the impact of denial rate
changes on labor force participation of individuals with chronic health
conditions. They did control for demographic change and the unem
ployment rate, and also found significant effects. We were able to repli
cate Parsons' findings exactly, and to test the robustness of his results
in models in which we also controlled for demographic and business
cycle effects. We found that taking these factors into account reduces
the estimated effect of denial rate increases by 50 percent, but the esti
mated effects were still very significant. We also assessed the validity
of Parsons' assumption that reductions in the denial rate from 1977 to
1978 reflected state DDS tightening of eligibility standards; if reduc
tions in denial rates were due to other factors, then it is not clear that
potential applicants and advocates would regard them to be indicators
of changes in eligibility standards. We found that lagged denial rates
had only very weak, insignificant coefficients in DI initial determina
tion models estimated for later years, which is consistent with Parsons'
assumption about the reasons for denial rate changes- from 1977 to
1978.
Our econometric analysis of state data did not provide other direct
evidence of program supply effects, by design. Despite this, it is possi
ble to make some inferences concerning the effects of supply changes
indirectly. In the remainder of this section we develop such inferences
about supply changes that have occurred since 1980.
Analysis of Supply Changes, 1980-89
Description of the Changes
The 1980 and 1981 Amendments to the Social Security Act reduced
DI benefits for some workers, introduced new work incentive provi
sions for DI and SSI, and required SSA to tighten adjudications. 12 In
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some ways these changes codified or extended earlier administrative
changes aimed at slowing the growth of the programs. The amend
ments set the stage for substantial administrative tightening of the eli
gibility standards for claims filed in the next two years, as well as for
aggressive efforts to remove persons who did not meet the tightened
interpretation of the eligibility standards from the roles through con
tinuing disability reviews (CDRs). This was followed by widespread
criticism of the loss of eligibility for many, particularly those with
mental impairments who were disproportionately affected by the
changes. This criticism eventually resulted in a moratorium on CDRs
in 1984 and the 1984 amendments to the Act.
The 1984 amendments called for new mental impairment criteria
that reduced the weight given to diagnostic or medical factors and put a
greater weight on functional factors, such as the degree to which the
applicant is limited with respect to activities of daily living, social rela
tions, concentration, persistence and pace, and ability to function in
work or work-like settings. In 1985, SSA published revised listings of
mental impairments for adults in order to comply with the amend
ments.
The 1984 amendments also required that "source evidence"—evi
dence provided by an applicant's own physician or other health care
provider (e.g., psychologist)—be considered first, prior to the results of
an SSA consultative examination. This had the effect of substantially
increasing the weight given to source evidence. The amendments also
required that due consideration be given to pain and other symptoms.
Pain had previously been an important factor in many decisions, but
concerns raised by litigation, advocates, and even SSA led Congress to
codify and reaffirm SSA's existing policy. Litigation over specific
guidelines for the consideration of pain continued after 1984. SSA has
now promulgated detailed regulations spelling out how symptoms are
to be evaluated. The new regulations also have special significance for
mental illnesses because consideration of mental symptoms, such as
anxiety and depression, is important in many cases.
Another change required by the 1984 amendments is often men
tioned along with changes in the treatment of source evidence and pain
and other symptoms: a change in the treatment of multiple nonsevere
impairments. Prior to the amendments, applicants were automatically
denied awards in the initial determination if all impairments were
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judged to be nonsevere, even if there were several; unlike in cases of
impairments that are severe, but do not meet or exceed the listings,
assessments of the effects of multiple "not severe" impairments were
not individualized. The change in the law stopped these automatic
denials. A final change brought about by the 1984 amendments was the
establishment of a medical improvement standard. Benefits could no
longer be terminated without substantial evidence of medical improve
ment in the beneficiary's condition.
The legislative and administrative changes that surrounded the 1984
amendments were in part instigated by, and accompanied by, court
decisions that required SSA to be less restrictive in making eligibility
determinations. In Mental Health Association of Minnesota v. Schweiker, a 1982 class action suit on behalf of persons with severe mental
illness in SSA's Chicago region whose benefits had been denied or ter
minated because of alleged administrative changes in the evaluation of
mental impairments, the plaintiffs charged that the Chicago region
DDS offices were not applying the decision-making process called for
in the regulations. Claimants with mental impairments who did not
meet the listings were presumed to be able to engage in unskilled work.
The judge ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring SSA's policy to be
"arbitrary, capricious, irrational, and an abuse of discretion" (National
Academy of Social Insurance 1994). A similar suit was brought by the
City of New York against SSA in 1983, ending in a decision favoring
the plaintiff and declaring that such a policy was illegal.
The Effects of the Supply Changes
The 15.4 percent decline in total initial determinations that occurred
from 1980 to 1982 is usually attributed to the supply tightening that
occurred during this period. That is, potential applicants were discour
aged from applying by reductions in benefits and the tightening of eli
gibility. The 10.7 percent increase in initial determinations from 1984
to 1986 is attributed to the changes surrounding the 1984 amendments,
while the 4.9 percent decline in initial determinations from 1987 to
1989 is attributed to the ending of their initial impact; i.e., the "pool" of
potential applicants who were affected by the changes was presumably
depleted.
The initial determination simulations provide strong evidence that
the effects of the supply changes on application growth during this
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period were even greater than the large swings in initial determination
growth indicate because the state-level factors in our models had large,
countervailing effects on initial determination growth (Exhibit 2.7). In
particular, if it were not for the short recession of 1980 and the more
substantial recession of 1981-1982, the swings in initial determination
growth would have been even larger. The simulations imply that total
initial determinations would have dropped by 28.8 percent from 1980
to 1982, instead of the actual 15.4 percent drop, if the unemployment
rate and other explanatory variables in the model had remained at their
1980 values. Analogously, the increase in initial determinations from
1984 to 1986 would have been 16.8 percent instead of 10.7 percent.
Further, the 4.9 percent decline from 1987 to 1989 that is usually
attributed to the ending of the initial impact of the changes surrounding
the 1984 amendments is entirely explained by the recovery from the
recession; had there been no recovery, the model predicts that initial
determinations would have grown by 0.1 percent.
While the initial determination simulations show that the effects of
this period's supply changes on initial determinations were much
greater than previously thought, the initial allowance rate simulations
show that the impacts of the supply changes on allowances, given
applications, were not as large as swings in the actual allowance rate
suggest. The simulations show that changes in other variables during
this period, especially the unemployment rate, contributed to the
decline in allowance rates from 1980 to 1982 and also contributed to
their growth from 1984 to 1986. For instance, the Dl-only simulations
imply that the initial allowance rate would have fallen by 2.3 percent
age points from 1980 to 1982 had the state-level explanatory variables
remained constant over this period, rather than by the actual decline of
3.7 percentage points; the same rate would have increased by 1.5 per
centage points from 1984 to 1986 instead of by the actual increase of
4.1 percentage points. Very similar results were found for the other
program categories.
To summarize, the findings from our analysis of this period indicate
that the impacts of historical supply changes on initial determination
and allowance growth were even greater than previously thought. Fur
ther, the "indirect" effects of the supply changes on initial allowances
(i.e., through effects on the number of initial determinations) are much
more important relative to "direct" effects (i.e., through effects on the
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share of initial determinations that result in initial allowances) than the
actual initial determination and allowance rate series suggest.
Analysis of Supply Changes, 1989-93
Description of the Changes
Several additional policy changes in the DI and SSI programs
occurred during the 1989-1993 period that may have affected the sup
ply of disability benefits. As discussed previously, the 1984 amend
ments required that source evidence be considered first in the disability
determination process. In 1991, further regulations regarding source
evidence were adopted as a result of court challenges to SSA's treat
ment of source evidence. These regulations stipulated that deference
must be given to source evidence because of the value of long-standing
relationships between the patient and the health professional, and more
weight must be given to source evidence the longer the relationship
between the health professional and patient, or if the professional is a
specialist in the relevant area. Further, if the source evidence is not
accepted, the examiner must explain why.
In 1989 SSA initiated a congressionally mandated SSI outreach pro
gram. Since 1989, more intensive efforts at outreach have been pursued
at the local, regional, state, and national levels. More than twenty-five
cooperative agreements have been awarded for SSI outreach demon
stration projects, some of which target persons with mental illness and
homeless persons (Committee on Ways and Means 1994).
Another supply change during the 1989 to 1993 period is the
marked decrease in the frequency of CDRs. Agency downsizing during
the 1980s combined with the increased claims workload in the early
1990s resulted in a reduced allocation of resources to conduct CDRs.
The proportion of DI beneficiaries leaving the rolls because of medical
recovery dropped to an all time low of less than 0.5 percent in 1993.
There were very significant SSI supply shifts for children during this
period, related to the 1990 Supreme Court decision in the case of Sulli
van v. Zebley and the adoption of new mental disorder listings for chil
dren in 1991. Even though these supply changes pertain to child
applications only, it has been suggested that the large impact of the
decision on DDS and SSA determinations for children spilled over to
decisions about adults. Because the most significant impacts of these
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changes were on allowances to children with mental disorders, it
would not be surprising if spillover effects for adult applications were
primarily in the mental disorder category.
Finally, changes in the adjudicative climate during the 1989 to 1993
period likely contributed to application and award growth. "Adjudica
tive climate" refers to the attitudes of state and federal government
adjudicators. The outcome in a marginal case may hinge on the attitude
of a state disability determination service adjudicator or an administra
tive law judge toward the applicant, which may in turn be influenced
by recent legislation, political and economic conditions, efforts by
advocacy groups, an SSA commissioner's views, SSA's budgetary out
look, court decisions, and changes in SSA regulations and policies.
Some have also argued that adjudicators faced with heavy workloads
during times of rapid application growth are likely to give questionably
eligible applicants the benefit of the doubt rather spend additional time
seeking additional evidence.
While changes in the adjudicative climate cannot be measured
directly, there is agreement among those familiar with the determina
tion process that they do occur and play a substantial role. Many
experts we interviewed believed that there was a significant shift in the
adjudicative climate in favor of making awards during the 1989 to
1993 period (see Lewin-VHI 1995a).
In addition to changes that occurred after 1989, the many changes
that were implemented prior to 1989 may have had a residual impact
on growth. As noted in the discussion of the initial determination simu
lations for 1980-1989, the decline in initial determinations from 1987
to 1989 may have been due to the economic recovery rather than the
end of the impact of changes surrounding the 1984 amendments. The
changes created a group of "newly eligibles" who would not have pre
viously satisfied the disability criteria, including some who had lost
benefits in the preceding years. Many newly eligible individuals proba
bly applied for benefits right away, but many others may not have
applied for benefits because they were either employed, received
income from some other source, or were not aware of their eligibility.
Toward the end of the decade, and continuing into the next decade, the
reasons why some newly eligibles did not apply earlier began to erode:
the economy deteriorated; many state and local income support pro
grams were cut; outreach efforts by SSA, state and local governments,
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and private organizations disseminated information about the new rules
to potentially eligible persons; and state and local governments, advo
cates, and lawyers learned how to identify potentially eligible individu
als and help them obtain a favorable decision.

Effects of the Supply Changes
Evidence from Initial Determination and Allowance Simulations.
The simulations of initial determinations for the period from 1989 to
1993 show that much of the growth in initial determinations over this
period is accounted for by unemployment and other state-level explan
atory variables in the econometric model, but that much remains unac
counted for. For SSI-only, a large share of the unaccounted for growth
is clearly due to Zebley and the change in the mental impairment list
ings for children. Even for DI, however, the growth not accounted for
by the models is large. From 1989 to 1993 DI initial determinations
increased by 21.6 percent, an increase that is 15.7 percentage points
greater than predicted by the econometric models.
The growth in DI initial determinations not accounted for by the
models' explanatory variables represents an implicit upper bound on
the effects of supply changes on initial determinations. As discussed
above, we think that growth not accounted for is partly due to impacts
of some other factors (the growth in the share of women who are dis
ability-insured, the business cycle, and state and local shifting efforts
especially) that are not fully captured in our models. Hence, the unac
counted for growth in initial determinations may substantially over
state the impact of supply changes. Nonetheless, it is likely that statelevel factors cannot account for all of the residual growth.
The initial allowance rate simulations for 1989-1993 provide stron
ger indirect evidence on the importance of supply changes. The simu
lations for DI show that the simulated series increased at a rate only
somewhat lower than the increase in the actual series in 1989 and
1990, but from 1990 to 1992 the two series moved in opposite direc
tions—the actual rate for DI increased by 5.4 percentage points, while
the simulated rate decreased by 0.9 percentage points. It seems likely
that better measures of state-level factors in the model would increase,
rather than reduce, the divergence in the actual and simulated series
because, in general, we have found that such factors have a proportion
ately smaller impact on allowances than on initial determinations.
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Hence, it is very difficult to explain these divergent paths by factors
other than supply factors.
The initial allowance rate for DI fell by 5 percentage points from
1992 to 1993, while the simulated rate fell by only 1 percentage point.
While it could be that the simulated series understates the negative
impact of the recession on the allowance rate, we would also expect to
find a decline in allowance rates after the initial impact of an expansion
in supply is realized—just as observed in 1986-1987 following the ini
tial impact of expansions surrounding the 1984 amendments. It is also
possible that some administrative tightening occurred in 1993 in
response to concerns over rapid program growth, but we are aware of
no explicit effort of this sort.
Evidence from Application and Award Simulations. The application
and award simulations for 1988-1992 provide some additional indirect
evidence on supply changes during this period. The analysis of appli
cations, for instance, accounts for more than three quarters of Dl-only
male application growth between 1988 to 1992, leaving only limited
room for the net effect of either supply factors or other omitted factors
on this group. 13 The models did less well in accounting for SSI applica
tion growth, female application growth, growth in applications from
those under age 50, and growth in applications in the mental and musculoskeletal disorder categories.
The fact that almost all of the application growth in the internal
organs category is accounted for by factors in the model (Exhibit 2.8),
while the other diagnostic groups show substantial unaccounted for
growth, is consistent with the hypothesis that regulatory changes such
as increasing the weight given to pain and other symptoms, increasing
reliance on source evidence, and broadening the standards' for those
with mental impairments resulted in substantial application growth
during this period. One important caution in interpreting the analysis
of growth not accounted for by impairment is that relatively rapid
application growth in some categories may simply reflect switching of
impairment classifications toward categories in which it has become
easier to obtain an award rather than applications that would not have
been filed in the absence of supply changes. Thus, for instance, excep
tionally high unaccounted-for growth in the mental disorder category
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may significantly overstate the effects of supply expansions on total
applications.
As mentioned previously, state and local efforts to shift the burden
of welfare spending onto the federal government are a significant
source of the exceptionally high growth in the mental impairment cate
gory, and we suspect that a significant share of the category growth that
is not accounted for by other variables is also due to these efforts. The
effects of state and local efforts on application and award growth are,
to some degree, inextricable from the effects of supply changes, how
ever. As mentioned previously, many we have talked to argue that suc
cessful state and local shifting efforts were in part made possible by
eligibility changes for mental impairments.
The econometric models also account for much less award growth
than application growth. In fact, although final allowance rates
increased over the 1988-1992 period, the models predict that they
should have declined, just as with our findings for initial allowance
rates. As in the analysis of initial allowance rates, it is difficult to con
ceive of an explanation other than a supply expansion for the growth in
the final allowance rate. The econometric analysis shows that the
effects on awards of most of the factors analyzed were proportionately
no larger than their effects on applications, with some (especially the
unemployment rate) being proportionately smaller. AIDS/HIV may be
an exception, but this would only apply to the infectious disease cate
gory.

CONCLUSION
A 1992 report from the Department of Health and Human Services,
known as the 709 Report, found that the causes of DI program growth
are many and complex. 14 The evidence we have examined confirms this
conclusion, but also points to three major causes of the acceleration of
application and award growth that began in 1989: the recession of
1990-1991; new and intensified efforts by states and localities to shift
the burden of welfare spending onto the federal government; and
expansion in the "supply" of benefits. The relative importance of each
factor varies by program and is different for applications and awards.

Growth in Disability Benefits

75

The recession is apparently more important for DI than SSI, while
shifting efforts and supply factors are more important for SSI than DI,
and supply factors are substantially more important for awards than for
applications. A fourth factor that clearly contributed to the acceleration
of growth, but to a lesser degree, is the AIDS/HIV epidemic.
The findings imply that the steady economic growth experienced by
the economy since 1992 is very good news for policymakers worried
about rapid program growth, especially for DI. This is confirmed by
the most recent data available on DI application growth (Exhibit 2.9):
after the growth rate reached a peak of 13.2 percent in 1991, it dropped
to 1.3 percent in 1994 and was a negative 6.9 percent through the first
seven months of 1995. These rates compare to expected growth of 2.1
percent based on changes in the size and age/gender composition of the
disability insured population alone. We would not be surprised if the
rate of growth continued to fall because application rates are still well
above their 1988 level. The bad news is that DI caseloads will continue
to grow in coming years because many of the large number of persons
awarded benefits during the recent period are expected to remain on the
roles for years to come (see Rupp and Scott, Chapter 4).
Exhibit 2.9 Annual Growth Rate of DI Applications, 1985-1994
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The findings add to mounting evidence that economic incentives
play a critical role in determining whether individuals with disabilities
participate in the labor force or seek, and perhaps obtain, disability
benefits. For many people with disabilities, it is not simply a matter of
whether they can or cannot work because of their disabilities; rather it
is a matter of whether the rewards to working are sufficient to make
work more attractive than leaving the labor force and applying for dis
ability benefits. While it must be recognized that this statement is not
true for a large number of individuals with disabilities who have virtu
ally no employment prospects even in a strong economy, the estimated
magnitude of the impact of recessions on DI applications indicates that
the statement is true for a large number.

Notes
1. The findings summarized here are compiled from three project reports: LewinVHI (1995a, 1995b, and 1995c).
2. See Rupp and Stapleton (1995) and Lewm-VHI (1995a) for discussion of earlier
years.
3. The SSI-only category in the national data excludes SSI applications from indi
viduals who were eligible for social security benefits in any category, including
those eligible as DI workers.
4. There are advantages and disadvantages to analyzing awards by "application
cohort." The primary advantage is that it allows us to examine the allowance rate
(awards per application filed) for each application cohort within age/gender/pro
gram groups Aggregate statistics typically compare applications filed in each
year with awards made in that year. The lag between the filing of an application
and a final decision may span one or more years. During periods of rapid applica
tion growth, allowance rates calculated from aggregate data may be greatly dis
torted. The primary disadvantage of using awards data for application cohorts is
that events that occur between the time an application is filed and the time of the
final decision cannot be modeled with aggregate data because the length of this
period varies greatly across individuals in each application cohort.
5. For initial determinations, the definition of concurrent is based on the status of
claims at the time the determination is made.
6. This variable is not included in the initial determination regressions reported in
the appendix to this chapter because we did not have data for the full 1980-1993
period. It was, however, included in models estimated using the subperiod for
which it is available. See Lewin-VHI (1995c).
7. We are grateful to Charles Scott of the Office of Supplemental Security Income
for providing this information.
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8. See U.S. General Accounting Office (1995). A total of 6,500 cases have been
identified in the states of California and Washington, combined.
9. The decline in initial determinations may have, in part, been a result of improve
ments in SSA's administrative computer system which were implemented in
1981. As a result of these improvements, it was frequently unnecessary to process
a formal application in cases where a person was found to lack insured status.
While this certainly had a large impact on the formal applications filed, it is
unclear as to its impact on initial determinations.
10. The /-statistic for the estimate is 7.7. The estimate using the 1980-1987 subpenod
is 0.73, and the estimate using the 1988-1993 subperiod is 0.84.
11. The /-statistic is 4.3 using the full period. The estimate using the 1980-1987 sub
penod is 0.8, while that using the 1988-1993 subperiod is 0.3.
12. See the National Academy of Social Insurance (1994) for a detailed description.
13. Note that this upper bound refers to net effects of unmeasured factors. It is
entirely conceivable that even if the net residual is small, there is room for poten
tially larger effects that work in opposite directions.
14. The report was mandated by Congress under Section 709 of the Social Security
Act. Its full title is The Social Security Disability Insurance Program: An Analy-
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Appendix to Chapter 2
As discussed in the text, we estimated a series of pooled cross-section timeseries models of applications and awards for the 1988-1992 period and of ini
tial determinations and initial allowance rates for the 1980-1993 period, using
annual data for states. In the first section of this appendix we provide a techni
cal description of the methodology. Selected regression results appear in the
next section, followed by results of simulations using the 1988-1992 estimates.
SPECIFICATION OF POOLED CROSS-SECTION TIME-SERIES
MODELS
For the 1988-1992 analysis, state application data were disaggregated and
analyzed by program, sex, age, and impairment: three program groups (DIonly, Dl-concurrent, and total SSI), the usual two sex categories, five age
groups (under 30; 30 to 39; 40 to 49; 50 to 59; and 60 to 64), and four impair
ment categories (mental illness and mental retardation; musculoskeletal; infec
tious diseases, including AIDS/HIV, and impairments not otherwise
classified; 1 and internal organ disorders—including cardiovascular, neo
plasms, and other internal disorders, as well as impairments caused by acci
dents. Thus, we estimated a total of 120 (3x2x5x4) application equations; each
equation refers to applications in a specific program/sex/age/impairment
group.
The 1988-1992 award analysis was performed at a higher level of aggrega
tion—by program and sex only (six equations). While we initially obtained
award data at the more disaggregated level, the 1992 award data were very in
complete because many decisions were still pending. We subsequently ob
tained updated data, but only at the higher level of aggregation.
The 1980-1993 initial determination and initial allowance rate analysis was
performed at a still higher level of aggregation—by program only (Dl-only,
concurrent, and SSI-only).
The models used in all of the analysis have the same structure. In each case
the dependent variable is the (natural) logarithm of one of the following: an ap
plication rate (applications per thousand population); an incidence rate (awards
per thousand population); an initial determination rate (initial determinations
per thousand population); or an initial allowance rate (initial allowances per
initial determination). In the application analysis the population in the denom
inator is for the relevant age/sex group; in the award analysis it is for those age
18 to 64 of the relevant sex; and in the initial determination analysis it is for all
those age 18 to 64.
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The dependent variable in each application equation is the logarithm of an
application rate. For the higher level of aggregation, the rate is male or female
applications for the program per one thousand adult males or females, respec
tively. For the lower level of aggregation, it is an impairment-specific "appli
cation rate" for the age/gender group—the number of applications in the
relevant program category per thousand persons from the age/gender group in
one of the four impairment categories. The dependent variable in the corre
sponding award equation is the corresponding impairment-specific "incidence
rate" —the number of awards in the impairment category per thousand persons
in the age/gender group.
Each equation estimated had the following general form:

]n(Aa ) = p, + p ,*,„ + p^ + . . . + PA, + a, VI, + ... aTVT, + Est
where
Ast is an application, incidence, initial determination, or initial
allowance rate, as specified above, in state s and year t.
p\5 is the intercept for state s (i.e., the equation intercept varies
across states). The intercepts are sometimes referred to as fixed
"state effects" because they capture the effects of all factors that
vary across states but not over time.
X\sti ^2sf' • • •' Xkst are me explanatory variables. For the 19801993 analysis these include both current and prior year values of
selected variables.
P! ... P^ are the coefficients of the X variables, to be estimated.
VI, ... VTt are dummy variables for each year of data except the
first (base) year. VI equals 0 for the first year and 1 for all subse
quent years, V2 equals 0 for the first and second year and 1 for all
subsequent years, etc. VT equals 1 in the last year (T) only.
(Xgg . . . 092 are the coefficients of the year dummies. These are
sometimes called "year" or "time" effects because each coefficient
captures the effects of changes in all national factors in the corre
sponding year that have the same impact on the dependent vari
able in all states.
Est is the error term for state s and year t
As described in the text, the analysis relates within-state changes in the de
pendent variable to changes in the explanatory variables. This is not immedi
ately evident in the above specification, but is in fact correct because of the
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presence of a different intercept for each state. Since these control for all crossstate differences that are fixed over time, they in effect control for all of the
base-year values of the explanatory variables as well as the base-year value of
the dependent variable. Hence, the coefficients of the explanatory variables are
determined by how the dependent variables change over time in relationship to
how the explanatory variables change over time.
The models were estimated by weighted least squares, with weights equal
to the size of the state's population in the relevant age/gender category. This
method yields efficient estimates if the variances of the regression disturbances
are inversely proportional to the size of the group population in the state and
the disturbances are independent across states and over time. Weighted esti
mates also provide better predictions of the national level of applications and
awards relative to unweighted estimates. The reason for this is that they im
prove the fit for large states relative to small states, and growth in large states
determines a large share of national growth.2
We also looked for evidence of serial correlation in the disturbances. In the
1988-92 analysis we assessed the importance of serial and correlation and oth
er dynamic specification issues by comparing the results obtained from weight
ed least squares using the full five years of data to results obtained using just
the first (1988) and last (1992) year of data alone. The main findings were very
robust in this comparison. The individual state intercepts wash out any autocor
relation in the "two-year" estimates, which are the basis of the findings report
ed here. In the 1980-93 analysis it was essential to use all years' observations
in order to examine dynamic aspects of initial determinations and allowance
rates. Hence, we specified a first-order autoregressive model for each state's
weighted disturbance, with a common autocorrelation coefficient for all states.
The estimated coefficient was always between zero and one and usually was
significant. We also found some evidence of spatial correlation in pairs of ad
jacent states, but the evidence was erratic and did not warrant the substantial
effort required to correct for it. Ignoring spatial correlation does not bias pa
rameter estimates but can result in estimated standard errors that are biased to
ward zero. The models were estimated using the Statistical Analysis System
(SAS); the REG procedure was used for the 1988-92 analysis and the MODEL
procedure was used for the 1980-93 analysis. Standard errors for the 1980-93
models were corrected for any cross-state heteroskedasticity in the weighted
disturbances, but this was not done for the 1988-92 analysis.
REGRESSION RESULTS
Selected application and award regression results for the 1988-1992 period
are reported in Exhibit 2A.1. These results were estimated using application
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and award data disaggregated by program and sex only; the voluminous appli
cation results by program, sex, age, and impairment are reported in the appen
dix to Lewin-VHI (1995b). Selected results from the 1980-1993 analysis of
initial determinations and allowance rates appear in Exhibits 2A.2 and 2A.3.
SIMULATION RESULTS FOR 1988-1992
We report simulation results based on the 1988-1992 application and award
models in Exhibit 2A.4. These show the percentage points of average annual
growth in applications or awards during the period that are accounted for by
each variable included in the final regression models, by program and sex. The
application results were obtained by aggregating results simulated by program,
sex, age, and impairment to the level of program and sex. Note that they do not
correspond to the aggregate regression results reported in Exhibit 2A.I, but
those regressions yield results that are very similar. Application simulations by
age and by impairment are reported in the appendix to Lewin-VHI (1995b).
The award simulations are based on the award regressions reported in Exhibit
2 A.I.
Appendix Notes
1.
2.

AIDS/HIV cases first were included in the "other" impairment category before
being recategorized in the infectious disease category.
To test for heteroscedasticity, we estimated White standard errors and found that
they were not significantly different from the standard errors estimated by
weighted least squares.

Exhibit 2A.1 Selected Regression Estimates for Application and Award Regressions, 1988-1992
Dependent variable: logarithm of per capita application or incidence ratio in gender/program category

Variable

Unemployment rate 1

Applications
Awards
Dl-only
Dl-concurrent
SSI-total
Dl-only
Dl-concurrent
SSI-total
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
0.266 0.128 0.323 0.074 0.209 0.050 0.181 0.056 0.189 0.015 0.113 0.065

(7.3)

(4.1)

(1.6)

(5.9)

(1.3)

0.073

0.122

0.086

(3.4)

(6.7)

(4.4)

0.037

0.107

0.078

-0.006

0.029

(1.0)

(2.5)

(2.2)

(-0.2)

(0.6)

GA program cuts2
AIDS/HIV incidence3

(7.7)

IRCA legalizations4
% of children in single
parent families5
-0.010 0.087
Time effect foi
1992 vs. 19886

(4.6)

(1.4)

(3.9)

(0.3)

(2.7)

(1-3)

0.082

0.099

0.085

(3.3)

(4.7)

(3.3)

-0. 091
(-2.2)
-0.068 -0.076
(^.7) (-4.3)

0.016

0.003

(1.3)

(0.2)
0.144

0.129

0.063

(0.7)

(0.9)

(0.4)

0.426

0.403

0.285

0.408

0.280

(-0-D

(0-8)

(1.9)

(2.4)

(2.2)

0.418 -0.142 -0.084 0.086
(3.1) (-1.0) (-0-6) (0.5)

0.056

0.235

0.190

0.388

0.207

0.287

0.165

0.346

0.311

0.474

(2.2)

(14.8)

(6.4)

(16.7)

(8.0)

(14.8)

(6.1)

(16.6)

(9.0)

(16.0) (14.1) (15.6)

NOTE- Coefficients of variables specified in logarithms are elasticities by definition Except for the time effect, all other coefficients have been converted
to elasticities "at the mean" by multiplying the coefficient itself by the mean of the variable. Elasticities in bold type have the expected sign and an abso
lute ^-statistic of at least 2.0 Elasticities in normal type have absolute r-statistics of less than 2.0 Italicized elasticities have the sign opposite that expected
and absolute f-statistics of at least 2 0. A separate intercept for each state was also included in each model (not reported)
'The variable used is the log of the state's unemployment rate.
The GA variable is zero for every state in 1988; in 1992 it is the number of cuts in GA beneficiaries per capita between 1991 and 1992 in seven states and
the District of Columbia and zero in all other states.
3The AIDS/HIV variable is the logarithm of the incidence rate
4The IRCA legalizations variable is zero in 1988 and is the number of legalizations per capita in 1992.
The percentage of children in single parent families is in logarithms.
This coefficient is an estimate of the percentage increase in the dependent variable from 1988 to 1992 that is not accounted for by the explanatory vari
ables.

Exhibit 2A.2 Regression Estimates for Initial Determination Models, 1980-1993
Dependent variable: the log of initial determinations per capita
Explanatory
variables
Expected
application ratea>b
Unemployment
rate b-c
Current
-1
-2
Sum
Labor force
participationa>b
Current
-1
-2
-3

1980-1993
1.00

Dl-only
1980-1987 1988-1993
1.00
1.00

Concurrent
1980-1993 1980-1987 1988-1993 1980-1993
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

SSI-only
1980-1987 1988-1993
1.00

1.00

0086*
(4.06)
0.099*
(4-57)
0.097*
(4.83)
0.282*
(10.5)

0.056*
(1.97)
0.066*
(2.36)
0.117*
(4.40)
0.239*
(7.6)

0099*
(4.05)
0.125*
(4.23)
0.027
(106)
0.251*
(6.9)

0.088*
(2.91)
0.123*
(3.88)
0050
(1.63)
0.261*
(6.6)

0083
(1.90)
0.078
(1.72)
-0.062
(-1 41)
0.099
(1.7)

0.085*
(290)
0132*
(4.20)
0042
(1.36)
0.259*
(6.9)

-0.022
(-0.72)
0.091*
(2.97)
0.073*
(2.42)
0.142*
(3.0)

0.045
(1.04)
0124*
(2.99)
0.085*
(1.99)
0.254*
(4.0)

-0.060
(-1.74)
0.001
(0.04)
-0.006
(-0.16)
-0.065
(-1.5)

-0.634*
(-3 34)
-0.046
(-0.27)
-0.181
(-1.14)
-0.040
(-025)

-0.608*
(-2.60)
0.414*
(1.97)
-0.149
(-0.74)
0.007
(003)

-0616*
(-2.57)
-0.465*
(-2.12)
0.061
(0.28)
-0.378
(-1.70)

0.065
(0.25)
-0.479*
(-2.03)
-0.256
(-1.14)
0118
(0.52)

-0.147
(-042)
-0.773*
(-2.50)
-0.621*
(-2 10)
-0.055
(-0.18)

-0.015
(-0.06)
-0.602*
(-2.48)
-0.371
(-1.53)
-0362
(-1.45)

0.201
(0.77)
-0.427
(-1.78)
-0.820*
(-3.56)
-0.223
(-0.97)

-0.427
(-1.21)
0.052
(0.17)
-0.628*
(-2.11)
-0.117
(-0.39)

0032
(0.11)
-1.196*
(-3.87)
-1.153*
(-3.82)
-0.632*
(-1.99)

-1.398*
(-3.5)

-0072
(-1.45)
-0008
(-1.18)

-0.336
(-0.8)
-0.180*
(-2.46)
-0011
(-0.43)

0.534*
(1434)
-6.469

0.344*
(5.81)
-6.454

0.172*
(226)
-6.746

-0.083*
(-7.01)
-0.187*
(-15.25)
-0.095*
(-8.75)
-0001
(-005)

-0.071*
(-5.60)
-0.187*
(-14.26)
-0.091*
(-8.14)
-0.011
(-082)

-0.901*
(-2.8)

Sum
Manufacturing
employment3'*5
AIDS/HIV6

-0.072
(-0.66)
0.004
(0.58)

Poverty3'13
GA changes
AFDCa
SSI supplements3
Autoregressive
param'eter
Weighted state
intercept
Time effects 1981
1982
1983
1984

-0.552
(-1.2)

-1.596*
(-2.8)

-1.350*
(-2.8)

-1.269*
(-2.3)

-1.120
(-1.7)

-2.949*
(-4.9)

-0.018
(-1 79)
0.037
(1.34)
0.002
(0.60)
-0.010
(-020)
0.382*
(4.34)

-0.003
(-0.10)
0.091*
(2.37)
-0.003
(-0.87)
-0.003
(-0.05)
0.758*
(6.11)

-0.019*
(-1.98)
0.007
(026)
0004*
(213)
-0.008
(-0.09)
0.284
(1.90)

-0.022
(-0.64)
0.065
(1.76)
0.009*
(2.20)
-0.303*
(-4.90)
0.734*
(5.82)

0.018
(1.57)
0.018
(0.56)
0005*
(218)
0.091
(0.90)
0.840*
(4.39)

0.515*
(14.99)
-2.494

0.278*
(4.64)
2.180

0.368*
(4.92)
-3.681

-0.032*
(-3.04)
0045
(1-79)
0005
(1.79)
-0.226*
(-3.84)
0.801*
(767)
0.727*
(22.95)
0.147

0.503*
(9.14)
-1.636

0.338*
(4.46)
4.709

-0.117*
(-640)
-0160*
(-9.04)
0044*
(2-81)
0.080*
(4.76)

-0.119*
(-5.49)
-0.158*
(-7.67)
0.063*
(3.36)
0.115*
(545)

-0.120*
(-6.75)
-0.169*
(-9.49)
0.030
(1.91)
0.051*
(3.02)

-0.140*
(-6.87)
-0 190*
(-9-74)
0.016
(0.89)
0.064*
(319)
(continued)

Exhibit 2A.2 (continued)
Dl-only
Concurrent
SSI-only
1980-1993 1980-1987 1988-1993 1980-1993 1980-1987 1988-1993 1980-1993 1980-1987 1988-1993
-0.028*
1985 -0.015
0.035*
0.032*
0055*'
0.062*
(-1.40)
(-245)
(2.12)
(199)
(3 73)
(3.78)
1986 0.070*
0.067*
0.219*
0.204*
0.157*
0.160*
(6.73)
(6.16)
(1253)
(15.20)
(1092)
(995)
0019
1987 0.028*
0.016
0.036*
0.057*
0.057*
(2.94)
(1.84)
(2.23)
(1.15)
(4.15)
(358)
-0.082*
1988 0.011
0.052*
(1.17)
(-6.05)
(381)
-0.035*
-0.032*
-0.008
1989 -0.005
0032*
0035*
(-0.49)
(-0.89)
(-2.60)
(-2 93)
(242)
(2.81)
0.026*
1990 0.032*
0.091*
0.096*
0.093*
0.102*
(3.40)
(3.06)
(922)
(6.80)
(7.10)
(8.58)
0009
1991 0014
0.091*
0.098*
0.161*
0.187*
(1.42)
(0.98)
(6.74)
(9-17)
(12 14)
(14.94)
0.035*
1992 0.038*
0.171*
0.175*
0.281*
0.328*
(4.10)
(4.24)
(13.69)
(12.13)
(19.38)
(21.72)
0.004
1993 0003
0.106*
0.107*
0.169*
0.146*
(0.38)
(0.26)
(7.87)
(627)
(1000)
(901)
SOURCE Lewm-VHI analysis of SSA data on initial disability determinations, using data for all 50 states and the Distnct of Columbia. SSI-only esti
mates include children.
aVanable is in logarithms
bVanable is age-adjusted.
* Significant at the 0.05 level.
Explanatory
variables

Exhibit 2A.3 Regression Estimates for Allowance Rate Models, 1980-1993
Dependent variable: the log of initial allowance rates
Explanatory
variables
Unemployment
ratea'b
Current
-1
-2
Sum
Labor force
participation3'15
Current
-1
-2
-3

1980-1993

Dl-only
1980-1987

(-6.5)

-0.002
(-007)
-0.058
(-1 63)
-0.102*
(-325)
-0.162*
(-4.4)

0.383*
(196)
0.047
(027)
-0404*
(-2.40)
0 116
(0.68)

0726*
(2.52)
-0.034
(-0.13)
0.308
(1.33)
0.620*
(269)

0.032
(142)
-0.104*
M54)
-0115*
(-5.41)
-0.187*

1988-1993

Concurrent
1980-1993 1980-1987 1988-1993 1980-1993

0.000
(0.00)
-0 158*

-0.105*

(-5.66)
-0.136*

(-2.89)
-0.132*

M.83)
-0.294*

(-3.07)
-0.367*

(-6.1)

-0.051
(-1 34)
-0.208*
M94)
-0.045
(-1 15)
-0.304*
(-6.1)

(-6.9)

(-6.2)

-0037
(-1.27)
-0.148*
(-4-77)
-0.097*
(-3 16)
-0.282*
(-6.9)

-0.335
(-0 75)
-0.381
(-1.04)
0175
(0.49)
0.780*
(2.25)

0.477
(1.33)
1.066*
(294)
-1.114*
(-3.11)
0.254
(0.69)

-0.238
(-094)
-0.131
(-0.58)
-0034
(-0.16)
0.584*
(2.71)

0.071
(0.21)
-0143
(-051)
0.605*
(2.22)
0.772*
(2.91)

-0.112
(-0.42)
0.485
(1.74)
-0.345
(-1.25)
1.128*
(377)

-0.209*

(-2.29)
-0.154*

-0.027
(-0.77)
-0.188*
(-5.28)
-0.113*
(-3.23)
-0.328*

(-4.2)

(-6.5)

0.863*
(3.44)
0.783*
(345)
-0.844*

-0358
(-1.13)
-0.040
(-0.14)
-0.498
(-1 82)
0.220
(0.80)

0003
(0.13)
-0099*
(-3.53)
-0058*

(-3.72)
-0.104
(-0.44)

SSI-only
1980-1987 1988-1993

(-3.74)
-0.130*
(-2.40)
-0 132*
(-2.54)
-0.471*

(-2 39)
-0.130*

(continued)
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Exhibit 2A.3 (continued)
Explanatory
variables
Sum
Manufacturing
employment3'6
AIDS/HIVa
Povertya'b

o

1980-1993
0.142
(0.4)
-0.074
(-1-47)
0.0 11
(1.56)

Dl-only
1980-1987
1.620*
(3.6)
0.036
(0.54)
0.001
(004)

1988-1993
0.698
(1.4)
0.152
(1.32)
-0.010
(-1.46)

0.547*
(15.45)
-1.001

0.283*
(4.81)
-0.924

0.461*
(6.36)
-0.870

-0.052*
(-4.29)
-0.017
(-1.30)

0.051*
(3.98)
0.018
(0.57)
0.001
(0.22)
0.052
(071)
-0.127
(-1.12)
0.620*
(1776)
-2.406

0.124*
(276)
0.065
(1.47)
-0.012
(-1.85)
0.053
(0.66)
0.187
(1.23)
0.455*
(7.95)
1.554

-0.083*

-0.056*

-0.100*

(-5.29)
-0.013
(-0.83)

(-2.60)
-0.053*

(-3.84)
-0.037
(-1.49)

GA changes
AFDCa
SSI supplements'5
Autoregressive
parameter
Weighted state
intercept
Time effects
1981
1982

Concurrent
1980-1998 1980-1987 1988-1993 1980-1993
-0.676
0.239
0.683
0.181
(-1.2)
(0.3)
(0.8)
(0.4)

(-2.49)

-0.006
(-0.56)
-0.005
(-0.13)
0.004*
(2.08)
-0.163
(-1.17)
0.280
(1.08)
0.563*
(8.31)
0.140

SSI-only
1980-1987 1988-1993
1.156*
1.305*
(2.1)
(2.4)

0.042*
(3.82)
-0.014
(-0.57)
0.002
(0.77)
0.166*
(2.84)
-0.139
(-1.50)
0.685*
(20.34)
-0745

0.064*
(2.02)
0051
(1-37)
-0.010*
(-2.13)
0.121*
(2.06)
0.022
(0.20)
0.293*
(4.86)
0.750

-0.025
(-1-45)
-0.007
(-0.41)

-0.057*
(-2.65)
0004
(0.18)

-0.008
(-0.90)
-0.017
(-064)
0.006*
(2.83)
0.028
(0.31)
0411*
(2.18)
0.529*
(7.73)
4.476

1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

0.120*
(10.62)
0.110*
(8.96)
0.007
(0.67)
0.021
(1.92)
-0.057*
(-5.67)
-0.041*
(-406)
0.002
(0.25)
0.009
(0.87)
0.079*
(7.79)
0.059*
(593)
-0.088*
(-7 17)

0.120*
(8.82)
0.096*
(6.25)
0020
(1.45)
0025
(1.93)
-0.063*
(-5.30)

0.010
(1.19)
0.022*
(2.61)
0.102*
(11.04)
0.071*
(9.02)
-0.075*
(-6.95)

0.218*
(11.64)
0.193*
(9.59)
0.011
(0.62)
0.098*
(5.70)
-0.131*
(-7.79)
-0.062*
(-3.77)
0.004
(026)
0.037*
(2.31)
0.061*
(3.78)
0.088*
(5.00)
-0.158*
(-7.58)

0.220*
(9.83)
0.160*
(6.40)
0.017
(0.85)
0090*
(4.69)
-0.150*
(-7.86)

0.003
(022)
0.044*
(334)
0.068*
(4.97)
0.094*
(524)
-0.105*
(-5.85)

0.168*
(11.35)
0136*
(8.62)
-0.022
(-1.59)
0.064*
(4.66)
-0.115*
(-8.75)
-0071*
(-5.48)
-0.009
(-068)
0.077*
(6.15)
0.093*
(7.38)
0.064*
(4.65)
-0.126*
(-7.48)

0.168*
(9.25)
0 111*
(5.51)
-0018
(-1.03)
0.060*
(3.67)
-0.126*
(-8.34)

-0.001
(-0.10)
0087*
(8.05)
0.091*
(8.60)
0070*
(5.11)
-0.071*
(-5.03)

SOURCE Lewm-VHI analysis of SSA data on initial disability determinations, using data for all 50 states and the District of Columbia SSI-only estimates include children
aVanable is in logarithms.
Variable is age-adjusted
*Sigmficant at the 0.05 level.

Exhibit 2A.4 Decomposition of the Growth in Applications and Awards, 1988-1992
Change in annual
applications or
awards, 1988-92

Level
Applications
Dl-total
Men
Women
SSI-total

329,369
182,649
146,720
434,274

Predicted annual growth rate accounted for by
Average Predicted Population
Children
Unem
annual
annual
growth
GA
IRCA
in singlegrowth growth
and
ployment program AIDS/ legalizaparent
rate
rate
aging
rate
cuts
HIV
tions
families
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
89
7.9
10.5

4.1
5.0
26
4.3

1.3
1.3
1.3

Men

227,938

Women
Awards
Dl-total

206,336

10.5
107
10.3

197,569

10.0

23

1.0

Men

110,971

2.8

Women

86,598
234,393

8.8
12.1

1.1
10
1.1

SSI-total

5.4

1.2
1.2

3.0

1.1

1.3

17

Interaction
(%)

Share of
growth
accounted
for
(%)

0.1
0.1

0.5

0.3

2.2

0.9

0.9
1.1

0.2
0.4

0.6

0.4

0.2

1.6
06

0.7
0.4

0.9

0.2

0.6
0.5

0.2

0.6

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.1

10
1.4

0.1

01
0.1

0.0
-0.1

0.1
O.I

23

0.1

-1.0

0.0
-01

11

-05

0.0
0.2

-10

-1.0

0.2

-0.1

6

-1.0

01

-0.1

9

0.3
0.7

12.0
0.6
09
Men
115,059
1.1
12.2
0.9
0.7
0.6
Women
109,334
11.8
1.0
0.5
1 1
0.5
SOURCE Simulations based on regression analysis of state data for 1988 and 1992

0.2
0.3

46
63
25
41
50
30

31
7

Comments on Chapter 2
Edward Yelin
University of California, San Francisco

The econometric findings reported by Stapleton et al. (Chapter 2)
demonstrate a strong relationship between state unemployment rates
and the growth in applications for Social Security Disability Insurance
(DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs. The analysis
is more sophisticated than previous research demonstrating this rela
tionship, principally because the researchers were able to incorporate
effects due to changes in the demographic structure and in how
national program rules were implemented in different states (Hambor
1975; Levitan and Taggart 1977; and Lando, Coate, and Kraus 1979).
Given the strength of these findings and the consistency of these
results with those of other researchers, policy makers concerned with
DI and SSI would do well to evaluate the forces in the economy that
give rise to increases in applications during periods of economic uncer
tainty. In this commentary, I will outline some of the long-term trends
that may account for the short-term problems in disability compensa
tion programs. In suggesting a focus on long-term changes, my
hypothesis is that persons with disabilities, like minorities and others
facing difficulties in the labor market, have experienced a dispropor
tionate amount of the shift in the kind and nature of employment.
Cyclical downturns may exacerbate some of these changes, or they
may legitimate applications for benefits that would not be approved
during good times.
Table 1 lists a few of the changes in the labor market that have
occurred during the last two decades or so. As men, especially older
men, have exited the labor force, women have entered the labor force
in record numbers, a trend especially pronounced among younger
women. These changes are associated with the shift from a manufac
turing to a service economy, with men disproportionately represented
in the former and women in the latter (Yelin 1992). At the same time,
the nature of work has changed. Smaller proportions of the labor force
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Table 1 Long-Cycle Complements to Short-Cycle Phenomena

Declining employment rates of men, especially older men
Rising employment rates of women, especially younger women
Declining employment in manufacturing
Rising employment in services
Increase in part-time employment
Increase in contingent employment, including self-employment
temporary, leased, and contract workers
• Declining percentage with employer-provided health insurance
and pensions

•
•
•
•
•
•

are in full-time, full-year jobs. Greater proportions are self-employed.
In addition, greater proportions are not actually hired by the firms for
whom they do the work. Instead, they may work on a contract basis or
may be employed by a temporary firm. Increasing numbers are
employed permanently by a contractor who then "leases" the workers
to the firm for whom the work is done (Osterman 1988). Finally,
smaller proportions of the labor force report receiving health insurance
or pension coverage from their employer (U.S. Bureau of the Census
1993; Yelin 1992).
Employment data .do not cover all these phenomena, but the data
that are available are consistent with the notion that persons with dis
abilities experience these trends disproportionately. Table 2 compares
overall rates of labor force participation for 1970-1972 and 19901992. Among all men, labor force participation rates declined slightly,
by 2.6 percent. Among all men age 55 to 64, labor force participation
declined more steeply, by 16.0 percent overall. Among all men with
disabilities, labor force participation rates declined by more than 15
percent, almost ten times the decline experienced by men without dis
abilities. Similarly, among men age 55 to 64 with disabilities, labor
force participation rates declined by more than twice as much as
among men these ages without disabilities. In contrast, among women,
those with disabilities shared in the growth in employment among all
women. Indeed, young women with disabilities experienced larger rel
ative growth than those without disabilities.
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Table 2 Change in Rate of Employment of Persons with and without
Disabilities, 1970-1972 vs. 1990-1992
With disabilities

Without disabilities

All

All men
Men, 55-64

-15.3

-1.6

-2.6

-29.3

-13.7

-16.0

All women

41.5

40.8

39.8

Women, 18-44

49.6

45.5

44.8

1.1

11.1

13.7

All persons

SOURCE- Adapted from Yelm and Katz (1994, Table 1)

Aggregating across a small net decrease in labor force participation
rates among all men and a large net increase among all women, overall
labor force participation rates increased by 13.7 percent during the
period covered. However, the net gain among persons with disabilities
was small, while among those without disabilities, it was ten times as
large.
Labor force trends among persons with disabilities would appear to
be tied to the contraction of manufacturing and the expansion of ser
vices (Table 3). In 1970, persons with disabilities held 9 percent of
manufacturing jobs. This proportion declined in the ensuing period, so
that by 1987 their share of manufacturing jobs fell to 8.3 percent.
Meanwhile, the share of jobs in services held by persons with disabili
ties increased, albeit not in a linear fashion, from 9.8 percent to 11.6
percent, almost 20 percent in relative terms.
The foregoing data are broadly consistent with the notion that per
sons with disabilities are prone to a last-hired, first-fired phenomenon,
displaced in declining industries and at higher rates than men without
disabilities, but hired in expanding ones and at similar rates to women
without disabilities.
In addition, persons with disabilities would appear to experience
short-term trends in employment disproportionately. Table 4 shows
labor force participation rates for persons with and without disabilities
for the period 1981-1983, a recession; 1983-1990, an expansionary
era; and 1990-1992, the most recent recession. In the two recessions,
persons with disabilities experienced much larger declines in employ-
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Table 3 Share of Employment among Persons with Disabilities, by Sector
and Year
197019821987
8.3
8.9
9.0
Manufacturing
Services__________9.8_________9.1_________11.6
SOURCE. Author's analysis of National Health Interview Survey.

Table 4 Cyclical Trends in Employment of Persons with and without
Disabilities (%)
_____Years_____ With disabilities ___ Without disabilities
^5-LO
1981-83
8.8
14.0
1983-90
____1990-92__________-4.1____________-0.8______
SOURCE Author's analysis of Annual March Supplement to Current Population Survey

ment than those without disabilities. In contrast, they experienced a
larger relative increase in employment when overall employment rates
were growing.
The long-term phenomenon of displacement of persons with dis
abilities—particularly men—from industries shedding workers and the
short-term downturns combine to generate a large pool of applicants
for disability compensation programs. In addition, other changes in the
nature of work, including the loss of security, the erosion of benefits,
and stagnant wages exacerbate these pressures, as does the aging of the
population and the growing prominence of conditions that begin earlier
in life, including mental impairments and HIV-related illness.
Stapleton and colleagues have improved the confidence with which
we can state that economic downturns increase the number of appli
cants. However, the long-term trends in employment play an important
role in creating the pressure that emerges in recessions. Thus, although
we confidently can predict that some of the pressure on disability com
pensation programs will relent with the end of a recession we also can
predict that until the employment patterns of persons with disabilities
match those of persons without, the pressure will return with the next
recession.
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Comments on Chapter 2
Paul R. Cullinan
Congressional Budget Office

There is an old saying that goes something like the following: "the
more things change the more they stay the same." Perhaps nowhere is
this more true in the public policy arena than for income support pro
grams for the disabled. Despite significant changes in assistive technol
ogy and in the legal status of persons with disabilities, many of the
issues raised in Chapter 2 were addressed in a various forums during
the 1970s. How do economic factors influence the demand and supply
of income support for the disabled? How can enhanced work incen
tives in disability benefit programs be implemented without making the
programs more attractive to the millions of nonrecipients with signifi
cant health problems? Can rehabilitation services be effective in
enabling disabled persons to participate more fully in the workplace?
How consistent is the administration of the programs across different
levels of adjudication, among states, and across different types of med
ical impairments?
My comments refer to the analysis of initial determinations and
allowance rates for the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs over the 1976-1993
period. Unlike most studies, this chapter analyses state-level data over
the period rather than national data or microdata. The authors argue
that this allows them to isolate state-specific effects from the impact of
national trends or changes in law. Moreover, the authors analyze the
effects for several subperiods in order to examine the stability of their
estimates. As they had hypothesized, initial determinations and allow
ances for disability benefits are strongly correlated with changes in the
unemployment rate—i.e., higher unemployment rates lead to increased
applications and to more allowances. These findings are similar to
those of studies conducted in the 1970s.
NOTE: These comments represent the views of the author and do not reflect any offi
cial position of the Congressional Budget Office.
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My comments focus on the adequacy of the economic modeling and
on some programmatic factors that I think are critical which the
authors have either ignored or have treated inadequately. While the
authors have done a commendable job in employing state-level data in
their modeling, I think they have relied too heavily on their state and
time variables to capture the effects of changing program parameters.
The authors address the issues of applying for disability benefits
from an economic perspective that individuals with severe health
impairments will choose to apply for benefits when the expected
returns are high compared with the rewards of market employment.
Because this is most relevant for persons applying for DI, my com
ments will focus on this group of applicants. In their analysis, returns
from work are modeled indirectly through unemployment rates, labor
force participation rates, and manufacturing's share of total employ
ment. There are no social security-specific variables because the pro
gram is not assumed to vary by state. Any differences among states are
supposed to be captured within the state dummy variables, and any
social security changes would be controlled for through the time vari
ables.
The implications of this specification are that higher unemployment
rates increase job search costs, increase worker uncertainty about job
stability, and may lead to slower wage growth. Similarly, declining
manufacturing employment is assumed to be associated with an
increased scarcity of "good" jobs. Ceteris paribus, a worsening of any
of these conditions would be expected to tilt the scales toward
increased applications for DI.
The potential returns from applying for public benefits depend on
the level of benefits (both cash and in-kind), the rate at which benefits
will change over time, and the expense of applying for the benefits. But
an overriding concern is likely to be the probability of actually being
allowed to receive the benefits and to retain the benefits over the
remainder of the person's working life. Given the relatively stringent
eligibility standards for DI, the potential applicant must also weigh the
loss of earnings capacity that might occur while the applicant is out of
work waiting for a final disability determination. Only a minority of
unsuccessful applicants are able to find market employment after they
have been denied DI benefits.
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The authors use time variables to proxy programmatic changes, but
interpreting the variables' coefficients is not straight-forward. The vari
ables may be picking up the impact of macroeconomic or fiscal policy
effects not captured by the other instruments in the regression equa
tions. Moreover, even within the arena of social security policy, the
coefficients may be influenced by a number of changing program
parameters—sometimes operating in opposing directions. During the
period, there were significant legislative changes affecting the generos
ity of benefits and major changes in administrative factors as well. The
1977 and 1980 social security amendments resulted in reduced benefits
for a significant portion of the applicant pool, particularly younger
adults with families. The phasing-out of student benefits in the Omni
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 also lessened family benefits
for applicants with older children. In addition, the administrative cli
mate over the 1977-1982 period was one of much greater scrutiny of
applications and allowances, with applications declining by more than
17 percent and initial allowance rates falling from 47 percent in 1977
to 29 percent by 1982. The fact that applications continued to decline
amidst the worst recession in the postwar experience is very likely an
indication that potential applicants recognized that it was much more
difficult to be found disabled by the Social Security Administration
than it had been in the previous decade.
As if these programmatic factors weren't enough, several other
aspects of program administration also played a role. First, an increas
ing number of denied applicants are appealing their denials to obtain a
hearing with an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Moreover, the ALJs
are reversing a larger and larger share of the determinations that they
review, with the reversal rate climbing from around 60 percent in 1987
to 75 percent in 1992. The result is that more than one-half of the
growth in awards from 1986-1992 came from reversals by ALJs.
Because the authors' analysis for the 1980-1993 period focuses on ini
tial determinations, this large and critical contributor to program
growth is ignored.
Although the quality control data of the Social Security Administra
tion (SSA) have indicated little change in the accuracy of decisions
made by state Disability Determination Services (DDSs), there are rea
sons to suspect that the DDSs may not be as thorough as they were in
the early 1980s, thereby leading to higher reversal rates upon appeal.
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Despite a 60 percent increase in the number of decisions made by
DDSs over the 1986-1993 period, DOS staffing levels were virtually
unchanged leading to decisions per staff year rising from 149 in 1986
to 247 in 1993. Such a large increase in productivity over a relatively
short period is remarkable, and it would be surprising—at least to cer
tain observers—if none of this gain was in fact attributable to a less
comprehensive review of applications by the DDSs.
Another and possibly related pattern is the increasing use of voca
tional factors in disability determinations. In 1983, only 17.7 percent of
awards at the initial determination level depended on vocational fac
tors; the comparable figure for 1991 was 31.7 percent. This trend might
be expected to increase the frequency with which the determinations
are questioned, because decisions based on vocational considerations
rather than solely medical evaluations tend to be more subjective.
Federal court decisions and the SSA's responses to them can also
change the calculus facing the potential applicant. Since 1986, SSA
has had a policy of acquiescing to circuit court decisions for all cases
in that particular circuit. Consequently, instead of having a unified fed
eral policy concerning disability determinations, the standards vary
from state to state and from one judicial circuit to another. This raises
questions about the interpretation of the coefficients of the state
dummy variables as indicators of state-specific effects rather than of
programmatic differences.
Despite these limitations, the authors' analysis is encouraging to
researchers in the area. Given the aging of the baby-boom population
into the stages of life with higher disability rates, it is important to
understand better the factors that influence growth in public disability
programs. This study and many others like it are necessary if we are to
have enough information to adapt our nation's support system for the
disabled in an ever-changing society.

Comments on Chapter 2
Richard G. Frank
Harvard Medical School

The point of departure for the analysis reported in Chapter 2 is that
there has been substantial growth in applications and awards under
both the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Social Security Dis
ability Insurance (DI) disability programs over the period 1988-1992.
The chapter represents an effort to look behind the overall trends in
program growth and to identify some basic forces that might be con
tributing to the impressive rates of growth in awards. The authors pro
ceed by gathering evidence from a variety of sources. They make use
of econometric analysis, interviews with experts, and documentary
materials on program changes. This is a very appealing approach to
developing a complete view of the evolution of two complex programs.
In the comments below, I will attempt to accomplish three things.
First, I will highlight several key observations made by the authors
about the nature of growth during the period. Second, I will review
their list of key forces that may be most important for understanding
the exceptionally high growth in SSI and DI awards in the mental ill
ness category. Finally, I will comment in some detail on three forces
that may offer the most promising explanations and discuss what I
found to be most persuasive in the authors' work and where more anal
ysis may be needed.

BASICS
In assessing the growth in disability awards under SSI and SSDI, the
authors decompose growth by two variables: 1) program status—DIonly, SSI-only, and DI/SSI concurrently; and 2) impairment class—
i.e., disease class. When the data are stratified by these two factors, a
number of important observations immediately emerge that serve to
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focus the rest of their work. The first observation is that even though
changes in both application and allowance rates occurred during the
1988 to 1992 period, it was the rise in application rates that made the
largest contribution to the growth in awards for all three program
classes (83 percent for Dl-only, 91.8 percent for DI/SSI, and 91.2 per
cent for SSI-only). The second observation is that the growth in both
applications and allowance rates for the mental illness class were well
above the overall rates of growth for all impairments. For example, for
the SSI-only program class, the growth in applications was 86 percent
for mental illness, compared to 66.9 percent for all conditions. The
third observation is that the growth in the application rate for the men
tal illness class was above that for all other conditions, thereby driving
up the growth in awards for this impairment group above that for all
impairments.

EXPLANATIONS
Five basic explanations are offered in Chapter 2. Table 1 associates
each type of explanation according to which component of the award
rate it is most likely to affect. The likely impact of changes in the
Social Security Administration criteria are clear and were relevant pri
marily to mental illness, so I will not address that factor in any detail
here. State outreach activities have also been well documented and dis
cussed by the authors, so that I will not deal with that policy change.
Cost Shifting
This factor involves economic choices that differ from those typi
cally discussed in the context of disability policy. The choices made in
cost shifting behavior are generally not initially made by program ben
eficiaries or potential beneficiaries. Issues related to cost shifting are
among the most important discussed by the authors. They present some
very suggestive econometric evidence showing that decisions about the
structure of state income support programs made by state governments
may have large impacts on federal disability programs and the federal
budget. The primary policy analyzed by the authors is the impact of
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Table 1 Explanations of Observed Trends

Explanations
SSA criteria

Applications

V

Cost shifting

V
V

Recession

V

Demographics/need

V

State outreach

Allowance

cuts in state General Assistance (GA) programs. They show that the
impact on growth in awards for the mental illness category is espe
cially large and significant.
It is important to note that there is more to the cost shifting story
than GA cuts. A question implied by the line of research pursued by
the authors is: What has changed for states to make cost shifting more
attractive in the late 1980s and early 1990s? Part of the explanation
offered by the authors relates to fiscal pressure on state budgets due to
1) the economic slowdown of the early 1990s, and 2) limits placed on
growth and taxation at the state level. Also growth in nonhealth and
human service segments of state budgets, such as prisons, may have
caused states to more aggressively pursue other ways to pay for income
support and medical assistance for indigent people.
A second explanation is important in explaining the growth of
awards for mental disability. During the late 1980s a number of states
were decentralizing their public mental health systems. Decentraliza
tion was usually accompanied by altered financial incentives for local
government. Among the most important changes was abandoning defi
cit funding of local mental health programs. The result is strong incen
tives to enroll people in programs where federal dollars can be
captured, since localities can keep the state dollars offset by the federal
monies. This is an area where more probing would undoubtedly be
valuable.

Recession
The authors advance two explanations about how the recession gen
erates the observed pattern of awards by impairment class. The first

106

Frank

argues that the recession hits "marginal" workers hardest. The second
posits that the recession causes mental illness. The evidence on the first
is reasonably strong. There is also other evidence suggesting that the
marginal worker effect is not a transitory phenomenon. Recent papers
by Cutler and Katz (1991) and Levy and Murname (1992) show that
throughout the 1980s demand for labor shifted away from low-skill,
low-education workers. The severely mentally ill disproportionately
fall into this group.
The second explanation offered, that recessions cause mental ill
ness, is not very persuasive. If one examines rates of major mental dis
orders in the 1980-1983 and the 1990-1991 periods, one is struck by
the stability in prevalence rates. Moreover, if one examines the
research on mental health and work where there exists some opportu
nity to sequence events, the impact of mental health on work is far
stronger than the effect of work on mental illness.
The last point builds on the impact of mental illness on social out
comes such as work. Virtually all the research in this area suggests that
mental disorders lead to elevated rates of divorce, early marriage and
child-bearing in women, and lower levels of household income. This
accords well with the observations that 1) SSI mental illness awardees
are more female than the overall SSI population; and 2) females in the
mental illness impairment group tend to be older than other SSI
females.

CONCLUSIONS
The authors have carefully examined available evidence and used
good sense and solid statistical analysis to study SSI award growth by
impairment class. They have offered some important empirical clues
about what matters most. A particularly unsettling finding relates to
cost shifting behavior. The result suggests that state welfare reforms
may lead to shifting of responsibility to federal programs and new
pressures on the federal budget. I believe they are pointing to key fac
tors that need immediate analysis in order to understand the conse
quences of our newest political currents as they become policy.
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3 The Impact of Health Care Costs
and Medicaid on SSI Participation
Aaron S. Yelowitz
University of California, Los Angeles

From 1984 to 1993, the disabled Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) population grew at an annual average rate of about 9.2 percent
(U.S. House of Representatives 1994). This chapter asks whether the
availability of public health insurance through the Medicaid program
contributed to the caseload growth. I specifically examine the effect of
increasing Medicaid's value on SSI participation. I focus my analysis
largely on the working-age population by examining the SSI participa
tion behavior of adults between the ages of 18 and 64 using the Current
Population Survey (CPS) data spanning the years 1987 to 1992.
Unlike the dramatic Medicaid program reforms for pregnant women
and children who might otherwise be eligible for Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC), and for the elderly who might otherwise
be eligible for SSI, the extensions of Medicaid for the disabled during
the 1980s were relatively minor. 1 Although I cannot use the type of leg
islative variation that has been used in other research to assess the
importance of Medicaid for other populations, I will assess the imporNOTE: Work on this chapter was supported by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Planning and Evaluation in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the
Social Security Administration. It solely reflects the opinions and interpretations of the
author. This chapter summarizes preliminary findings from a larger study, "Why Did
the SSI-Disabled Program Grow So Much? Disentangling the Effect of Medicaid." I
am grateful for the helpful comments and encouragement from Janet Cume, Wei-Yin
Hu, James Poterba, David Stapleton, Duncan Thomas, and Barbara Wolfe. Kimberly
Dietnch kindly provided some of the state-level data used in the analysis. Gloria
Chiang and Shen Zwirlein provided excellent research assistance. Any errors are the
sole responsibility of the author. Correspondence may be sent to me at Department of
Economics, University of California, Los Angeles, 405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles,
California 90095-1477. Telephone: (310)825-5665. Fax: (310)825-9528. E-mail:
yelowitz@prometheus.sscnet.ucla.edu.
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tance of health insurance for the disabled using variation in Medicaid
expenditure across states.
The primary estimation technique (instrumental variables) leads to
the conclusion that the rising value of Medicaid contributed greatly to
the increase in the SSI rolls in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The
instrumental variable estimates suggest that around one-quarter of the
increase can be explained by this. In addition, the effects of Medicaid
are much more important for the white population than the AfricanAmerican population. The remainder of the paper is organized as fol
lows. The next section provides some background on SSI and Medicaid and reviews the economic importance of Medicaid for other
populations, followed by presentation of some theoretical consider
ations. Next, a descriptive analysis of the CPS data is presented. The
regression results follow, and a final section explores policy implica
tions.

INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Background on the SSI Adult Disabled and Medicaid Program
SSI was introduced in 1974, replacing state-run programs for the
needy aged, blind, and disabled. In 1993, $23.5 billion was spent on
SSI cash benefits for these groups. While the number of elderly and
blind SSI participants remained stable, the number of disabled SSI par
ticipants increased from 2.9 million recipients in 1988 to 4.0 million
recipients in 1992.
In addition to having limited income and assets, an adult between
the ages of 18 and 64 must be disabled to qualify for SSI. For purposes
of eligibility, disabled individuals are those "unable to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determined physi
cal or mental impairment expected to result in death or that has lasted,
or can be expected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12
months." While this definition may appear to be quite objective, eligi
bility standards, especially for mental impairments, have changed due
to legislative, regulatory, and judicial action (U.S. General Accounting
Office 1995).
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Besides receiving a monthly cash supplement, Medicaid provides
the disabled adult with a second valuable benefit from SSI participa
tion. Each state's Medicaid program offers its own package of covered
medical services within broad federal guidelines. Federal law requires
states to offer eight mandatory services and allows them of offer thirtyone optional services.2 Although only 15 percent of all Medicaid bene
ficiaries are disabled, they account for a much larger share of Medicaid
costs. The average spending on disabled beneficiaries amounted to
$7,717 per beneficiary in fiscal year 1993.3 In contrast, average spend
ing on nondisabled recipients was $2,233.
For disabled adults, there is little opportunity to receive public
health insurance except by participating in SSI. A notable exception to
this is section 1619 of the SSI law, which is intended to remove some
of the work disincentives for the disabled. Section 1619(a) of the law
provides continuation of cash benefits on the basis of disability even if
earnings are at or above the "substantial gainful activity" level as long
there is not a medical improvement in the disabling condition. Under
section 1619(b), disabled individuals can continue to be eligible for
Medicaid even if their earnings take them past the SSI breakeven point.
These provisions turn out to be quite minor, however. In September
1992, just 48,000 of the 2.6 million disabled adults between the ages of
18 and 64 participated in either the 1619(a) or 1619(b) program (U.S.
House of Representatives 1993).
Prior Studies of Medicaid and Welfare Participation
While the Medicaid program was introduced thirty years ago, and
the program costs have been soaring, only recently has the program
garnered much academic interest. The key obstacle in assessing Med
icaid 's impact on outcomes such as welfare participation has been that
eligibility for Medicaid and cash benefits had been highly correlated.
The reason that most of the recent academic interest on Medicaid has
focused on its interaction with AFDC and not SSI is due to the belief
that the behavioral elasticities of the blind, elderly, and disabled are
extremely small.
Several studies have examined the impact of Medicaid on AFDC
participation and work effort. While some of the earlier studies found
that Medicaid had a surprisingly small effect on the AFDC and labor
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market decisions of female-headed households, more recent work has
found larger effects.
Blank (1989) exploits the fact that the average Medicaid expenditure
differs tremendously across states. 4 She used data on 475 femaleheaded households from the 1980 National Medical Care Utilization
and Expenditure Study (NMCUES). She finds that health problems
significantly increased AFDC participation, but that program rules—
such as the presence of the Medically Needy (MN) program or the
value of Medicaid insurance coverage—had insignificant effects on
AFDC usage. The effects on the MN program are not necessarily sur
prising because eight of the thirty MN states in her sample had a pro
tected income level below the maximum AFDC payment level. More
surprising was the robustness of the finding that the mean state-specific
Medicaid insurance value did not affect AFDC participation.
Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) construct an individual-specific valuation
of health insurance to surmount Medicaid's collinearity with AFDC
eligibility and benefits levels. They note that a Medicaid variable that is
constructed from a state-specific average may not proxy for the valua
tion of the Medicaid program by any particular family. They link 545
female-headed households from the 1984 Survey of Income and Pro
gram Participation to the 1980 NMCUES for health information to
construct a "heterogeneity" index for Medicaid's value based on differ
ent health characteristics of the woman and her family. This index
yields enormous variation in Medicaid: the total actuarial values range
from $2.18 to $2,740 per individual, which is then combined across
family members to get a family-specific value. Using this approach,
they find sizable effects of Medicaid on labor market outcomes: if all
workers were covered by private health insurance, AFDC participation
would fall by 7.3 percentage points and the employment rate would
rise by 16.0 percentage points.
Yelowitz (1995) examines expansions in Medicaid eligibility tar
geted toward young children between 1988 and 1991. These expan
sions linked Medicaid eligibility to the federal poverty line rather than
a state's AFDC income eligibility limit, thus offering an incentive to
leave welfare. He finds that these reforms significantly decreased
AFDC participation and increased labor force participation. Among
female-headed households, the effects were largest for divorced and
separated women, and negligible for never-married women. Yelowitz
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(1996b) examines recent changes in the Medicaid program on the SSI
participation of the elderly. By using the implementation of a buy-in
program for Medicare in the 1980s (which offered a substitute for the
cost-sharing provisions of Medicaid), he finds that Medicaid has a big
ger impact on exits from SSI for the elderly than the expansions tar
geted towards children had on exits from AFDC for female heads.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
This section briefly explores how Medicaid may influence the SSI
participation decision. The disabled individual maximizes a utility
function, U(C, L), which is a function of consumption goods (C) and
leisure (L). The price of consumption goods (Pc) is normalized to $1
per unit, while the price of leisure is simply the wage rate (W). He is
given a time endowment (T) which he can allocate between work and
leisure. He may also receive nonlabor income (AT), for instance from
the earnings of his spouse. Therefore his full budget constraint is
defined as
(1)

PcC + WL = WT + N.

In Figure 3.1, this is represented as the segment ABC. Given this bud
get constraint, the consumer maximizes his utility.
By introducing the SSI system into the model, the government
essentially changes the budget constraint. The program offers a grant
(G), which was $669 per month for a married couple in 1994, and
reduces this grant for earning income in the labor market. This reduc
tion, known as the "benefit reduction rate" (T), is 50 percent of earned
income. Therefore the net wage falls to (1 - T) W along the initial part
of the budget constraint.
The final institutional feature to consider is incorporating Medicaid.
Broadly speaking, Medicaid is received when the individual is on SSI
and is lost in its entirety after leaving SSL This discrete drop in benefits
is known as the "Medicaid notch"—the design of the program creates a
portion of the budget constraint where we would predict that no utilitymaximizing person would choose. Consider an individual who lives in
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Figure 3.1 Incorporating SSI and Medicaid into the Budget Constraint
Consumption
goods(C)

, (1-1) Wage

M1
SSI grant (G)
A
T

Nonlabor income
Leisure (L)
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a state where Medicaid is valued at some small amount, M1—this can
be thought of as the dollars the family would have to spend on medical
expenses in the absence of insurance. His budget constraint now is rep
resented by ADEFC in Figure 3.1. Consider a second individual who
lives in a different state that has the same SSI grant but a more gener
ous Medicaid program, so that M2>M1 . In this state, the budget con
straint is represented by AGHFC.5
Given these different budget constraints, we can predict that the
more valuable the Medicaid package, the higher the SSI participation
rate. This arises for two reasons. First, increasing the value of Medicaid makes SSI more attractive to those who are ineligible based on
their earnings. In this case, some people in this group may reduce their
earnings in order to qualify. Second, increasing the value of Medicaid
may encourage individuals who were previously eligible but not partic
ipating to join the program. In this case, the net benefit may not ini
tially outweigh the stigma cost of participating, but it could after the
value of Medicaid increases.

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
I use the 1988-1993 March Annual Demographic File, which pro
vides retrospective information on family income, health insurance
coverage, and program participation from 1987 to 1992 on the noninstitutionalized population. I choose to begin the analysis using the
March 1988 CPS onward because several additional questions on
health insurance coverage were added that make these later surveys
less comparable to earlier ones. 6 1 end the analysis with the March
1993 CPS because the last data on Medicaid average expenditure (the
key independent variable) is for fiscal year 1992.7
Table 3.1 shows sequential selection criteria and the number of
observations eliminated from each screen for each CPS year. I use
about one-third of the roughly 900,000 observations contained in the
1988-1993 CPS years. The nine most important exclusions were being
over the age of 64, being under the age of 18, living in Arizona, having
imputed information on SSI or Medicaid receipt, having an imputed
spouse number, being a woman under the age of 45, being a race other
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Table 3.1 Sample Selection Criteria, Current Population Survey: March
Annual Demographic File
1988
Initial number of
155,980
observations
Over 64
18,610
Under 18
43,032
Lived in Arizona
1,091
287
Imputed disability
status
Imputed SSI receipt
463
74
Imputed SSI value
Imputed Medicaid
1,188
495
Imputed veteran status
Imputed age
280
Imputed marital status
1,007
Imputed spouse
1,212
number
172
Imputed sex
Imputed education
443
Imputed race
41
Women under age 45
31,077
AFDC participants
276
Not African American
1,952
or white
Imputed wage/salary
548
income
112
Imputed worker's
comp income
Imputed veterans
84
benefit
Imputed disability
95
income
1,164
Female head with
child present
Male head with
804
child present
1,232
Related children in
family
Final number of
50,241
observations

1989
144,687

1990
158,079

1991
158,477

1992
155,796

1993
155,197

17,740
39,482
1,045
280

18,902
43,281
1,078
367

19,043
43,762
1,057
291

18,954
42,700
993
274

19,074
42,901
974
414

447
78
1,067
418
190
900
1,606

427
86
1,208
503
199
432
2,309

469
91
1,378
524
142
360
2,223

333
103
1,429
508
212
272
969

354
96
1,504
471
187
311
902

166
328
38
28,520
223
1,820

157
284
53
31,789
266
2,148

160
231
36
31,693
266
2,290

140
302
33
31,323
297
2,381

159
201
34
30,611
305
2,624

505

561

514

461

434

93

106

141

114

95

78

86

79

69

64

79

97

81

105

105

1,045

1,222

1,234

1,244

1,254

745

885

852

928

959

1,058

1,249

1,298

1,247

1,262

46,736

50,384

50,262

50,405

49,902
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than African American or white, living in a single-parent household,
and having more related children than own children in a family. 8 The
CPS is, perhaps, more useful than other household data sets because
only a small fraction of the adult population participates in SSI-disabled.
Table 3.2 presents some summary statistics for the variables used in
the analysis for the entire population, SSI recipients and SSI nonrecipients. Among the entire group, SSI participation is 1.15 percent over the
time period, while Medicaid participation is nearly double that number,
2.24 percent. Even with the exclusions of single-parent households
above, it is still possible that some families have access to Medicaid
from alternative sources rather than through the SSI disabled program.
Part of the gap between the two participation rates could result from
the existence of the Medically Needy program or the General Assis
tance program. Among SSI recipients, more than 90 percent also
receive Medicaid. There are at least two reasons why Medicaid partici
pation may not be complete for SSI recipients. First, survey respon
dents might only report that they received Medicaid if they actually
went to the hospital. Second, because a number of states require a sec
ond application for Medicaid, the respondent may not apply for bene
fits until they become sick. This table also shows that Medicare
participation averages 28.2 percent for SSI recipients and 2.2 percent
for nonrecipients. Since an SSI recipient is much more likely to partic
ipate in the disability insurance (DI) program than the average member
of the population, a prolonged spell can result in Medicare coverage. A
nonrecipient can also qualify for DI and thereby qualify for Medicare.
The next five variables in Table 3.2 represent state-level policy vari
ables for the Medicaid and SSI program. 9 The average Medicaid
expenditure for disabled SSI recipients is more than $2,000 higher than
for elderly SSI recipients and more than $2,400 higher than for blind
SSI recipients. The real Medicaid expenditure also exceeds the maxi
mum annual SSI grant (which includes state supplements) by more
than $800. There appear to be small differences in the average levels
across SSI recipients and nonrecipients: nonrecipients appear to live in
states with a higher Medicaid expenditure and substantially higher SSI
grant. On the surface, these differences in average expenditure on Med
icaid and average SSI benefits would suggest that higher benefits
reduce participation. There are a variety of other factors, such as atti-
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Table 3.2 Summary Statistics, 1987-1992
Entire
sample

Nonrecipients

SSI
recipients

SSI participation

0.0115

0.0000

1.0000

Medicaid participation

0.0224

0.0121

0.9074

Medicare participation

0.0247

0.0217

0.2817

Average annual Medicaid benefit
for disabled (1990$)

$7,948
(3,662)

$7,952
(3,665)

$7,605
(3,361)

Average annual Medicaid benefit
for blind (1990$)

$5,529
(5,177)

$5,525
(5,168)

$5,890
(5,887)

Average annual Medicaid benefit
for elderly (1990$)

$5,936
(3,747)

$5,935
(3,744)

$6,015
(3,994)

Annual SSI benefit (1990 $)

$7,131
(2,130)

$7,146
(2,130)

$5,884
(1,747)

Variable name

Section 209(b) state

0.2491

0.2490

0.2650

Respondent's age

42.20
(13.14)

42.13
(13.13)

47.91
(13.09)

African American

0.0763

0.0746

0.2231

Resides in central city

0.2122

0.2098

0.3268

Education < 9

0.0640

0.0608

0.3412

9 < Education < 12

0.1013

0.0993

0.2275

Education =12

0.3779

0.3792

0.2712

Currently married

0.6640

0.6690

0.2316

Number of own children under
age 6

0.1932
(0.5249)

0.1950
(0.5270)

0.0357
(0.2406)

Number of own children aged
6 to 17

0.4222
(0.8296)

0.4256
(0.8318)

0.1244
(0.5209)

Male

0.7520

0.7543

0.5503

Veteran

0.2088

0.2104

0.0708

Private coverage

0.7601

0.7681

0.0794

NOTES: Author's tabulations of the March 1988-1993 Current Population Survey Annual Demo
graphic File. Standard deviation in parentheses. Total number of observations is 297,930, of
which 3,414 are SSI recipients.
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tudes toward welfare participation, that also vary across states and are
correlated with benefit levels.
Finally, Table 3.2 presents several demographic characteristics that
are included in the regression analysis. On average, SSI recipients are
older and less educated. They are also more likely to be single, have
fewer children, and be female. Finally, there are large differences in the
take-up (and presumably availability) of private insurance coverage.
While less than one-tenth of SSI recipients had coverage, more than
three-quarters of the nonrecipient sample had private coverage.
Table 3.3 illustrates trends in SSI participation from 1987 to 1992
for the entire sample and for several demographic groups. For the
entire sample, the SSI participation rate increased steadily, from 0.98
percent in 1987 to 1.27 percent in 1992. Perhaps the most striking fea
ture of this table is that the level of participation for the African-Amer
ican population is more than three times as high as for the white
population. The trend in participation, however, shows no consistent
pattern—the participation rate falls from 3.07 percent in 1987 to 2.81
percent in 1989, and rises to 3.33 percent in 1992. The trend for whites
is more clear: the SSI participation rate increased by more than onethird between 1987 and 1992, from 0.81 percent to 1.09 percent,
despite varying economic conditions. The different trend foreshadow
the different empirical findings for whites and African Americans in
the regression analysis below. 10 Finally the table shows that SSI partic
ipation rate for adult women was more than 1 percentage point higher
than the rate for men, though both groups show a similar increased
trend in participation.
It is important to note that program participation in the CPS, as with
many other household surveys, appears to be underreported. The
national SSI participation rate in the adult population was 1.75 percent
in 1992, compared to 1.27 percent in the CPS (U.S. House of Repre
sentatives 1993). While participation rates also appear to be consis
tently under-reported in most states, the discrepancies vary. The
participation rate is underreported by 0.07 percentage points in Florida,
by between 0.32 to 0.48 percentage points in Illinois, New York, and
Texas, and by 0.95 percentage points in California. If the stigma of
reporting program participation to a survey taker varies across states,
then the patterns we see across states would be likely to emerge.

Table 3.3 Trends in SSI and Medicaid Participation over Time (%)
Entire sample

African American

White

Men, 18-64

Men, 45-64

Women, 45-64

1987

0.985 (0.044)

3.078 (0.280)

0.813(0.041)

0.727 (0.043)

0.992 (0.091)

1.768(0.118)

1988

1.067(0.047)

3 846 (0.327)

0.845 (0.044)

0.777 (0.046)

1.080(0.099)

1.958(0.129)

1989

1.073 (0.045)

2.812(0.265)

0.928 (0.044)

0 776 (0 045)

1.114(0.096)

1.988(0.125)

1990

1.155(0.047)

3.559 (0.300)

0.959 (0.045)

0.813(0.046)

0.956 (0.089)

2.201(0.131)

1991

1.319(0.050)

3.511 (0.293)

1.133(0049)

0 992 (0.050)

1.346(0.105)

2.310(0.134)

1992

1.268(0.050)

3.346 (0.288)

1.093(0.048)

0.942 (0.050)

1.178(0.098)

2.225(0.131)

1.966(0.061)

5.972 (0.384)

1.638(0.058)

1 706 (0.066)

1.907(0.126)

2.756(0.146)

1988

1.919(0.063)

6.015 (0.404)

1.592(0.060)

1.608(0.067)

1.946(0.133)

2.872(0.155)

1989

2.070 (0.063)

5.830 (0.376)

1.756(0.060)

1.715(0.066)

2.220(0.135)

3.160(0.157)

1990

2.397 (0.068)

6.881 (0.411)

2.031 (0.065)

2.065 (0.073)

2.314(0.138)

3.411(0.163)

1991

2.495 (0.069)

6.234 (0.385)

2.179(0.067)

2.177(0.074)

2.288(0.137)

3.461(0.163)

1992

2.601 (0.071)

6.177 (0.386)

2.299 (0.069)

2.253 (0.076)

2.349(0.137)

3.622(0.166)

SSI

Medicaid
1987

NOTE: Results from the March 1988-1993 Current Population Survey Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.4 illustrates trends in the average real SSI benefit level and
real Medicaid expenditure from 1987 to 1992. 11 The average benefit
level is computed from the CPS, based on the respondent's state of res
idence, time period, and marital status. Clearly, two different trends
emerge here. Real SSI cash benefits remain largely unchanged. This
may not be too surprising since the federal benefit level is indexed for
inflation. Medicaid expenditure increased by more than $3,000 in real
terms over this period. This pattern in Medicaid expenditure is similar
to the pattern in overall SSI participation rates, and is at least sugges
tive that a link between the two trends may exist.
Table 3.4 Trends in SSI Benefits and Medicaid Expenditures

1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992

Annual SSI benefit
7,211
7,074
7,163
7,090
7,112
7,133

Average Medicaid
expenditure
6,700
6,482
7,771
8,308
8,607
9,730

NOTES; Results from the March 1988-1993 Current Population Survey All values are in 1990
dollars. Medicaid expenditures is deflated by the medical CPI.

REGRESSION RESULTS
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Estimates Using Average Medicaid
Expenditure of Disabled
For ease of interpretation, I present results from a linear probability
model. The coefficients from the models below therefore may be inter
preted as percentage point changes. The basic estimating equation is
denoted by
(2)

SSI.PARTj = Po + PjMEDICAID.BEN,, + (32SSI_BEN,r
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The subscript * refers to individuals, j to states, and t to time periods.
The outcome, SSI participation (SSI_PART) is a binary variable equal
to 1 if the respondent participated in the program in the previous year.
Two key policy variables that are expected to increase SSI participation
are the average real Medicaid expenditure (MEDICAID_BEN) and the
average real SSI benefit (SSI_BEN). I2 The vector X contains several
individual-level variables that may also influence SSI participation,
including the respondent's age and its square, race, residence in a cen
tral city, education, marital status, number of children present, gender,
and veteran status. 13 In addition, I amend this basic specification to
allow for nationally uniform, time-varying shocks to SSI participation
through the inclusion of five time dummies, as well as time-invariant,
state-specific shocks to SSI participation through the inclusion of
forty-nine state dummies. The coefficients P0, pj, p2> Ps> 5/» and 5, are
to be estimated, and et- is an error term.
By including state-fixed effects (SJ) and time-fixed effects (Tt\ the
regression framework accounts for some of the other factors that may
lead to an increase in SSI participation. I am able to control for the
effects of the business cycle (at the national level) with the time dum
mies. Since other studies have demonstrated that this influences dis
ability insurance applications, it may be reasonable to expect it to
influence SSI participation. If changing economic conditions are corre
lated with Medicaid expenditure, the results will be biased by not
accounting for this omitted variable.
Three other explanations for SSI growth, which essentially vary
over time, are also controlled for. First, SSI spell lengths may have
increased in duration because the Social Security Administration was
performing fewer disability reviews. Second, some medical break
throughs may have allowed disabled people to live longer than they
otherwise would have (U.S. General Accounting Office 1995). Third,
there has been growth over time in outreach efforts for SSI.
Several unmodeled or unobservable variables that differ across
states could bias the results. As shown earlier, the SSI reporting behav
ior in the CPS data varies by state. If admitting program participation
represents permanent differences in attitudes that vary by state, includ
ing state-fixed effects will account for this. In addition, the availability
of Medicaid coverage varies across states, and this could affect SSI
participation. For instance, a poor adult may be able to receive health
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insurance coverage through the Medically Needy program or the Gen
eral Assistance program. It is possible that these variables are corre
lated with Medicaid expenditure and affect SSI participation. For
instance, more liberal states may have these optional programs, which
would tend to discourage SSI participation, and have more generous
Medicaid services, which would increase average Medicaid expendi
ture. This type of modeled difference across states would likely lead to
the conclusion that increased Medicaid expenditure reduces SSI partic
ipation. To the extent that the MN and GA program remain fixed over
the time period, this heterogeneity would be accounted for with statefixed effects. It is plausible that the programs may have changed over
time, however. Several states, including Michigan, eliminated their GA
program in the early 1990s. If this program change is correlated with
Medicaid expenditure, then even the model that includes state- and
time-fixed effects will be biased. To account for these possibilities, I
include four additional variables that vary over time at the state level:
1) the Medically Needy protected income level for one person, 2) mea
sures of the state unemployment rate, 3) labor force participation, and
4) a measure of cuts in a state's General Assistance program. 14
The results in the first column of Table 3.5 show that the OLS esti
mate of Pi is statistically insignificant and economically unimportant.
The point estimate suggests that increasing Medicaid by $1,000 leads
to an increase in SSI participation of 0.005 percentage points. Since
Table 3.4 illustrates that average Medicaid expenditure for the entire
sample rose in real terms from $6,700 in 1987 to $9,730 in 1992, this
coefficient estimate implies that increased Medicaid expenditure raised
the probability of SSI participation by 0.015 percentage points. Since
SSI participation for the whole sample increased from 0.98 to 1.27 per
cent (or 0.290 percentage points), the OLS estimate implies that rising
health care costs can explain less than six percent (0.015 divided by
0.290) of the rise in SSI participation.
On the other hand, this model shows that increasing the SSI benefit
increases SSI participation, though it is only marginally significant.
Raising the benefit by $1,000 results in an increase in SSI participation
of 0.053 percentage points. While this estimate could be an explanation
for the rise in participation, Table 3.4 shows little change in cash bene
fits over time. The CPS estimates indicate that from 1987 to 1992, SSI
benefits fell slightly in real terms from $7,211 to $7,133. While the
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Table 3.5 Linear Probability Model from Full Current Population
Survey Sample on SSI Participation

(1)

(2)
Ordinary least squares Instrumental variables
Medicaid benefit/ 106
SSI benefit/106
Section 209(b) state
Per capita GA cut
Unemployment rate/105
Labor force participation/ 106
Annual Medically Needy
income limit/ 106
Respondent's age
Age2/100
African American
Resides in central city
Education < 9
9 < Education < 12
Education =12
Currently married
Number of own children
under age 6
Number of own children
aged 6 to 17

0.0510
(0.0950)
0.5397
(0.3201)
0.0035
(0.0038)
-0.0002
(0.0001)
0.2737
(0.2321)
-0.0035
(0.0012)
-0.0626
(0.6884)
0.0016
(0.0001)
-0.0012
(0.0001)
0.0164
(0.0007)
0.0017
(0.0005)
00520
(0.0008)
0.0176
(0.0006)
0.0032
(0.0004)
-0.0300
(0.0010)
0.0042
(0.0004)
0.0001
(0.0002)

0.2453
(0.1536)
0.5284
(0.3201)
0.0038
(0.0038)
-0.0002
(0.0001)
0.1761
(0.2372)
-0.0030
(0.0012)
0.0159
(0.6396)
0.0016
(0.0001)
-00012
(0.0001)
0.0164
(0.0007)
0.0018
(0.0005)
0.0520
(0 0008)
0.0176
(0.0006)
0.0032
(0.0004)
-0.0299
(0.0010)
00042
(0.0004)
0.0001
(0.0002)
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Table 3.5 (continued)_____________________________
(2)
(I)
Ordinary least squares Instrumental variables

Veteran
Observations
Adjusted R2

-0.0039
(0.0005)
-0.0048
(0.0005)

-0.0039
(0.0005)
-0.0048
(0.0005)

Male

297,930

297,930
00363

0.0363

NOTES. Results from the March 1988-1993 Current Population Survey. Standard errors in
parentheses All models also include state-fixed effects (49), time-fixed effects (5), and a constant
term Instruments in column 2 are average Medicaid expenditures for the blind and elderly

cash benefits increase the probability of participation, they cannot
explain the growth in participation. The table also shows the effect of a
third policy variable, whether the respondent lived in a Section 209(b)
state. Since very few states changed status from Section 209(b) to Sec
tion 1634 during the period, the effect of 209(b) status is essentially
subsumed in the state-fixed effect. The estimate in this column is not
significantly different from zero and economically small.
The labor market variables enter the model with the expected signs:
increases in the unemployment rate raise SSI participation (though it is
imprecisely estimated), while increasing labor force participation low
ers SSI participation. Not surprisingly, the MN variable is imprecisely
estimated: after controlling for state-fixed effects, there is little inde
pendent variation in the income limit. Contrary to expectations, the
parameterization of the GA cut variable is "wrong-signed" and margin
ally significant. While larger GA cuts (indicating a larger positive
value) should presumably increase SSI participation (and therefore
enter into the model with a positive sign), instead the sign is negative.
Education and family structure appear to play important roles in SSI
participation. Relative to those with a college degree, individuals with
less than nine years of education are 5.2 percentage points more likely
to participate in SSI, while those with less than twelve years are 1.8
percentage points more likely to participate. In addition, those who
only completed high school are significantly more likely to participate
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in the SSI disabled program than those who entered college, but the
economic impact is not as dramatic as for the other educational groups.
Being married lowers SSI participation by 3 percentage points, while
having an additional young child increases the probability of participa
tion. The positive effect of young children may indicate a "spillover"
effect on SSI participation resulting from the Supreme Court's Sullivan
v. Zebley decision. It is well known that the number of children on SSI
skyrocketed during this time frame, and once a household enrolled one
member on SSI, its propensity to enroll other members may increase.
The signs of the other demographic and location-specific character
istics enter into SSI participation largely as expected. SSI participation
increases with age, but at a decreasing rate. Since many physical dis
abilities may not occur until later ages, this finding makes sense. Rela
tive to whites, being African American raises the probability of SSI
participation by 1.64 percentage points. This is consistent with the con
tinually higher levels of participation in Table 3.3. Living in a central
city raises SSI participation. This may occur for two reasons. First,
those in central cities may have more access to welfare and social secu
rity offices or health care facilities, which lowers the transaction costs
of SSI participation and raises the value of Medicaid, respectively. Sec
ond, if living in a central city means that individuals have better infor
mation about the programs, they would be more likely to participate.
Finally, being male or being a veteran significantly lowers SSI partici
pation.
Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimates Using Average Medicaid
Expenditure of Elderly and Blind as Instruments

The prior estimates using variation in disabled expenditure may be
biased if changes in the underlying health of the SSI population
affected both Medicaid's value and SSI participation. If the eligibility
criteria for disability becomes less strict, for example, so that people
who were previously found to be ineligible are now deemed eligible
for SSI, then the former estimates of Pj would be too small. In the
Supreme Court's Sullivan v. Zebley decision, such a reevaluation
occurred for children, and this may have had spillovers into the adult
population. 15 In addition, if states attempted to shift their GA and MN
beneficiaries onto the SSI rolls, and if these groups happened to be
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healthier, the OLS results would be biased. In this case, the marginal
disabled SSI recipient will likely incur less health care expenditure
than the average recipient, so that average expenditure falls while SSI
participation increases. This would lead to a spurious negative correla
tion (which in turn biases the coefficient downward). 16
To correct for this simultaneity bias, I instrument for average Medicaid expenditure of the disabled in each state-year cell with the corre
sponding average expenditure of the elderly and of the blind. These
variables reflect different aspects of the state's Medicaid program that
influence its value, such as variation in health care prices, access to
care, and scope of services. Since the criteria to qualify as a blind or
elderly recipient is more objective, these instruments are unlikely to be
correlated with changing definitions of disability. 17
At this point, it is important to discuss the validity of the instrumen
tal variables. Expenditure for neither the blind nor elderly fully cap
tures the breadth of a state's Medicaid program—the blind tend to be
healthy, and the differences in elderly expenditure may reflect differ
ences in nursing home access. This does not invalidate the estimation
technique, however. Two conditions must hold: the instruments must
be correlated with the endogenous regressor and uncorrelated with the
error term. While the expenditure on the elderly and blind is not per
fectly correlated with expenditure on the disabled, they are extremely
powerful instruments—the first stage F-statistic (predicting Medicaid
expenditure for the disabled) is over 10,000. In any case, if the instru
ments were weak predictors, the instrumental variable estimates would
be biased toward the OLS estimates so I would be unlikely to find any
effect of Medicaid.
By instrumenting, the coefficient estimate in the second column of
Table 3.5 increases dramatically, consistent with changing the budget
constraint in Figure 3.1. Increasing Medicaid expenditure by $1,000 is
now associated with an increase in the probability of SSI participation
by 0.024 percentage points. Again, taking the rise in Medicaid expen
diture from Table 3.4, this estimate implies that rising health care costs
from 1987 to 1992 raised the probability of participation by 0.070 per
centage points. Since the total increase in SSI participation was 0.290
percentage points, the point estimate indicates that rising health care
costs can explain around one-quarter of the rise in SSI participation.
The point estimates on the other explanatory variables remain largely
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unchanged, both in significance and in magnitude. By comparing the
coefficient estimates on Medicaid expenditure and SSI benefit levels, a
$1,000 increase in SSI leads to a similar rise in participation as a
$2,170 increase in Medicaid expenditure.
Recall that Table 3.3 showed dramatic differences in SSI participa
tion rates across racial lines. This may suggest that rising health care
costs have different effects on the African-American and white popula
tions. The two columns in Table 3.6 divide the sample into whites and
African Americans, respectively. Again, I instrument for average dis
abled Medicaid expenditure with average blind and average elderly
Medicaid expenditure in each state-time cell.
The Medicaid coefficient estimates for the white population are
slightly larger than the IV estimates from the second column of Table
3.5. The effect of Medicaid expenditure increases slightly, and the
coefficient is more precisely estimated than in the full sample. Cash
benefits appear to play a less important role in SSI participation than
for the full sample. In contrast, Medicaid appears to play little role in
the SSI participation decision of African Americans, though the coeffi
cient is imprecisely estimated. While the policy variables explain little
of the SSI participation decision for African Americans, the demo
graphic variables on education, family structure, gender, and veteran
status are all significant predictors of participation.

CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
This chapter finds that rising health insurance costs are an important
reason for participation in the SSI-disabled program. By using a large,
nationally representative household data set, I find that around onequarter of the rise in SSI participation may be due to increases in the
value of Medicaid. The effects appear to be concentrated in the white
population, not the African-American population.
I show that ordinary least squares estimates of Medicaid effect pro
duce badly biased estimates, since the health status of the disabled
population was changing. The estimates using instrumental variables
produce much stronger positive effects of Medicaid on SSI participa
tion. Is it reasonable to assume that the health status of the disabled
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Table 3.6 Differences in Medicaid's Impact Based on Race

(1)

White

(2)
African American

Medicaid benefit/ 106

0.2828
(0.1421)

02118
(1.6752)

SSI benefit/106

0.3014
(0.3043)

1.4481
(2.3016)

Section 209(b) state

0.0041
(0.0035)

0.0432
(0.1305)

Per capita GA cut

-0.0001
(0.0001)

-0.0007
(0.0007)

Unemployment rate/105

01695
(0.2256)

3.0078
(16.5125)

Labor force participation/ 106

-00014
(0.0012)

-0.0241
(0.0093)

Annual Medically Needy
income limit/ 106

0.5453
(0.6200)

-5.6620
(3.4722)

Respondent's age

0.0016
(0.0001)

-0.0003
(0.0006)

Age2/100

-0.0014
(0.0001)

0.0017
(0.0007)

Resides in central city

0.0014
(0.0005)

0.0037
(0.0027)

Education < 9

0.0475
(0.0008)

0.0944
(0.0048)

9 < Education < 12

0.0159
(0.0006)

0.0323
(0.0035)

Education = 12

0.0030
(0.0004)

0.0095
(0 0027)

Currently married

-0.0265
(0.0010)

-0.0546
(0.0067)

Number of own children
under age 6

0.0032
(0.0003)

0.0132
(0.0026)

Number of own children
aged 6 to 17

0.0000
(0.0002)

0.0022
(0.0015)

Male

-0.0024
(0.0005)

-0.0248
(0.0035)
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Table 3.6 (continued)
(1)
White
-0.0043
(0.0005)

Veteran
Observations
Adjusted R2

(2)
African American

275,187

-0.0073
(0.0032)
22,743

0.0303

0.0591

NOTES: Results from the March 1988-1993 Current Population Survey Standard errors in
parentheses. In addition to the coefficients shown, all models also include state-fixed effects (49),
time-fixed effects (5), and a constant term. Instruments in columns 1 and 2 are average Medicaid
expenditures for the blind and elderly.

changed so dramatically while the health status of elderly and blind did
not? Knowing the answer to this question is vital for assessing the
validity of the instruments. It is difficult to believe that the health status
of the blind changed dramatically from 1987 to 1992, and the instru
mental variables results do not change markedly by only using the
Medicaid expenditure for the blind as an instrument. On the other
hand, it is possible the health status of the elderly on SSI may have
changed because the Qualified Medicaid Beneficiary (QMB) program
in the 1980s and 1990s offered an incentive for the elderly to leave SSI
and still retain Medicaid. Around 1.4 million elderly were enrolled in
this program in December 1992; however it is not known whether the
health status of former SSI recipients who left and enrolled in the
QMB program was better or worse than the average SSI recipient.
Are the estimated effects too large? At this point, it is important to
remember about the recent empirical findings on other Medicaid popu
lations. In other work, Yelowitz (1995,1996b) finds significant effects
on AFDC participation for female household heads and on SSI partici
pation for elderly households. In those studies, the policy experiment
was somewhat different from this study, however. The policy changes
for young children and for the elderly offered Medicaid benefits with
out necessarily applying for AFDC or SSI, which therefore offered
incentives to leave those welfare programs. In a closer comparison to
this study, Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) attempt to value Medicaid and find
strong effects on AFDC participation for female-headed households. It
is plausible to think that health insurance plays a more important role
in the economic decision making of disabled adults than either female
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household heads or elderly households. Therefore, the stronger results
here appear reasonable.
The findings have several policy implications for program design.
Since Medicaid is an important determinant of SSI participation, offer
ing health insurance without the need to participate in SSI may reduce
total costs. This could occur because disabled adults may then forego
the cash benefits from SSI—which amounts to more than $20 billion
annually. On the other hand, some disabled adults who were not previ
ously participating in SSI, because the program may be stigmatizing,
may decide to participate in a Medicaid-only program, which could
increase costs. In theory, this could occur through the Medically Needy
program. The program typically has lower income limits than SSI and
fewer covered services under Medicaid than for categorically needy
recipients. Thus, Medically Needy may not offer enough of an incen
tive for the disabled to leave. Therefore modifications of existing SSI
program rules concerning Medicaid may have an impact on total costs.

Notes
1.
2.

3.

4.
5.

See Yelowitz (1995, 1996b) for explanations of the Medicaid reforms for children
and the elderly, respectively.
Required coverage includes inpatient and outpatient hospital services, rural health
clinic services, federally qualified health center services, laboratory and x-ray ser
vices, nursing facility services for individuals under age 21, family planning ser
vices, physicians' services, home health services for any individual entitled to
nursing facility care, nurse-midwife services, and services of certified nurse prac
titioners.
These expenditure numbers include spending on intermediate care facilities and
skilled nursing homes. I believe that it is important to include these numbers
because access to these facilities is indeed part of Medicaid's value. While it is
certainly true that only a small portion of the population will be institutionalized,
it is also true that a small portion will use any particular Medicaid service. There
fore excluding this expenditure seems ad hoc.
Winkler (1991) takes a similar approach.
It is not necessarily clear that an increase in Medicaid spending per beneficiary
translates into an increase in the value to individuals, however. For example, as
real payments to doctors or other service providers increase, the individual getting
the same service at higher cost may not have greater value. It is much more diffi
cult to obtain a family- or individual-level valuation, although other studies, such
as Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) have tried.
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6.
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

13.

14.

15.

Yelowitz
These questions specifically dealt with the health insurance status of children in
the household. Survey respondents were effectively asked twice about the health
insurance coverage of children in the household.
Furthermore, I restrict my attention to adults who would be unlikely to collect
Medicaid from a program other than SSI. Thus, I exclude single-parent house
holds with children under age 18 (who may be eligible for Medicaid under the Aid
to Families with Dependent Children, or AFDC, program). I also eliminate
women between 18 and 44 from my sample. For this group, the primary health
insurance expense would be due to pregnancy, and other reforms in the Medicaid
program from 1984 onward could bias the results for SSI participation. To accu
rately examine the impact of Medicaid for these groups, not only would the
expansions need to be parameterized, but the joint AFDC, SSI, and labor force
participation decisions would have to be modeled, which is beyond the scope of
the current paper. See Cume and Gruber (1994) for an analysis of these Medicaid
pregnancy expansions.
I follow Winkler (1991) in excluding Arizona from the analysis. Arizona had a
Medicaid demonstration project for part of the time period I examine, and data on
average Medicaid expenditure are not available.
All of these variables were obtained from various editions of U.S. House of Rep
resentatives (1993).
Although the difference for African Americans is striking, it is not all that surpris
ing for a means-tested program.
These are deflated using the CPI-U for the SSI benefit level and the medical ser
vices CPI for Medicaid.
I include a third state-specific variable, whether or not the respondent lived in a
section 209(b) state. Several states changed status between section 209(b) and
section 1634 between 1987 and 1992, but in models with state-fixed effects, this
effect is never reliably estimated. I would expect the coefficient to be negative—
living in a state with extra application procedures for Medicaid increases transac
tion costs and thus lowers SSI participation.
I include many of the same demographic variables that Winkler (1991) includes in
her AFDC participation equation using the CPS. In addition, I tried restricting the
sample to adults aged 22 to 64 since some rules which govern the SSI eligibility
for a child who reaches the ages of 18 to 21 have changed over time. The results
on the Medicaid and SSI variables are similar to the coefficients reported here.
These variables are carefully explained in Stapleton et al. (Chapter 2). It is possi
ble that the inclusion of the labor market and General Assistance variables reflect
outcomes of the same utility maximization process that lead to SSI participation,
since these are constructed from participation rates rather than changes in the bud
get constraint. However, it is more likely that they are instead driven by changes
in the business cycle, so that they are not endogenous, at least at the person-level.
The Supreme Court ruled that disability standards for children may not be nar
rower than those applied for adults. As a result, eligibility criteria for children are
based on a child's developmental delay and limitations on the child's ability to
engage in age-appropnate activities of daily living. This has increased the number
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of children classified as disabled. Prior to 1990, the same disability criteria that
applied to adults were also applied to children.
16. This argument suggests growth in SSI-disabled expenditure should be slower than
other groups who use similar Medicaid services, for whom the health mix was not
changing. My calculations show average expenditure on the disabled grew 41 per
cent in real terms from 1987 to 1993. The growth rates for the blind and elderly
were much greater, 77 and 144 percent, respectively.
17. An aged person age 65 and over with limited income and resources can qualify
under the aged SSI program, while blind individuals are defined as those with
20/200 vision or less with the use of a correcting lens in their better eye, or
those with tunnel vision of 20 degrees or less.
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Comments on Chapter 3
Barbara Wolfe
University of Wisconsin-Madison

I like the paper by Aaron Yelowitz (Chapter 3) and believe its gen
eral finding that Medicaid is a significant factor in explaining the
recent growth in numbers of adult Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
recipients. We know that Medicaid has been growing—from 22.9 mil
lion recipients ($48.7 billion expenditures) in 1988 to 35.1 million
recipients ($107.9 billion expenditures) in 1994. Medical expenditures
have increased tremendously over the period studied, and an existing
body of literature on other population groups finds similar results: that
publicly provided health insurance is an important determinant of indi
vidual choices concerning both age of retirement and applications for
Aid to Families with Dependent Children.
The theoretical framework is one established in the literature and
makes sense as applied here. It is a choice-based, utility-maximization
model in which the provision of Medicaid (an either/or or a 0/1 choice,
the so-called Medicaid notch) is incorporated into an individual's
choice, selecting the option that maximizes well-being. Well-being is
proxied by potential income (including the value of benefits in-kind) in
each of the two options, SSI with Medicaid versus working. Health is
not fully incorporated into the model; Yelowitz discusses the need to
incorporate health into his model, but at the moment, well-being under
the work option depends only on earnings for each individual. Health
limitations are not incorporated, and although Yelowitz mentions this
omission, he never discusses how it might influence the model. For
consistency, he needs to incorporate the probability of being offered
private insurance and a value for it if it is offered by an employer.
One further comment on the model is that most states have a spenddown provision that allows certain persons to obtain Medicaid without
being on SSI, and many states offer medical care coverage through
another program, General Assistance (GA). Hence, a number of per
sons are potentially eligible for Medicaid or GA, and the probability of
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eligibility and the speed by which they could be found eligible are also
factors to be considered. These factors are not incorporated into the
model.
In regard to the data and empirical work, most of the exclusions
seem reasonable, except perhaps for those eliminated because they
have imputed information—but this is a problem that plagues all of us
doing empirical research. In this case such exclusion seems quite
minor and pertains to a very small proportion of the observations.
There are a few puzzles in the data.
1. The author reports Medicaid expenditures for disabled persons
that are too high according to official figures in Health United
States, 1995. In these official statistics, average spending in 1993
was $7,706, compared to Yelowitz's reported value of $9,226.
The author states that his figure includes nursing home expendi
tures (see note 3 in Chapter 3), but so do the official statistics as
reported in Table 139 in Health United States, 1995, which arebased on Health Care Financing Administration data. A similar
issue arises with the data used for Medicaid in the study. Why
these differences?
2. It would be meaningful to see a comparison of the insurance cov
erage in a matched sample according to education, age, and mari
tal status. I do not think that a comparison to the total U.S.
population is very informative.
Many of the results seem plausible. A few raise questions about the
reasonableness of the estimation. Perhaps the most puzzling involves
the dummy variable included as an indicator of 209(b) states, which
are more stringent with regard to Medicaid eligibility: not all persons
eligible for SSI are eligible for Medicaid. This leads to an expected
negative sign on the variable for a 209(b) state, yet the result is posi
tive, though not significant. The other puzzle is why the number of
children should be positive when there are no dependent benefits asso
ciated with SSI and, hence, no additional benefit to families with chil
dren. The author's explanation of a link to the Zebley case seems
inadequate (unlikely) as an explanation.
Yelowitz appropriately raises the issue of endogeneity of the value
of Medicaid. His argument is that if the benefits become more gener-
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ous, an increased number of marginal persons (i.e., those who tend to
be healthier and use less medical care) will be attracted to SSI and
Medicaid. This means that as more people join the ranks of those on
these programs, the expected benefit, at least as measured in this study,
will fall. This fall will not reflect decreases in program generosity, but
rather increased generosity. Because of this potential problem, instru
mental variables are used in the next set of estimates. But the choice of
instruments is not compelling, in the following ways.
Expenditures on the blind and the elderly are used as instruments.
According to the statistical test reported, they work well. Yet at least on
an intuitive basis, neither of these groups seems able to fully measure
the breadth of a state's Medicaid program. Blind persons tend to be
healthy, so their medical expenditures will not reflect the scope of a
state's Medicaid program. And differences in expenditures of the aged
across states are likely to reflect differences in nursing home access
rather than in breadth of acute and chronic coverage. Preferable instru
ments would seem to be expenditures by disease category. This would
require background information on the basis for a disability determina
tion, which is not available in Current Population Survey data. One
suggestion, drawing on an alternative data set, is to identify groups by
expected expenditures—grouping, for example, into the following four
categories: low cost, low technology, high technology, and experimen
tal and related groups. This also suggests that using SIPP data may be
preferable, although the time span would be shorter.
Finally, other factors that may or may not be fully taken into account
may help explain the growth in SSI and Medicaid enrollment among
adults.
• Reduced coverage of private insurance over this same time
period, resulting in more co-payments and less coverage for other
family members. This could explain some of the growth in SSI
and Medicaid spending.
• Poor health, which reduces potential wages. This is also part of
the utility-maximization framework and should be incorporated
into the model.
• The increase in the number of AIDS cases. Many of these people
are covered by SSI and Medicaid; $55 million was spent on AIDS
in 1989, $280 million in 1992 and $500 million in 1994. The
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number of persons covered for AIDS differs substantially across
states.
• There may also have been significant changes in the treatment
and diagnosis of many illnesses over this period, which would
also influence expenditures over time.
• Some drug addicts and alcoholics have become recipients of SSI
and Medicaid during this period, and 75 percent of these persons
are in two states—California and Illinois. If their use of medical
care differs significantly from that of traditional recipients, the
means of these states would be influenced by these persons in
ways that would not represent true differences in the expected
value of Medicaid across the states.
This type of research could be improved through the use of data
sets, such as the Survey of Income and Program Participation, with
more information on health conditions, as well as through the use of a
new data set—the supplement to the National Health Interview Survey,
which oversamples and resamples persons with disabilities. Use of
such data may allow some additional work on how to create better
groupings by diagnosis to predict the value of Medicaid, in particular
to test whether those requiring greater expenditures are more likely to
apply.
Given the available data, this author has done a good job of explor
ing the role of Medicaid in explaining the recent growth of SSI. The
chapter provides evidence to convince us that Medicaid is an important
factor in accounting for that growth.

4 Determinants of Duration
on the Disability Rolls
and Program Trends
Kalman Rupp
Charles G. Scott
Social Security Administration

Discussions of factors causing the increases in social security dis
ability caseloads usually feature rises in the number of awards.
Changes in the number of new awardees, however, do not directly
translate into caseloads; duration is the essential link. Those who stay
on the rolls for a long time contribute disproportionately to caseloads,
and therefore to program cost. A better understanding of factors affect
ing duration on the disability rolls should contribute to improvements
in our ability to project future caseloads, to assess the effects of policy
alternatives on caseloads, and to identify promising interventions
designed to contain caseload growth. Duration on the rolls can be seen
both as a function of factors affecting selection into the Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) and Social Security Disability Insurance (DI)
programs and as the result of factors directly affecting program exits
and reentry. Selection into the SSI and DI disability programs is
affected by the disability and economic criteria of eligibility. SSI and
DI share the disability selection criteria. The severity of disability crite
ria exerts two contrasting effects on duration: the relatively high mor
tality risk reduces expected duration, while low recovery associated
with severely disabling conditions increases it.
SSI and DI differ in terms of economic eligibility. DI requires that
the person meet an insured status based on recent work activity. It is
important that, while the Dl-insured status is a precondition of entry, it
does not affect exits from the rolls. In contrast, SSI is means-tested,
and therefore financial eligibility factors (changes in income and
assets) form a potential source of exits and reentry. Some people qual
ify for both SSI and DI benefits. Over the years, the disability and eco139
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nomic eligibility criteria of DI and SSI interact with largely exogenous
demographic and economic factors to influence duration.
Programmatic variables also directly affect duration by influencing
exits and reentry. Such variables include work incentive provisions,
continuing disability reviews, vocational rehabilitation, and various
rules concerning suspensions, terminations and return to the rolls.
Some of these variables directly affect program eligibility (e.g., Con
tinuous Disability Reviews [CDRs]), while others are expected to
affect duration on the rolls through altering behavior (e.g., vocational
rehabilitation). All of these variables affect the generosity of the bene
fits and therefore may have indirect effects through altering application
behavior.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the factors
affecting duration on the DI and SSI disability rolls based on previous
studies and original research by the authors, and to analyze implica
tions for caseload growth, projections, and policies. Several previous
studies analyzed duration on the SSI and DI rolls on the basis of micro
data from the Social Security Administration's administrative records
systems. Most described the experiences of a single annual cohort of
awardees using a fixed (e.g., two- or four-year) follow-up window
(e.g., Treitel 1979; Bye, Riley, and Lubitz 1987; Scott 1989; Bye et al.
1991). Hennessey and Dykacz (1992, 1993) compared two annual
cohorts on the basis of a four-year follow-up window. With the single
exception of Scott (1989) focusing on SSI disability stays, the above
studies analyzed duration on the DI rolls among DI awardees, some of
whom may have had concurrent unobserved SSI disability benefit
receipt experience. Two studies (Hennessey and Dykacz 1989; Rupp
and Scott 1995) utilized a much longer follow-up observation period
(nine years and ten years, respectively), and used statistical methods to
adjust for the lack of complete data on the completion of first DI spells
(right censoring) and on first spell and total duration (including multi
ple spells) data for the SSI disability program. These are the only two
previous studies that presented mean duration statistics that are
adjusted for censoring bias. Hennessey and Dykacz (1989) based their
estimates on the experience of a single (1972) annual cohort of DI
awardees, while Rupp and Scott (1995) utilized a data file containing
multiple annual cohorts of SSI disability awardees and based their esti
mates of mean duration on the experience of persons first awarded pay-
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ments during 1974-1982. They also conducted comparisons of
duration patterns in DI, SSI, and Aid to Families with Dependent Chil
dren. Other relevant previous studies looked at terminations (Schmulowitz 1973), analyzed the postrecovery experience of DI beneficiaries
(Dykacz and Hennessey 1989), and compared the health and earnings
of DI beneficiaries with the experience of rejected disability applicants
(Bound 1989). Treitel (1979) analyzed the outcomes of appeals by ini
tial DI denials and presented six-year follow-up data on death rates
among rejected applicants. Only one previous study focused on the
implications of trends in the composition of disability awardees on
duration (Chirikos and Rupp 1992; Chirikos 1993). The study was
based on aggregate data on awardees and a secondary analysis of micro
data on duration, but was limited to DI.

AWARDEE CHARACTERISTICS AND DURATION
In this section we describe the effects of key awardee characteristic
variables on duration and analyze the effect of the changing mix of
awardees along these dimensions on trends in expected duration on the
DI and SSI disability rolls. We will focus on the effects of age, gender,
and diagnosis.
• Age is expected to affect duration because of its negative effect
on the length of exposure to potential program participation, the
positive relationship between age and mortality risk, and the neg
ative relationship between age and the probability of return to
work. The first two factors suggest a negative relationship
between age at award and duration, while the third one is
expected to affect duration in the opposite direction.
• Gender may affect duration because of the lower mortality risk of
females in the general population, although this may be clouded
by selectivity in the award process. Also, work-related suspen
sions may be affected by gender differences, since men and
women differ in work histories and work-related incomes.
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• Diagnosis fundamentally affects mortality risk, as well as the
nature and severity of functional limitations and work disabilities
affecting the opportunity costs of return to work.
We will analyze duration on the DI and SSI disability rolls separately
due to the current lack of comprehensive event history data for both
programs within a unified framework. In the first half of this section we
will focus on DI awardees, some of whom received SSI benefits for
many years, while others, particularly those applying for both pro
grams, received them for a short period of time. According to our pre
vious estimates (Rupp and Scott 1995), approximately 75 percent of
awardees applying for both DI and SSI benefits complete their first SSI
payment eligibility spell for reasons of excess income, presumably
largely as a result of the start of DI payments. We can infer that the
bulk of the disability payment experience of these concurrent awardees
consists of duration on the DI rolls. Since concurrent awardees are
implicitly reflected in the DI duration data, and because of the predom
inance of early SSI exits for this group, the second half of this section
focuses on nonconcurrent SSI awardees, i.e., persons initially eligible
for SSI but not DI payments.
Duration on DI: Characteristics and Trends
There are three principal reasons for the suspension or termination
of DI benefits: medical or work-related recovery, death, and retirement
(conversion to the old-age component of social security at age 65).
Overall, more than half of first DI disability spells end with retirement,
more than a third are terminated due to death, and only 11 percent
recover. Gender differences are dominated by the lower mortality risk
of females. There is a strong negative relationship between age and the
probability of recovery (Chart 4.1).
As age at award increases the probability of death increases, but the
numbers also indicate that the competing outcome of conversion to the
retirement program overtakes as the main reason for termination at the
older age groups. Diagnostic differences are also marked, particularly
among younger awardees. We note that changes in program rules, to be
discussed later in more detail, play an important role in a beneficiary's
recovery. In particular, changed work incentives, such as the introduc
tion of the extended period of eligibility, changes in the number of
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CDRs, and the introduction of the medical improvement standards
might have substantially altered the probability of recovery during the
last two decades.
The net effect of age on expected duration is negative (Table 4.1).
While overall expected length of first spells varies substantially by
diagnosis—ranging from the low of 3.4 years for neoplasms to the high
of 15.6 years for mental disorders, age differences are also important,
especially for mental illness and nervous system disorders, where the
expected duration of first spells is around 25 years in the youngest age
group.
As expected, diagnostic differences are strongest in the youngest
group and least pronounced among 50- to 61-year-olds (Chart 4.2).
The lengths of stay shown in Table 4.1 represent the first uninterrupted
Table 4.1 Estimated Average Length of First DI Spells by Age and
Diagnosis, 1972 Awardees (in years)
Diagnosis

18-34

Age group
35-49

50-61

All
ages

6.7

7.6

3.0

3.4

Infective

7.4

Neoplasms

5.1

8.8
4.3

Endocrine

11.1

11.7

6.9

8.3

Mental disorders

16.4

Nervous system

25.5
23.4

16.2

7.8
7.4

15.6
12.5

Circulatory

16.7

11.6

6.4

7.5

Respiratory

15.9

12.4

6.3

7.3

9.0

8.9

5.8

7.0

Geritourinary
Musculoskeletal

9.5
15.4

9.6

5.4

7.5

14.7

7.6

10.0

Congenital abnormalies

21.8

15.0

6.9

13.5

Accidents
Other

11.8

11.2

7.4

9.9

24.2

14.5

7.2

12.0

18.4

12.5

6.5

9.3

Digestive

All diagnoses

SOURCE Hennessey and Dykacz (1989, pp. 10, 12).
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Chart 4.2 Average Length of First DI Spells
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stay on the DI rolls. We do not currently have good data on expected
total duration on the DI disability rolls that would account for multiple
spells. Accounting for multiple spells is potentially important, because
some beneficiaries who leave the rolls may subsequently return. Based
on data by Dykacz and Hennessey (1989), the authors estimated that
accounting for multiple spells may result in an increase in mean dura
tion of as little as a 0.4 years, from the 9.3 years average presented in
Table 4.1 to 9.7 years in the aggregate (Rupp and Scott 1995).
Given the obvious importance of age and diagnosis in affecting
duration, it is natural to ask whether changes in the mix of awardees
along these characteristics through time resulted in marked changes in
the expected duration of successive cohorts of DI awardees. The pro
portion of younger awardees (aged 34 years or less) has increased from
13.5 percent in 1975 to 19.3 percent in 1993. The data also show some
marked shifts in the mix of awardees by diagnosis. The proportion of
awardees with a primary diagnosis of mental disorders has increased
from 11.5 percent in 1975 to 26.1 percent in 1993, while the proportion
of awardees in the circulatory disorders category decreased from about
30 percent in 1975 to 14 percent in 1993.
By combining information on the changing mix of awardees by age
with disaggregated data on spell length for subgroups identified by age,
it is possible to simulate mean spell length over time. Our estimates
reflect the effect of changes in the age mix of new awardees on the
expected mean length of first spells. Changes in the age mix of award
ees produce a slow upward trend in expected duration from about 9
years in 1960 to about 11 years in 1992; most of the estimated increase
occurred since the early 1980s (Chart 4.3).
We did some additional work to see if the addition of diagnostic
detail would change the results of the simulation substantially. We
tested this hypothesis by conducting an alternative simulation using
information on mean duration of first spells by age and diagnosis and
data on the joint distribution of awardees by age and diagnosis for 1975
and 1993. The results of the two simulations were virtually identical,
suggesting that using age-specific information for the simulation pro
duces robust results with respect to diagnosis. This is an important
finding with respect to projection methodology highlighting the pri
mary importance of the age distribution of new awardees for expected
duration. We also compared our results with those of Chirikos (1993),
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who used a different methodology but arrived at results consistent with
ours. This provides further evidence concerning the paramount impor
tance of the age mix of new awardees.
Changes in the age mix of new awardees reflect a variety of forces,
including changes in demographics (e.g., aging of the baby boom gen
eration), epidemiological trends in the incidence of various disabling
conditions with various age distributions of onset, and changes in the
Social Security Administration (SSA) regulations (e.g., mental impair
ment regulations). Thus the results reflected in Chart 4.3 cannot simply
be attributed to demographics alone. In order to better understand the
role of demographics in explaining our results, we conducted an analy
sis of the effect of changes in the age mix of the Dl-insured population
on duration. Changes in the age mix of the Dl-insured population
between 1975 and 1993 reflects largely, though not exclusively, the
aging of the baby boom generation and therefore are indicative of
demographic shifts in the U.S. population. In order to estimate the
effect of changes in the age mix of the Dl-insured population, we ana
lyzed the effect of year-to-year changes in the age mix of the Dlinsured population on duration, assuming unchanged incidence rates
between successive years and using the age-specific duration estimates
used in the previous analysis that produced Chart 4.3. In our simulation
we updated the incidence rate assumptions annually.
Actuarial data show that the proportion of younger (18 to 34 years
old) Dl-insured workers peaked during the early 1980s, while the pro
portion of older insured workers declined until fairly recently. Much of
the overall decline in the average age of Dl-insured workers between
1975 and 1993 is attributable to an increase in the proportion of mid
dle-aged (35 to 49 years old) Dl-insured workers at the expense of
older (50 to 61 years old) Dl-insured workers.
Our analysis shows that a substantial portion of the increase in the
mean duration of first DI spells we attributed to changes in the age mix
of DI awardees can be explained by demographics, but other factors
contributed almost as much. We estimate that about half (0.8 years) of
the 1975-1993 increase in expected duration (1.4 years) is attributable
to changes in the mix of the Dl-insured population. The rest (0.6 years)
is attributable to other factors contributing to the lowering of the age at
entry among new awardees. For example, if the incidence of awards for
conditions with a relatively early onset (e.g., mental retardation and

Growth m Disability Benefits

149

psychiatric conditions) disproportionately increases, average age at
award may decline, even if no demographic factors are at play.
The data also suggest that the trend of increasing duration of new
awardees has magnified the implied effects of the rapid rise in the num
ber of new awards during the last decade on eventual caseloads. While
the number of DI awards (aged 62 or less) has increased from about
250,000 in 1982 to about 580,000 in 1993, expected duration also
increased by about 1 year (about 10 percent). Together, the influx of
awardees and the increase in stay length substantially affect caseloads.
This effect can be seen by multiplying the two factors (first two col
umns in Table 4.2). Expected benefit years rose from 2.5 million for
the 1982 entry cohort to about 6.3 million for the 1993 cohort. The
1982-1993 increase in benefit years was primarily the result of
increased awards; the increase in expected duration had a relatively
small contribution to the overall change. However, if we take a longer
view by looking at changes between 1975 and 1992, the previous and
most recent peak in DI awards, duration becomes the key factor; an
increase in expected duration from 9.5 to 11 years is a major contribu
tor to the increase in simulated benefit years.
Finally, we note that our simulations reflect only the effect of
changes in the mix of awardees (by age, and probably diagnosis as
well) and do not capture changes affecting mean duration either for
selected subgroups or across the board. For example, changes in work
incentives, such as the introduction of the extended period of eligibil
ity, might have increased mean duration, particularly for younger
groups of awardees. In this case, due to such cohort effects, mean
expected duration may have increased during recent decades more than
our simulations seem to suggest.
Duration on the SSI Disability Rolls

In this section we focus on duration on the SSI disability rolls
among nonconcurrent awardees prior to reaching their 65th birthday.
In contrast to the discussion of DI, our analysis here also covers chil
dren, who form an important, rapidly increasing, and controversial part
of the SSI disability program. We will, however, present some informa
tion for working-age SSI awardees separately that will be of use in
comparisons with DI. The main difference between the DI and SSI dis-
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Table 4.2 Simulated Expected Mean Length of First DI Spells and
Expected Total Benefit Years by Annual Cohort of Awardees

Year
1960
1965
1970
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

Total awardees
under 62
158,497
219,236
288,813
494,662
455,037
471,708
388,888
349,781
335,901
302,231
254,921
267,851
313,259
364,325
370,500
366,865
373,483
372,024
423,777
468,238
583,507
580,038

Simulated
mean length
8.9
8.8
9.4
9.5
9.5
9.6
9.6
9.6
9.7
9.8
9.8
10.1
10.2
10.2
10.6
10.5
10.4
10.6
10.8
10.8
11.0
10.9

Simulated
benefit years
1,405,721
1,939,064
2,708,524
4,720,422
4,341,190
4,526,983
3,747,513
3,363,795
3,258,407
2,952,807
2,500,992
2,709,214
3,194,568
3,700,105
3,922,681
3,838,548
3,878,463
3,925,845
4,558,993
5,071,412
6,394,946
6,306,206
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ability programs affecting duration is the fact that DI is conditioned on
prior work history, while SSI is means-tested. SSI recipients might lose
payment eligibility as a result of changes in their family income or
assets. It is to be noted, however, that DI beneficiaries are more at a
risk of losing payment eligibility for work-related reasons, even after
the liberalization of work incentive provisions during the 1980s. The
differences in program design between the two programs need to be
considered in comparing the SSI results, to be presented below, with
the analysis of DI duration.
Overall, the SSI means test is the most important reason for first sus
pensions during the first ten post-award years (Table 4.3). Death and
reaching age 65 are clearly much less important reasons for first exits
than in DI, even accounting for the fact that the eventual first suspen
sion of many of the approximately one-quarter of awardees who did
not exit during the first ten post-award years will be one of these two
categories. The data show marked differences in the reason for first
exits by age, diagnosis, and to a lesser extent by gender, generally in
directions consistent with the DI findings.
The SSI stays of the 1974-1982 cohorts (Table 4.4) were corrected
for the right-censoring of observations (Rupp and Scott 1995). Projec
tions were made not only for first spells but also for total years
expected on the rolls. Not surprisingly, the data show that the mean
duration of first spells is substantially lower for working-age SSI
awardees when compared to DI awardees. Moreover, subgroup differ
ences are less marked in SSI, particularly by age group. These program
differences appear to be driven by the effect of the SSI means test on
the dynamics of first spells. Early suspensions due to the failure to con
tinue to qualify for the means test affects SSI awardees largely inde
pendently of age and diagnosis.
When multiple stays are accounted for (Chart 4.4), the overall pic
ture dramatically changes, however. Overall, the mean SSI stay almost
doubles from 6.9 years for first stays to 13.2 years for all spells for
nonconcurrent adults and children combined. This brings the mean SSI
stay to a level clearly higher than the mean DI duration, even account
ing for the lack of precise data on DI total duration. The difference
between the two programs appears largely attributable to the inclusion
of children in the SSI disability program, although the data do not
allow for a precise comparison. We note that the DI first spell and SSI

Table 4.3 Reason of Completion of First SSI Disability Spell during First 10 Post-award Years for Persons First
Awarded SSI Disability Benefits during 1974-1982, Nonconcurrent Adults and Children
Reason for first suspension (%)

Age, diagnosis,
and gender

No exit
during 10
postaward Excess
years
income

All
persons

Total
(%)

22,747

100

23.3

32.7

11.7

0 to 17 years

3,922

100

35.9

34.9

6.7

3.4

3.5

0.0

15.5

18 to 34 years

5,566

100

33.2

33.7

6.3

8.6

3.0

0.0

15.3

35 to 49 years

3,911

100

32.9

28.5

16.1

4.8

3.0

0.0

14.7

50 to 61 years

7,411

100

10.1

36.3

17.5

1.6

2.8

22.0

9.6

62 years and over

1,937

100

0.0

20.4

6.0

0.6

1.2

66.8

5.0

5,663

100

26.6

29.8

11.7

3.6

2.8

15.7

9.9

Infectious and parasitic

199

100

17.6

33.7

16.1

1.5

4.0

12.6

14.6

Neoplasms

936

100

3.5

28.5

53.4

0.6

0.5

4.4

9.0

Endocrine

738

100

16.9

32.7

18.2

0.5

2.0

17.3

12.3

Total

Death

Public Excess Reached
instit. resources age 65
4.1
2.9
12.9

Other
12.5

Age

Diagnosis
Missing

Psychiatric

2,793

100

25.4

26.6

6.5

14.4

3.1

8.0

16.0

Mental retardation

3,606

100

40.2

31.1

3.5

5.7

3.9

2.6

13.0

Central nervous system

2,047

100

23.5

42.5

6.7

1.3

3.8

7.6

14.6

Circulatory

2,295

100

11.3

34.4

15.3

0.6

1.8

25.4

11.1

Respiratory

678

100

12.4

32.3

17.7

1.0

2.4

22.4

11.8

Digestive

288

100

10.1

28.1

34.0

1.7

0.7

11.5

13.9

Genitourinary

164

100

12.2

36.6

22.0

1.2

1.8

12.2

14.0

1,743

100

14.1

39.4

6.7

0.8

3.0

23.9

12.0

Congenital

416

100

27.4

42.5

8.9

1.7

4.3

2.4

12.7

Injury

577

100

19.2

35.9

9.4

3.1

1.6

12.5

18.4

Other

604

100

14.9

36.8

12.6

2.6

3.6

14.4

15.1

13,226

100

23.2

31.9

11.3

2.8

3.1

15.9

11.7

9,521

100

23.3

33.8

12.3

5.9

2.6

8.6

13.5

Musculoskeletal

Gender
Female
Male

SOURCE: Authors' longitudinal study file of 22,747 persons first awarded SSI benefits dunng 1974-1982

Table 4.4 Estimated Mean Duration of First SSI Disability Spells and Total Preretirement-Age Duration on the SSI
Disability Rolls by Age and Diagnosis, Nonconcurrent Adults and Children (years)
Diagnosis
First spell
Infectious and parasitic
Neoplasms
Endocrine
Psychiatric
Mental retardation
Central nervous system
Circulatory
Respiratory
Digestive
Genitourinary
Musculoskeletal
Congenital
Injury
Other
Missing
All diagnoses

Otol?
years

18 to 34
years

35 to 49
years

50 to 61
years

62 years
and over

All
ages

10.1
3.4
4.3
9.1
11.9
8.6
4.9
6.6
7.1
3.6
5.8
8.7
7.4
8.9
13.1
10.7

9.8
2.6
6.2
7.3
12.2
8.2
8.9
5.3
4.2
4.5
7.0
8.0
7.6
6.8
10.4
9.4

6.8
2.0
9.0
8.7
9.5
7.4
6.4
8.0
5.0
5.9
7.4
8.8
6.8
5.3
8.8
7.7

3.8
1.5
4.3
4.8
5.8
4.3
3.9
4.0
2.8
3.9
4.4
4.8
4.0
3.4
4.6
4.2

1.0
0.8
1.2
1.2
1.3
1.3
1.1
1.2
1.2
1.0
1.3
1.1
1.3
1.0
1.3
1.2

6.0
1.8
5.2
6.9
11.3
7.2
4.1
4.4
3.6
4.2
4.7
8.1
5.8
5.0
7.8
6.9

Total disability stays
Infectious and parasitic
Neoplasms
Endocrine
Psychiatric
Mental retardation
Central nervous system
Circulatory
Respiratory
Digestive
Genitourinary
Musculoskeletal
Congenital
Injury
Other
Missing
All diagnoses

32.3
11.2
25.3
25.8
28.1
26.1
17.3
26.0
17.9
15.6
23.7
27.0
23.6
25.8
26.7
26.5

17.2
6.8
14.2
19.6
23.3
18.8
13.7
11.3
14.8
12.9
15.7
20.0
16.1
14.9
20.4
19.9

8.3
2.8
12.1
13.5
14.8
11.9
10.1
11.1
7.2
9.6
11.8
13.3
10.8
9.5
12.4
11.6

4.9
1.7
5.5
6.0
7.2
5.3
4.8
4.8
3.3
5.1
5.4
6.9
5.0
4.3
5.4
5.1

1.2
0.8
1.2
1.2
1.3
1.3
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.1
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.0
1.3
1.2

SOURCE Authors' estimates based on longitudinal study file of 22,747 persons first awarded SSI benefits dunng 1974-1982.

9.6
3.2
8.2
14.4
23.3
17.0
5.6
6.6
5.7
9.4
7.2
22.1
11.2
10.2
13.3
13.2
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Chart 4.4 Average Length of First SSI Disability Spell and Total Pre-65
Stay: Nonconcurrents
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total stay estimates by age-group among prime-age adults are fairly
close. Accounting for multiple stays in SSI highlights the age, and to a
lesser extent, diagnostic differences in duration.
With duration patterns already described, we need to see how the
demographic and diagnostic mix has changed over time. The most dra
matic trend is the increasing proportion of children from 12.7 percent
of new awardees in 1974 to 40.9 percent in 1993. Changes in the diag
nostic mix of new awardees are also substantial, with the proportion
with mental retardation and psychiatric conditions increasing dramati
cally, from 5 percent to 22 percent (mental retardation) and from 6.8
percent to 31.1 percent (psychiatric conditions) between 1974 and
1993. A long-term decline of the proportion of females among new
nonconcurrent SSI awardees from 56.8 percent in 1974 to 47.5 percent
in 1993 reflects the increase in the proportion of women in the DIinsured population during this period of time.
Armed with both durations and demographic patterns, we were able
to produce simulations that reflect changes in the joint distribution of
new awardee cohorts by age, gender, and diagnosis. We also conducted
simulations using information on changes in the age distribution alone
and on changes in the age-gender mix. These latter, cruder methods,
resulted in almost identical results. This robustness suggests that fac
tors associated with the age mix of new awardees dominate the results.
This is consistent with our findings for DI in this respect.
Changes in the age distribution of new awardees between 1974 and
1993 are responsible for a substantial increase in expected duration
from a mean of 12.3 years in 1974 to a mean of 17.8 years in 1993
(Chart 4.5). This is a much more dramatic increase than was observed
for DI. However, when children are excluded from the analysis, the
trends for DI and SSI nonconcurrent adults appear much more similar.
The combined effect of changes in the number of new awardees and
the mix of awardees by the demographic variables considered in our
analysis can be represented by the simulated benefit years associated
with each entry cohort. As previously shown for DI, this is simply the
product of the number of new awards and simulated mean total dura
tion for each annual cohort of new awards (Table 4.5).
The combined effect of the dramatic drop of new awards between
1974 and 1982 and the dramatic increase in childhood disability
awards with long expected duration during subsequent years produces
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Chart 4.5 Simulated Average Length of Total Pre-65 SSI Disability Stays:
Nonconcurrents

Duration
(years)
18

16
14
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8

6

Adults +
children

4
2
0
74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92

Year of award

a dramatic pattern of changes and contrast between the early 1980s and
recent years.
The analysis above is limited to the effects of awardee mix on
expected duration and does not address the possibility that factors
other than age, gender, and diagnosis might have also induced changes
in duration on the rolls. Such other factors could include either
awardee characteristics other than the three variables considered, or
factors (such as programmatic variables) directly affecting duration
events.
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Table 4.5 Simulated Expected Total Preretirement Age Duration on the
SSI Disability Rolls among Children and Nonconcurrent
Adults, 1974-1993
Simulated mean total
duration (years)

Year

Number of
awardees

Total (adults +
children)

Adults
only

Simulated
benefit-years
(total)

1974

423,400

12.3

9.8

5,207,820

1975

366,900

12.8

9.9

4,696,320

1976

295,100

13.3

10.3

3,924,830

1977

266,600
225,000

14.1

10.4

3,759,060

13.8

10.2

3,105,000

195,000
196,000

14.4

10.3

14.2

10.3

2,808,000
2,783,200

1981
1982

158,200

14.8

10.2

2,341,360

160,800

14.9

10.5

2,395,920

1983

14.7

10.7

2,920,890

1984

198,700
222,300

14.7

10.8

3,267,810

1985

261,300

14.6

11.3

3,814,980

1986

14.3

11.0

3,749,460

1987

262,200
250,100

14.1

10.7

3,526,410

1988

253,500

14.0

10.7

3,549,000

1989

327,400

15.8

10.8

5,172,920

1990

391,700

15.3

10.8

5,993,010

1991

472,900

15.9

11.0

7,519,110

1992

549,400

16.9

11.3

9,284,860

1993

525,400

17.8

11.3

9,352,120

1978
1979
1980

NOTE- Number of awardees estimated from SSI 1-percent sample file Simulations based on joint
distnbution of annual awardees by age, gender, and diagnosis and authors' estimates of total stay
for subgroups.
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PROGRAMMATIC FACTORS DIRECTLY AFFECTING
DURATION
In the previous section we have demonstrated that the mix of awardees fundamentally shapes duration on the rolls. Nevertheless, these
effects are conditional on programmatic rules concerning exit and
reentry events. In this section we will focus on programmatic factors
directly affecting duration, including suspensions and terminations for
medical- and income-related reasons, work incentive provisions, and
vocational rehabilitation.
CDRs form the primary vehicle for removing persons from the DI
and SSI disability rolls for medical reasons. The number of CDRs per
formed greatly varied over the years subject to swings in political deci
sion making and SSA staffing constraints. During the early Reagan
years, CDRs were perceived as important tools for containing the
growth of the disability rolls. Following a political backlash and
numerous court decisions, a moratorium was issued on CDRs during
the mid 1980s, followed by the introduction of the medical improve
ment standards making the removal of persons from the disability rolls
for medical reasons more difficult. At the 1983 peak, 436,000 DI cases
were reviewed, comprising 13.5 percent of the caseload (U.S. House of
Representatives 1993, p. 64). More than 40 percent (182,000) were
removed from the rolls. In contrast, during 1995 only 0.1 percent of the
DI caseload was reviewed, and only 15 percent of these (475 cases)
were removed from the rolls. Subsequently the number of CDRs per
formed increased somewhat. The experience with CDRs in the SSI
program also showed great variations, with a minimum level of activity
during the last couple of years.
More recently, the role of CDRs as a policy tool has increased again,
as exemplified by Section 212 of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 concerning SSI childhood dis
ability cases, as well as other recent initiatives. Section 201 of P.L.
103-296, the Social Security Independence and Program Improve
ments Act of 1994, introduced time-limited benefits for persons dis
abled based on a finding that drug addiction or alcoholism was a
contributing factor material to the finding of disability. More recently,
these provisions were replaced by stricter provisions of P.L. 104-121,
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the "Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996," providing for
the outright termination of cash benefits and health coverage for all DI
and SSI disability recipients who received disability benefits based on
drug addiction and/or alcoholism at the time of the enactment of the
law as of January 1, 1997, and prohibiting future DI and SSI disability
benefit allowances (and associated Medicare and/or Medicaid eligibil
ity) to any future disability applicant whose drug addiction and/or alco
holism would be material to the determination of disability.
CDRs clearly affect duration on the rolls and may affect subsequent
applications similar to the effect of denial rates, as was demonstrated
by Parsons' work (1991). In this pioneering study, based on economic
theory, Parsons hypothesized that high denial rates discourage subse
quent disability applications as a result of their negative effect on the
expected net benefits of DI application. His empirical analysis—based
on data from the late 1970s—provided results consistent with this
hypothesis. CDRs may have negative effects not only on duration
among those on the rolls, but also on subsequent DI applications for
similar reasons.
However, past experience suggests difficulties with relying on CDRs
as a primary strategy of containing caseload growth both because of
the legal and political problems embedded in the approach and for sub
stantive reasons. Many persons on the disability rolls face serious med
ical problems; identifying those whose medical condition sufficiently
improves and is likely to improve in the future is inherently difficult.
Moreover, time spent on the disability rolls -results in the depreciation
of work skills and is expected to result in difficulties in returning to the
labor force, especially without assistance. The General Accounting
Office study of DI beneficiaries terminated during 1981-84 found that
more than half returned to the rolls, and of those who did not, nearly
half were not working (quoted in U.S. House of Representatives 1993,
p. 70).
Administrative changes related to the SSI means test are also of
potential importance in affecting duration. As we discussed previously,
the data presented in Table 4.5 suggest that recent changes in the han
dling of failure to respond to an agency request for information had a
negative effect on suspensions, and hence a positive effect on length of
stay. In general, procedures designed to tighten the monitoring of SSI
means-test eligibility are expected to reduce duration, while loosening
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of procedures and/or reduction in the amount of resources devoted to
monitor SSI income or asset eligibility are expected to increase dura
tion.
In light of the difficulties of relying on the stick-only approach of
CDRs, the interest in the carrots of work incentives is understandable.
Both SSI (Section 1619 program) and DI (trial work period and
extended period of eligibility) have gone through substantial liberaliza
tions. Little is currently known about the effects of these changes on
duration. The cohort-based comparison of DI exit rates during the
1970s and 1980s (Hennessey and Dykacz 1993) suggests that the liber
alization of DI work incentives during the early 1980s actually
increased length of stay. Similarly, with the introduction of Section
1619 provisions SSI suspensions directly resulting from work activities
were eliminated, and data presented in Table 4.6 suggests no secular
increase in income-related suspensions either. Thus, it appears that pre
vious reforms of work incentive provisions might have increased dura
tion in both programs. In addition, as Hoynes and Moffitt (1996) argue,
such changes in work incentive provisions may induce additional
applications thereby further adding to caseload size.
Vocational rehabilitation (VR) is another positive strategy to reduce
duration in the disability rolls. The number of disability beneficiaries
served by the state VR system has been historically small and has
decreased further since SSA's placement-oriented reimbursement of
VR agencies was introduced. Moreover, little is known about the effec
tiveness of these interventions because of the difficulty in establishing
a useful control group. The interest in vocational rehabilitation demon
strations is rooted in the perceived failure of work incentives to move
sizable numbers of beneficiaries to productive employment in an effi
cient manner. Six-year experimental follow-up results from the Transi
tional Employment Training Demonstration (Decker and Thornton
1995) indicate that the employment services raised the average
employment and earnings levels of the mentally retarded SSI recipients
who were offered transitional employment services, and that the
increases persisted relatively undiminished during the six-year period.
However, the modest reduction in SSI payments offset only a fraction
of the cost of transitional employment services. Moreover, only a small
subset of eligible SSI recipients volunteered for the demonstration. A
more recent SSA demonstration initiative, Project NetWork, targets a

Table 4.6 Reason for First Exit by 24,48, and 120 Months after First Award, Children and Nonconcurrent SSI
Awardee Cohorts (%)
Exit reason
Total3
Exit status at month 120
No exit
Excess income
Death
Public institution
Excess resources
Other
Total

Total3
Exit status at month 120
No exit
Excess income
Death
Public institution
Excess resources
Other
Total

1974
4,234

1975
3,669

1976
2,951

1977
2,666

1978
2,250

1979
1,950

1980
1,960

1981
1,582

1982
1,608

1983
1,987

22.6
31.7
10.2
3.4
2.4
29.7
100

22.8
30.6
9.9
41
2.6
30.1
100

23.1
32.0
9.7
3.8
2.3
29.1
100

21.3
33.3
10.5
4.7
24
27.9
100

23.4
32.4
11.3
4.4
3.1
254
100

23.6
34.4
11.3
4.5
3.3
23.0
100

25.1
33.7
11.6
4.1
3.8
21.7
100

25.3
336
11.6
3.7
3.7
22.2
100

24.5
352
11.3
42
2.9
22.0
100

26.3
34.5
10.5
49
4.0
19.8
100

1984
2,223

1985
2,613

1986
2,622

1987
2,501

1988
2,535

1989
3,274

1990
3,917

1991
4,729

1995
5,494

27.1
35.5
10.4
4.5
2.3
20.1
100
(continued)

Table 4.6 (continued)
Exit reason
Total3
Exit status at month 48
No exit
Excess income
Death
Public institution
Excess resources
Other
Total

Total3
Exit status at month 48
No exit
Excess income
Death
Public institution
Excess resources
Other
Total

4,234

1975
3,669

1976
2,951

1977
2,666

1978
2,250

1979
1,950

1980
1,960

1981
1,582

1982
1,608

1983
1,987

46.2
23.9
6.4
2.5
1.6
19.5
100

45.5
240
6.5
3.0
1.5
19.5
100

44.1
24.9
6.1
3.0
15
204
100

437
25.9
6.8
3.6
1.0
190
100

44.3
25.0
8.0
35
22
17.0
100

43.9
26.6
8.5
3.2
23
15.6
100

45.8
25.6
8.4
3 1
2.8
14.3
100

475
25.7
7.1
2.5
2.5
14.7
100

46.3
27.7
7.5
3.1
20
13.4
100

48.0
26.9
5.9
3.9
3.2
12.1
100

1984
2,223

1985
2,613

1986
2,622

1987
2,501

1988
2,535

1989
3,274

1990
3,917

1991
4,729

1995
5,494

48.2
27.7
7.0
3.3
1.8
12.0
100

50.7
25.2
5.9
3.7
2.1
12.4
100

51.5
24.6
7.4
3.1
1.9
11.4
100

51.9
24.8
8.2
3.3
1.6
10.2
100

517
261
7.5
2.5
1.4
109
100

550
22.4
7.4
2.4
2.2
10.7
100

57.2
23.3
6.3
2.3
1.8
9.1
100

1974

Exit reason
Total3
Exit status at month 24
No exit
Excess income
Death
Public institution
Excess resources
Other
Total

Total3
Exit status at month 24
No exit
Excess income
Death
Public institution
Excess resources
Other
Total
aNumber, not percent

4,234

1975
3,669

1976
2,951

1977
2,666

1978
2,250

1979
1,950

1980
1,960

1981
1,582

1982
1,608

1983
1,987

63.7
16.9
4.6
1.6
10
12.1
100

61.1
186
4.4
22
1.1
12.7
100

59.7
196
4.0
2.3
0.9
13.5
100

60.2
197
4.4
24
0.6
12.7
100

59.5
20.1
5.8
2.5
1.4
10.8
100

601
20.7
56
2.1
1.4
10.2
100

616
19.4
5.7
22
1.4
9.6
100

60.5
20.5
5.8
15
1.6
10.2
100

58.1
237
5.6
25
1.4
8.8
100

61.1
21 1
4.2
29
2.4
8.2
100

1984
2,223

1985
2,613

1986
2,622

1987
2,501

1988
2,535

1989
3,274

1990
3,917

1991
4,729

1995
5,494

62.3
221
4.8
1.8
1.2
7.8
100

65.0
193
4.0
2.6
1.7
7.4
100

642
19.8
4.9
2.2
14
7.6
100

654
19.6
5.6
2.2
1.0
6.1
100

64.7
20.8
5.1
1.5
0.6
73
100

67.8
179
4.4
1.7
1.1
7.0
100

69.2
185
4.0
1.6
1.3
5.5
100

70.5
17.4
4.0
2.0
1.1
5.0
100

72.1
161
3.9
1.9
0.7
5.4
100

1974
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much broader group, including all DI beneficiaries and SSI recipients
in the demonstration areas and uses a case-management approach to
return-to-work (Rupp, Bell, and McManus 1994). The net impact
results of this large-scale experimental evaluation are not available yet,
but preliminary analyses of demonstration participation suggest that—
similar to the Transitional Employment and Training Demonstration—
only a fraction of project eligibles volunteered for the demonstration
(Rupp, Wood, and Bell 1996).
In view of the increases in the size of the caseload, policymakers
continue to have an interest in these more direct methods of limiting
duration on the rolls as evidenced by SSA's evolving employment
strategy and the recent review of the disability program by the National
Academy of Social Insurance (Mashaw et al. 1996). Whether such ini
tiatives are going to have substantial effects on duration in the desired
direction (reduction) is too early even to speculate on. Nevertheless,
while much more research needs to be done on the effects of CDRs,
work incentives, vocational rehabilitation, and other programmatic
variables on duration, it appears safe to infer that none of these factors
had a large overall effect on containing caseload growth over the last
decade. If anything, the most consequential recent changes probably
had effects in the opposite direction. By all likelihood the medical
improvement standards, changes in the mental regulations, and the
Zebley decision contributed to increased expected duration. Thus, the
results of our simulations concerning expected length of stay in the
previous section are likely to provide a conservative view of past trends
in expected duration.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE DURATION AND
CASELOADS
In our analysis so far we have focused on past trends in awardee
characteristics and expected duration. These factors do affect the future
by virtue of the fact that the potential exposure to program participa
tion of new awardees, especially among those young at first entry, is
extremely long. Thus, as we have demonstrated, and assuming no
major changes in program rules, the past trend toward younger entrants
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in both DI and SSI, most notably evidenced by the recent influx of a
large number of children to the SSI disability rolls, is expected to put a
strong upward pressure on caseloads for many years to come, unless a
large number of the recent entrants are removed from the rolls through
new policy initiatives. This implication of past trends for future case
loads will affect SSA's disability programs even if the past trends
toward younger entrants were to be reversed in the future.
This section addresses the next logical question. What can we say
about the expected duration of future cohorts of new entrants? Can we
assume that the past trends toward younger entrants and increasing
expected duration will continue in the future? Or perhaps we should
expect the reversal of these trends and shorter duration for future
entrants? What are the expected effects of such future trends in dura
tion on caseloads?
There are a large number of potential factors that might affect the
duration of future entry cohorts, from demographic and economic fac
tors to future policy and procedural changes. The purpose of this sec
tion is not to provide crystal ball speculations about the net effect of all
of these diverse forces, but rather to spell out the implications of some
relatively tangible factors, notably demographic trends.
While we did not attempt to project future changes in age-specific
incidence rates, we have used actuarial projections of the age distribu
tion of the Dl-insured population to assess the likely future effects of
the aging of the baby boom generation on expected future mean dura
tion.
Our analysis shows that this factor alone is likely to result in a oneyear decline in expected duration of first spells between 1993 (see
Table 4.2) and 2006 (Chart 4.6). While this appears as good news, the
same demographic forces also seem to imply future increases in inci
dence rates.
The net effect may be an upward demographic pressure on case
loads during the next ten to fifteen years as suggested by the relation
ship between age, DI incidence rates, and duration in a cross-sectional
framework (Table 4.7). The two factors (incidence and expected dura
tion) work in the opposite direction: as age increases the incidence of
disabling conditions serious enough to warrant the award of DI disabil
ity benefits increases, while expected duration decreases. The product
of these two factors represents the net effect on caseloads: expected DI
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Chart 4.6 Estimated Effect of Changes in Age-Mix of the DI Insured
Population on Average Length of First SSDI Spells

Duration (years)

12
10
8

6

94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
Year of first award
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Table 4.7 DI Incidence Rates, Expected Duration, and Benefit Years per
1,000 Insured Workers

Age group

Awards per
1,000 Dl-insured
workers

Expected first-spell
duration (years)

Expected DI benefit
years per 1,000
insured workers

18-34

2.1

18.4

39.0

35-49

4.5

12.5

55.9

50-61

13.1

6.5

85.3

SOURCE Incidence rates were calculated by the authors based on data on the number of DIinsured workers (1993) provided by SSA's Office of the Actuary and the number of 1993 awards
by age group. Estimated first-spell duration data by age group are based on estimated by Hennessey and Dykacz (1989)

benefit years increase as we move toward the older cohorts of new
entrants, because the positive effect of age on incidence rates is stron
ger than the negative effect on duration.
We do not have actuarial projections for the population financially
eligible for SSL Nevertheless, the population satisfying the SSI means
test is conceptually akin to the notion of the Dl-insured population.
While the SSI financial eligibility criteria are much more complex than
the concept of the Dl-insured status, a microsimulation model devel
oped by analysts at the Social Security Administration (Wixon and
Vaughan 1989; Vaughan and Wixon 1989) based on the rich income
and asset information available from the SIPP provides an opportunity
for some analysis. Table 4.8 provides an estimate of the size and agedistribution of the population economically eligible for SSI. The esti
mate, provided by Denton Vaughan to the authors, suggests that
approximately 25.7 million persons aged 18-64 were financially eligi
ble for SSI disability benefits in 1984. These estimates include (but do
not identify) persons concurrently satisfying the economic eligibility
criteria of both programs, as well as working-age persons eligible for
SSI only. Our analysis shows that overall, the relationship between age,
incidence, and expected duration of benefits is similar in the two pro
grams. Nevertheless, there are some notable differences.
First of all, the SSI incidence rate is higher than the DI incidence
rate. The comparison is affected by the exclusion of concurrents from
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Table 4.8 SSI Awards per 1,000 Persons Satisfying the SSI Means Test,
Expected Total Duration and Benefit Years per 1,000
Financially Eligible Persons

Age
group

New SSI
noncurrent
Number of
Mean total
awards per
persons
duration on
financially
1,000
eligible
financially SSI disability
for SSI
rolls
eligible persons
(years)
in 1984
(000)

Expected SSI
disability
benefit-years of
new awardees
per 1,000
financially
eligible persons

18-34

18,198

3.4

19.9

68

35-49

3,791

10.7

11.6

124

50-61

2,713

22.5

5.1

115

62-64

470

26.4

1.2

32

NOTE4 The estimated number of financially eligible persons was provided to the authors by Denton Vaughan based on the 1984 SIPP using the rmcrosimulation model developed by him and Ber
nard Wixon (Wixon and Vaughan 1991; Vaughan and Wixon 1991). The SIPP estimates reflect the
estimated number of persons satisfying the SSI income and assets means test, irrespective of eligi
bility for DI The number of SSI awards estimated from the author's 1-percent SSI study file,
however, is limited to persons receiving SSI benefits only, at least dunng the initial year following
first award. Total duration estimates reflect all SSI disability spells and are based on age-specific
means

our SSI incidence rate numerator and by the fact that the SSI incidence
rates reflect the 1984 experience, while the DI incidence rates reflect
1993 data. However, considering both of these factors would
strengthen, rather than weaken the contrast. An important issue for
future research is the reason for the higher SSI incidence rate. There
are at least three competing hypotheses that might contribute to this
finding. First, the average health and disability status of the financially
eligible SSI population might be relatively low. Second, SSI benefits
are more attractive relative to alternative sources of income for the SSI
financially eligible population than the DI benefits are relative to the
wages of Dl-insured workers. Third, because of differences in human
capital and the lack of work experience, financially eligible SSI appli
cants might have an easier time of qualifying under SSA's vocational
criteria than might be the case with the average DI applicant. One fac
tor that might work in the opposite direction is that a substantial por-

Growth in Disability Benefits

171

tion of the financially eligible SSI population may meet the means test
only marginally, and therefore face only relatively low levels of
expected SSI payments reducing the economic incentive to apply.
When both cash and noncash benefits are considered, however, the net
incentives to apply for SSI may be very strong even for financially eli
gible persons qualifying only for a small amount of SSI cash benefits
because of the importance of Medicaid for many SSI applicants.
Table 4.8 shows that the relationship between age and expected ben
efit years is somewhat different for SSI when compared to DI. In par
ticular, the increase between the two younger age groups is reversed as
age increases. The implication of this finding for the projection of the
future effects of demographics on caseloads is that the aging of the
baby boom generation might have a smaller net effect on SSI caseloads
when compared to DI. However, because of the complex relationships
between age, poverty status, family structures, disabilities, and other
factors affecting the size of the SSI financially eligible population and
incidence rates, much more work needs to be done before firm conclu
sions can be reached about trends in future awards, duration, and case
loads in the SSI disability program.

CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we assessed the relationship between age, gender,
diagnosis, and duration on the DI and SSI disability rolls, and quanti
fied the implications of past trends in awardee characteristics and
future caseloads. We also looked at programmatic factors directly
affecting duration, and the combined effect of incidence rates and
expected duration on age-specific expected benefit years. We also
made some inferences about the likely effects of the aging of the baby
boom generation on expected duration and caseloads.
The data show that lifetime duration in both the DI and SSI disabil
ity programs is long; thus long duration is an important determinant of
caseloads, and hence of program cost. Between 1975 and 1993 the
shift toward younger entrants resulted in substantial increases in the
expected duration of new awardees in both DI and SSI. These past
trends in expected duration create an upward pressure on future case-
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loads, especially in SSI where the recent influx of children is expected
to have substantial future effects on caseloads, under the assumption
that current program rules will stay in effect for persons already on the
rolls in the future. An important issue for future research concerns the
effects of Section 211 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor
tunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 envisioning substantial tightening of
SSI childhood disability eligibility provisions.
Our analysis suggests that the aging of the baby boom generation
contributed to the 1975-1993 increase in the expected average duration
of successive cohorts of new DI entrants, but that these trends will
reverse during the 1993-2006 period as the baby boom generation
ages. This will moderate, but not entirely eliminate, the likely upward
pressures of the aging of the baby boom generation on future caseloads
arising from rising incidence rates.
Our analysis suggests the usefulness of cohort-based studies of
duration for understanding and quantifying the factors affecting future
terminations and caseloads. In particular, such a perspective seems use
ful in disentangling the effects of awardee characteristics, the size of
successive awardee cohorts, programmatic variables and other factors.
Several important issues remain for future research. We need to learn
much more about the interaction of the SSI and DI programs as they
affect the duration of disability benefits and future caseloads, and par
ticularly about the duration experience of concurrent awardees. Much
more work needs to be done, and is feasible to do, concerning trends in
SSI financial eligibility and their effect on duration and caseloads.
Finally, there is a clear need for creative and rigorous work on the
likely consequences of various strategies to contain the growth of the
disability rolls through affecting entry and exit events.
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Comments on Chapter 4
Daniel Mont
Congressional Budget Office

Kalman Rupp and Charles Scott (Chapter 4) provide an important
extension to the work on award growth presented in this volume. As
they correctly point out, the extent to which caseloads grow is depen
dent not only on the inflow of recipients to the major disability pro
grams, but how long those recipients remain on the rolls.
The aging of the baby boom generation, report Rupp and Scott, will
increase caseloads. This increase, however, is the result of two oppos
ing effects. On the one hand, an older population will have more occur
rences of disability; that is, awards should increase as baby boomers
age. On the other hand, older people typically have shorter spells of
receiving disability benefits. Once they reach the normal retirement
age they are no longer classified as disabled, and their benefits convert
to retirement benefits.
Rupp and Scott examine factors other than age that influence the
duration of spells on Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), such as gender and diagnosis.
What is lacking, as they point out, are analyses that isolate the impact
of programmatic factors. Continuing Disability Reviews (CDRs),
vocational rehabilitation, the trial work period and extended period of
eligibility, and the level of substantial gainful activity presumably all
have an effect on the length of time someone receives benefits. The
impacts of these program characteristics are not well understood.
The main reason concern has risen over growing caseloads in the DI
program is the dwindling of the program's trust fund. Recently, the dis
ability trust fund was bolstered, but this was by reallocating resources
away from the retirement trust fund. The fundamental problem
remains.
To understand the effects of age on total benefits paid (and thus on
the trust fund), it is necessary to not only consider the effect of age on
caseloads but on benefits paid. Since DI benefits are a function of past
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earnings, more awards to older applicants will generally mean higher
average monthly checks. As shown in Table 1 (using demographic and
program data reported in Rupp's and Scott's paper), the age distribu
tion of awards in 2005 should be much higher than in 1993, the most
recent year reported in the paper. Furthermore, older awardees get sig
nificantly larger monthly checks; as shown in Table 1, the difference
can be hundreds of dollars per month. Therefore, the impact of aging
baby boomers on the disability trust fund will be larger than their
impact on caseloads.
Table 1

Percentage of DI Awards by Age, Recipients under 62
Under 35

35-49

50-61

1993

19.3

34.7

46.1

2005a

14.2

30.6

55.2

Average monthly benefit
of new award in 1993______$521.6_____$681.6_____$809.5
SOURCE- Computed using data from the Social Security Administration.
Projection

5 Characteristics of SSI and DI
Recipients in the Years Prior
to Receiving Benefits
Evidence from the PSID
Mary C. Daly
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

One of the most disturbing aspects of the recent growth in the Sup
plemental Security Income (SSI) and Social Security Disability Insur
ance (DI) rolls has been the increasing number of young people—
individuals in their 20s, 30s, and 40s—who have moved onto the dis
ability benefit system. Research on transitions off of the disability rolls
suggests that many of these young recipients could remain on the sys
tem for much of their adult lives (Rupp and Scott 1995). This potential
change in program usage, from a bridge between work and retirement
to a long-term income maintenance alternative, coupled with rising
program expenditures and a growing commitment to supporting people
with disabilities in the labor market, have renewed interest in the paths
that individuals take to benefit receipt.
This chapter begins to characterize these paths by describing the cir
cumstances and experiences of SSI and DI beneficiaries in the years
before they receive benefits. Specifically, it examines the labor market
effort, living arrangements, income sources, and economic well-being
of a sample of SSI and DI recipients during the five years prior to ben
efit receipt. This pre-award view of disability benefit recipients is
important to the development of preventative policies designed to
maintain individuals in the labor market and outside of the social safety
net.
NOTE- Opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
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BACKGROUND
Almost all of the research on SSI and DI recipients has focused on
characteristics of current recipients and on their economic well-being
and labor market behavior after benefits have been awarded. Scott
(1989) described the characteristics of individuals who came onto the
SSI rolls between January 1974 and December 1986. Kochhar and
Scott (1995) examined the disability patterns among SSI and DI recip
ients and related changes in the SSI caseload to specific changes in dis
ability requirements and outreach initiatives. Rupp and Scott (1995)
estimated the length of stay on SSI by age and diagnosis. Hennessey
and Muller (1994) followed a group of DI recipients to determine the
factors that influence their decisions to return to work. Scott (1992)
examined the work efforts of individuals on SSI both before and after
receiving benefits. Each of these studies began at the point of benefit
receipt and focused on the factors that contribute to changes in the size
and composition of the recipient population. Whereas such studies pro
vide valuable information about the circumstances of individuals
receiving benefits, they yield little information about these recipients'
pre-award characteristics.
Several pre-award scenarios are plausible. One possibility is that
individuals with average income, skills, and attachment to the labor
market become so severely disabled that they are prohibited from
working and must rely on transfer income for their economic wellbeing. In this situation, SSI and DI act as public insurance and protect
the recipient from economic losses associated with the onset of a dis
ability. In alternative scenarios, the onset of disability may not be the
event that precipitates applying for and receiving benefits. Instead,
individuals with disabilities may be capable of work, but unable to find
employment because of insufficient or mismatched skills and educa
tion or because of declining economic conditions that reduce labor
market opportunities. In these cases, disability benefits represent
"unemployment insurance" for people with disabilities who are unable
to find jobs. 1
From the perspective of policymakers, the road that people take
towards benefit receipt is important. Economic disparities that were
present before the application for and receipt of benefits may not be
eliminated by disability-based programs designed to offset the losses
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associated with working-age disability or to provide transitional
income security during periods of health-related losses in economic
well-being. Moreover, the extent to which work can be used to reduce
the disability benefit rolls will depend largely on the path that people
take to benefit receipt. Individuals with average work histories who
become unable to work either because of an acute change in their
health or because of a transitory shift in economic conditions will be
more easily integrated back into the labor market than either individu
als with a history of long-term transfer receipt or persons with an
increasingly severe long-term health condition.
Finally, while income transfers represent one option for maintaining
the economic well-being of all individuals with disabilities, their effec
tiveness for all groups may not be equal. Examining this and similar
issues requires that we look at individuals and their circumstances
before they begin to receive benefits. It is this prebenefit picture that
will provide the information necessary to make judgments about alter
natives to moving onto the rolls.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data

The empirical results in this study come from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID data span more than two decades,
from 1968 to 1991. Since 1968, the PSID has interviewed annually a
sample of some 5,000 families, representing a disproportionate number
of low-income individuals. At least one member of each family inter
viewed has been either part of the original families interviewed in 1968
or born to a member of one of these families. Partial information on
individuals who ceased to be respondents prior to 1991 is included in
the analysis whenever possible. The PSID currently contains data on
over 42,000 persons, approximately 23,000 of whom are current
respondents. This study uses the 1991 Family Individual ResponseNonresponse File, including data from 1970 to 1991. Sample weights
are applied in the analyses to correct for the original oversampling of
low-income households. For a more complete discussion of these data,
see Hill (1992).
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Methods
This study relies on longitudinal data that record information about
income, benefit receipt, family composition, employment, and, to a
lesser extent, health in each year for a set of individuals. Using this lon
gitudinal information, the analysis selected a sample of individuals
who began to receive benefits at some point during the data history. It
then determines that information on these sample members for the pre
vious five years is complete and organizes these individuals by the
onset of their benefit receipt.
Capturing SSI and DI Awards
Unlike administrative data, the PSID does not provide a complete
history of SSI and DI receipt. However, because the PSID began inter
viewing families in 1968, there are now 22 years of data over which
benefit receipt can be traced. Since 1975, the PSID has collected infor
mation on the types of transfer benefits collected by each member of
interviewed families. Respondents are asked to identify the program(s)
that their benefits come from and to estimate the total amount of
money transferred to each household member. Information from these
questions is used to identify SSI and DI receipt for all members of the
sample.
Individuals are included in the sample of SSI(DI) initial awardees
when five consecutive periods of no SSI(DI) benefits are followed by
one period of SSI(DI) receipt. 2 To further refine the sample of individu
als with a beginning spell of SSI(DI), individuals living in households
reporting SSI(DI) receipt during the period immediately preceding the
individuals' award are excluded from the sample.
Sample Development
The sample includes all adults who experienced an observable spell
of SSI or DI receipt, who were between the ages of 18 and 64 when
receipt began, and who have at least five years of data recorded in the
years immediately preceding the award year. Some members of the
sample experienced multiple spells of benefit receipt over the periods
covered. However, since the analysis is intended to capture experiences
preceding the first award of benefits, subsequent spells are excluded
from the analysis.
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Initial SSI awards are recorded beginning in 1979; DI awards are
evaluated beginning in 1984. Although the PSID contains information
on SSI receipt prior to 1979 and Old Age and Survivors Disability
Insurance (OASDI) receipt prior to 1984, there are insufficient data to
build a complete history during these periods. In the case of SSI receipt
there are no data on a respondent's pre-SSI association with one of the
state-based programs for Old-Age Assistance, Aid to the Permanently
and Totally Disabled, and Aid to the Blind. Since the analysis sets out
to examine the pre-award circumstances of new SSI recipients, individ
uals receiving'benefits between 1974 and 1979 are excluded from the
analysis. For DI the problem is slightly different. Prior to 1984, the
PSID data do not include an indicator for the type of OASDI benefit
received. Thus, it is not possible to separate SSDI transfers from trans
fers based on age or survivorship.3
Applying these criteria, the final sample of new SSI recipients,
which includes all those individuals who had five consecutive periods
of no SSI receipt followed by at least one period of SSI benefits
between 1979 and 1991, contains 211 individuals. The DI sample,
which contains individuals who have five consecutive periods of no
social security benefits followed by at least one period of DI receipt,
has 199 members.4'5
Measuring Disability
Self-reported disability is recorded in order to observe the time
between a self-reported health event and the beginning of disability
benefits. There is continued discussion in the literature about the best
way to ascertain disability status from self-reported measures, but
since all members of the sample have already been classified as dis
abled for the purpose of receiving benefits (by passing the substantial
gainful activity screen), the most comprehensive set of measures is
used (see Burkhauser and Daly [1996a, 1996b] for a brief summary of
this debate). Four questions are combined to create the self-reported
disability measure used here. The four PSID variables used are 1) dis
abled or in need of care, 2) lists primary activity as permanently dis
abled, 3) ranks health as fair or poor, 4) reports having a physical or
nervous condition that limits the type or amount of work that can be
performed. Any individual falling into one or more of these categories
is considered to have a self-reported disability.
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Measuring Employment and Presence of Other Earners
Individuals are classified as employed in the previous year if they
report that they worked 52 hours or more and had positive wage earn
ings. Individuals are classified as living with other earners if anyone in
the family unit reported both positive hours and positive earnings dur
ing the year.
Measuring Social Assistance and Social Insurance
Social assistance includes all means-tested public transfers such as
AFDC, food stamps, and General Assistance. The PSID data identify
two welfare programs: AFDC and food stamps. All other social assis
tance programs are classified as other welfare. Social insurance
includes all public transfers made on the basis of employment contri
butions; these include workers' compensation, unemployment insur
ance, and social security.
Measuring Economic Well-Being
Since this analysis focuses on changes in an individual's access to
resources, household economic status in the absence of government
taxes and transfers (pregovernment income), and in their presence
(postgovernment income), are measured.6 To account for differences in
family size, the equivalence scale weighting factor contained in the
U.S. Bureau of the Census poverty measures is applied to each individ
ual household income.
The variables used in this analysis describe the economic and family
characteristics of individuals who receive disability transfers. The vari
ables are intended to capture the relative costs and benefits of applying
for or receiving transfers. At the individual level, a person's marital sta
tus, self-identification of disability, and labor force status are reported.
Although individuals apply for and receive benefits, these decisions are
often made within the context of family resources. Thus, the analysis
reports on the presence of other earners, other transfer income, and the
level of household size-adjusted income inclusive of taxes and trans
fers. Finally, household composition is examined by comparing the
two types of living arrangements in which a recipient has no other
adult present: single-person households and single-parent households.
To the extent that co-residing adults have two sources of income (either
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transfer income or earnings), these single adult families may be more
vulnerable to economic losses associated with disability and thus more
likely to apply for benefits.

RESULTS
The analyses presented here use multiperiod data to follow the path
of adult SSI(DI) recipients in the five years prior to benefit receipt. The
initial award is captured by requiring individuals to have five years of
no SSI or DI benefits followed by at least one year of benefits. The lon
gitudinal sample is used to examine the labor market activity, house
hold economic well-being, and household composition of individuals
prior to the beginning of SSI and DI payments, by examining these
transitions, a clearer picture of who comes onto the disability benefit
rolls, and what factors put individuals at risk for receiving benefits, can
emerge.
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 report the percentage of individuals who are in a
particular circumstance—such as having a disability, falling below the
poverty line, or living in a single-adult household—in each year prior to
benefit receipt (?)• Table 5.1 describes the experiences of the sample of
SSI recipients. The average age at award among SSI recipients is 42.0
years. About one-third of the sample is married in each of the five years.
The percentage of individuals reporting that they have a disability
increases as the award year (f) draws nearer, moving from 42 percent to
63 percent.7 As the employment and transfer receipt percentages reveal,
many of these individuals are unemployed or out of the labor force and
relying on transfer income well before they receive SSI payments. Less
than 30 percent were employed five years before receiving benefits, and
less than one-quarter were employed three years before receiving bene
fits. However, more than one-half were living with other earners and
more than three-quarters were living in a household receiving some
type of government transfer (social assistance or social insurance).
The stability of the percentage of other earners and the percentage
of households receiving transfer income helps explain the very static
pattern of pre- and postgovernment income over the evaluation period.
Mean pregovernment income decreases modestly from five years prior
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Table 5.1 Characteristics of the Population of Adult SSI Recipients in the
Years Prior to Benefit Receipt in Year t
Characteristics
t-5
t-4
t-3
t-2
t-1
t
Individual3
Married (%)
32
34
34
32
30
29
Self-reported
disability (%)
42
45
50
56
61
63
Employed (%)
28
29
24
25
24
24
Household
Other earners (%)
60
58
56
53
56
57
Receiving social
assistance(%)
32
34
34
32
30
8
Receiving any public
transfer (%)
73
72
77
82
82
100
In poverty (%)
32
34
36
32
31
37
Pregovernment
income ($)
9,151 9,170 9,416 8,459 8,413 8,253
Postgovernment
income ($)
11,421 11,593 11,913 11,333 11,387 11,639
Household composition
Mean family size
3.82
3.75
3.50
3.39
3.32
3.23
Single-person
household (%)
7.5
7.9
7.7
10.5
11.0
16.5
Single person with
children (%)
17.3
12.4
15.6
13.8
12.7
8.2
All others (%)
75.2
79.7
76.7
75.7
76.3
75.3
Head or partner in
household (%)
64.4
64.6
64.8
65.1
66.8
69.6
Child of head or
partner (%)
28.4
28.3
28.2
27.9
25.8
21.9
Other related or
unrelated adult (%)
7.2
6.1
7.0
7.0
7.4
8.5
SOURCE 1991 Panel Study of Income Dynamics
NOTE Sample of individuals 18-64 years of age who began to receive SSI benefits between 1979
and 1991 (N - 211). Results are weighted to reflect population values.
Individuals' average age at award in year / is 42.0.
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Table 5.2 Characteristics of the Population of Adult DI Recipients in the
Years Prior to Benefit Receipt in Year t
Characteristics

t-5

t-4

t-3

t-2

t-1

t

Individual3
Married (%)
50
50
49
51
49
49
Self-reported
disability (%)
42
44
49
55
66
75
Employed (%)
51
49
42
39
33
18
Household
Other earners (%)
66
58
58
59
59
59
Receiving social
assistance (%)
11
9
15
10
11
4
Receiving any public
transfer (%)
57
58
65
64
72
1.0
In poverty (%)
14
12
18
16
23
20
Pregovernment
income ($)
17,104 16,004 16,579 15,649 15,651 13,383
Postgovernment
income ($)
17,238 16,676 17,211 16,670 17,472 17,350
Household composition
Mean family size
3.33
3.25
3.13
3.07
3.05
2.92
Single-person
household (%)
13.3
15.6
16.5
16.4
13.6
14.5
Single person with
children (%)
7.3
6.9
5.6
5.7
9.0
8.5
All others (%)
79.4
77.5
77.9
77.8
77.5
77.5
Head or partner in
household (%)
77.9
79.4
79.4
80.9
80.9
83.2
Child of head or
partner (%)
16.8
15.4
16.5
15.1
15.0
12.7
Other related or
unrelated adult (%)
5.3
5.2
4.1
4.0
4.1
4.1
SOURCE- 1991 Panel Study of Income Dynamics
NOTE: Sample of individuals 18-64 years of age who began to receive DI benefits between 1979
and 1991 (N = 199) Results are weighted to reflect population values
Individuals' average age at award in year Ms 44 9
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to receipt (t - 5) to the award year (f), declining by 8 percent. After
taxes and transfers have been included, this decline in household
income disappears. Mean postgovernment income actually increases
by 2 percent over the same period.
Although household income does not fluctuate very much over the
period, the components of household income do change. The diver
gence in pre- and postgovernment income over the five years indicates
that as the award year draws near, an increasing portion of the average
recipient's household income comes from public, rather than private,
sources. Finally, the static pattern of average economic well-being
comes with more than 30 percent of the eventual recipients in poverty
each year. Thus, the income stability observed is at a relatively low
level of economic well-being.
Apart from changes in individual characteristics and household eco
nomic well-being, future awardees may experience changes in house
hold composition that create the need for, or access to, benefits. For
some individuals, disability benefits may be the mechanism by which
they can live independently. The final portion of Table 5.1 describes the
changes in household composition and living arrangements that occur
prior to period t. As the year of benefit receipt draws closer, the number
of eventual recipients living in single-person households increases.
This rise is correlated with declines in both the number of single-parent
families and the number of individuals living with their parents. The
percentage of single-parent families falls from 17.3 percent in t - 5 to
8.2 percent in t. Likewise, the percentage of individuals living in their
parents' homes falls from 28.4 percent in t - 5 to just over 20 percent in
t. The growth in the number of single-person households suggests that
living in a single-person household and receiving SSI benefits may go
together. Overall, these results show that a majority of eventual SSI
recipients are heads or partners of their own households.
In Table 5.2 the focus shifts to DI recipients. Because of the mini
mum quarters of coverage required of DI applicants, their prebenefit
experiences are likely to include more work and higher levels of eco
nomic well-being than the SSI recipients. The average age of recipients
in the first year of benefits is 44.9 years. As with SSI recipients, the
prevalence of disability among the sample members increases as the
award date approaches. As the prevalence of self-reported disability
increases, the percentage employed decreases, moving from 51 percent
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in year t - 5 to only 18 percent in year t. DI recipients were more likely
than SSI recipients to be employed five years prior to receiving bene
fits; one-half of the DI recipients were employed in t - 5 compared to
less than one-third of the SSI recipients. Moreover, there is a discern
ible process of transitioning out of the labor market among DI recipi
ents. Over the five-year period the percentage of eventual DI recipients
employed declined steadily, whereas among SSI recipients employ
ment status remained relatively static.
In addition to their own work efforts, DI recipients have more
household resources to draw on than did the SSI recipients in the years
prior to receiving benefits. A larger fraction live with other earners,
more are married, and fewer are living in single-adult households. Not
surprisingly, a smaller percentage are in poverty or receiving transfers.
As for SSI recipients, mean postgovernment income among future DI
recipients remains stable throughout the five years preceding their DI
receipt. And like SSI recipients, pregovernment and postgovernment
income among future DI recipients remains stable throughout the five
years preceding their DI receipt. And like SSI recipients, pregovern
ment and postgovernment income among future DI recipients diverge
as the benefit year approaches, implying a growing reliance on public
transfers for income support.
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 describe the prevalence of characteristics and cir
cumstances in each year among the sample of eventual recipients, but
do not provide information about individual transitions or patterns of
behavior over the five years. The remaining analyses focus on individ
ual patterns and transitions prior to benefit receipt. Tables 5.3 and 5.4
show the percentage of eventual recipients living in a particular cir
cumstance by the number of years prior to receipt. Since this analysis
encompasses a five-year span, an individual may be in a particular state
from 0 to 5 years. These results provide some indication of the duration
of circumstances among eventual recipients.
Table 5.3 reports findings for the sample of SSI recipients. The first
row of Table 5.3 shows that more than one-third of the eventual recipi
ents reported being disabled in each of the five years prior to receiving
benefits. An additional one-third never report being disabled in the
PSID data. The next row of Table 5.3 shows that about one-half of
eventual SSI recipients did not work at any time during the five years
prior to receiving benefits. The remaining 50 percent who did work

188

Daly

Table 5.3 Characteristics among SSI Recipients Five Years Prior to
Benefit Receipt (%)
(Number of years prior to receipt)
Recipient was:

543210
36.2

3.7

10.6

7.8

11.3

30.4

9.9

9.1

9.4

8.4

12.1

51.1

40.3

7.7

8.0

9.9

7.2

26.9

Receiving social assistance 15.6

11.3

3.9

3.3

17.0

48.9

Receiving any public
transfers

61.0

11.0

5.8

6.6

5.2

10.4

In poverty

17.7

6.3

3.9

12.2

14.6

45.2

Living alone

7.1

0.2

0.4

0.9

5.3

86.1

Living as single parent

5.1

7.0

0.9

5.4

4.4

77.1

Reporting a disability
Employed
Living with other earners

SOURCE- 1991 Panel Study of Income Dynamics
NOTE Sample of individuals 18-64 years of age who began to receive SSI benefits between 1979
and 1991 (N = 211) Results are weighted to reflect population values

Table 5.4 Characteristics among DI Recipients Five Years Prior to
Benefit Receipt (%)
(Number of years prior to receipt)
Recipient was:
Reporting a disability
Employed
Living with other earners
Receiving social assistance
Receiving any public
transfers

543210
36.8

2.2

9.4

11.5

11.7

28.4

5.7

26.1

15.3

13.8

6.0

33.1

47.5

5.5

5.1

7.2

11.2

23.5

1.0

5.1

3.9

5.1

9.6

75.3

42.1

15.2
4.0

4.8
9.9

11.0
15.1

17.0
62.9

In poverty

3.6

10.1
4.5

Living alone

9.9

3.6

2.2

1.6

1.8

80.9

Living as single parent

3.3

1.3

2.1

0.5

5.4

87.4

SOURCE- 1991 Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
NOTE1 Sample of individuals 18-64 years of age who began to receive DI benefits between 1979
and 1991 (N = 199) Results are weighted to reflect population values.
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over the five-year period were about equally dispersed over the distri
bution of years 1-5, although a slightly larger number reported one
year of market work than reported two, three, four, or five years of
market work. Moving down the table reveals that a large fraction (40.3
percent) of eventual recipients lived with other earners in each of the
five years prior to receiving benefits. An even larger fraction (61.0 per
cent) received some form of government transfer in each of the five
year prior to receiving SSL Only about 10 percent of the future recipi
ents received no government transfers prior to being awarded SSL
Although a majority of eventual recipients lived with other earners and
received government transfer income prior to receiving benefits, less
than one-half maintained incomes above the poverty line in each of the
five years. About 20 percent were in poverty over the entire five-year
period, and about 25 percent were in poverty for one or two years over
this period.
These results add to the picture of SSI recipients in the years just
prior to benefit receipt. This view diverges slightly from the one cast in
Table 5.1. Table 5.3 indicates that work is more important and transfer
receipt less important that the percentages in Table 5.1 would imply. At
the same time, the results in Table 5.3 show that the incidence of pov
erty among eventual recipients is higher than implied by the yearly
prevalence rates in Table 5.1.
In Table 5.4, the analysis is repeated for DI recipients. Like the SSI
recipients, about one-third of the DI recipients reported being disabled
in each of the five years prior to receiving benefits, and an additional
one-third were never captured as disabled in the PSID data. Although
the patterns of self-reported disability are similar among SSI and DI
recipients, Table 5.4 shows that eventual DI recipients are more likely
to work, less likely to receive benefits, and less likely to be in poverty
than individuals who move onto SSI. Two-thirds of the eventual DI
recipients (compared to one-half of SSI recipients) work at some time
over the five-year period; about one-quarter work in each year up to the
year prior to receiving benefits. Only 25 percent report receiving social
assistance over this period, although about 80 percent received some
form of public transfer. Consistent with a greater reliance on work,
only one-third of the DI recipients are in poverty at any point during
the five years prior to benefit receipt, compared to more than one-half
of eventual SSI recipients.
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Tables 5.3 and 5.4 identify the fraction of eventual recipients who
are either always or never in a particular circumstance. Tables 5.5 and
5.6 shift the focus to the proportion of beneficiaries who experience
transitions prior to receiving benefits. These results capture the paths of
those who were not at either of the endpoints (0 or 5 years) in Tables
5.3 and 5.4.
Table 5.5 reports results for SSI recipients. The first column records
the percentage of individuals experiencing a transition at some time
over the entire five-year period; the second column reports the rates of
transition in the year prior to benefit receipt. Events for disability,
divorce or separation, loss of employment, and move to a single-person
household are recorded for the individual. 8 In addition, changes in an
individual's household economic status are recorded as loss of other
transfers, fall into poverty, and a change (positive or negative) in
household income of more than 50 percent. Finally, increases and
decreases in family size are recorded. These transitions describe the
amount of movement into and out of circumstances that potentially
change the need and eligibility for disability-related benefits.
Among SSI recipients the events of disability and job loss are the
most common. About 30 percent of the sample of SSI recipients moved
from reporting no disability to reporting a disability during the fiveyear preaward period. Only about 10 percent reported that the transi
tion to disability occurred just two years prior to being awarded SSI.
Loss of employment was slightly more common. Loss of employment
is defined as moving from having earnings to not having earnings at
some point between t - 5 and t - 1. Thirty-two percent of the sample
reported such a transition. A little less than half that number, 12 per
cent, report a loss of employment between t - 2 and t-l.
Based on the movements recorded in the previous tables, both the
loss of employment and the transition into disability were expected.
Less expected were the large number of individuals who experienced a
change in one of the measures of household economic well-being.
Tables 5.1 and 5.3 showed that the percentage of eventual benefit recip
ients living in households with other earners and receiving transfer
income was relatively stable over the five-year period. But Table 5.5
reveals that the stability captured for the average is not representative
of all individuals. More than one-quarter of eventual SSI recipients
lose the support of other earners in their household prior to receiving
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Table 5.5 Changes in Family and Economic Circumstances Prior to
Benefit Receipt among Adult SSI Recipients (%)
Periods
_________Change__________t-5tot-l

Periods
t-2tot-l

Individual
Event of disability

29

10

Divorce or separation

3

1

Move to a single-person household

6

3

32

12

Loss of other household earners

26

4

Loss of welfare income

24

10

Loss of all transfer income

18

5

Fall into poverty

28

9

50% or larger decline in
postgovernment household income

20

7

50% or larger increase in
postgovernment household income

42

10

52

17

Loss of employment
Household income

Household composition
Decline in family size

Increase in family size_____________34________14____
SOURCE: 1991 Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
NOTE" Sample of individuals 18-64 years of age who began to receive SSI benefits between
1979 and 1991,(Af=211) Results are weighted to reflect population values
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Table 5.6 Changes in Family and Economic Circumstances Prior to
Benefit Receipt among Adult DI Recipients (%)
Periods
_________Change___________t-5tot-l

Periods
t-2tot-l

Individual
Event of disability

32

14

Divorce or separation

8

1

Move to a single-person household

6

1

53

17

Loss of other household earners

22

3

Loss of welfare income

17

4

Loss of all transfer income

19

2

Fall into poverty

29

12

50% or larger decline in
postgovernment household income

23

5

50% or larger increase in
postgovernment household income

44

14

Decline in family size

38

13

Increase in family size

__ __ __ 30

__ ___11

Loss of employment
Household income

Household composition

SOURCE 1991 Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
NOTE: Sample of individuals 18-64 years of age who began to receive DI benefits between 1979
and 1991 (N = 199) Results are weighted to reflect population values
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benefits. Similarly, 24 percent stop receiving social assistance for at
least one year prior to receiving benefits. Fewer individuals move
entirely out of the transfer population. About 18 percent lose all trans
fer income during the five years prior to receiving benefits.
Nearly 30 percent of the recipients transitioned from not poor to
poor over the course of the period. One-fifth experienced a drop in
their postgovernment household income of more than 50 percent. The
frequency of these types of transitions point to a significant level of
economic uncertainty during the years preceding movement onto the
SSI rolls. This economic uncertainty is underscored by the finding that
42 percent of eventual SSI recipients experience a 50 percent or larger
increase in their postgovernment family income during the study
period. Although increases in income are much more likely given the
low base from which these individuals start, these fluctuations indicate
that many future recipients experience substantial changes in their
household income just prior to benefit receipt. Finally, both increases
and decreases in family size are common in the years prior to an SSI
award. About 50 percent of the future recipients experience a decline in
family size at some time during the five years before receiving benefits.
A smaller number—about 34 percent—have an increase in family size.
Taken together, these results point to a frequency of events that put
individuals at risk for losses associated with their disability. The fact
that changes in economic and household factors are as common as
changes in health suggests that for many eventual SSI beneficiaries,
becoming a recipient may often be a response to economic factors that
interact with health.
Moving to changes among DI recipients, Table 5.6 reports similar
patterns to the ones found for SSI recipients. Loss of employment is
more common than changes in disability status. Loss of other earners
and loss of public transfers occurs for about one-fifth of the sample.
Approximately equal numbers of DI and SSI recipients experience a
fall into poverty, or a positive or negative change in postgovernment
household income. A smaller number of DI recipients, compared to
SSI recipients, experience declines in family size, but about the same
percentage report an increase in family size.
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CONCLUSIONS
This analysis has examined the characteristics of individuals in the
years prior to receiving disability-related benefits. The picture that
emerges is one in which changes in individual employment, household
economic status, and household composition are as likely as changes in
health. Moreover, for a large fraction of individuals, health status
remains constant over the course of the five years prior to benefit
receipt. However, since the PSID data include no measure of severity,
no clear interpretation of this can be made.
Like other research, this analysis confirms that work is an important
component in the lives of many future recipients, transitions out of
employment in the five years prior to benefit receipt occur for about 30
percent of the SSI recipients and for about 50 percent of the DI recipi
ents. It is these groups who could potentially benefit—conditional on
the severity of their impairment—from programs that encourage work
and attempt to maintain people independently in the labor market.
Despite some connection to the labor market, a large fraction of benefit
recipients have been on public transfers for a number of years, particu
larly among SSI recipients. For these individuals, interventions
designed to avoid movement onto the transfer rolls must begin long
before they apply for disability transfers.
While these data do not permit more elaborate determinations of the
experiences of disability benefit recipients in the years prior to their
awards, the results encourage this type of analysis. Further research in
this area will help complete the picture of the transition of individuals
onto the disability rolls and the types of assistance and support that
would best serve to reduce long-term recipiency.

Notes
1.
2.

See Chapter 3 for an analysis of the relationship between economic conditions
and the disability rolls.
The PSID data do not consistently permit the identification or concurrent SSI/DI
recipients. To account for the possibility that SSI/DI concurrent recipients are dif
ferent from SSI-only recipients, a two-year SSI receipt criterion is applied for sen
sitivity analysis. This two-year restriction is based on the findings of Rupp and
Scott (1995), which show that approximately 75 percent of concurrent SSI/DI
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3.

4.

5.

6.
7.

8.
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recipients exit the SSI program within the first year. The results are not sensitive
to this change.
The sample is a proxy for the first onset. In the case of SSI recipients who came
into the panel after 1974, and those who were eligible for benefits under the previ
ous programs for the aged, blind, and disabled, individuals may have had spells of
benefit receipt that are not observed in the data. In the case of DI benefits, individ
uals may have had benefits prior to the beginning of the panel in 1968 or prior to
becoming part of the panel at some later period.
Using the stated criteria, there are 293 SSI recipients and 258 DI recipients. How
ever, 82 of the SSI recipients and 59 of the DI recipients are not part of the PSID
original sampling frame. These "out of sample" members of the PSID do not have
sampling weights and therefore cannot be used in this analysis.
The robustness of the results to the small sample sizes was checked by shortening
the in-sample requirement from five to three years. Although the sample sizes
increased by approximately 50 cases the results were not changed. Therefore, the
analysis reported refers only to the five-year requirement sample.
The tax routing developed by the staff of the PSID is used to compute the postgovernment income measure.
Given that each member of this sample has passed the substantial gainful activity
test to receive benefits, it is somewhat surprising that only two-thirds report that
they have a disability at the time they are awarded benefits. This discrepancy in
self-identified disability and an official disability classification may be associated
with the lack of specific questions about mental impairments in the PSID data.
Death of a spouse is not an option for SSI recipients due to the difficulty in iden
tifying why benefits were received (i.e., for disability or survivorship).
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Comments on Chapter 5
Daniel Mont
Congressional Budget Office

Mary Daly uncovers the instability that lurks beneath the seemingly
stable behavior of aggregate measures of poverty and living arrange
ments among people in the years prior to the receipt of disability bene
fits. For example, the percentage of adult Supplemental security
Income (SSI) recipients living with other earners in each of the five
years prior to receiving benefits remains almost constant at just under
60 percent. However, Daly shows that during those five years prior to
receiving benefits, over 20 percent of recipients experienced the loss of
an earner in their family.
These important results, however, can be easily misinterpreted if
used to draw conclusions about the causes of Social Security Disability
Insurance (DI) or SSI receipt. Take the above statistics. One should not
conclude that the loss of an earner from one's household necessarily
leads to a big increase in the chances of going on SSI. If the total num
ber of future recipients in households with other earners stays constant
at 60 percent, and 20 percent are losing household earners, then many
future recipients, maybe as many as 20 percent, must be gaining house
hold earners. One could equally conclude that gaining a household
earner increases one's chances of receiving SSI! Of course, what could
be happening are two separate types of events. Some people could lose
the assistance of other earners and seek help through the SSI program,
while others could be finding it harder to live on their own and so move
in with others, but still end up receiving SSI.
The point is that there are a lot of transitions occurring among these
people. It is unclear, however, how these factor in to the dynamics of
SSI and DI recipiency.
The fact that instability exists among future SSI recipients is not sur
prising. After all, in order to qualify for SSI benefits a person by defini
tion has not had a stable work history.

197

198

Mont

The finding that there is a reasonable amount of change in the fam
ily and economic circumstances prior to the receipt of DI benefits is
more interesting. Nevertheless, the impact of this finding is tempered
by the fact that Daly makes no comparison with people not receiving
benefits. How can- you judge if instability is associated with DI receipt
unless you know if future DI recipients experience more or fewer tran
sitions than their nondisabled counterparts?
The work Daly has done is an important first step at examining the
path to receiving disability benefits and provides a much needed
description of the lives of beneficiaries prior to their becoming benefi
ciaries. Interesting extensions of this work would include
• comparing the rate of transitions reported in Chapter 5 to similar
rates for people with similar levels of economic resources who do
not end up receiving benefits
• investigating how circumstances surrounding transitions that lead
to receipt of benefits differ from other transitions
• undertaking an event history analysis, or some other procedure, to
determine how changes in living arrangements and economic cir
cumstances affect the probability of beginning a spell of SSI or DI
recipiency
• decomposing the disabled into categories of people who have had
more similar experiences, for example by age or type of disability.

Comments on Chapter 5
Virginia Reno
National Academy of Social Insurance

This is a very well-done paper. It is a thoughtful, clear, and concise
descriptive analysis of what can be learned from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) about Social Security Disability Insurance
(DI) and Social Security Income (SSI) beneficiaries in the years prior
to benefit receipt. It leaves the reader wishing to know more, yet grate
ful that the author did not stretch the analysis beyond what the data can
show. I have two brief comments about the paper's conclusions and
some more general observations about disability policy research.
The paper concludes that changes in employment and economic sta
tus are as likely as changes in health in the five years before receipt of
DI or SSI disability benefits. On one level, this should not be surpris
ing. The purpose of DI and SSI is to provide benefits to people with
severe work disabilities, not simply those with impairments. Conse
quently, it is reasonable to expect changes in employment and eco
nomic status along with changes in health status prior to benefit
receipt.
This finding is consistent with what we heard in focus group inter
views conducted for the Academy's Disability Policy Panel (Mashaw
and Reno 1996a, p. 177-193). Those interviews included beneficiaries
in three broad impairment categories: musculoskeletal, mental, and
"other," which included circulatory, respiratory and other body-system
diseases. In all three groups the onset of work disability was often
gradual. Despite the onset of illness or injury, people often remained at
their jobs months or even years after the onset of their conditions.
They typically turned to DI only after they could no longer hold down
their jobs. Often they had exhausted other remedies, such as rehabilita
tion, and other avenues of support, such as unemployment insurance or
workers' compensation. Those on SSI sometimes had relied on other
assistance before they learned about and qualified for SSI. While focus
groups are only anecdotal, they, like the PSID data, suggest that the
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transition onto the disability benefit rolls is a gradual process. Benefit
recipients tend to be older workers with chronic, progressive condi
tions. They do not fit a conventional image of "persons with disabili
ties" that might be conveyed by the popular wheelchair logo.
Wheelchair users are only a small proportion of DI beneficiaries, less
than 5 percent some years ago (Lando, Cutler, and Gambler 1982). It
appears that the nature of the person's impairment, and its interaction
with the demands of work the person can reasonably be expected to do,
are more important that the suddenness of impairment onset in under
standing antecedents of benefit receipt.
Daly's paper goes on to conclude that "for a majority of individuals
health status remains constant over the course of the five years preced
ing benefit receipt," but adds a caveat that measures of severity of
health conditions are lacking. I would suggest that the caveat makes
the conclusion of dubious validity. Because health status is measured
in such a rudimentary way, changes in health status are not fully cap
tured. In this analysis, health status and disability status are used inter
changeably. It is a binary variable made up of answers to four
questions about 1) disability or need for care; 2) whether primary
activity is permanently disabled; 3) whether health is fair or poor; and
4) presence of a physical or nervous condition that limits the type or
amount of work that can be performed. Presence of a disability is a
positive response to at least one of the above. Absence of disability is
none of them. By this construct, the only change captured is a transi
tion from having none of these conditions to having at least one during
the five years that end before benefit receipt. Changes in the severity of
progressive health conditions after onset are not. measured, nor are
onsets that occur in the year of benefit receipt. Without more refined
measures of health and disability status, the conclusion that health sta
tus remains constant does not seem to be supported.
The remaining points I want to make are not about the paper, but
about what the author had to work with, or more important, what she
did not have to work with. The paper highlights the serious dilemma
researchers face in attempting to do policy research on the DI and SSI
programs without adequate data. Investment in appropriate data bases
has been sorely lacking over the last fifteen years. General household
surveys designed for other purposes have two serious limitations for
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studying beneficiaries, problems of sample size and ambiguity in iden
tifying the population of interest.
The PSID yielded 199 persons classified as having been newly
awarded DI benefits from 1984 through 1991, an eight-year period
when 3.4 million persons were awarded DI benefits (SSA 1995, p. 264).
Similarly, it yielded 211 adults identified as new SSI awardees over the
thirteen-year period from 1979 through 1991 when 4.1 million adults
were awarded SSI benefits on the basis of disability or blindness (SSA
1995, p. 302). The very sparse observations seriously constrain what
can be reliably quantified with regard to the diversity of people's expe
riences as they enter the disability benefit rolls.
General purpose surveys simply are not very cost-effective ways to
sample disability beneficiaries, particularly new entrants. Despite con
cern about the size of the disability benefit rolls, entry onto the rolls
remains a rare event. DI incidence rates over the period under study
ranged from about 3 to 5 per 1000 insured workers (Mashaw and Reno
1996a, p. 16). If we take account of the fact that only about threefourths of the working-age population are insured, the overall DI inci
dence rate is about 2 to 4 per 1,000 Americans between 18 and 65
years old. SSI incidence rates are no larger than these over the period
under study. Because receipt of social security or SSI disability bene
fits is rare, special surveys are needed to target and screen adequate
samples of individuals who are at risk of entering the disability benefit
rolls.
A second data limitation for the purpose of studying the characteris
tics of DI and SSI beneficiaries is the lack of an exact match between
administrative records and responses to household surveys. There are
a number of reasons to worry about the validity of beneficiary status as
reported in household surveys. First, anecdotal evidence suggests that
beneficiaries often are unsure about what kind of benefits they are
receiving. Distinctions among DI, SSI, workers' compensation, or
other public or private benefits are not as clear to beneficiaries as they
may be to policy analysts. Second, in many household surveys, one
person in the household answers for everyone in the household. If we
are worried about beneficiaries knowing the kinds of benefits they
receive, we should be equally worried about proxy respondents know
ing this information. Third, there are situations in which a workingage person may be correctly reported as the "recipient" of social secu-
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rity or SSI but is not the "beneficiary" whose health, disability, and
employment status are of interest. This could occur if the recipient is a
representative payee for a beneficiary who is too young, too disabled,
or too impaired in old age to manage his or her own affairs. The payee
is, technically, a recipient in that her or his name is on the check. Some
4.2 million social security beneficiaries and 1.7 million SSI beneficia
ries have representative payees (Mashaw and Reno 1996b, p. 56). The
payees are very likely to be working-age adults who are not disabled.
It remains a question how general household surveys distinguish bene
fit "receipt" from disability beneficiary status among the working-age
population.
For all of these reasons, our confidence in survey findings about the
relationship between disability status and receipt of social security or
SSI benefits among working-age adults would be greatly enhanced by
an exact match with the Social Security Administration's administra
tive records. This is true whether we are talking about the PSID, the
Current Population Survey, the National Health Interview Survey or
the new Health and Retirement Survey. Exact matches are not simple.
They must comply with federal confidentiality requirements and are
resource-intensive to construct well. But they are critically important
for policy research on disability benefit programs and the cost is small
in relation to the size of the programs for which policy evaluation is
needed.
I recognize that researchers always want more and better data. But
for purposes of research on the DI and SSI programs, data no better
than that which existed nearly two decades ago would be a vast
improvement. Between 1960 and 1978 the Social Security Adminis
tration (SSA) sponsored special surveys of the disabled population
every six years. The surveys were designed to capture the segment of
the working-age population at risk of entering the disability rolls, as
well as beneficiaries themselves, and some surveys included denied
applicants. Each survey matched the reports by individuals in house
holds with SSA's administrative records of the respondents' work and
benefit histories. The period since 1978 has been a long dry spell in
data base development.
This research conference is encouraging if it indeed barkens a
revival of commitment within the federal government to investment in
data bases that are needed to study the social security and SSI disabil-
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ity benefit programs. A promising new development is the first release
of data files of the 1994-1996 Disability Survey sponsored by an interagency consortium led by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Planning and Evaluation in the Department of Health and Human Ser
vices (Adler 1996). In addition, the SSA's New Beneficiary Data Sys
tem provides longitudinal data that follow a cohort of new DI
beneficiaries for a decade after they entered the benefit rolls (Yeas
1996). Finally, SSA's Disability Evaluation Study, which holds prom
ise for study of the programs' eligibility criteria, continues to move
through the planning, development and funding process (SSA 1996).
All of these are promising new developments for disability research
Mary Daly's paper is a masterful job of gleaning from an existing
data base new insights about the antecedents of entry to the DI and SSI
disability rolls. If all of the new data bases under development are
brought to fruition, researchers will have new opportunities over the
next few years to refine our understanding of social security and SSI
disability programs and the people who turn to them.
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Part II
A Closer Look
at State and Local Experiences

6 The Growth in Disability
Programs as Seen by
SSA Field Office Managers
L. Scott Muller
Peter M. Wheeler
Social Security Administration

There are 1,300 persons in the Social Security Administration (SSA)
who have witnessed firsthand the recent dramatic growth in the Social
Security Disability Insurance (DI) and SSI disability programs: the
managers of local social security offices. This group provides a truly
unique source of information, and we knew, if asked, they would give
us straightforward, thoughtful responses. So in March 1994 we sur
veyed them for their perceptions as to what factors contributed to the
increase in the number of persons applying for and receiving disability
benefits.
The survey had both structured questions—to get the managers'
thoughts on specific issues such as the impact of the local economy and
the types of advisors and organized outreach efforts in their area—and
open-ended questions—to enable the managers to provide any feed
back they wanted. All 1,300 managers were surveyed, and 1,171
responded, for a 90 percent response rate. About 38 percent of those
responding (or 446 managers) took extra time and effort to write
insightful, in-depth comments to the open-ended questions.
Before getting into the findings, though, it is important to mention
three caveats to the survey. First, the managers were not anonymous in
the survey. It was critical that we be able to recontact them for clarifi
cation if needed. (Judging from the quoted material in this article, how
ever, they certainly seemed to be indifferent to being identifiable.)
Second, much of the information requested was subjective: the survey
solicited their opinions, not quantifiable data. And third, the survey did
not discriminate between factors that would affect social security (DI)
versus SSI claims. (Note: A more detailed version of this paper—with
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additional information about the survey, its methodology, and find
ings—is available from the authors.)

SURVEY FINDINGS
The field office managers identified a wide range of factors that they
thought affected the recent (since 1989) growth in the number of per
sons applying for and receiving disability benefits: local economic
conditions, increased awareness of the availability of benefits, court
cases, the decision process (that is, the way SSA determines if a person
is disabled), changes in medical standards, the impact of state and local
governments, the value of the disability benefit package, the lack of
continuing disability reviews, other financial incentives (such as a pri
vate insurance company's requiring a disability application as a condi
tion to receive payment), and other miscellaneous factors.
Considering these factors led us to conclude that the growth in the
disability programs was not simply a demand-side phenomenon (that
is, the growth was not simply due to the fact that more persons were
seeking benefits and/or more beneficiaries were staying on the rolls).
There was a supply-side effect as well: for example, court rulings had
made whole new classes of persons eligible for benefits, and outreach
efforts had sought applications from persons who had heretofore not
chosen to apply for benefits. Further, we found that the factors could be
grouped by whether they were internal or external to the agency (Table
6.1). The distinction is important because the external factors are out
side SSA's control, but the internal factors can be more easily altered or
influenced by policy makers.
Local Economic Conditions
High unemployment is often thought to cause an increase in the
number of persons applying for disability. The field office managers
were asked the extent to which they believed that local economic con
ditions influenced the number of applications in their area. About a
quarter of the managers said that local conditions had either no impact
(9 percent) or had very little impact (14 percent); the remaining three-
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Table 6.1 Factors Identified by Field Office Managers as Influencing the
Growth in SSA Disability Programs
Demand effects

External to SSA:
Economy, unemployment
Changing occupational structure

Internal to SSA:
Outreach, program awareness
Higher allowance rates

State cutbacks, burden shifting
Advisors, attorneys, etc.

Fewer continuing disability reviews
Attractiveness of benefits package

HIV/AIDS

Easier medical standards
Attorney fee policy

Incentives to apply
Aging of the population

_____
Change in attitudes, less stigma
Supply effects
Internal to SSA:
External to SSA:
Court cases
Congressional mandates (includes
outreach, medical improvement
standard, etc.)

____

Outreach
Easing medical standards (includes
Zebley regulations, new mental
listing, drug addicts and
alcoholics)
Fewer continuing disability reviews
Workload credits

quarters of the managers were about evenly divided between those who
believed that local economic conditions had a modest impact (39 per
cent) or a large impact (37 percent).
Managers were asked to cite some past events that had affected their
particular office. Some listed event after event of specific plant closings
and severe cutbacks, clearly demonstrating a sensitivity to events in
their local economy and labor market. Others simply said "general eco
nomic conditions" or "layoffs in construction industry." More than a
third of the managers listed three or more events. Some said that
growth during the recent recession was different from that of past
recessions. Under-employment was cited as often as unemployment as
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the source of the problem. Some managers, however, said their area
experienced growth in the number of disability applications and
awards despite a healthy or improving economy. A few of the reasons
they gave for this are discussed in the section on miscellaneous factors.
Overall, the survey responses from the field office managers tended
to support a link between poor local economic conditions, unemploy
ment, and layoffs and increased applications for disability benefits.
Among the comments offered were the following:
Economic conditions definitely have a major impact in the rise in
disability claims. When factories have massive layoffs or close
down, we receive DIB [disability insurance benefit] claims from
workers with medical problems who had been working despite of
their impairments.
The economy has taken a downturn. You cannot lay off thousands
of people in their mid-forties and not think that they are not going
to file for benefits.
Lack of retraining, lack of access to health insurance, and unavail
ability of alternative employment that replaces lost earnings can
lead to physical and/or emotional deterioration that gradually
builds until SSA is the only option left.

Increased Awareness of the Availability of Benefits
Since the late 1980s, SSA has made a concerted effort to increase
public knowledge and understanding of the disability program. Did the
managers think that these efforts contributed to the growth in the dis
ability programs? Clearly they did.
The managers were asked for some details about their own efforts in
this area. For example, did their office provide information about the
disability program to the local media? About 80 percent said yes.
(Managers who responded negatively sometimes noted that these activ
ities were handled by their area director's office, or that their office was
in a major metropolitan area so that these activities were done by the
offices in the city. Some managers said that they had tried to place
materials in the local media, but were unsuccessful due to lack of inter
est from the media—usually newspapers.) The survey listed eight pub
lic information or outreach activities that might have been done: more
than half of the managers did at least three.
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Nearly four out of five field offices maintained outside contacts for
the purposes of providing information and advice. The contacts were
usually with hospitals, advocacy groups, welfare and social service
agencies, mental health clinics, doctors, employers, vocational rehabil
itation providers, AIDS clinics, and penal institutions. More than half
the managers said that their office had made special arrangements with
these contacts for taking disability claims.
Obviously, the managers had put considerable time and effort into
their public information and outreach work—which may explain why
many of them were frustrated with our inquiries about outreach activi
ties.
We were asked to do SSI outreach for many years. When we are
asked to do something we do it and we do it quite successfully.
Why do you now want to know why there was an increase in
applications?
Question—if we've pushed outreach for years and awarded mil
lions to grantee agencies [to help us reach all potential claimants],
why are we now concerned that applications are on the rise?
It appears that our agency's own initiatives are responsible. Sev
eral years ago we undertook massive outreach initiatives to spread
the word and contact as many potential disability applicants as
possible. We worked hard at this; we were successful; and, now
we are reaping the benefits of our efforts. The increase in disabil
ity claims is not a great mystery to us in the field offices. Rather it
is a logical outcome of this agency's initiatives and goals over the
past several years.

Some managers felt that SSA had gone overboard in its outreach
efforts—and they said so:
I strongly believe that SSA is pushing outreach too much.
I personally believe SSA has taken outreach efforts to the extreme.
In doing so I'm concerned that we have not always served the
other half of those we represent—the taxpayer—properly.

In addition to SSA's outreach and public information activities,
there are many other ways that a person could have become aware of
the DI and SSI disability programs. Some of the ways mentioned by
the managers include referrals from state or local agencies or advocacy
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groups; referrals by attorneys; the publicity generated by court cases;
or word of mouth.
According to nearly 90 percent of the managers, claimants were
often sent to their office by local welfare agencies. One-third said that
the local legal aid society, advocacy groups for the disabled, or private
social service agencies often referred claimants to them. The survey
asked if any of these groups gave bad advice—that is, were they refer
ring persons who were clearly not eligible for disability benefits? More
than 20 percent of the managers could name one or more advisors who
consistently did this: half of them cited local welfare agencies—those
who administer the General Assistance, Aid to Families with Depen
dent Children (AFDC), food stamps, and Medicaid programs. One
manager stated:
Most of our applicants are referred to us by the state welfare
offices. . . . Many physicians believe they are "helping" their
patient to continue receiving welfare benefits if they were to check
12 months or longer, not realizing that the patient is then required
to file for SSA/SSI benefits. Claimants with broken leg(s), or
pregnancy or some other mild ailment are unnecessarily being
referred.

Nearly 60 percent of the managers said that attorneys in their area
often advertised for disability claimants. Furthermore, about 90 per
cent of the managers could list at least one person or organization in
their area who actively promoted filings for disability benefits by pro
viding either information or assistance to persons going through the
application or appeals process. Nearly 25 percent of the managers
could name nine or more such advisors! In all, the managers gave over
3,500 names of persons or groups who provided advice and assistance.
(Perhaps the most interesting of these were the third-party arrange
ments whereby a state government contracts with a private company
and pays a fee for each individual who is deemed eligible for a disabil
ity benefit. For example, under one Maryland program, the private con
tractor is paid a fee for each welfare recipient who is placed on the SSI
rolls. Other states and localities have adopted similar strategies.)
More than 80 percent of the managers said that TV, radio, or news
papers in their area usually or sometimes provided coverage of the dis
ability programs.
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The press reports on people receiving SSI because of drug or alco
hol addiction have resulted in an increase in people filing alleging
these disabilities.
News articles on the substance abuse cases allowance rates have
had some impact.

Word of mouth was cited as a source of information by nearly 20
percent of the managers who offered comments. They said that new
applicants often came to their office after talking with other applicants
or because they were encouraged to apply after hearing stories about
others being allowed benefits and getting large retroactive checks.
The impact of "word on the street" in connection with SSI for
children and DA&A [benefits based on drug addiction and alco
holism] cannot be ignored. Individuals file because neighbors and
relatives have received benefits. It is not infrequent that a parent
will make an appointment for a child who has been diagnosed by
the schools with "special needs," but by the time of the appoint
ment he/she will want to file applications for other children in the
family.

Court Cases
Court decisions was the topic most frequently addressed in the field
office managers' comments: fully half of them mentioned the courts as
a factor in the growth of the disability program.
Nothing creates an incentive for filing a claim like a court case
which results in adding a lot of people to the rolls. Nothing creates
new claims like a neighbor getting a big retro check.

And among the court cases, none has had more impact than the Zebley decision. In fact, the Zebley case (which dealt with benefits for dis
abled children under the SSI program) was the single factor most cited
as influencing the growth in the disability rolls: 43 percent of the man
agers who offered comments said it was a major factor in the increase
in workloads and growth in the disability program. The managers also
thought that some teachers and school administrators either assisted
parents to apply or actually pushed parents to apply because their
school could then receive benefits (such as additional special education
funding and access to medical and other tests). As one manager stated:
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These [SSI disabled children's benefits] are being pushed by local
schools, physicians, and most of all economically disadvantaged
parents. In addition to the cash received by the family, entitlement
to our disability programs opens the door to other federal govern
ment funding for agencies as well as individuals in assisting these
children.

None of the managers indicated approval of SSA's Zebley policy; all
indicated that this was an area in need of attention. Some of the manag
ers had strong opinions.
We have observed some disability claims (mostly SSI disabled
child's claims) where the medical evidence used to establish bene
fit entitlement has seemed to us to be so "slim" that it would make
one think that almost any adolescent and pre-adolescent child
going through the typical socialization experiences and "growing
pains" may qualify for SSI.
Rarely do we take a claim from a disabled child who has a physi
cal disability. Almost all of them are mental. The decisions are
based on subjective "evidence" and the claimants have learned
how to act and answer the questions. I do not have the figures but
it appears that generally there is more than one SSI applicant or
recipient in the household. It is not unusual for an applicant to file
for 2 to 5 children at the same time.
Once a parent gets one child on SSI they begin the process of
qualifying others in the family, 5 or more siblings getting SSI is
not unusual.

The Decision Process

The application and decision process has clearly changed in recent
years. Allowance rates (particularly through reversals at the Adminis
trative Law Judge [ALJ] level) are up. Attorney involvement is up,
appeals rates are up, and denied applicants refile more than they did in
the past. SSA's attorney fee arrangements guarantee payment will be
received—and large backlogs and slow processing time, combined
with high ALJ allowance rates, guarantees large retroactive payments
and large fees for representatives. The managers had the following
comments about recent changes in the decision process.
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Field office staff believe that there are too many levels of disabil
ity appeal and find it difficult to accept SSA's disparities of allow
ances at the different decisional levels: 30% at initial level, 12% at
reconsideration, and 80-90% at hearings level.
We are seeing more non-attorney reps soliciting clients, even
across state lines; some appear to have questionable motives, to
the point of coaching prospective applicants on responses, impair
ments, limitations, and conduct.
We continue to get disturbing allegations that the word is out and
that anyone can get disability by "faking" their way through con
sultative examinations. We are repeatedly getting disability appli
cants who have never been treated for their alleged impairment
and the sole medical source for the decision is a single consulta
tive exam.
Disability applicants have expressed a belief that there is a differ
ent set of criteria used at the hearings level. Applicants frequently
ask if they can't go straight to filing a request for a hearing
because they have had other applicants tell them they will be
denied at the initial and reconsideration levels but will be allowed
at the hearing level.
We believe the High allowance/Reversal rate by ALJs encourages
both applicants and local firms to pursue disability no matter how
slight the impairment might be. "The word" is out on the street—
file for disability. You'll get denied but if you appeal to a judge
you'll get approved. Unfortunately, the stats prove this theory . . .
... they will file and refile if denied. Many believe that if you keep
trying, an approval will come sooner or later.

Changes in Medical Standards
More liberal standards—either because of court cases, legislation, or
changes in regulations—have encouraged more individuals to apply
for benefits. Comments about SSA's drug addiction and alcoholism
(DA&A) policy were offered by nearly 20 percent of the field office
managers who provided comments. As was the case with comments
concerning the Zebley case and SSI childhood disability benefits, no
manager indicated that SSA had made an improvement to the program
with its current policy in this area.
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Drug and alcohol abusers are also finding easy benefits with SSL
A couple of years ago, addicts needed a primary diagnosis relating
to a mental or physical impairment before benefits could be paid.
As I am writing this, I have an SSA-831 [disability determination
form] in front of me showing a primary diagnosis of Cocaine
Dependence, with a secondary diagnosis of Alcohol Abuse. This
applicant has no physical or mental impairment alleged or diag
nosed. Most addicts have responded positively to the promise of
easy, free money from the government.
The most significant cause for the increase in our disability claims
was because of the change in criteria for the mentally ill and
DA&A cases. . . . We need a different approach to behavior con
trolled illnesses. . . . Our present system only encourages people
to continue their destructive behavior.
In 1984 Congress mandated that SSA review and update its listings
of mental impairments. This was done, and allowances for mental
impairments rose considerably before leveling off. Nearly 10 percent
of the managers who offered comments mentioned mental impair
ments.
The word is out in the legal profession that: (a) if you go to a hear
ing and (b) show some mental involvement of disability in addi
tion to the physical documentation, you will win.
If a comment by an applicant or observation by an interviewer
shows any indication of a mental problem, we order a psychologi
cal [exam]. This is done even though the claimant has never been
previously treated for a mental problem and in all probability
never will be. Thus, in numerous cases, a one time exam forms a
significant piece,of evidence on which an allowance is made. We
base allowances on such terrible impairments as attention deficit
disorder, hyperactivity, personality and mood disorders.
About 7 percent of the managers who gave comments discussed the
impact that easier standards and high or disparate allowance rates were
having on the program. One manager noted how his own disability
determination service responded to pressure to loosen standards:
After media coverage of the low allowance rate ... of individuals
filing for disability benefits, we began to see our allowance rate
increase from 24 percent to 48 percent. It is now averaging about
40 percent.
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However, not all managers felt that easing the standards was an error
on SSA's part. Some felt that these more liberal standards were more
appropriate, particularly in light of the problems some workers have in
finding jobs. One manager questioned the validity of the standards
"when 80 percent of the initial claims are denied."
The Impact of State and Local Governments
Many states have tried to solve their budget problems by cutting
back their social programs and shifting the financial burden to the fed
eral government. Has this affected the DI or SSI disability programs?
Of course: about 10 percent of the managers who offered comments
mentioned state welfare offices and their referral policies as a factor in
the growth SSA disability programs; more than 5 percent mentioned
cutbacks in state welfare benefits and other programs; and about 5 per
cent mentioned state efforts to shift the burden from state or local pro
grams to federal programs.
We believe another major factor is increased referrals from public
and private welfare agencies. The economic crunch facing states
and localities has caused them to look to SSA programs as they
have never done before.
Our local welfare office employs over 250 people, our office but
21. The welfare office now has 4 disability advocates whose job it
is to refer people to get them off welfare rolls and onto other pro
grams like SSI and disability.
The Value of the Disability Benefit Package
Some managers felt that the benefit package (cash benefits as well
as health coverage under Medicaid or Medicare—after a twenty-fourmonth waiting period) was becoming more generous than the work
alternative, considering the paucity of good, high-paying jobs. Bene
fits—especially SSI benefits to disabled children—were considerably
more generous than welfare payments. Although only 3 percent of the
managers who commented mentioned the value of the benefits pack
age, some of their comments are worth noting.
The program is turning into an income subsidy for anyone who
can get it, with very large financial rewards when you include
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medical assistance, cash tax free payments, and all the other
related benefits. People can still earn a lot of wages or SE [selfemployment income] each month plus the underground economy.
In many instances receipt of SSA and SSI benefits provide a stan
dard of living comparable to that of those who work full time in
'this area.
AFDC households are enticed by the possibility of receiving
monthly check of $469.00 per child instead of the $115/month
AFDC grant, with no limit for the number of children in the
household. We have an unknown number of households in our ser
vice area receiving SSI for 2, 3, and even 4 members. They tell
others in the neighborhood who come in to file for their child who
they say is "dumber" than the neighbor's child who is getting SSI.

The Lack of Continuing Disability Reviews
Over the past several years, SSA has opted to conduct fewer Con
tinuing Disability Reviews (CDRs) in order to devote more staff to pro
cessing the backlog of initial claims. In the past, CDRs were done
regularly to make sure that a person continued to be eligible to receive
disability benefits. About 20 percent of the managers who offered com
ments felt that the reduction in CDRs contributed to program growth—
not because there were fewer beneficiaries being found ineligible and
thus removed from the rolls, but because fewer CDRs encouraged
claimants to apply—it made benefits appear to be a lifetime promise of
support. All the managers who commented in this area indicated that
conducting more CDRs should be a priority; none thought that this was
a workload that could be sacrificed without a detrimental effect on the
programs. Some of them commented as follows.
Even the fact that Social Security has failed to perform a signifi
cant number of medical CDRs in the last few years may contribute
slightly in making disability-based benefits appear more attrac
tive. Having a "permanent" source of income may increase one's
motivation to contact Social Security and apply for benefits.
We believe the permanent nature of SSA disability benefits (usu
ally paid for the rest of an individuals life) encourages filings as a
means of a lifetime income.
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CDR's [continuing disability reviews] aren't being done, so the
idea is becoming more wide spread that if you "get on" Social
Security disability you are there forever, so it is worth the effort.

Other Financial Incentives
The survey asked the field office managers to list any sources of
financial incentives offered to individuals to encourage them to apply
for benefits. One-fourth of the managers listed one or more such incen
tive. Among those mentioned were 1) some private insurance compa
nies require an application for disability benefits as a condition for
disability or long-term sickness benefits—and some reduce disability
pay if the insured fails to apply; 2) some employers or unions require a
disability filing as a condition for extended sick pay; 3) some welfare
or general assistance programs provide a higher payment while a dis
ability claim is pending or require a disability application as a condi
tion for receiving benefits or continuing benefits; 4) some state general
assistance or welfare programs do not have work requirement for per
sons filing for disability benefits; 5) some local governments have a
fund for health expenses for indigents that pays medical expenses only
while a claim is pending; 6) some AFDC payments are terminated after
a child reaches a certain age unless there is a disability claim pending;
and 7) some states provide no access to the Medicaid program unless
there is a disability application pending. Some of the managers pointed
out:
We receive far more applications from persons who know they
will be denied but are required by their insurance company to file.
Insurance company can then get a copy of our file and not have to
pay for a lot of medical reports.
We have numerous employers with sick pay plans which require
participants to file for DIB [disability insurance benefits]. In many
cases, there is no doubt that the claim will be denied. However, the
individual must file as a requirement to continue to receive bene
fits. In some cases, the individual says they know they will be
denied and are filing only because they must.
The State, through Welfare and the school boards, as well as some
private Agencies, quickly figured out by having children file for

220

Muller and Wheeler

SSI, we would conduct needed medical tests at our cost. With a
simple release form they then have access to those records.
Many of the people who file for disability are required to do so by
the State or County in order to receive medical assistance. They
only need medical help not disability benefits to get back on their
feet. Universal medical coverage would reduce the number of
applicants.
Some people file for SSI each year or so, even though they are
regularly denied, because they want a visit to the doctor, and we
will pay for consultative exams for those without medical evi
dence.

Other Miscellaneous Factors
Changes in Attitude
Field office managers stated that they've noticed a real change in the
public's attitude about receiving government benefits. There is a
greater acceptability—with less stigma attached. Some of the manag
ers said that they have found that disability is now viewed as an accept
able alternative to work.
. . . there are available jobs in high enough numbers to rule out
local economic conditions as the primary factor for any increase
in disability claims. The fact is, however, when a potential job
applicant or already employed person working for the Federal
minimum wage or even $5.00 an hour sees their monthly takehome pay vs. what their friends are getting in monthly welfare or
disability benefits, there is no incentive to work ... It is therefore
our belief that IT IS THE WORK ETHIC that is missing from the
population in our area, not the lack of available work.
Prior to the 1960's, there was great reluctance on the part of most
citizens to ask for government assistance. The work ethic was
strong and those who could work, even in spite of impairments,
sought every opportunity to work as a matter of pride and selfesteem. This is not longer the case. The definition of disability has
changed in the minds of the American public. Conditions that
were once seen as impairments are now seen as totally disabling.
Shrinking job markets and the growth of government programs
are contributing factors. The stigma that was once attached to ask
ing for public assistance is gone . . .
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A subtle change in how people view disability has occurred in
recent years. It is no longer viewed (or even presented by SSA) as
a severe long-term condition preventing you from doing anything.
It is viewed today as an income supplement to unemployable or
underemployed individuals.

The Aging of the Baby Boomers
More than 7 percent of the field office managers who offered com
ments mentioned changing demographics and the aging of the baby
boom generation as a factor in the growth of the disability rolls.
We've noticed an increase in disability claims in our area even
though our economy has remained strong, and we're not in a hot
bed of advocacy group activity. My spin on the increase in claims
is due to: the babyboomers are getting into their 40's and 50's,
which is prime DIB [disability insurance benefit] filing time.
.. . there are more people in their mid to late 40's, i.e., the age that
the individual is more likely to become disabled. In other words,
the "baby boomers" are getting older and their age is causing
them to fall victim to the impairment related statistics.

Prisoners and Prison Newsletters
Just over 4 percent of the field office managers who offered com
ments mentioned a growing trend among prisoners to seek benefits—
which should not be surprising: SSA has been doing outreach efforts in
penal institutions for several years. Two of the managers commented as
follows.
Folsom Prison in our service area turns over 100 prisoners a week
who believe they are SSI eligible and who will file claims as soon
as they are on the street.
The prison system underground tells inmates they are eligible for
DIB [disability insurance benefits] ... In the last 4 years we have
seen a big increase of applicants recently released from prison.
Parole Officers often refer claimants to file for disability.

Employer Disincentives to Hire the Disabled
Despite whether the economy is good or bad, there are certain disin
centives to employers to hire the disabled: a disabled worker may
cause an increase in the company's group insurance rates, or he or she

222

Muller and Wheeler

may increase workers' compensation rates for the company or file
workers' compensation claims. Several field office managers men
tioned these disincentives as possibly influencing the growth in the DI
and SSI disability programs.
Employers, because of workmen's comp, will not hire anyone
with any type of physical problems.
Many people comment that they would work, but no one will hire
them because:
1) Insurance/workers' compensation risk
2) Group insurance would be cancelled
3) Worried about workers' comp claims
4) Previous medical problems (e.g., back problems)

CONCLUSIONS

According to the field office managers, much of the increase in dis
ability applications and awards was influenced by changes in the way
SSA does business. Some of these changes were internal (for example,
SSA's decision to do fewer continuing disability reviews in order to
process more initial claims), and some of these changes were external
(for example, the Zebley court case).
Overall, the field office managers strongly agreed in three areas:
first, attention needs to be given to SSA's current policy regarding dis
abled children's benefits under the SSI program; second, attention
needs to be given to SSA's current policy regarding drug addicts and
alcoholics; and third, reinstatement of continuing disability reviews
needs to become an agency priority.
The survey responses make it difficult to ignore the potential impact
SSA's own decisions have on program growth: the growth since the
late 1980s cannot be solely attributed to outside influences beyond the
agency's control.

7 The Ending of General Assistance
and SSI Disability Growth
in Michigan
John Bound
Sherrie Kossoudji
Gema Ricart-Moes
University of Michigan

Applications for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) disability
benefits have risen dramatically over the last several years. This growth
in applications and in awards has occurred for both juveniles and
adults. While the Sullivan v. Zebley decision has had an impact on the
standards, applications, and awards for juveniles, no similar ruling or
policy shift applied to adults. Even so, applications and awards have
risen dramatically. In an effort to understand this rapid growth, the
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation of the
Department of Health and Human Services commissioned Lewin-VHI
to conduct case studies of five states: California, New York, Florida,
Texas, and Michigan. This paper presents our findings for Michigan.
There are a number of factors that make Michigan an interesting
case study. The rate of growth of applications for SSI disability bene
fits in Michigan has been among the most rapid in the country. Michi
gan was an early pioneer in welfare restructuring, and the growth of
applications coincided with the elimination of the state General AssisNOTE: Work on this chapter was supported by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Planning and Evaluation in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Data
collection for the General Assistance termination project was supported by the Ford
Foundation. The paper solely reflects the views of the authors and does not necessarily
represent the official positions of the Department of Health and Human Services.
Much of the authors' interpretations represented here are based on interviews con
ducted with various individuals representing different organizations in the state of
Michigan. We are grateful for the considerable time these individuals devoted to
answering our questions. We also appreciate the assistance provided us by Alan Shafer
and his staff at the Social Security Administration.
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tance (GA) program in 1991. Moreover, there appears to have been
quite an active outreach program in the state, with coordination among
the Social Security Administration in Michigan, state agencies, and
advocacy groups.
We have interviewed individuals working for the Social Security
Administration, the state of Michigan, and various advocacy agencies
in an attempt to learn from their interpretations of this phenomenon.
We have also made simple calculations using data from the Social
Security Administration and the Michigan Department of Social Ser
vices. Both our interviews and quantitative analysis present a fairly
consistent picture of developments in Michigan.
In the remainder of this paper, we present data on the growth of SSI
applications and awards in Michigan during the period from 1988 to
1993. We also present some background material on developments in
the state of Michigan, focusing on the ending in October 1991 of
Michigan's General Assistance program. Following this background
material, we review information derived from our interviews and quan
titative analysis of the administrative data. We end with a short discus
sion of what we think we have learned from the Michigan case study.

RECENT TRENDS IN APPLICATIONS AND AWARDS
FOR SSI IN MICHIGAN
In Figure 7.1 we display annual adult applications for SSI disability
benefits in Michigan from 1988 to 1993. Data for men and women are
presented separately. These data are drawn from the Social Security
Disability Research File (DRF) and are limited to adult disability
applications and awards. They do not reflect growth encouraged by the
Sullivan v. Zebley decision because that applied only to children. Over
all, there were approximately 246,000 applications in the six-year
period, at least some of which were reapplications after a denial of an
initial disability claim. While nationwide adult applications rose by 54
percent between 1989 and 1993, in Michigan they doubled, rising from
28,000 applications in 1989 to 57,000 in 1993. Patterns for women and
men were very similar. Over this same period of time, the non-elderly
adult population in Michigan grew by less than 2 percent. Thus, very

Figure 7.1 Total Adult SSI Disability Applications
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little of the doubling of the SSI applications can be accounted for in
terms of population growth.
The data also show the fraction of SSI applicants awarded benefits
rising from 44 percent of 1988 applications to 51 percent of 1991
applications. Award rates fell somewhat in 1992 and even more in
1993, but much, if not all, of this drop probably reflects the fact that a
substantial fraction of the 1993 cohort of applications was still pending
on appeal. Data on initial determinations show the fraction of SSI
applicants awarded benefits at the initial determination continued to
rise through 1992. Given the fact that the fraction of denied applicants
was also rising over this period of time, it seemed likely that, at least
for 1992 and possibly even for 1993, award rates would eventually
exceed those of preceding years. The fact that awards were rising more
rapidly than applications would seem to belie any notion that what was
going on was simply an increase in the number of frivolous or marginal
applications.
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 document applications for those with mental
impairments and those with other impairments. 1 Applications for those
with mental impairments tripled between 1989 and 1993, rising from
6,000 in 1989 to 19,000 in 1993. In contrast, applications among those
with other impairments rose by roughly 75 percent. As a result, appli
cations for those with mental impairments accounted for roughly 45
percent of the growth in total SSI applications in Michigan. Applica
tions for those with mental impairments continue to rise after 1991,
while applications for those with other kinds of impairment seem to
have plateaued.

THE ENDING OF GENERAL ASSISTANCE IN MICHIGAN
Background
Between 1979 and September of 1991, Michigan funded a statewide
GA program. GA was a cash-granting program for impoverished
adults without dependent children. During the 1980s, the caseload var
ied between a high of 142,000 in 1984 and a low of 93,000 in 1989
(Michigan Department of Social Services 1991). Even though GA

Figure 7.2 Adult SSI Disability Applications for Mental Impairments
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technically served an able-bodied population, it is now clear that it
actually served older people, the chronically ill but not classified dis
abled, and those who had some measure of disability. Kossoudji and
Danziger (1993) found that 40 percent of the GA population was over
age forty, that one-quarter had applied at some time for SSI, and that
70 percent of respondents to a sample survey reported at least one
chronic illness.
In September 1991, there were still 118,632 people receiving grants,
although the enrollment had gone down since spring 1991 because of
the termination threat. The decline in enrollment stemmed principally
from a drop-off in applications to GA rather than from recipients leav
ing the rolls. Eligibility criteria were simply based on income and
assets. Most cases represented adult individuals, but some families
with dependent children—families in which both parents were unem
ployed or earning below the GA maximum income but who did not
meet Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC-UP) employ
ment history qualifications—were eligible for GA and represented a
little more than 10 percent of the caseload (Kossoudji and Danziger
1993).
The state of Michigan, along with other states, faced severe fiscal
problems in the early 1990s. While the revenue the state received from
both the federal government and from state sales tax were declining,
the costs of incarcerations, health care, foster care, and public assis
tance were all rising. A new, conservative republican governor, John
Engler, was elected to office in November 1990 after running a cam
paign in which he promised to both lower taxes and balance the bud
get.
Although spending in other social programs was cut, Engler singled
out General Assistance for virtual elimination. Engler first proposed
this action in his fiscal year 1992 budget submitted to the Michigan
legislature in January 1991. In May, Engler announced publicly that
the GA program would be eliminated on June 1. Actual elimination of
the program was held up in court, but finally went into effect October
1, 1991. At the same time two supplemental programs, Emergency
Needs and GA-Medical were cut. GA-Medical coverage provided pri
mary ambulatory care everywhere except Wayne County, which had its
own managed care program. Emergency Needs (which was later rein
stated with reduced funding) provided for one-time application for
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funds to pay heating bills (for example), when the situation was an
emergency and not part of an ongoing problem (Kossoudji and Danziger 1993).
After GA was terminated, two much smaller programs were created
for special populations: State Family Assistance (SFA) for families
with children, and State Disability Assistance (SDA) for those deemed
disabled, aged, or residents of substance abuse treatment facilities. The
monthly grants are comparable to former GA stipends. SDA is easier
to get on than SSI (processing of applications is quicker and work lim
itations are expected to last 90 days, not the year required for SSI);
however, unlike GA, health is central to the determination of eligibility
for SDA. Moreover, those qualifying for SDA are required to apply for
SSI as well. The state makes an effort to recover back payments from
SSA if an individual is determined eligible for SSI.
In March of 1991, GA served 122,500 cases. Eleven and one-half
percent of those were in families that would automatically qualify for
SFA, while 1.3 percent were identified as disabled persons and would
automatically qualify for SDA (Kossoudji and Danziger 1993). Those
not automatically eligible for SDA could apply, but SDA continued to
serve a much smaller population than did GA. State records indicate
that within the first five months after GA was eliminated, only one-fifth
of former GA recipients had applied for SDA benefits. Of those who
processed applications, one-quarter were approved. In May 1992, a
total of 8,898 individuals were on SDA. The average monthly caseload
on SDA has been about 10,000 since then, with 3,000 to 4,000 thou
sand annual transfers to SSI. They represent between 10 and 15 percent
of SSI disability awards in Michigan.
The State Medical Program (SMP) replaced GA-Medical every
where except Wayne County, which continued its own managed care
medical program. However, SMP did not go into effect until December
1, 1991, two months after GA was terminated. Furthermore, at that
time only those who had been converted to SDA and SFA were
enrolled in the new medical program. Others who met SDA/SFA
income and asset requirements became eligible for and could apply for
SMP. SMP is less comprehensive in coverage than Medicaid. It does
not cover inpatient services and requires small co-payments for ser
vices and prescriptions (Kossoudji and Danziger 1993).
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Implications
Most of the people we interviewed identified the ending of GA as
the single most important impetus behind the growth in SSI applica
tions. Even before Engler announced the ending of GA, many used the
program as a transition or backup. Others on GA who were potentially
eligible for SSI did not, however, apply. The paradox is that SSI bene
fits were substantially more generous than GA benefits. For example,
in 1990 an individual on GA would receive $266 per month in cash. On
SSI, the same individual would have received $431. From the point of
view of the state of Michigan, the person on GA would have cost $266
while the same person on SSI would have cost the state only $45. Thus,
both the GA recipient and the state of Michigan had considerable
incentives to shift from GA to SSI.
Various explanations were offered for why more of those in GA had
not applied for SSI benefits. Bureaucratic inertia was offered as one
explanation for why program administration did not do a better job
encouraging individuals to apply for SSI. Health status was not a
requirement for eligibility for General Assistance. As a result, those
potentially eligible were not identified. What might make this situation
seem more reasonable is the fact that probably only a small minority of
GA beneficiaries could pass the stringent medical screening required
before receiving SSI benefits, and that this fraction would have been
smaller in 1979, when GA was started, before the change in the mental
health listings.
Another reason why people may not have applied is the more
bureaucratic process and more numerous personal contacts associated
with the SSI program. Applications required considerable effort and
energy, and prospects for allowance were still uncertain. GA had a sim
pler application and redetermination process, if for no other reason
than because health was not a criterion for enrollment. Once GA was
eliminated, however, people who were poor and in ill health basically
had no other option besides SSI. Many of those on GA suffered mental
impairments and/or had drug abuse or alcohol problems. These indi
viduals may have been particularly reluctant to apply for SSI benefits.
It was suggested to us that such individuals might find it less stressful
to just get by on the low GA benefits than to be frequently reviewed, as
would have been the case had they been on SSI. The simpler alternative
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may have been particularly attractive to the mentally ill who are para
noid or socially isolated. GA helped them live marginally but relatively
hassle free.
After GA was terminated, there were both federal and state outreach
efforts targeted at former GA recipients who might have been eligible
for SSL The Chicago Regional Office of the Social Security Adminis
tration initiated one such campaign, sending letters to this population
in December 1993. Returned letters were routed to the field offices.
The individuals we talked to did not seem to think this effort had been
terribly effective. The letter gave minimal information about the SSI
program. For example, it did not clearly mention that one must be dis
abled. The result was an increase in claims from people who wanted to
get SSI but, by their own admission, were not disabled. Rather, they
were unable to work due to the lack of job opportunities and inade
quacy of their skills.
State-level efforts are thought to have been more effective. A series
of computerized cross matches was conducted to see if the former GA
recipients had applied for or already were on other social security pro
grams. At least two mass mailings followed these cross matches. The
mail included information about other available sources of disability
funding as well as a preset initial appointment time at the local Michi
gan Department of Social Services (MDSS) office. Field office staff we
talked to thought these efforts had been somewhat effective.

OUTREACH AND ADVOCACY
Outreach
Whether we talked to social security field office staff, individuals
from MDSS, or representatives of the advocacy community, there
seemed to be general agreement that outreach efforts coordinated
among the Social Security Administration, state agencies and advocacy
groups had a strong impact on applications and awards for SSI and
Social Security Disability Insurance (DI).
Recent outreach efforts by field offices have expanded significantly
for two main reasons. First, over the past several years, SSA has issued
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a series of mandates for field offices to conduct outreach to specific
population groups which, among others, include low-birth-weight
babies, children, and the homeless. Second, the Zebley decision led to a
mandate from SSA that requires all field offices to increase the accessi
bility of their staff to community residents.
The MDSS has conducted its own outreach efforts through meet
ings with schools, probate court, nearly all social service agencies, and
others who could make referrals. They provided an in-depth descrip
tion of disability and instructions on how to file. In addition, MDSS
hired temporary workers to screen files for possible leads for social
security. The individuals we talked to thought that these efforts had
resulted in a substantial increase in applications for SSL
Two state-specific outreach initiatives—the Michigan Inter-agency
Task Force on Disability and the Client Services Task Force—are
thought to have had a significant impact on rates of applications. Each
task force includes representatives from a variety of state agencies,
including the Departments of Health, Social Services, Labor, Educa
tion, and Mental Health, with additional representatives on the Client
Services Task Force from Legal Aid, and senate and congressional
offices. These task forces focus on outreach through education and
increasing awareness of the SSI and DI program changes. The outreach
initiatives have been especially active since 1988 and target mostly
potential SSI beneficiaries (the clientele of most groups represented on
the task forces).
The education of workers in agencies participating in SSI outreach
has had a major impact. There have been internal departmental alerts in
SSA, and teachers and health care professionals have been trained to
help identify possible cases. We were told that there is now close coop
eration with local agencies and liaisons with shelters and community
health agencies. -Better understanding of the process of applying for
disability benefits and increased awareness of programs available for
different populations have enabled the social service personnel to do a
better job of informing and referring potential SSI applicants to the
MDSS office. Hospitals and social workers as well as all the human
services agencies, both local public and private, have been very asser
tive in getting people to apply. Those we talked to felt that outreach
works best when one goes to providers; direct appeals have not proven
to be as effective.
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In addition, many health care providers have, over the last few years,
become more in touch with MDSS and helped people apply for SSL
Health care providers have an incentive for trying to get individuals
onto SSI. Since those on SSI also have Medicaid, getting clients onto
SSI implies that the health care providers will end up reimbursed for
the services they provide. The Medicaid coverage is more extensive
than SMP (for example) and also pays more under the DRG prevailing
rate cap. MDSS has its own staff in the major hospitals collecting nec
essary medical information on the clients. This facilitates their helping
people to apply.
Substance abuse clinics and providers also represent significant
referring agents. They refer a lot of people under rehabilitation to the
MDSS office. Coupled with the GA cut, the state initiated outreach
efforts targeted to alcoholics who were on GA and rehabilitation. For
example, Harbor Light in Detroit was very active in searching for and
finding drug addition and alcoholism (DA&A) people and helped them
apply for SSL Legislation dating from 1972 as well as more recent leg
islation mandates rehabilitation, monitoring, and facilitation of treat
ment. In Michigan, the Drug Abuse and Alcohol Referral and
Monitoring Agency (DARMA) refers clients to the proper rehabilita
tion agencies. However, there is an insufficient number of resources
available to which to refer these individuals can be referred. Since
DARMA started in 1989 there has been an extensive outreach effort. A
great deal of time has been spent in talking to different advocacy
groups and social services providers, giving them accurate informa
tion, organizing workshops and implementing panel discussions. In
addition, DARMA monitors compliance and reports to MDSS. They
have mental health therapists and substance abuse therapists as well as
rehabilitation counselors working with them. They organize transporta
tion and have contact with different agencies, like homeless shelters, to
facilitate the process for the clientele. They assist in finding resources,
cooperate with the rehabilitation council, and monitor progress.
DARMA works very closely with the Disability Determination Ser
vices and has provided them with a good deal of information. In the
opinion of the director, Ms. Rojas-Dedenback, DARMA has created a
willingness by the MDSS to provide information about the available
options to DA&A persons. The whole community has become more
aware and has started to contact more people about applying for dis-
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ability. Previously, there was a lack of awareness; people thought that
GA was all there was for them, and it was not until they received better
information that DA&A people have started to come forward. Primary
referral sources for DARMA are the agencies they work with, i.e., ser
vice providers, homeless shelters, advocacy groups, women's shelters,
and treatment providers. The availability of benefits to those who are
addicted has been spreading by word of mouth and has dramatically
increased the number of claims being filed.
As evidence of the effectiveness of the outreach efforts to the
DA&A population, field office representatives mentioned changes in
the general knowledgeability of the population potentially eligible for
SSL Others also thought that there had been a change in attitudes, most
importantly a change in attitudes among potential applicants regarding
the acceptability of identifying oneself as a substance abuser. While
five years ago individuals would rarely identify themselves as sub
stance abusers, currently it is not uncommon for individuals to enter an
SSA office announcing that they were participating in some specific
drug rehabilitation program and that they thought that doing so quali
fied them for SSI payments. DA&A people "hang together," and SSI is
discussed. Field office staff also mentioned that, largely as a result of
the changes that had occurred in the applicant pool, the staff had
become much more aware of the interrelation between substance abuse
and mental health problems.
The general perception among the people we talked to was that the
increased awareness of SSI could be attributed to a combination of var
ious outreach efforts and word of mouth. Specifically, the growth of the
shelter population, a group targeted for these outreach efforts, contrib
uted to the rise in SSI applications. Many shelters in Michigan are now
actively helping residents apply for disability benefits, including pro
viding vans to help residents get to local MDSS offices, providing staff
time to help individuals fill out paperwork, or having outside agencies
come in to help. For example, in Detroit, at the request of a shelter, the
Detroit Urban League will come out with SSI applications and help
residents fill out forms.
Outreach efforts underway with the homeless shelter population
illustrate the way in which outreach efforts may have interacted with
the ending of GA to spur SSI application growth. The shelter popula
tion in Michigan grew substantially after the ending of GA because the
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termination affected the population most at risk for homelessness. The
state poured in funds for new shelters and additional beds, instigating a
growth of shelters. In the Detroit area, emergency shelter providers
think that over 75 percent of their adult clientele were former GA
recipients (Park, Danziger, and Parrot 1994). Thus, the ending of GA
indirectly increased the size of the population targeted for outreach
efforts. Moreover, the state's increased investment in sheltering the
homeless has added an extra incentive for getting those in the shelters
onto SSI.

Advocacy
In recent years, advocacy groups that assist people in different levels
of the application procedure and ensure that cases get through the
bureaucracy have grown rapidly. Opinions differ as to what accounts
for this growth. Some of the individuals we talked to thought the
growth represented a response to a perceived need on the part of SSI
and DI applicants. Others emphasized the fact that advocacy has
become financially profitable. Various groups have begun to compete
with each other for customers and funding. The advocacy and nonattorney groups can also increase their potential income by applying
for federal and state funds (allocated for outreach effort, for example),
and they can apply for grants from different foundations like the Mott
Foundation and Robert J. Wood Foundation. Attorneys advertise on
TV, in newspapers, and the yellow pages to handle disability claims.
The fact that attorneys consider DI/SSI disability cases as almost
always winnable is evidenced by their willingness to accept these cases
on a contingency basis. The fraction of SSI and DI applications that
have some form of representation has increased greatly in recent years
and continues to do so.
The Medicaid Assistance-SSI advocacy program (MA-SSI) was
started in the late 1970s and was funded at a higher rate starting in late
1982. It was instituted to serve two populations, the primary population
being the GA and Medicaid recipients (single adults who DDS deter
mined to be disabled). The other group that the MA-SSI advocacy pro
gram has under contract to service are clients from the Community
Mental Health Agencies and the Department of Mental Health (people
who were moved out of state hospitals).
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The MA-SSI advocacy program helps clients get through the appli
cation process. The program had a 89 percent reversal rate on denials,
once they got to the federal level. This kind of success rate was par
tially a result of the fact that the advocacy program only sent people to
apply whom they felt were probably eligible and whom they were will
ing to back up by being present as paralegals.

QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE ON THE IMPORTANCE OF GA
While those we talked to emphasized both outreach and the ending
of GA as important, the kind of qualitative information we derived
from our interviews can never resolve questions regarding the relative
importance of these two forces. Moreover, opinions varied somewhat
as to the relative importance of the ending of GA.
There is a variety of quantitative information available that can shed
some light on the potential impact of the ending of GA on SSI applica
tions. Much of this information comes from the Michigan Department
of Social Services administrative data on GA recipients collected by
Sandra Danziger and Sherrie Kossoudji at the University of Michigan
as part of a project evaluating the impact of the ending of GA. This
data base includes information on three populations of GA recipients:
those on GA in September 1990, in March 1991, and in September
1991.
The MDSS data on these three populations were matched to data
from the Social Security Administration's Disability Research File
data. To maintain confidentiality, the information on the merged file
was restricted to basic information on applications and awards for SSI,
together with variables indicating which of the three GA populations
the applicant belonged to. These merged data allow us to calculate the
number of SSI applications per month made by individuals from each
of the three GA populations.
The merged data show that of the 112,800 individuals receiving GA
benefits as of September 1990, 43,700 (or close to 40 percent) had
applied for SSI by the end of 1993. GA beneficiaries accounted for 46
percent of total applications in 1991.
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This 46 percent could exaggerate the impact of the ending of GA on
SSI applications. Many former GA recipients who applied for SSI ben
efits might have done so even if GA hadn't been eliminated. At the
same time, we cannot measure the impact of the termination on people
who were not enrolled in GA but who, after 1991, might have applied
to GA rather than SSI. One way to gain insight on the causal impact of
ending GA on SSI applications is to look at data on monthly applica
tions. There are quite distinct seasonal patterns in the monthly data
with, for example, applications falling during December. For this rea
son, we deseasonalized the application data. 2 The deseasonalized
monthly applications are presented in Figure 7.4. They reveal a limited
upward trend through 1990. There is a small spike in January 1991
after Engler took office, a much larger spike in May, when Engler
announced the ending of GA, and an even more dramatic spike in
October 1991, when GA actually ended. Post-1991 applications, while
more variable than those before the transition, never fall close to their
pre-1991 levels. While many factors contribute to these changes, GA
termination is almost certainly responsible for the transitional spikes.
Patterns are even more distinct when we focus on applications from
the populations on GA. Figure 7.5 shows such data for the population
on GA in September 1990. This figure makes clear that there had
always been a flow of individuals between GA and SSI. Not surpris
ingly, many appear to have used GA as a transitional or backup pro
gram, applying for SSI benefits either before or immediately after
beginning to receive GA benefits. 3 At the same time, this graph also
indicates that the GA population responded both to the announcement
that GA was ending and to the actual termination of benefits with an
immediate heightened interest in SSI. The September 1990 GA recipi
ent population continued to apply for SSI benefits at higher levels well
past 1991. In 1990, they accounted for roughly 10 to 20 percent of
monthly SSI applications. Even after being responsible for large num
bers of applications through 1992, these same people still represented
an average 20 percent of applications in 1993. The loss of the GA
option, deteriorating health (perhaps associated with the loss of GA),
and community outreach all stimulated the increased interest in SSI.
We wondered whether the increase in applications for the GA popu
lation might have come primarily from the more marginally impaired.
One might imagine that before the ending of GA such individuals

Figure 7.4 Adult SSI Disabled Applications, Deseasonalized Series
Reference lines on Jan. 1991, May 1991, and Sept. 1991

SOURCE" Social Secunty Administration Disability Research File matched to the Michigan Department of Social Services Data

Figure 7.5 Adult SSI Disabled Applications, Sept. 1990 GA Population—Deseasonalized Series
Reference lines on Jan. 1991, May 1991, and Sept. 1991

SOURCE4 Social Secunty Administration Disability Research File matched to the Michigan Department of Social Services Data
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would not have bothered applying for SSI since the chance of succeed
ing was low. We checked to see if the application peaks seem to have
represented a more marginally impaired population by examining
award rates by month of application. In fact, award rates for those
applying in May, September, and October of 1991 were no lower than
were award rates in the preceding months. What we did find is that a
somewhat disproportionate share of applications in May, September,
and October of 1991 represented first-time applicants.
Figures 7.6 and 7.7 reproduce Figure 7.5 but distinguish between
those with and without mental impairments. These figures highlight the
nature of these GA recipients' health impairments, contribute to the
verification of expert opinion about the reluctance to apply for SSI for
those with mental impairments, and reflect the intensified outreach
efforts to the DA&A population. Mental impairment applications for
September 1990 GA recipients virtually soar after January 1991, par
ticularly for men. Applications for other impairments exhibit the now
familiar three spikes but then retreat to lower levels. In September
1990, when the population was measured, 29 percent of women's and
33 percent of men's SSI applications were associated with mental
impairment. Exactly two years later, and one year after GA termina
tion, mental impairment represented 36 percent of GA women's and 47
percent of GA men's applications.
We have also used the data we have to obtain crude estimates of the
effect that the ending of GA had on applications for SSI. We use a
number of different approaches to do this. Our first approach uses the
overall number of applications for SSI benefits to project what applica
tions would have been like had they followed the pre-1991 trend. To do
this we regressed the log of applications on monthly dummies and a
linear spline with kinks at January 1989 and January 1990. We then
used these estimates to project applications for 1991 (Table 7.1). We
attribute the gap between the actual and projected number of applicants
to the ending of GA. The implicit assumption behind these calculations
is the notion that, were it not for the ending of GA, applications would
have continued increasing at the same rate they had been during 1990.
These estimates suggest that the ending of GA can account for about
two-thirds of the total increase in the number of applications between
1990 and 1991.

Figure 7.6 Adult SSI Disabled Applications for Mental Impairments,
Sept. 1990 GA Population—Deseasonalized Series
Reference lines on Jan. 1991, May 1991, and Sept. 1991

- - - - Men
SOURCE: Social Security Administration Disability Research File matched to the Michigan Department of Social Services Data.

Figure 7.7 Adult SSI Disabled Applications for Other Impairments,
Sept. 1990 GA Population—Deseasonalized Series
Reference lines on Jan. 1991, May 1991, and Sept. 1991
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Table 7.1 Estimates of the Short-Run Effect of Ending GA on SSI
Applications in Michigan
Men

Women
Total

Mental

Total

Mental

7212

1836

6591

2081

Method l a

4996 (69%)

527 (29%)

4221 (64%)

869 (42%)

Method 2b

3832 (53%)

830 (45%)

3391 (51%)

1313 (63%)

Method 3C

1866 (26%)

460 (25%)

1545 (23%)

496 (24%)

Actual rise,
1990-1991
Estimated
effects

SOURCE- Social Security Administration Disability Research File matched to the Michigan
Department of Social Services Data.
aMethod 1: The log of monthly applications were regressed on a linear spline in time plus monthly
dummies for the 1988-1990 time period Predictions based on this regression were calculated for
1991. Method 1 estimates the impact of the ending of GA as the difference between the actual
number of 1991 applications and the number predicted from the regression.
Method 2. Using deseasonahzed data for the three GA populations combined, applications were
predicted for 1991 assuming that applications continued at their Oct. 1990-Dec 1990 level Dif
ference between actual and predicted represents estimated effect of ending GA.
cMethod 3: Excess of deseasonahzed applications of May 1991 over April 1991 and of Sept and
Oct. 1991 over Aug 1991 represents estimated impact of GA.

An alternative approach to trying to estimate the impact of the end
ing of GA on 1991 applications is to estimate the number of individu
als on GA who applied for SSI but would not have done so, were it not
for the ending of GA. Since not all of those induced by the ending of
GA to apply for SSI during 1991 will have received GA benefits, the
question we are now asking is slightly different than asking about the
impact of the ending of GA altogether.
To estimate the fraction of those on GA during the year prior to its
termination who were induced to apply for SSI benefits, we took sim
ple approaches meant to bound the total affects. First we assumed that
applications from those who had been on GA some time during 1991
would have continued at the (deseasonalized) rate they were appearing
during the last three months of 1990. Results from such calculations
are shown in the third row of Table 7.1. Method 2 suggests that the
ending of GA could account for roughly 50 percent of the increase in
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overall applications and somewhat more of the increase for those with
mental impairments.
Of course, it is possible that applications from those on GA might
have risen even were it not for the ending of GA. A more conservative
approach is to simply use the applications that occurred during the
May, September, and October peaks to estimate the impact of GA. Fig
ures 7.5-7.7 would clearly seem to indicate that this approach will
underestimate the total impact of the ending of GA on applications. As
such it represents a conservative lower bound estimate. The fourth row
of Table 7.1 shows the spikes account for roughly 25 percent of the
1990-1991 growth in applications for SSI. Even these conservative
estimates suggest an important role for the ending of GA.
Similar methods can be used to calculate the longer term effects of
the ending of GA. Obviously, the further out our projections go, the
less confidence we have. Using pre-1991 data and method 1 to project
applications into 1992 and 1993 suggests that while the ending of GA
continued to have an effect, it accounted for a smaller and smaller frac
tion of the overall growth in applications—45 percent of the growth in
applications between 1990 and 1992 and 31 percent of the growth
between 1990 and 1993.
Finally, cross-state variation can also shed light on the longer-term
impact of GA's termination on SSI applications. Other states that
recently restricted the availability of GA benefits have also experienced
above-average growth in SSI applications. Estimates produced by
Lewin-VHI personnel found a statistically significant association
between the growth in SSI applications and the downsizing of GA.
Simulations based on the Lewin model on Michigan show the ending
of GA accounting for roughly 30 percent of the overall growth in SSI
applications and 50 percent of the growth in applications involving
mental impairments between 1988 and 1992 (Stapleton and Dietrich
1995).
The September 1990 GA population is a convenient one for analyz
ing GA termination's impact on SSI applications because it was mea
sured before rumors of termination began to alter the GA population
itself. It was only four months later, however, that Governor Engler set
in motion the termination action. Earlier GA populations could be
more informative about the stable transition to SSI over longer periods
of time. We were unable to match data on earlier GA populations to the
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Table 7.2 Percentage of Various General Assistance Population
Subsequently on SSI by Date
General assistance population
in September
Date

1988

1989

1990

1991

September 1989

2.9

September 1990

5.5

3.4

September 1991

8.1

6.5

2.6

September 1992

11.5

10.3

8.0

5.8

13.0

11.5

June 1993
SOURCE" Michigan Department of Social Services Data

Disability Research File. 4 However, the MDSS administrative data
itself does indicate when individuals were enrolled in SSI. Table 7.2
presents data for populations on GA during September of each year
from 1988 through 1991. The columns give the number and fraction of
the original GA populations receiving SSI benefits one, two, three, and
four years later. Thus, for example, 2.9 percent of those on GA in Sep
tember 1988 were on SSI in September 1989. Again, we see transition
rates rising over time. After two years, 5.5 percent of the September
1988 GA population was receiving SSI benefits. In contrast, after
somewhat less than two years, 11.0 percent of the September 1991 GA
population was on SSI.

DISCUSSION
A variety of factors in combination seem to have been responsible
for the rapid rise in the number of adult SSI disability applications. The
elimination of General Assistance removed one possible alternative
option for potential SSI applicants. Along with this, extensive and
well-coordinated outreach efforts seem to have increased awareness
among both social service providers and potential applicants them
selves. Finally, resources have been increasingly targeted at helping
potential applicants with the application process. While we continue to
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have an interest in estimating the impact of the ending of GA on SSI
applications, this change did not occur in isolation. The ending of GA
might have had a very different impact on SSI applications had out
reach or advocacy efforts been different. Similarly, outreach efforts
were certainly motivated and facilitated by the ending of GA.
Our analysis of the rapid rise in SSI applications in Michigan quite
clearly implicates the elimination of GA as an important factor in spur
ring this rise. Other states in which similar case studies were conducted
did not eliminate or drastically scale back welfare benefits. However,
one can interpret the elimination of GA benefits as a dramatic attempt
to cut state expenditures and to shift some welfare expenses from the
state to the federal government. Results from the case studies done in
California, Texas, and New York suggest that many states have
responded to their fiscal problems by a similar shifting of individuals
off state-funded onto federally funded programs (Stapleton et al.,
Chapter 2 in this volume).
Most economists modeling the decision to apply for disability bene
fits (or, more generally, welfare benefits) have modeled the decision as
a function of the potential gains for program beneficiaries. While we
have no doubt that such gains play an important role in determining the
choices individuals make, our results suggest that a number of other
factors are also important. For SSI applicants, what Richard
Burkhauser has referred to as "gate keepers" and Michael Lipsky
(1980) has referred to as "street-level bureaucrats" would seem to play
a central role. When GA existed, many people were satisfied enrolling
in this less lucrative but also less bureaucratically onerous program.

Notes
1.
2.

3.

We have not included mental retardation with other mental impairments.
To do so we regressed the log of the number of applications on a linear time trend
together with monthly dummies. The coefficients on the monthly dummies were
then used to adjust the raw data. To be precise, we estimated twelve monthly dum
mies constraining the coefficients to average to 0. Letting (3, represent the coeffi
cient of the ith month's dummy, and letting nlt represent the number of SSI
applications in the /th month of the 1th year, then the adjusted number of applica
tions is nlt = nlt I exp (J3, ).
Those enrolled in GA in September of 1990 could have entered the program at
any time previously.
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Social security numbers were not available on existing files for populations of GA
beneficiaries before September 1990.
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8 Lessons from Case Studies
of Recent Program Growth
in Five States
Gina Livermore
David Stapleton
Andrea Zeuschner
The Lewin Group

In Chapter 2 of this volume we report on our empirical analysis of
growth in applications and awards, focusing especially on the period
from 1988 to 1992. That analysis pooled state-level time-series data
from all states to empirically estimate the impacts of specific factors. In
order to further investigate the reasons for the recent growth in the dis
ability programs, and to better understand the findings from our empir
ical analysis, we conducted case studies of application and award
growth for Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and for Supple
mental Security Income (SSI) in five states. The states chosen for study
experienced substantial application growth in either one or both dis
ability programs and were believed to have had different experiences
with regard to the factors hypothesized to have contributed to that
growth. The states included in the study are California, Florida, Michi
gan, New York, and Texas.
We visited each state to interview staff from the following types of
agencies and organizations: state Aid to Families with Dependent Chil
dren (AFDC) programs, state or local General Assistance (GA) pro
grams, state Medicaid programs, local Social Security Administration
(SSA) field offices, large county hospitals, state employment depart
ments, public mental health agencies, state offices of immigration, and
outreach programs in schools, prisons, hospitals, and homeless shel
ters.
In this chapter, we summarize the qualitative evidence of the impact
of various factors on growth obtained during the site visits and through
follow-up phone interviews. More detailed discussion of the findings is
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contained in Lewin-VHI (1995a). We also present a statistical analysis
of the experience of each state using the econometric models estimated
from the pooled state-level data. Although the focus of the paper is on
adults, some of the information collected is relevant to SSI child appli
cations and awards.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the first sec
tion, we discuss the reasons for selecting each of the five states
included in this study, and we describe the trends in applications and
awards in those states over the 1988 to 1992 period. In the next section,
we first present the findings from the interviews conducted during the
site visits to the five states. We then present the findings from the
econometric analysis of state-level disability application data from
1988 to 1992. The results of this analysis are combined with the char
acteristics of each of the five case study states to assess the impact of
specific factors on application growth in each state. In the final section,
we summarize the lessons learned from conducting the five state case
studies.

FEATURES OF APPLICATION GROWTH IN THE CASE
STUDY STATES
All five of the case study states were large in terms of the total num
ber of disability applications filed during the 1988 to 1992 period.
Together, these states represented 35 percent of all disability applica
tions filed in 1988, and include the four largest states in terms of total
applications filed. The states were selected in part because of their size,
in part because of diverse patterns in application growth, and in part
because of interesting features that were identified through screening
interviews with Disability Determination Service (DOS) administra
tors in seventeen states and from a review of the findings from a survey
of field office managers conducted by SSA. We summarize some of
their interesting features below. 1
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California
California was the largest state in terms of DI and adult SSI disabil
ity applications in 1988, representing 12 percent of total claims filed.
California is the only state of the five in which General Assistance ben
efits, called General Relief (GR), are mandated by the state but are
completely funded and administered by counties. Several factors
believed to have contributed to application and award growth nation
ally may have been particularly important. These include the recession
(due to its relative severity in California compared to the nation),
immigration, fraudulent applications, and growth in applications based
on drug abuse and alcoholism (DA&A).
Florida
Florida had the fifth largest number of DI and adult SSI disability
applications in 1988, representing 4.7 percent of total claims filed.
Total applications grew 69 percent between 1988 and 1992, the second
highest growth rate among all states. Interestingly, however, Dl-only
application growth was only moderately high (ranked 14th), despite
the fact that the increase in Florida's unemployment rate over the
period was significantly higher than the nation's during the same time
period. Factors believed to have contributed to application and award
growth include the recession, immigration, and efforts by health care
providers to assist clients with applications.
Michigan
Michigan had the eighth largest number of DI and adult SSI disabil
ity applications in 1988, representing 4 percent of total claims filed.
Between 1988 and 1992, Michigan experienced the second highest rate
of SSI-only application growth in the nation. While SSI-only applica
tions rose by 45 percent nationally, in Michigan they rose by 83 per
cent. Awards rose even more rapidly than applications. Applications
based on mental impairment rose substantially faster than applications
based on other conditions and accounted for over 40 percent of the
growth in total SSI applications. Increases in Dl-only and Dl-concurrent applications were closer to the national median (ranked 22nd and
16th, respectively) despite the fact that the growth in Michigan's unem-
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ployment rate was higher than the nation's during the same period. An
important factor believed to have contributed to the high rate of SSI
growth was the termination of the state's General Assistance program
in 1991.
New York
New York had the second largest number of DI and adult SSI dis
ability applications in 1988, representing 8.6 percent of total claims
filed. While Dl-only application growth from 1988 to 1992 was very
high (44 percent for New York vs. 27 percent for the entire country),
Dl-concurrent and SSi-only application growth was relatively low (34
and 25 percent for New York vs. 52 and 45 percent for the entire coun
try). New York has a reputation for its past efforts to help low-income
residents attain federal benefits, and we hypothesized that the success
of past efforts was partly responsible for the comparatively slow
growth in SSI applications. New York was also selected because we
wanted to learn more about a New York City Board of Education
project to help children in special education programs obtain SSI bene
fits in the wake of Sullivan v. Zebley and the new child listings for men
tal impairments.
Texas
Texas had the third largest number of DI and adult SSI disability
applications in 1988, representing nearly 7 percent of total claims filed.
Over the 1988 to 1992 period, growth in Dl-only and Dl-concurrent
applications was lower than average (ranking 36th for Dl-only growth
and 42nd for Dl-concurrent growth). During this period, however,
Texas experienced higher than average growth in SSI-only applications
(ranked 15th). This combination of higher than average SSI-only
growth and lower than average Dl-only and Dl-concurrent growth
made Texas a potentially interesting case study. Texas experienced
very small changes in the overall unemployment rate during the reces
sion. The relatively low growth in unemployment for the state, how
ever, masks a great variation in changes in the unemployment rate
across regions within the state.
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EXPLANATIONS FOR DISABILITY APPLICATION
GROWTH IN THE CASE STUDY STATES
In this section, we first synthesize information obtained during inter
views with representatives from a variety of state and local organiza
tions in each of the five case study states. After discussing the
qualitative information collected in these interviews, we present the
results from a quantitative analysis of application growth in each state.
Findings from the Site Visit Interviews
We organize the discussion of the qualitative information obtained
through interviews by the primary nondemographic factors believed to
have contributed to disability application growth from 1988 to 1992.
These include the 1990-91 recession, state program changes and out
reach efforts, changes in SSA eligibility requirements, and other minor
factors, including immigration and changes in the prevalence of spe
cific health conditions.
The Recession
The recession of 1990-1991 was characterized by a recovery that
was much slower than other post-war recoveries. This was particularly
evident in the labor market (Council of Economic Advisors 1993). This
recession affected states differently, due to variations in the length,
severity (Table 8.1), and nature of the recession across states.
In California, the impact of the recession was apparently a signifi
cant force behind recent DI application growth, and perhaps SSI appli
cation growth as well. The recession in the state was more severe, on
average, than in the rest of the nation (California experienced a 3.8 per
centage point increase in unemployment, compared to a 1.9 percentage
point increase nationally). Southern California was hardest hit, where
job loss was concentrated in the defense and construction industries.
Interviewees in California indicated that job loss was concentrated
among older, more experienced workers, and among workers in lowskill jobs. The job loss experienced by older workers was often perma
nent in nature, which may have contributed to DI application growth.
Interviewees also reported that efforts by employers to assist laid-off
employees in obtaining DI benefits increased during this period. The
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Table 8.1 Unemployment Rates by State, 1988 to 1992 (%)
1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

Change
1988 -1992

California

5.3

5.1

5.6

7.5

9.1

+ 3.8

Florida

5.0

5.6

6.0

7.3

8.2

+ 3.2

Michigan

7.1

7.5

9.2

8.8

+ 1.2

New York

7.6
4.2

5.1

5.2

7.2

8.5

+ 4.3

Texas

7.3

6.7

6.2

6.6

7.5

+ 0.2

6.7

7.4

+ 1.9

State

All states
5.5
5.3
5.5
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics (1994).

recession may have contributed significantly to SSI application growth
from immigrants, as immigrants experienced particularly high rates of
unemployment, but were often not disability-insured.
Florida's recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s also apparently
had a significant impact on application and award growth, particularly
in the Dl-concurrent application category. The recession in Florida was
more severe, on average, than in the rest of the nation (Florida's unem
ployment rate rose by 3.2 percentage points). Furthermore, while the
nation's employment losses were largely concentrated in manufactur
ing, Florida's losses were concentrated in construction. A significant
loss of low-wage jobs may partially explain the high rate of Dl-concurrent application growth, and only moderate Dl-only application growth
in Florida since 1988.
The recession may have also been an important factor behind DI
application growth during the 1988 to 1992 period in Michigan even
though the increase in the unemployment rate for the period (1.2 per
centage points) was less than the national average. The recession's
early start in Michigan during the mid 1980s, and the auto industry's
failure to recover, may account for some of the increase in Dl-concurrent applications, as the income and resources of these DI recipients
were reduced to SSI eligibility standards. One impact of the recession
was that it led to strained state and local budgets and increased demand
for public assistance. Reductions in state welfare programs due to the
budgetary crisis had a clear impact on SSI application and award
growth (discussed below).
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The severe recession in New York was characterized by large layoffs
in major firms, many of which were expected to be permanent as man
ufacturing companies accelerated the downsizing and restructuring of
their operations. There was strong consensus among interviewees that
the severity and nature of job losses during the recession contributed
substantially to growth in DI applications, especially among workers
with long-established jobs who were permanently laid off. Because
many such workers would qualify only for DI, this may explain the
rapid growth in Dl-only applications. The state's Office of Disability
Determination and SSA field offices worked with employers and pri
vate disability insurers to facilitate the application process for employ
ees.
The recession that affected the nation in 1990 and 1991 had rela
tively little impact on unemployment in Texas, but this is because
Texas was experiencing a recovery from a severe recession that
affected the state in 1985 and 1986. This may explain why Texas expe
rienced lower than average growth in Dl-only and Dl-concurrent appli
cations during the 1988 to 1992 period, both because overall
unemployment did not increase by much and because individuals who
might have been affected in the later period may have already applied
for benefits during the earlier recession. As in California, we found
anecdotal evidence that high unemployment among immigrant popula
tions contributed to growth in SSI applications from immigrants.
State and Local Shifting and Outreach Efforts
In each of the five states, we found evidence of changes in policies
or procedures that may have had the intended or unintended effect of
shifting individuals from state and/or locally funded assistance pro
grams to the federally funded SSI program. The nature, intensity, and
apparent success of such policies is related to the financial incentives
involved. Below, we discuss some of these policies and incentives and
their potential impact on primarily SSI growth in the five case study
states. We first discuss policy changes related to Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) and GA programs. We then discuss pol
icy changes associated with state Medicaid programs.
AFDC and General Assistance. In general, we found that efforts to
shift welfare recipients onto SSI were focused on GA recipients; we
found only very limited efforts targeted at recipients of AFDC. There
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are several reasons for this, financial incentives for state and local gov
ernments being foremost among them.
State and local savings from shifting AFDC recipients onto SSI are
fairly modest. The federal government already pays at least 50 percent
of AFDC benefits in every state, so the savings to the state and/or local
ity are at most 50 percent of the reduction in benefits. Some states also
pay SSI supplements, so these must be deducted from any AFDC sav
ings that would be realized. In contrast, the savings from shifting a GA
recipient onto SSI can be very large, for two reasons. First, states and/
or localities pay for GA benefits in their entirety. Second, and often
more important, states and localities usually pay for most of the health
care provided to GA recipients, with no direct support from the federal
government. Shifting a GA recipient to SSI in almost all cases means
that the federal government will thereafter pay for at least half of the
individual's health care through Medicaid. AFDC recipients are
already Medicaid-eligible, so no such savings accrue when an AFDC
recipient is shifted to SSI.
There are two other reasons that shifting efforts focus on GA recipi
ents. First, a greater proportion of GA recipients may be likely to qual
ify for SSI than of AFDC recipients. According to data from the 1984
Survey of Income and Program Participation, 24 percent of persons
receiving cash welfare assistance other than AFDC or SSI had a sub
stantial disability compared to 17 percent of persons receiving AFDC
(Mathematica Policy Research 1990). Second, in many ways, local
governments are in a better position than state governments to imple
ment shifting efforts effectively, and their share of the combined state
and local financial responsibility for GA benefits is usually much
higher than their corresponding share for AFDC. Local government
familiarity with and proximity to local agencies and organizations—
the local welfare department, hospitals and other health care providers,
local advocacy organizations—gives them a distinct advantage over
states in implementing shifting efforts. In some states, including Cali
fornia, Texas, and Florida, local governments are responsible for 100
percent of GA cash benefits, while the state is responsible for all
AFDC payments not paid by the federal government.
Termination of Michigan's General Assistance program was the
most dramatic change affecting SSI application and award growth in
Michigan. GA served a substantial number of persons before its termi-
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nation. As of September 1991, the last month of GA existence, 118,632
individuals were on the GA rolls, but only a fraction were enrolled in
two successor programs: 11.5 percent in State Family Assistance
(SFA) and 1.3 percent in State Disability Assistance (SDA). Those
qualifying for SDA are required to file for SSI, a practice which was
not enforced while the GA program was in operation. SDA caseloads
are approximately 10,000 per month. About three to four thousand of
these individuals transfer to SSI each year, representing about 13 per
cent of SSI awards in Michigan in 1992.
Since 1988, aggressive outreach efforts in Michigan, coordinated
between SSA, state and local agencies, and advocacy groups, have
been an important factor behind increases in applications and awards.
The outreach efforts have been effective in targeting specific popula
tion groups and in identifying potentially eligible individuals. Special
attention has been paid to children, low birth weight babies, and former
GA recipients. The state of Michigan conducted its own outreach
efforts through meetings with schools, probate court, nearly all social
service agencies, and others who could make referrals. At the state
level, a series of computerized cross-matches were conducted to see if
former GA recipients had applied for, or already were on, other social
service programs. At least two mass mailings of information followed
these cross-matches resulting in an inflow of disability applications to
SSA field offices. Of the various organizations engaged in outreach
activities, health care providers have been particularly aggressive in
referring individuals to the DSS offices.
In New York, the costs of health and welfare expenditures that are
not paid for by the federal government are shared equally by the state
and its counties. This cost-sharing arrangement creates a strong incen
tive for the two levels of government to cooperate in shifting welfare
beneficiaries onto SSI. The cost-sharing mechanism has been in place,
however, since the 1960s, and many of the state shifting mechanisms
were also in place before 1988. This may partly explain New York's
lower than average SSI application growth since 1988. Shifting efforts
aimed at AFDC and, especially, Home Relief (HR) recipients (HR is
New York's GA program), have been in place for some time. An exam
ple is the Disabled Client Advocacy Program (DCAP) implemented in
1986, which identifies and assists disabled AFDC and HR recipients in
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the application process for SSL Such efforts were intensified more
recently.
The incentive to shift HR recipients in New York is particularly
strong because their health care is paid for by a "state-only" (state and
county financed) Medicaid program. Shifting HR recipients to SSI
results in especially large gains to state and county governments
because the federal government assumes responsibility for half of an
HR recipient's health care costs under Medicaid when the recipient
obtains an SSI award. Medical cost savings in the typical case are sub
stantially greater than cash benefit savings.
In addition to the outreach and SSI application assistance provided
to AFDC and HR recipients, New York state and local agencies have
implemented collaborative outreach efforts that target institutionalized
adults prior to discharge, as part of an effort to keep discharged indi
viduals from becoming HR recipients. Both the Department of Mental
Health and the Department of Parole initiated statewide outreach activ
ities to their target populations, individuals with severe mental illness
and prisoners about to be released, in 1986. Individuals in these target
populations are more likely to apply for SSI than DI. The impact of
these efforts on application growth may have been strongest prior to
1988, contributing to the relatively low SSI application and award
growth after 1988. We also learned of local outreach efforts to specific
hospitals that began in the early 1990s. Another important group that
was identified by interviewees as a target of SSI outreach initiatives is
homeless persons. Such initiatives were implemented by specific SSA
field offices that target homeless shelters in their service areas; the SSA
field office we visited implemented such an initiative in 1985. These
initiatives were very aggressive in finding potential SSI applicants and
assisting them in the application process.
One particularly notable outreach effort in New York City, albeit for
children with disabilities, illustrates how the impact of outreach efforts
on applications and awards may diminish over time. An intensive effort
was initiated in 1992 to identify children potentially eligible for SSI,
with an apparently substantial impact on child applications and awards.
This is a joint effort by the New York City Board of Education, the
state's Office of Disability Determination, and SSA. Since its inception
in August 1992, the program has accounted for approximately 200
awards per month. During the first few months of operation, approxi-
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mately 90 percent of cases were approved. At that time, the project
referred only the most severely disabled children in the school system
(those with IQs less than 59 or in need of physical assistance). The
project's target population has expanded, however, and now that chil
dren with a wide variety of impairments (including less severe mental
retardation, emotional impairments, conduct disorder, and some physi
cal impairments) are regularly referred through the project, the allow
ance rate has decreased significantly. This example illustrates what has
probably occurred with many of the shifting efforts initiated during the
1988 to 1992 period. New efforts can result in large immediate
increases in disability applications and awards as those most likely to
qualify are targeted first. Subsequently, however, the flow of referrals
and the allowance rate are likely to diminish.
In California, efforts to shift individuals onto SSI focused on Gen
eral Relief (GR; California's general assistance program) applicants
and beneficiaries. As in New York, Los Angeles County has an "SSI
Advocacy Program" in place that provides SSI application assistance
to GR beneficiaries, and, in some cases, assistance at the SSI hearings
level. Los Angeles County's effort to shift GR recipients onto SSI is
probably among the most aggressive in the state, due to the relative
severity of the recession in the county as well as the relative size of
their GR population (which accounts for 52 percent of all GR recipi
ents in the state). The county's efforts began in 1982 and were signifi
cantly increased in 1985, 1988, and 1992.
In Texas, we interviewed staff from the General Assistance program
in Harris County (Houston area). No important policy changes in the
Harris County GA program were identified. Texas does not, however,
have a statewide GA program, and our findings for Harris County may
not be generalizible to GA programs operated in other counties. In the
state AFDC program, the implementation of an integrated eligibility
screening process for AFDC clients may have had an impact on SSI
applications. This process involves screening and assistance with
application for other welfare programs for which the client may be eli
gible. In 1989, SSI was added to the screen. Although explicit shifting
was not the intended goal, the increased coordination among welfare
agencies may have contributed to growth in SSI applications.
As in Texas, Florida does not have a statewide GA program. Find
ings from our interviews with staff of the GA program in Dade County
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indicate that this program actively referred recipients to SSI prior to
1988, and that changes in GA policies during the 1988 to 1992 period
had little or no effect on SSI applications. As in Texas, Florida has a
welfare eligibility screening system, which was implemented in 1992.
The Florida system involved the training of AFDC caseworkers in SSI
eligibility requirements. Though implemented late in the period of this
study, the greater awareness of SSI eligibility combined with stream
lining of the application process for welfare benefits may have contrib
uted to SSI application growth in Florida.
SSA field office interviewees in Florida also indicated that SSI out
reach activities in their state are among the most aggressive, sophisti
cated, and targeted outreach efforts in the nation and have probably had
a significant impact on application and award growth in Florida since
1988. While the outreach activities of SSA field offices in the state
have probably not increased significantly in intensity or aggressiveness
since 1988, their continued efforts to identify and establish relation
ships with potential sources of referrals may have led to outreach
efforts that generate higher numbers of referrals, as well as higher
allowance rates.
Medicaid Programs. Rising health care costs, continued deinstitutionalization of persons with mental disorders, and changes in the ben
efits of state Medicaid programs may have affected applications to SSI.
Some states, responding to budgetary pressures, have expanded Medicaid coverage to services that were previously fully financed by state or
local governments. Recent studies of state responses to the growth in
Medicaid spending in nine states over the 1988 to 1992 period noted
that six of these states (including Michigan, New York, and Texas)
expanded coverage of mental health and mental retardation services
under Medicaid in order to shift more of the cost of this care to the fed
eral government (Coughlin et al. 1994). 2 Such changes in Medicaid
coverage might induce providers and advocacy organizations to assist
potentially eligible individuals to apply for SSI in order to obtain Med
icaid coverage.
These incentives may have been further enhanced by changes in
SSA policies that occurred in 1991. The changes increased the weight
placed on "source evidence" (evidence from a claimant's own health
care provider) in disability award decisions, giving a claimant's pro
vider greater influence over the outcome of a claim. This may have
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intensified provider efforts to help patients obtain benefits, but we have
not found any evidence on this point.
In Texas, the passage of legislation in 1985 requiring counties to
take fiscal responsibility for their medically indigent population
increased incentives for county-financed public hospitals to identify
these individuals and help them to obtain Medicaid coverage. The Har
ris County Hospital District, one of the largest county public hospital
systems in Texas, recently implemented a computerized screening pro
gram that identifies clients who are potentially eligible for Medicaid
through any of a variety of programs, including SSL In addition, Texas
expanded its Medicaid coverage of outpatient mental health services in
1990-1991. This expansion increased incentives for community men
tal health care providers to ensure that their patients apply for Medicaid-associated programs for which they are potentially eligible. This is
likely to have contributed to the above average growth in SSI applica
tions based on mental impairment that Texas experienced during this
period.
Several outreach efforts initiated in Texas during the 1988 to 1992
time period apparently stemmed from the desire to enroll clients in SSI
so they would then have the health insurance coverage of Medicaid.
For example, in addition to its screening activities, the Harris County
Hospital District operates an SSA-sponsored outreach program to hos
pitals, clinics, and homeless shelters in the Houston area. Individuals
potentially eligible for DI or SSI are assisted with the filing of an appli
cation. A similar program was implemented in 1994 by the Mental
Health and Mental Retardation Authority of Harris County. Outreach
was also conducted by representatives from the SSA field office in
Houston to patients of an area AIDS clinic.
In Florida, several interviewees indicated that efforts by health care
providers have been particularly important in explaining DI and SSI
application growth, and that these efforts were driven, in large part, by
the potential to increase Medicaid enrollment and decrease the costs of
charity care to providers. Since 1988, many large county hospitals have
been working with SSA field office staff to identify individuals poten
tially eligible for SSI. In addition, some hospitals have begun to hire
contractors to recoup the funds lost in providing care for the uninsured.
In exchange for assisting uninsured patients in applying for all benefits
to which they may be entitled, hospitals pay these contractors a per-
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centage of the recouped funds. Finally, in 1992, providers of commu
nity-based services for persons with developmental disabilities were
permitted to bill Medicaid directly for their services. Prior to 1992, ser
vice providers contracted with and were reimbursed by the Department
of Developmental Services, who in turn billed Medicaid. This change
in Medicaid reimbursement policy creates a strong incentive for pro
viders to ensure that their clients are covered by Medicaid, and may
explain some of Florida's exceptionally large Dl-concurrent and SSI
application growth in the mental retardation impairment category.
Changes in Program Eligibility Requirements
Several revisions to the criteria SSA uses to evaluate disability
implemented in the mid 1980s and early 1990s may have had a signifi
cant impact on application growth. One of the most important changes
was the revision of the criteria for determining disability based on
mental impairment. These changes, implemented in 1985, increased
the weight given to the functional ability of an applicant in determining
eligibility relative to diagnostic criteria (see Chapter 2).
Other than state DDS administrators, interviewees had limited to no
knowledge of changes in eligibility requirements except the changes
for children brought about by Sullivan v. Zebley. We did not, however,
interview individuals who might be the most knowledgeable about the
changes in the disability eligibility criteria, such as advocates or dis
ability attorneys.
In California and Florida, most interviewees indicated that changes
in eligibility requirements did not have a significant impact on applica
tion and award growth for adults. In Michigan, however, interviewees
indicated that an increase in applications based on mental impairment
followed the 1985 changes in the mental impairment listings. The
impact of these changes may have been delayed as awareness of the
changes, and the perception that these changes eased the strictness of
eligibility criteria, spread among professionals and potential appli
cants. Growth in claims based on mental impairment is closely associ
ated with growth in drug addiction and alcoholism (DA&A) claims. It
is believed that this was partly due to the increased training and clarifi
cation of the rules on how to evaluate DA&A claims. Individuals inter
viewed in New York also believed that heightened awareness of DA&A
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eligibility criteria may have contributed to application growth in that
impairment category in New York.
In Texas, interviewees at the SSA field office in Houston believed
that the changes in the mental impairment listings had caused denial
rates to decline considerably and thus affected awards. They also indi
cated that there has been a shift in the adjudicative climate, in that field
office staff now provide more information to applicants regarding how
to become eligible for the programs, rather than just taking information
from the claimant, as was the case in the past.
Other Factors
Immigration. With the exception of Michigan, all of the case study
states have relatively large immigrant populations. New immigrants are
not eligible to apply for DI until, like others, they have satisfied the
work requirements for disability-insured status. During the period
under study, legal immigrants, however, could apply for SSI after three
years of legal residency in the United States; the waiting period has
since been increased to five years. In 1987, the Immigration Reform
and Control Act (IRCA) allowed certain classes of undocumented
immigrants to become legal immigrants. Immigrants legalized under
IRCA were not required to wait three years to apply for SSI. Prior to
conducting the case studies, we had thought that IRCA immigrants
may have contributed to SSI growth in the states with large immigrant
populations, as IRCA created a larger pool of immigrants eligible to
apply for SSI. Only a few individuals interviewed, however, com
mented on the extent to which applications from immigrants may have
contributed to growth. Empirical evidence, described later, also indi
cates that IRCA legalizations had little impact on application growth
(see also Chapter 2).
Interviewees in California indicated that applications from immi
grants may have experienced above average growth since 1988 for sev
eral reasons. First, anecdotal evidence provided by SSA field offices
indicates that, in general, immigrant groups tend to be relatively well
organized and aggressive in their pursuit of SSI benefits. Second, Cali
fornia has recently experienced a surge in fraudulent applications,
which has predominantly involved immigrant groups (see GAO 1995).
Finally, the recession led to high unemployment in the immigrant pop
ulation.
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In Florida, interviewees indicated that immigration probably did not
have a large impact on application and award growth since 1988. Any
impact that did occur was probably concentrated in certain areas of the
state and among certain types of immigrants (i.e., entrants and refugees
as opposed to legal immigrants).
In Texas, individuals from the Houston field office and state DDS
office believed that applications from immigrants had increased in
recent years. This may have been, in part, due to high unemployment
among the immigrant population in Texas during the 1988-1992
period. In addition, interviewees at the field office in Houston com
mented on an increase in suspected fraudulent applications filed by
Vietnamese immigrants.
Specific Impairments. A few interviewees in some states commented
on the extent to which applications based on particular impairments
had increased.
In New York, the very high concentration of HIV/AIDS cases in the
service area of the Manhattan SSA field office accounted for rapid
application growth in this area. This growth, and the high allowance
rates for these applications, resulted in overall allowance rates that
were temporarily very high—as high as 80 percent in 1992 for SSL
The disparity between awards at this field office and other field offices
caused the DDS to review all HIV/AIDS case determinations, resulting
in a significant reduction in this field office's allowance rate in 1994.
Individuals at the Houston field office also indicated that applica
tions from individuals with HIV/AIDS, especially women, were
increasingly prevalent. They attributed this growth to recent outreach
efforts to patients of an area AIDS clinic.
Interviewees in California indicated that the recent national surge in
DA&A applications was concentrated in California. We found several
factors in addition to high prevalence rates that may have contributed
to DA&A application growth in the state, including cuts in state fund
ing to counties for mental health and substance abuse services, the
impact of "word of mouth" in prisons, and the effectiveness of out
reach efforts targeted to the homeless.
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Findings from an Econometric Analysis of State Data
As part of a related study, a regression model of application growth
from 1988 to 1992 was estimated using state-level data on disability
applications disaggregated by age, impairment, program (Dl-only, DIconcurrent, and SSI) and gender (see Chapter 2). The specific factors
analyzed in the model of application growth include the (log) unem
ployment rate, GA program cuts (per capita reductions in the number
of GA recipients), HIV/AIDS incidence (new cases per capita), per
capita new legalizations under the Immigration Reform and Control
Act, and the (log) percent of children living in single-parent families.
The last variable, children in single-parent families, is used as a proxy
for changes in family structure, including declines in marriage rates.
Reductions in financial support from spouses is thought to have con
tributed to disability application growth. Marriage rate data by state is
not available, so the number of children in one-parent families is used
as a proxy.3
The amount of application growth accounted for by each factor for
each state is reported in Table 8.2. The first factor, population growth
and aging, was relatively more important in Florida, California, and
Texas than in Michigan or New York. Population growth and aging
accounted for as much as 2 percentage points of annual growth in the
first three states.
Unemployment accounted for a substantial amount of Dl-only and
Dl-concurrent application growth in California, Florida, and New
York, especially for males. In these states, unemployment accounted
for between 50 and 70 percent of annual Dl-only and Dl-concurrent
application growth for males.
Michigan was the only state of the five studied that experienced
reductions in its General Assistance program caseload. The results
from the econometric analysis indicate that this had a substantial
impact on growth in Michigan's SSI applications. Annual SSI applica
tion growth accounted for by GA cuts in Michigan is estimated to be
6.4 percentage points for males and 4.3 percentage points for females.
This represents 40 percent and 27 percent of annual SSI application
growth for males and females, respectively. There was also a substan
tial impact on DI applications from men in the Dl-concurrent category.
A separate analysis of application growth by impairment (not shown)

Table 8.2 Annual Growth in Applications Accounted for by Factors in the Regression Analysis, by Program and
Gender, 1988 to 1992
Men
Predicted annual growth
accounted for bya
Population growth and aging
California
Florida
Michigan
New York
Texas
Unemployment
California
Florida
Michigan
New York
Texas
GA program cuts
California
Florida
Michigan

Dl-only
Women

Dl-concurrent
Men
Women

SSI-total
Men
Women

1.9
2.3
0.9
0.4
1.7

1.9
2.1
0.9
0.2
1.7

2.1
2.4
0.7
0.5
1.9

1.9
2.2
0.8
0.3
1.8

1.9
2.3
0.5
0.3
1.7

1.8
2.1
0.7
0.2
1.6

4.2
3.5
1.0
5.3
0.2

2.0
1.9
0.5
2.7
0.1

4.4
4.2
1.1
5.3
0.2

1.1
1.0
0.2
1.1
0.1

3.1
3.1
1.0
3.8
0.1

1.1
1.2
0.2
1.4
0.1

0.0
0.0
6.4

0.0
0.0
4.3

0.0
0.0
3.5

to

o\

OS

New York
Texas
AIDS/HIV
California
Florida
Michigan
New York
Texas
IRCA legalizations
California
Florida
Michigan
New York
Texas
Children in one-parent families
California
Florida
Michigan

0.2
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.2

-0.1
-0.1
0.0

0.2
0.2
0.3

0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0

0.9
1.6
1.3
0.5
0.5

0.4
1.0
0.8
0.3
0.3

0.7
0.5
0.9

0.9
0.7
1.2

0.0
0.0

0.9b

1.2b

0.1
0.0
0.1
0.1

0.2
0.0
0.1
0.3

0.7
0.5
0.9

0.8
0.7
1.1
(continued)

Table 8.2 (continued)

New York
Texas
Share of growth accounted for by
regression model0 (%)
California
Florida
Michigan
New York
Texas
Annual growth rate (%)
California
Florida
Michigan
New York
Texas

Dl-only
Women
Men
0.0
0.0
-0.1
0.2

Dl-concurrent
Women
Men
-0.1
-0.1

SSI-total
Women
Men
-0.1
-0.1

0.5

0.6

0.5

0.6

84.0
98.5
61.5
68.9
64.5

47.8
43.1
23.2
26.9
25.6

66.3
58.7
64.9
81.3
48.5

32.2
21.7
17.4
18.2
22.9

62.5
48.0
65.4
53.3
34.6

49.3
28.0
42.9
26.0
26.9

7.8
6.7
3.9
9.0
3.1

9.0
10.2
7.8
10.8
7.8

13.6
16.7
12.8
8.0
6.6

12.6
18.9
13.2
7.5
11.2

12.6
16.1
16.1
8.6
8.5

10.9
15.9
15.7
6.5
10.0

SOURCE Lewm-VHI(1995a).
aGrowth due to specific factors expressed as percentage points. The results are based on application regressions estimated by age/impairment/gender/pro
gram subgroups. Not all variables were included in each model.
bLarge growth accounted for by IRCA legalizations in California is the product of a very large growth in the variable and statistically insignificant coeffi
cients.
cTotal growth accounted for includes a small interaction among the factors above.
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indicates that the elimination of Michigan's GA program accounted for
49 percent of all Michigan SSI application growth in the mental
impairment category (Lewin-VHI 1995a).
New cases of HIV/AIDS accounted for the most application growth
in Florida and Michigan for male Dl-concurrent applications (the vari
able was not included in the regressions for females). Annual growth
accounted for by HIV/AIDS was generally higher for Dl-concurrent
applications than for Dl-only or SSI applications in all five states.
Growth in the number of IRCA legalizations accounted for the most
SSI application growth in California, about 1 percentage point for both
males and females. The coefficient for the IRCA variable, however, is
statistically insignificant in the application regression. As discussed in
Chapter 2, estimates of S.SI applications from IRCA immigrants calcu
lated by SSA also indicate that this group had a very small impact on
SSI application growth.
The final variable, children in single-parent families, accounted for a
small amount of the Dl-concurrent and SSI application growth in all
states except New York. This variable accounted for somewhat more
growth in Michigan and California than in the other case study states.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The five case studies provide some important lessons concerning
both the factors that contributed to the tremendous growth experienced
from 1988 to 1992 and the determinants of application and award
growth in general. These lessons confirm or enrich many of the find
ings from our related research on caseload growth (see Chapter 2).
Lesson 1: The acceleration of growth in applications and awards dur
ing the period from 1988 to 1992, above longer-term trends,
was primarily due to three factors:
• the recession
• states and localities shifting the burden of welfare
spending onto the federal government
• expansion in the "supply" of benefits
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The relative importance of each factor varies by program
and is different for applications and awards.
There was a broad consensus among interviewees that the recession
played an important role in high DI application and award growth in
California, Florida, Michigan, and New York, and that the relatively
mild downturn in Texas explains relatively low growth in that state.
This consensus is strongly supported by the econometric evidence.
State and local policy and program changes had the effect of shifting
many recipients of state and local welfare benefits onto SSI and, to a
lesser extent, DI during this period. The apparent impact of the termi
nation of Michigan's GA program and accompanying outreach efforts
provides the strongest example, but aggressive efforts were found in
other states as well. While in some states these efforts predated the
period under consideration, many were initiated during the period and
others were intensified. This factor can be viewed as an extension of
the first because new and intensified shifting efforts were, to a signifi
cant degree, responses to recession-induced budgetary shortfalls.
Supply changes refer to regulatory and policy changes, SSA out
reach activities, court decisions, and the adjudicative climate. The evi
dence on this factor comes primarily from the regression analysis and
the interviews with experts, conducted for related studies. The regres
sion analysis shows that much growth remains unaccounted for after
taking into account the recession, GA cuts, and some other factors.
While some of the residual growth is likely due to limitations on our
ability to fully capture the impact of the recession, shifting, and other
factors in the regression analysis, patterns of residual growth across
impairment groups and across applications and awards are consistent
with the hypothesis that a substantial fraction of the residual growth is
due to supply changes. Anecdotal findings from the case studies are
consistent with this conclusion.
The recession was a more important factor for DI growth than for
SSI growth, while shifting of welfare beneficiaries and supply changes
were more important for SSI. Supply changes were clearly much more
important for awards than for applications. It is difficult to explain why
allowance rates increased over this period in any other way; evidence
from the regression analyses indicate that the other important factors
had a negative impact on the allowance rate, if any.
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We have also found evidence that AIDS/HIV and changes in family
structure contributed to the acceleration of application and award
growth during this period, but their effects appear to have been small
by comparison to the effects of the three factors cited above. Longterm growth in applications and awards is due to factors that we did not
examine in the case studies—principally growth and aging of the popu
lation and, for DI, growth in the share of women who are disabilityinsured (see Chapter 2).
Lesson 2: Regression estimates of the impact of the recession and of
cuts in GA programs may significantly understate the full
impact of the recession and efforts to shift the burden of
welfare spending onto the federal government.
As we found in the case studies, the nature of job losses during the
recession varied from state to state, and this variation apparently had
an impact on applications: job losses among older, more experienced
workers in California were believed to have had an impact on Dl-only
applications; job losses in construction were thought to have affected
Dl-concurrent growth in Florida and California; and low-wage job
losses and high unemployment among immigrants were thought to
have contributed to SSI growth in California, Florida, and Texas. The
unemployment rate variable used in the regression fails to capture
these subtleties of the business cycle that are important for application
and awards. If the regression models were able to capture these more
subtle changes in labor market conditions, they would almost certainly
account for even more of the application and award growth during this
period.
An analogous conclusion applies to the GA variable. The variable
used in the regression analysis is an imperfect measure of state and
local efforts to shift the burden of welfare spending onto the federal
government. In the case studies, we found substantial new or intensi
fied shifting efforts in California, Florida, New York, and Texas, many
unrelated to GA programs in those states, or occurring in GA programs
that were not cut during the 1988 to 1992 period.
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Lesson 3: Significant departures from long-term trends in application
and award growth are generally self-limiting.
When we began this work, applications and awards were still grow
ing very rapidly, and there were fears that they would continue to grow
unless something changed. The major factors that we have identified as
contributing to the acceleration of growth over this period—the reces
sion, state and local shifting of welfare recipients onto SSI, and the
expansion of the supply of benefit—were, however, one-time changes
that temporarily increased application and award growth. Continued
increases in unemployment, increases in efforts to shift the burden of
welfare spending onto the federal government, and expansion of the
supply of benefits would be necessary to sustain the rapid growth of
this period. Instead, increases in unemployment are rarely sustained for
long periods and are usually followed by declines during economic
recoveries, opportunities to shift the burden of welfare spending onto
the federal government diminish as the remaining pool of disabled wel
fare recipients shrinks, and the effects of supply expansions also
diminish as the number of nonrecipients in newly eligible groups gets
smaller. While the impact of changes in specific factors on application
and award growth may be self-limiting, the consequences of such
growth for caseload and program expenditure growth may be experi
enced for some time into the future (see Rupp and Scott, Chapter 4).
Lesson 4: The burden of health care spending on state and local gov
ernments is a significant factor behind efforts to shift GA
recipients and other indigent users of health care services
onto SSI.
The burden of health care costs for indigent users of health care falls
largely on state and local governments. Once such an individual
receives an SSI award, the federal government pays for 50 to 80 per
cent of his or her health care, via Medicaid. Savings to state and local
governments from this change are often significantly greater than the
reductions in cash payments. Reductions in direct state and local fund
ing for indigent health care and for mental health services and simulta
neous expansion of Medicaid mental health benefits may have
substantially increased the intensity of provider outreach efforts in
some states during this period, and outreach efforts undertaken by pub-
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lie hospitals and other health care providers appear to be among the
most effective.
Lesson 5: Recent welfare and health reforms are likely to have a sub
stantial impact on SSI applications and awards.
When we began examining growth in SSA's disability programs, we
frequently encountered skepticism with the suggestion that reductions
in general assistance and AFDC benefits would have an impact on SSI
applications and, especially, awards. Since SSI benefits are more gen
erous than GA or AFDC benefits, why wouldn't anyone likely to be
eligible for SSI apply? The answer to this question was provided by
many we interviewed. In brief, the intellectual and emotional invest
ments required to successfully apply for SSI are a sufficient obstacle
that many who are eligible will not apply when other sources of sup
port, although lower, are more readily available. Thus, cuts in other
support, or provision of intellectual and emotional support for applica
tion, can induce the filing of SSI claims. This explanation is most
apparent for individuals with severe mental disorders.
Many proposals to impose significant new limitations on AFDC
benefits are currently under consideration by most states, and some
states have already implemented major reforms. While disabilities are
less prevalent among AFDC recipients than among GA recipients, a
significant number of AFDC recipients—adults and children—have
disabilities. Unless these recipients are exempt from work require
ments, time limits, and other criteria, they can be expected to apply for
SSI benefits. Furthermore, as a result of federal financing for AFDC
being converted to block grants to the states, the financial incentives
for states to shift AFDC recipients onto SSI have substantially
increased, and, again, we should expect increased shifting to occur.

Notes
1.

Throughout this chapter, we describe growth in adult applications and awards in
three program groups: Dl-only, Dl-concurrent (low-income DI applicants who
also file for SSI within six months of their DI filing), and SSI (blind and disabled
categories only). In some instances, we examine growth in SSI applications from
individuals who are not eligible for any type of social security benefit (S Si-only),
but in general, SSI applications because of technical reasons that are related to
differences in the time and place of filing for the two programs, and because SSI-
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only applications exclude SSI applicants who are eligible for social security bene
fits other than DI disabled worker benefits.
Little or no shifting of mental health services was indicated for California and
Florida in this study. While California did not expand Medicaid mental health ser
vices, the state did reduce funding to counties for mental health and substance
abuse treatment services.
Elasticities obtained from an econometric analysis where data are disaggregated
by program and gender only are reported in the appendix to Chapter 2. Estimates
from a more disaggregated analysis (report in Lewin-VHI 1995b) and data for
each of the five case study states were used to obtain the results reported here.
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Comments on Chapters 6 and 7
Martha R. Burt
Urban Institute

For someone like myself, who comes to this conference from the
perspective of research on homelessness and on the severely and per
sistently mentally ill, these papers by Muller and Wheeler (Chapter 6)
and by Bound, Kossoudji, and Ricart-Moes (Chapter 7) contain some
very interesting and provocative findings. I will focus most of my com
ments on the latter chapter, since that was my primary assignment, and
refer to the former as it augments the findings of Bound, Kossoudji,
and Ricart-Moes.

A SUCCESSFUL POLICY

Both papers describe something we very rarely see documented in
evaluation research—the successful administration of public policy. I
strongly agree with the comments of several field managers (Chapter 6),
who said, "What else did you expect?" as the consequence of greatly
expanded and targeted outreach efforts to bring eligible nonparticipants
onto the rolls. To that comment I might add, "What else did you expect?"
as the consequence of Governor Engler's decision to end Michigan's
General Assistance (GA) program for all but a very few individuals.
Both appear to have been quite successful at achieving their goals. The
latter action also appears to have had some results that its supporters
denied would occur despite strong evidence to the contrary: the docu
mented rise in the homeless sheltered population as reflected in Chapter
7, and the rise in SSI applications and awards indicating significant lev
els of long-term disabilities among the former GA population. It is par
ticularly telling that the largest jump in SSI applications and awards
related to the end of GA occurred among those with mental impair
ments. I think it likely that the same is true for the jump in the number
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of sheltered homeless (and probably also the unsheltered homeless pop
ulation).
Both of these chapters document the effectiveness of persistent and
well-focused outreach efforts. Chapter 7 differentiates between out
reach, seen as actions of local Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
offices, and advocacy, seen as actions of direct service providers and
state agencies. I think the two go hand-in-hand, and it is quite likely
that some of the SSI outreach efforts (and also the state agency activi
ties) involved increasing the knowledge and program savvy of direct
service providers so they could prescreen potential applicants and also
help them to complete their applications. Thus I do not think one can
separate the effects of outreach and advocacy; I see them as two arms
of the same body, both intent on drawing people into the application
process and assuring that they succeed at it.

THE ROLE OF STATE INTERESTS
However, what we can see as a success story from the point of view
of SSI participation we can also see as illustrating some troubling
trends in state-federal relations, which have potentially negative impli
cations for the well-being of poor and disabled people. The role of state
agencies in expanding the SSI rolls is instructive. For decades, states
have sought ways to shift costs from their own coffers to those of the
federal government. In the past decade or so they have gotten signifi
cantly more sophisticated at this cost-shifting. In the case of SSI,
Michigan had two major programs that were entirely state-funded—
General Assistance (and its accompanying medical program) and state
mental hospitals. By ending General Assistance, the state could elimi
nate the cost of supporting the entire caseload and shift the burden of
support for SSI-eligibles to the federal government. By furthering the
efforts of state mental hospital patients' move into the community once
they have the support of SSI, the state could shift to the federal govern
ment a portion of its responsibility to provide both domiciliary and
health care. The people who succeed in getting SSI are financially bet
ter off than they were on GA or as state hospital residents, but those
who cannot qualify or who never apply are certainly worse off. The
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fact that significant numbers of people in both the GA and mentally ill
populations cannot and do not receive SSI, and therefore end up desti
tute and sometimes homeless, is usually overlooked or downplayed by
state officials as they try to reduce state outlays for services and assis
tance to poor and disabled people.
It is important to recognize that all levels of government are divest
ing themselves of responsibility for some categories of disability—
chief among them mental disabilities—and that this has been going on
for a long time. State efforts to shift costs will only increase in the
coming years; their effects should not be overlooked, or masked by
lumping federal, state, and nonprofit actions together into overall cate
gories of "outreach" and "advocacy."

THE NEED FOR ATTENTION TO REHABILITATION
It is also possible that there has been some overextension of SSI, or
at least a failure to consider or require participation in rehabilitation
efforts for those who might benefit from them. The most obvious
newly expanded group of SSI recipients to whom this applies is those
eligible by reason of drug abuse or alcoholism. Even among the longterm street homeless with drug or alcohol addictions, research evi
dence now indicates that recovery is possible, along with a return to
gainful employment. Both the National Institute on Drug Abuse and
the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism have spon
sored demonstrations showing significant success rates. Further, the
efforts of many homeless service providers have helped at least some
substance abusers recover, although formal evaluations are lacking.
Rather than making the assumption of lifelong dependency for these
conditions, the Social Security Administration (SSA) should be pro
moting efforts to help SSI recipients move toward self-sufficiency to
the extent possible.'
Let us assume that we can think of a four-part research agenda for
SSI participation, including 1) who are the pool of eligibles; 2) what
gets them to apply; 3) what affects awards (whether their applications
are successful); and 4) what affects exits. I am suggesting that we need
to pay somewhat more attention than we do at present to the last of
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these. We need to look at exit rates differentially by disabling condition
and try to understand what SSA actions or policies could affect exit
rates.

NEED FOR MORE FLEXIBILITY
My earlier caveat, "to the extent possible," brings me to the final
point I want to make. My final comment does not really stem from
either Chapter 6 or Chapter 7. However, I think it is important to use
this forum to raise the issue of the stringency of SSI eligibility criteria,
particularly with regard to capacity to work. We probably all recognize
that our current ability to define "disability" with any precision leaves a
good deal to be desired. For SSI purposes, we must deal not only with
the presence of a physical or mental condition (diagnosis), but also
with the extent to which the condition entails significant functional
limitations (disability), and the extent to which it has lasted and can be
expected to last a long time (duration). The biggest problems in deter
mining eligibility come with identifying the level of functional limita
tion and the expectation for duration.
To ease the burden on determining gradations of functional limita
tion, the SSI eligibility criterion has been set quite high with respect to
work—to be eligible for SSI, recipients must be completely unable to
work. Yet the nature of some illnesses (particularly mental illnesses)
that qualify a person for SSI may permit some work, in either a steady
part-time capacity or episodically. The strong bent of current thinking
about the severely and persistently mentally ill is that working, at
whatever level is possible, is good for self-esteem, physical health, and
mental health, even if it may not be enormously rewarding financially.
The same is probably true for other disabilities.
But people also rely on the medical care available to them through
Medicaid while they are on SSL They often feel they cannot risk losing
their SSI, even if their work activity could compensate for the income,
because they would also lose health benefits. Perhaps it is time for SSA
to reexamine the nature of some of the disabilities that form the biggest
categories of current recipients. It could give some consideration to
rule changes that would allow recipients to do whatever level of paid
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work they could, while still retaining their Medicaid coverage. Some
fair reduction in cash grant levels might also be worked out. This
would be in everybody's interest—clients, states, SSI, and providers.
To the extent that the opportunity already exists under current regu
lations for significant levels of paid work while still retaining benefits,
SSA should make greater efforts to assure that direct service providers
and advocates know about this opportunity. From my experience with
community-based providers of services to the severely mentally ill, I
do not think anyone is clear about what clients can and cannot do and
still retain their SSI. Participants at this conference have told me that
there is considerable flexibility for paid work under current SSI rules.
But ignorance of these opportunities among the people working most
closely with SSI program beneficiaries seems to be widespread. There
fore it is likely that fewer recipients work than might otherwise do so.

Note
1.

This point may now be moot. The ability of these programs to continue serving
clients whose primary diagnosis and reason for receiving SSI is alcohol or drug
abuse will be challenged severely by new provisions for SSI eligibility contained
in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996. The loss of SSI
income and Medicaid eligibility for this population reduces their ability to pay for
housing and to receive needed medical care, both of which helped maintain them
in the housing supplied by these demonstration programs.

Comments on Chapters 6, 7, and 8
Barbara Henry Bordelon
U.S. General Accounting Office

As a discussant, I have focused on one of the explanations for SSI
application growth discussed by Muller and Wheeler (Chapter 6);
Bound, Kossoudji, and Ricart-Moes (Chapter 7).; and Livermore, Stapleton, and Zeuschner (Chapter 8): state outreach activities that shift
individuals with disabilities from state-funded assistance to the feder
ally funded SSI program. I compare their findings with those of the
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) and elaborate on GAO's
results. I conclude with some implications for public policy.

STATE OUTREACH EFFORTS SHIFT INDIVIDUALS TO SSI

Early in 1995, GAO profiled eight state-funded disability advocacy
projects through telephone interviews with state welfare administra
tors. Similar to findings reported by Livermore, Stapleton, and
Zeuschner in Chapter 8, GAO found aggressive state outreach efforts
that shifted individuals from state-funded assistance to Supplemental
Security Income (SSI). GAO's findings also provide evidence to sup
port the perceptions of financial burden shifting from state and local
governments to the federal government reported in Muller and Wheeler
(Chapter 6).
In testimony before the Congress, GAO reported that state efforts to
enroll state welfare recipients in SSI were one of several factors that
contributed to a tremendous growth in the number of disability recipi
ents between 1985 and 1994 (GAO 1995a). GAO estimated that at
least one-half of all states funded disability advocacy programs. These
programs proactively assisted state welfare recipients with disabilities
in negotiating the SSI application and appeals process. In so doing, the
states hoped to accomplish three ends (Hardin 1992):
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• Increase recipients' income and often improve their access to
medical care
• Enhance savings to the state government
• Bring more federal dollars into the state economy
GAO found that state disability advocacy projects primarily served
General Assistance recipients. As noted by Livermore, Stapleton, and
Zeuschner (Chapter 8), state and local governments paying 100 percent
of General Assistance benefits had a financial incentive to transfer their
qualifying General Assistance recipients with disabilities to a fully fed
erally funded program such as SSL
Moreover, states avoided costs by moving individuals from statefunded medical assistance programs to Medicaid, which is partially
federally funded. (In most cases, individuals qualifying for SSI are eli
gible for Medicaid benefits.) Although some state disability advocacy
projects served Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) cli
ents and foster care children, those caseloads generally were consider
ably smaller than their General Assistance caseloads.

MODELS OF DISABILITY ADVOCACY SERVICES
GAO found that states generally used one of the following three
models to deliver disability advocacy services.
• State contracts for advocacy services. Some states contracted
with private-sector firms for disability advocacy services. For
example, the state of Maryland contracted for the management of
its Disability Entitlement Advocacy Program with Health Man
agement Associates, Inc., for about $3 million annually. This
amount covered the contractor's management fee and reimburse
ment of basic costs, including legal services. Similarly, the Mas
sachusetts Public Welfare Department contracted with ten
community groups that helped public assistance recipients apply
ing for SSI. The state also contracted with a legal services pro
gram to represent SSI applicants during reconsideration and
hearings. Massachusetts sent about 5,000 letters a year informing
General Assistance recipients who had been denied SSI benefits
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about the state's legal services.
State advocacy units staffed by state employees. Some state
advocacy programs were staffed by state employees. For
instance, the state of Washington employed specialists—called
SSI facilitators—to help with the SSI application process. Facili
tators identified potential SSI candidates; assisted candidates with
the application process; and helped the client file for reconsidera
tion of the initial eligibility denial, administrative hearing, and
appeals through the courts. With the assistance of facilitators, 80
percent of the cases filed were approved, 60 percent at the initial
level, reportedly due to thorough client screening and case devel
opment, as well as attentiveness to timely filing of paperwork.
As another example, Oregon state employees—called SSI liai
sons—were trained in the SSI application process by the local
Disability Determination Service (DDS). The liaisons tracked the
status of a case through an online hook-up to the DDS and pro
vided needed information to help the DDS in its decision-making
process. They also represented clients at hearings.
Combination of state employees with contracted legal ser
vices. Finally, Pennsylvania illustrates a third model that com
bined contracting with the use of state employees. Pennsylvania's
Disability Advocacy Program had 139 advocates who were state
employees in sixty-seven county offices. For legal services, the
state contracted with the Pennsylvania Legal Services Center to
support half the cases at the hearings level. The balance of the
cases were supported by private attorneys.

DISABILITY ADVOCACY: FINANCIALLY BENEFICIAL TO
STATES
As Livermore, Stapleton, and Zeuschner note, strong financial
incentives exist for state and local governments to shift general assis
tance recipients to SSI. State officials with whom GAO talked found
disability advocacy to be extremely cost-effective. The state could usu
ally more than make up for its advocacy expenses, which were often
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less than the recouped General Assistance payments made by the state
during the waiting period for SSI benefit approval, 1 while avoiding the
costs associated with General Assistance and medical assistance.
In fact, GAO found that, together, five states reported using disabil
ity advocacy programs to generate gross savings of about $90 million
in a given year by helping enroll in SSI nearly 26,000 individuals
receiving state benefits (GAO 1995a). Most of these reported gains
came from one state. In fiscal year 1994, Pennsylvania reported net
savings of $55 million by helping more than 15,000 public assistance
recipients enroll in SSI instead of state General Assistance.

IMPLICATIONS OF OUTREACH FOR PUBLIC POLICY
Outreach is a legitimate activity for states to inform their citizens of
their entitlement to SSI and its eligibility requirements. Consequences
may result, however, that may have a potentially negative effect on the
states' disability advocacy project.
1. Given the difficulty of predicting work capacity on the basis of
medical impairment, to what extent do outreach efforts direct
individuals who may have some capacity to work to a system that
emphasizes work incapacity?
The literature shows that work capacity is a function of many factors
and that accurately predicting work incapacity for most people with a
physical or mental impairment is difficult (U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services 1988). Given the difficulty of accurately predict
ing work capacity, beneficiaries may have a greater capacity to work
than was previously believed. Therefore, to what extent do outreach
efforts contribute to labeling someone as work disabled who in fact has
the potential to work, inadvertently encouraging work incapacity?
2. Outreach is a front-end activity of the disability program that
seems to receive much more attention than back-end activities
that help individuals leave the rolls by returning to work. Can we
afford to continue to overemphasize front-end activities to the
detriment of activities that enhance independence through
employment?
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State outreach efforts emphasize the front end of the process—
increasing awareness of the disability program, identifying eligibles,
and supporting the disability determination process—while, at the back
end of the process, less than 1 percent of beneficiaries with disabilities
leave the rolls to go to work.
Moreover, vocational rehabilitation (VR) plays a limited role in dis
ability programs, with state VR agencies successfully rehabilitating
only about 1 out of every 1,000 beneficiaries, on average, each year
(GAO 1995b). Compare these dismal outcomes at the back end of the
process to the success of the extensive outreach efforts at the front end
that is documented in these papers. And then ask yourself whether we
can afford NOT to pay attention to a) setting up an early expectation
for maximizing work potential through various types of employment
and rehabilitation services, and b) early intervention before contact is
lost with the employer to maintain skills, prevent job loss, and enhance
capacity.
Enduring solutions to these public policy issues will take time and
resources to craft, but steps should be taken immediately to improve
the direction of federal disability.

Note
1.

The Social Security Administration requires that an interim assistance agreement
must be in effect with the state if SSA is to repay the state for the amount of Gen
eral Assistance it gave the individual during the waiting period for approval of SSI
benefits. This is referred to as an "interim assistance agreement."
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Part III
Perspective on Program
Growth and Policy

9 Growth in Federal Disability
Programs and Implications
for Policy
Gilbert Fisher
Melinda Upp
Social Security Administration

This is a time of immense change in the world of disability: change
in how we think about disability, change in the nature of work, change
in the characteristics of persons applying for disability benefits, and
change in our thinking about the role of the federal government in
assisting some of our most vulnerable citizens.
The subject of this conference is causes and implications of growth
in the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) disability programs. This presentation argues
that it is not just change in the size of the programs that is, or should
be, at issue. In addition, it is change in the needs and demands of per
sons with disabilities and changes in the attitudes of society that must
cause us to consider some of the fundamental underpinnings of the fed
eral disability programs.
When we started this project in 1992, the Social Security Adminis
tration (SSA) was faced with the need to understand largely unantici
pated growth in the DI and SSI disability programs. Our focus on the
determinants of program growth was essential for many reasons,
including the need to effectively plan for adequate program financing,
adequate staffing to process workloads, and policy changes to meet the
needs of a changing beneficiary population. The primary concern was
whether the rapid increase in the application rate—and to a somewhat
lesser degree, in the award rate—would continue.
Thus, the research reported on in Part II of this volume was largely
driven by the policy needs of the government, especially SSA. In this
chapter we review the principal findings, then discuss their relevance to
policy issues.
NOTE- Ms. Upp died in 1996.
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REVIEW OF THE FINDINGS
The principal findings of the research conducted by Lewin-VHI as
well as by in-house staff at SSA and the Office of the Assistant Secre
tary for Planning and Evaluation are as follows:
• Application and award rates have peaked and now are in decline.
• Changes in the characteristics of those applying for and being
awarded benefits are leading to beneficiaries spending longer
times on the benefit rolls.
• The resultant decline in the termination rate may well be the most
important driver of program growth for the next two decades or
so.
More specific aspects of these findings are discussed below.
The Relationship between DI and SSI
This conference considers both the DI and SSI disability popula
tions. Usually, we have considered the programs separately, believing
that they serve quite different kinds of persons, one group insured for
DI benefits on the basis of significant work experience and the other
eligible for SSI because they do not have a significant attachment to the
labor force. Increasingly, these lines are becoming blurred. Our study
of growth in the DI program almost immediately became a study of
growth in both the DI and SSI programs, as it became apparent that the
major source of growth in the DI program was individuals applying
concurrently for DI and SSI. These concurrent applicants are persons
with enough work experience to become insured for DI benefits but
whose economic status is so poor that their income and resources are
below the means test limits for SSL Concurrent DI and SSI applicants
are now more than half of all DI applicants. Generally, the research
finds that factors influencing growth in one program are the same as
those that influence growth in the other, although they may differ in the
degree of influence that they exert.
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Applications and Awards
One fundamental question underlying the research effort was, are
the increases in applications and awards short- or long-term phenom
ena? The answer is both.
The research reported here, as well as actual experience, indicates
that applications and awards in both the DI and SSI programs have lev
eled off. There were fewer DI applications in 1995 than in 1994, and
fewer SSI applications in 1994 than in 1993. Final awards (awards
after all appeals are heard) have leveled off in both programs. Declines
in awards at the initial level have somewhat offset continuing increases
at the appeal/hearings level.
Short-Term Factors
One important cyclical source of growth—more so for the DI than
the SSI program—was the poor economic conditions that prevailed in
the early 1990s. In a bad job market, some who meet the programs'
strict definition of disability and otherwise would have worked may
apply for benefits. Lewin found that about one-fifth of the increase in
DI applications and about a tenth of the increase in SSI applications
from 1988 through 1992 seemed to have been influenced by increased
unemployment.
Relatively short-term fluctuations in public awareness of the DI and
SSI programs and perceptions about whether program rules are being
strictly or less strictly enforced also influence program growth. It is
generally believed that the programs were administered relatively
strictly in the early 1980s. The administration, the courts, and the Con
gress all responded in the mid 1980s by making it easier to get on the
rolls and harder to put beneficiaries off the rolls. These attitudes seem
to have prevailed until fairly recently.
Another factor at work has been state efforts to shift beneficiaries
from state to federally financed programs. Lewin found that cuts in
state welfare programs (general assistance) in seven states and the Dis
trict of Columbia contributed significantly to the increase in both SSI
applications, including Dl-concurrent applications. 1 The incentives for
states to shift persons from their rolls to SSI so that the beneficiaries
will become eligible for Medicaid would be significantly diminished
by funding Medicaid through block grants to the states. However,
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funding other programs, such as AFDC, as block grants would increase
incentives to shift beneficiaries to programs, such as SSI, that are more
directly funded by the federal government.
Longer-Term Factors
Lewin found that the aging of the baby boomers was contributing
significantly to long-term growth in application and awards for both
programs. 2 This source of growth can be expected to continue for at
least two decades for the DI program, until the boomers approach age
65, and even longer for the SSI disability program. 3
Another long-term source of growth in the number of applications
for DI is the increased work experience of women and the accompany
ing increase in their likelihood of being insured for benefits. This factor
has the opposite effect on the SSI program, however: as more women
become insured for DI benefits, fewer apply only for SSI benefits.
New eligibility criteria for benefits on the basis of mental and painrelated impairments also appear to be a continuing source of applica
tion and award rate growth.4
An increase seems to be continuing in applicants' appeals of denied
applications and in award rates at the appeals level. Appeals and
award rates clearly influence each other, and high appellate award rates
encourage more applications.
Finally, Lewin found that a decline in family support contributed to
application growth in both the DI and SSI programs. Lewin used a
proxy measure to capture this effect—the increase in the number of
single-parent families. Again, this trend does not appear to be turning
around.
Terminations

The other main driver of program growth is duration on the rolls, or
termination rates. Work done by our Office of Disability and by Rupp
and Scott (Chapter 4) shows that duration is up and that termination
rates are down. These changes, in turn, are being driven in large part by
the changing characteristics of those who are now applying for and
being newly awarded benefits.
First, they are younger. More than half of persons newly awarded DI
benefits are younger than 50, and almost two-thirds of those awarded
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SSI benefits are younger than 50. Second, they are increasingly likely
to suffer from lingering impairments, such as mental and musculoskeletal disorders. Awards to persons with mental disorders increased by
80 percent between the 1988 and 1992 DI applicant cohorts, compared
with an overall increase of 48 percent in awards. The comparable
increase in SSI awards was 81 percent, compared to an overall increase
of 65 percent. Meanwhile, the share with heart disease and cancer
declined dramatically in both programs.
These interrelated changes—in the age distribution and impairment
mix of beneficiaries—mean beneficiaries are staying on the rolls
longer because they are less likely to recover, and in the case of DI,
they also are less likely to convert to old-age benefits. Thus, it is
increasingly clear that fundamental, long-run program growth will be
driven not by ever-increasing application and allowance rates, but
rather by the changing characteristics of our beneficiaries. These
changes in the characteristics of our beneficiaries are not news. But to
some of us, at least, their importance is just beginning to be fully
understood.

POLICY ISSUES
The questions raised in this section stem from concerns about the
change in the characteristics of our beneficiaries, the effect of this
change on program growth, and the effect of our program on the bene
ficiaries.
Definition of Disability
What do we define as disability? For both the DI and SSI programs,
the Social Security Act defines disability as inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment, that can be expected to result in death,
or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of
not less than twelve months.
SSA is being challenged to rethink this definition of disability for
several reasons. First, under the Americans with Disabilities Act
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(ADA), as Martynas Yeas (1995, p. 55) put it in a recent paper, people
are not either disabled or not disabled. Rather, they are at different
points along a continuum of needing accommodation and assistance in
order to work.
Second, many with impairments that meet our definition neverthe
less work, while others similarly impaired do not. So do our listings
really distinguish between those who can and cannot work? Or do they
distinguish between those who are expected to work and those who are
not? Many blind persons work, for example, but blind persons are
automatically presumed to be disabled under our rules. While in fact
some blind persons can do some kinds of work, our rules are based on
a presumption that a blind person should not have to work and that
there is a public responsibility to that person.
Third, the creators of the disability program had in mind, for the
most part, those with acute illnesses, such as heart disease or cancer.
Especially when we think of the DI program, we think of older persons
with a steady attachment to the labor force who are struck down with
potentially terminal disorders. But, thanks to enormous strides in med
ical technology, some diseases—many kinds of heart problems, for
example—are survivable that used not to be. So even persons with
these kinds of illnesses are living and receiving benefits longer. As we
have said, the increases in our rolls are coming from those who are
younger and/or those who suffer from mental disorders and back prob
lems. Persons with these impairments are not expected to die as a
result, but improvement often is either not expected or difficult to mea
sure. So these beneficiaries are receiving benefits longer.
If we are going to revisit our definition of disability, what should be
our new criteria? SSA has been exploring criteria that reflect ability to
function in the workplace, but our experience so far suggests that this
may be difficult to implement in a way that can be codified and admin
istered as objective national standards and in a way that society will
find acceptable.

The Federal Role
Having raised and not attempted to answer the difficult question of
defining disability, we move to a second: What should be the federal
role be in providing for persons with disabilities? Should we worry less
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about a one-size-fits-all definition and more about different types of
interventions for different types of persons?
For a long time we have grappled with the belief that our programs
should 1) provide income support until recovery or death for those who
cannot work and 2) encourage return to work for those who have the
potential to work. As more beneficiaries are young or suffer from
chronic impairments, concerns mount about the role of DI and SSI dis
ability benefits in encouraging a lifetime dependency on public income
support.
• Is this fair to the person with a disability? Is it in their best inter
est?
• Is this a desirable public policy outcome?
• With regard to the DI program, what is the appropriate role of a
social insurance program?
Moreover, SSA is an agency with its roots in providing long-term
income support for retirees. Its primary function has been to get the
right check to the right person at the right time. We do not have much
experience or expertise in facilitating self-sufficiency.
As we grapple with strategies to encourage employment, we have to
consider a number of issues. One of the most difficult of these is how
to develop standards that can be applied nationally to determine what
type of intervention is best for whom. This is especially difficult when
the differences among persons with a given kind of impairment are at
least as great as the differences among persons with different kinds of
impairments.
There is no question that many people with disabilities strongly
want to work. And society expects those who can support themselves
to do so. But in providing work opportunities, we must 1) not put any
one at risk of losing life-sustaining support, such as medical benefits,
and 2) take account of the fact that many of our beneficiaries are poorly
educated, have few work skills, and have had, at best, a fragile attach
ment to the workforce.
A number of options to change the federal role have been proposed.
These include time-limited benefits; providing only services, but no
cash; and offering partial benefits. Each of these approaches has some
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advantages over our present system, but each presents some issues, as
well. For example,
• What happens when the time limits are up and the person is not
self-sufficient? What are the criteria for deciding whether benefits
should continue? And, what is the alternative to benefits for those
for whom benefits are the last resort?
• Is it fair to limit any category of persons with a disability to ser
vices only and no cash support? Being disabled costs money, not
only in terms of forgone earnings, but also in terms of the need to
buy ongoing support for daily life.
• What might be the criteria for partial benefits? How do we define
partial? Could a change from the current definition toward some
standard for partial benefits be equitably and uniformly adminis
tered?
• What is the appropriate federal role, if any, for those who meet
our definition of disability but who nevertheless work and have
significant impairment-related work expenses?
Subsequent chapters in this volume address these and other issues.
They are immensely challenging and complex issues.
It is tempting, on the one hand, to think that all is well and to resist
change in the disability programs now that application and award
growth have slowed, to think that the disability programs no longer
present an issue. It is equally tempting to regard growth as bad, to
assume that something is wrong if the programs are increasing in size
and cost. Neither is the case.
As we consider the DI and SSI disability programs, we must keep in
mind what it is that is driving fundamental, long-term growth: the
changes in the nature of disability and of persons being awarded bene
fits, and the resultant increases in duration on the rolls and declines in
termination rates.
We must, of course, be certain that elements over which SSA has
some influence are not driving application and award growth out of
control. We must be certain that we have adequately financed the dis
ability programs. We must make sure that we take appropriate adminis
trative steps to ensure that only those who continue to be eligible stay
on the rolls.
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But most important, we must be certain that our programs continue
to serve the best interests of persons with disabilities and the best inter
ests of society.

Notes
1.
2.

3.

4.

Research conducted under the Lewin-VHI contract has been summarized in
Chapters 2 and 8.
Application rates are defined as the percent of applications based, in the case of
DI, on those insured for disability benefits and, in the case of SSI, on those in the
population covered by the SSI program Award rates have been variously defined;
the term here is used to mean awards in any year as a percent of applications in a
given year.
Technically, in the DI program, an applicant may be disabled before age 65, but
becomes retired at age 65 or older. This is because benefits stop being paid from
the DI trust fund and start being paid from the separate Old-Age and Survivors'
Insurance trust fund for beneficiaries at age 65. No such distinction is made in the
SSI program.
The same medical eligibility criteria are used for the DI and the SSI programs.
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The View from the Trenches

The View from SSA's
Philadelphia Regional Office
Larry Massanari
Social Security Administration

Although this chapter is entitled, "The View From the Trenches," I
would challenge the premise that the authors of this chapter are really
the ones working in the trenches. Whatever the case, each of us is a
practitioner and is responsible for managing a portion of the disability
process.
The commentaries we provide are a departure from the formal
research papers that make up Chapters 2 through 8. The discussions
here are more intuitive and more anecdotal, and perhaps more subjec
tive and speculative than analytical; and I think it is safe to say that
they are based less on hard objective data than on our impressions,
observations, and opinions. We very much appreciate and are very
much impressed by the work that is presented in the earlier chapters.
The analyses have certainly added to our understanding of the causal
relationships between those factors that most of us had assumed were
generating the dramatic increase in our claims. By and large, the find
ings reflect our own experience, particularly those findings that relate
to application growth.
While the results are very useful in the aggregate, we do need to be
cautious in applying generalized conclusions to specific sections of the
country, and even in assuming that state-level findings are applicable to
every area of a particular state. We have seen widely diverse patterns of
application growth, and our experience suggests that the reasons for
growth vary greatly, not only among states but among counties as well.
My comments are based on observations and experience in the fivestate Philadelphia region. Application growth in the mid Atlantic states
for the past seven years has generally been consistent with national pat
terns. The overall rate of growth in this region was a few percentage
points ahead of the national average in five of those seven years. We
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have seen very little, if any, increase in Social Security Disability
Insurance (Dl)-only receipts. At the other extreme, Supplemental
Security Income (SSI)-only cases have increased by a full 102 percent
and concurrent claims by 73 percent over that seven-year period.
As you would expect, application growth has been uneven across
our five states, ranging from a 34 percent increase in West Virginia to a
64 percent increase in Maryland. The most significant growth has been
in Maryland and Virginia. Since 1988, concurrent and SSI-only claims
in both of those states have increased by well over 100 percent. Our
experience in the Philadelphia region so far in fiscal 1995 would sug
gest that the rapid growth in initial claims is not yet over. During the
first eight months of this fiscal year, our claims receipts were running
13 percent higher than during the same period one year ago. That's five
times greater than the national average and more than double the
growth in any of the other nine regions. The sharp rise in initial deter
minations this year is largely the result of a 22 percent increase in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. That increase is being driven by sig
nificant cuts in the Commonwealth's general assistance program.
In describing the demographics of recent disability applicants, front
line employees tell me that applicants today are more likely to be
younger, even younger than the baby boom cohort. They are more
likely to be women, and they are more likely to allege a mental or
stress-related impairment than at any time in the past. Particularly in
the large metropolitan areas in the region, applications for AIDS, HIV
infection and Drug Addiction and Alcoholism (DA&A)-related impair
ments are increasing. Employees are beginning to see the second and
third generation of adults from the same household filing for SSI bene
fits. As a growing number of applicants come to accept SSI as a legiti
mate and permanent source of income—as a legitimate and permanent
way of life—we fear that we may be creating a cycle of dependency
that families are going to find more and more difficult to escape.
As in other parts of the country, the business cycle has clearly influ
enced receipt patterns in this region. The impact of the 1990-1991
recession was very apparent, particularly in highly industrialized areas
of the region. However, we are beginning to wonder if longer-term
structural changes in the economy have not had an equally significant
impact on certain parts of this region. We also wonder whether the wid
ening gap between low- and high-income families has had and will
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continue to have a significant effect on program growth. The general
economic decline in some parts of this region as well as industrial
restructuring have resulted in the elimination of many jobs that in the
past have been held by unskilled workers. In our region, job loss has
been concentrated in heavy manufacturing, in mining, and in the con
struction industry. Increased automation and technology have reduced
the demand for unskilled and semiskilled labor. Consequently, large
numbers of people have simply removed themselves from the labor
market because they don't have the education or the skills to compete.
Last week, a 65-year old coal miner filed a retirement application in
our office in Clarksburg, West Virginia. He had made well over
$50,000 per year, he had lived a good life, and he was now ready to
retire. But according to the claims representative who took his applica
tion, the man was probably functionally illiterate. He had a very diffi
cult time understanding the most simple explanation or instruction.
Similar situations are arising throughout the region. Today, with indus
tries such as coal mining and glass manufacturing beginning to close, it
is doubtful whether that same person entering the labor market today
could earn more than minimum wage. These individuals might well
end up poor, underemployed, perhaps being paid cash "under the
table," and filing for SSI on the basis of a developmental disability. In
many parts of the region, this is becoming a common applicant profile.
These are people who, out of frustration, are dropping out of the labor
market and are no longer seeking a job. Sadly, they have no alternative
but to turn to us for financial support. These individuals, of course, are
not reflected in any of our unemployment statistics.
In the Philadelphia region, cost-shifting actions by state and local
governments have been, and I think will continue to be, a major con
tributor to increased claims receipts. All of our states require, or cer
tainly strongly encourage, applicants to their assistance programs to
also file with us. Many local welfare offices continue to refer people to
social security (SSA) who are obviously not disabled. Yet, these offices
still insist that SSA provide a formal denial.
Two of our states, Pennsylvania and Maryland, operate well-orga
nized and highly effective referral programs. They are aimed at shifting
disabled persons from state-funded programs to SSI. For instance,
Maryland began contracting with a private company back in the late
1980s to carry out its referral function. The contractor screens, refers,
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and represents applicants in an effort to get them on the federal rolls.
The contractor is also paid a fee for each welfare recipient who is ulti
mately placed on SSI or DI rolls. The Maryland program, and a similar
program in Pennsylvania, have been highly successful from our per
spective in SSA, as well as from theirs. They have been successful
because the states' and the contractors' employees are well trained, and
they have a very solid understanding of our program. They are also
plugged into SSA's service delivery network, which enhances the pro
cessing of these referrals and subsequent shift to our rolls.
Our claims workloads, as you would expect, have surged following
the introduction of state welfare reform initiatives. Those initiatives
have, of course, all been aimed at reducing state expenditures. Both the
Commonwealth of Virginia and the District of Columbia tightened up
their General Assistance (GA) programs back in 1991, driving a large
number of applicants into our offices. Since that time, the District has
removed over 40 percent of their eligibles from their GA rolls. Penn
sylvania, in 1994, introduced major changes in its GA program affect
ing a significant number of chronically and transitionally needy
persons. That action has had an enormous impact on new SSI applica
tions in the State of Pennsylvania.
The state of Maryland eliminated its GA cash benefit program for
disabled persons this month. Effective July 1995, they dropped 22,000
disabled persons from their cash benefit rolls. That cash benefit will
now be replaced by a much more modest provision for special services.
Needless to say, we expect the action by Maryland to have a sizable
effect on new SSI applications in that state. As several state workers
have said in Maryland, SSI is now "the only game in town," and so we
are expecting large numbers of applicants to come into our offices in
the coming months.
We think it is likely that Virginia also may eliminate its General
Assistance program, except for emergency assistance, during their next
legislative session. They nearly did so this year. Considering our expe
rience with the reduction of state GA programs and what has happened
to claims intake in our offices, I can't help but believe that the welfare
reform proposals that are currently being debated in the Congress will
have an enormous impact on social security offices. If limits of any
kind are imposed upon Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) benefits, I think we can expect many former recipients to
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begin filing for SSL I agree with the conclusions reached by the
authors of Chapters 2 and 8 with respect to the welfare reform initia
tives. I think, too, that their conclusions with respect to block granting,
AFDC, or Medicaid are also right on target.
Finally, just a brief comment on our SSI outreach activities in the
Philadelphia region. Our local field offices, like field offices across the
country, conducted very aggressive outreach programs back in the late
1980s and early 1990s. We worked in close cooperation with private
agencies, community organizations, and service providers to increase
program understanding, to train their employees, and to target potential
eligibles. Despite a high level of commitment and an equally high level
of activity, neither these internally managed initiatives nor the work of
outreach grantees has, in my judgment, had an appreciable affect on
application growth. While we would see sudden spurts of claims fol
lowing major outreach events or outreach activities, our impression is
that most of those new applicants would have eventually filed for SSI
at some future stage anyway. So, at most, my suspicion is that our out
reach efforts got people to file somewhat earlier than they would have
otherwise. Frankly, I am inclined to believe, as are many of my staff,
that the expanded involvement of advocates, the legal aid community,
and even private attorneys has done more to influence program growth
than our own agency-sponsored initiatives.

The View from SSA's Concord,
New Hampshire, District Office
Celeste Hemingson
Social Security Administration

The Concord, New Hampshire, field office certainly experienced the
same expansion that is being reported elsewhere, but in our case, the
growth continued into 1995. Although the increases tapered off in
1993. we had a 17 percent increase in disability claims receipts in
1994. and so far the intake in 1995 is as least as high as in 1994. The
same thing has been happening throughout New Hampshire. The 1994
phenomenon is puzzling to me. Although I could partially explain it by
some changes in state welfare department policies that I will describe
later, those changes would normally account for an increase in SSI
claims. The biggest growth we experienced in fiscal year 1994 was
actually in Title II claims.
I present only one other piece of quantifiable information in this
chapter, and that is a description of a disability outreach project that I
did. I think this example provides a useful illustration of outreach
projects, and I'm particularly proud of this one because it was very cost
effective.
In 1991,1 made a deal with the director of the State Department of
Special Education to deliver fliers I had printed up to the parents of
severely disabled children. The flier described basic entitlement
requirements and included a tear-off coupon parents could mail in if
they thought their child might qualify. We gave New Hampshire's
Department of Special Education 8,000 flyers, which they distributed
to teachers. We received thirty-eight replies, fourteen of which resulted
in allowances.
The other types of outreach activities we do in district offices are not
quantifiable. They are generally aimed at advocacy groups and others
with whom disabled people come into contact and they're designed to
enable the disabled to access our programs more easily. Several of the
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studies in this volume indicate that SSI and social security disability
are difficult programs to access and that this might be why some poten
tial beneficiaries would rather stay on General Assistance than apply
for our benefits. If that's true, then perhaps our work with these groups
may have broken down that barrier and paid off in additional claims.
We train workers in homeless shelters on who to refer to us; we set
up telephone links for filing claims; we train veterans' service organi
zations such as the VFW on who to refer to us and what types of evi
dence we need. That's the type of outreach we do.
Outreach is always a form of publicity, but publicity, even if it's
unwanted, will increase the application rate. I will describe the role of
publicity in disability claims growth.
In 1968, my job was to place information about social security on
nationwide radio and television networks. It was a tough sell. Public
affairs directors believed that carrying information about elderly or dis
abled people would undermine the young image stations were eager to
project. My-biggest—in fact my only—success on that job was to place
on a network radio feed a series of vignettes about sports figures who
had obtained disability benefits. I used to think that if I could only
make our program seem controversial, I could get some air time. Luck
ily my bosses didn't go for the idea.
They didn't have to. Ever since the controversy hit the press about
our payment of benefits to drug addicts and alcoholics, we've been get
ting calls from people identifying themselves as drug addicts or alco
holics, asking for benefits.
Word of mouth is also an important factor that encourages applica
tions for disability benefits. We have found that increasing the supply
of awards increases the demand for awards. Many of those who apply
for benefits say they're doing so because a relative or a neighbor was
allowed, and they're sure they're just as disabled as he is. Many tell us
they understand they'll have to apply three times before they're
allowed.
I would like to turn to some changes in state and local welfare prac
tice that have impacted us in New Hampshire. Here the changes have
not been an instance of cost-shifting. I think for us cost-shifting is yet
to come. In our case what happened is an indication of how Medicaid
is a driver of SSI claims. Under a New Hampshire state law which
went in to effect on December 1, 1993, the state was required to use the
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Social Security Administration's definition of disability in determining
Medicaid and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (a state pro
gram) entitlement. (New Hampshire is a 209B state, which means it
makes its own determination about Medicaid entitlement). In the inter
est of efficiency, the state decided to use our actual disability decision
instead of making a separate decision on their own. As a result, we
quickly heard from applicants who told us they had to apply with us
before the state would take their Medicaid application. Others said they
were required to file with us within twenty days of filing for Medicaid.
Although the state had always required Medicaid applicants to file for
social security or SSI, there was now more follow-through in making
those applications happen.
Another change we've noticed is more applicants being referred
from their town welfare directors. (General Assistance in New Hamp
shire is paid for from town budgets and is administered by individuals
elected to a post often titled "overseer of the poor.") We also see more
towns requiring interim assistance agreements from applicants. We
believe these increases are because town budgets are becoming
increasingly stressed by the downturn in the economy.
We do notice that unemployment influences "demand for awards."
We continue to see more people filing because they can't find work.
Many tell us they can work but just can't get work. We also get more
disability claims from 62-year-old workers who are also filing for
retirement benefits. Our assumption is that the economy as much as
disability is causing these workers to retire early.
These facts are surprising, because the unemployment rate in the
Concord area is only 2.8 percent. However, this brings up a point we
should all consider: most of the new jobs in New Hampshire are in
retail sales and services, not jobs that pay enough to present a mean
ingful alternative to disability benefits. Many of the available jobs are
the type that Richard Frank described (see the discussion following
Chapter 2), which are limited in hours just enough so that the employer
will not have to provide benefits. These are not jobs that are a meaning
ful alternative to disability benefits.
Another cause of disability applications is not directly related to
current unemployment. It's what I categorize as economic deprivation.
People contact us because they no longer have other resources to fall
back on. Two signs of this are the increased inquiries we get from those
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with short-term disabilities and those who are still working, but who
have been advised by their doctors to stop working. These are workers
who have no savings and no benefits to cover the period of time during
which no social security or Supplementary Security Income (SSI) is
available.
There have also been some changes in the world of work that cause
people to apply for Social Security Disability Insurance (DI). This is
the other side of the coin. More employers are requiring a disability
claim before a company's private insurance policy will pay.
Recent trends to hire those with developmental disabilities have
resulted in more and more SSI and disabled child beneficiaries becom
ing insured on their own. Gina Livermore and her colleagues found
that growth in the Mental Retardation category was greater than for
any other category in Dl-only and Dl-concurrent applications (Chapter
8). An advocate told me last week that she counsels disabled teens in
school-to-work programs to apply for SSI in order to lock in Medicaid
entitlement through the 1619 program. Once again, Medicaid drives
SSI claims.
In summary, and this is particularly directed to those who don't
work for social security, an article of faith for social security employ
ees is that our programs provide a safety net. One of the things we say
when we talk about retirement benefits is that you can depend on social
security even when you can't depend on anything else. Our protection
is portable, it's inflation-proof, and it's not vulnerable to stock market
downturns. These facts also apply to the disability program, but in
addition there are some other relevant facts: we're there when other
income maintenance programs drop out of the picture. States, towns,
and employers are relying on social security to pick up the slack when
they can't do it. We are increasingly becoming the program of last
resort.

The View from Michigan's Office
of Disability Determination
Charles Jones
Michigan Family Independence Agency

I am going to be wearing two hats since I come from one trench as a
Disability Determination Service (DDS) administrator, and I am now
in another trench with respect to the disability process redesign. So I
am going to be talking with you from both of those perspectives. What
I want to do, though, is to describe to you a cartoon that I saw in Los
Angeles earlier this year because it really put a lot of things into per
spective for me that I had sort of been thinking about relative to social
policy and how we tend to approach it in this country. The cartoon was
a scene from Washington, D.C., and there was a well-dressed man who
was walking down the street. Behind him you could see the Capitol
dome and the Washington Monument in the background and in front of
this man was an open manhole and there was a hand sticking out of the
manhole and a voice was saying, "Help me out!" Well, as the man
approached the manhole he reached into his pocket and pulled out
some money and stood as far away from the hand as he possibly could
and gave this hand some money. In the next scene the man was walking
on past the manhole and the person was still saying, "Help me out!"
When the man was past the manhole, the hand and the person were still
down in the manhole. I think that is very descriptive in terms of how
we tend to approach social policy in this country. We tend to think that
we are helping people out of the hole, but once we do whatever it is
that we do with them in whatever arena, most people are still stuck in
that hole.
Yesterday, I heard a lot of very good things in terms of reasons why
there is program growth, and I agreed with most of what I heard. In
terms of being from the trench in DDS in Michigan, I didn't hear any
thing that was new. It was not surprising that when the economy gets
bad, people file for disability. It was not surprising that when govern-
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ments become economically strapped, they cost-shift. It was not sur
prising that when we change the program to make it more attractive for
people to receive disability benefits, they apply in greater numbers.
And it was no surprise that, as Celeste Hemingson indicated, when we
advertise, there is a growth in the number of applications. What I was a
little bit surprised about yesterday was that there was no discussion
regarding what it is that we are going to do with all of this valuable
research and all of this valuable information. Are we going to use it to
anticipate future workloads? Hopefully, that would allow us to better
react to them. Or, are we going to use it to prevent future work loads?
Probably, the information is going to be used in both ways, but not in
the context of any overall social policy.
In terms of the view from the trench, in the Michigan DDS trench
we always had this picture of a giant pendulum out there and this pen
dulum would swing from left to right, left to right, over the years. I
don't mean that necessarily to signify any political spectrum, but it
does swing, and we never seemed to get that pendulum right in the
middle where it would do the most good. We saw the pendulum swing
ing in the early 1980s with the Continuing Disability Review (CDR)
debacle, where a decision was made that we need to get people off the
roles because in fact there were, and still are, people on the disability
rolls who should no longer be there. But there was no discussion, there
was no thought of why they got there, who they were, and more impor
tant, what we were going to do with them once we got them off the
rolls. The result was a knee-jerk reaction where we kicked a lot of peo
ple off the rolls and another knee-jerk reaction when we wound up put
ting them back on at the hearing level. Now we just have all these
people on the rolls and everybody is screaming that we've got to get
them off. We also saw the Zebley decision, which I personally thought
was a good decision, but which resulted in putting a lot of kids on the
rolls. We didn't have any thought or discussion regarding that aspect of
program growth and what we wanted to accomplish with these kids.
What did we want them to do once they got on the rolls? Again, this
knee-jerk reaction. Now we have another knee-jerk reaction that is
going to swing the pendulum in the other direction, probably take a lot
of kids off the rolls, or prevent them from getting on the rolls—kids
who should be getting disability. And yet there is no discussion about
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what's the best thing for the kids or what objectives we want for the
kids.
We saw in Michigan these knee-jerk reactions with respect to costshifting, and I was a part of that. We were very successful and very
good at what we did. We saved a lot of money for the state, we got a lot
of people onto SSI, and hopefully people benefited from the money
that they got and from the medical care they received. But in Michigan,
we had no discussions of return-to-work, we had no discussions of
whether or not we were actually helping people with disabilities meet
their needs on a daily basis to help them live, and we had no discus
sions about what we expected in terms of educational outcomes for
children. We just had a very successful cost-shifting effort. I am hope
ful that we did help some people in the interim, but again all of this was
done without any specific objectives for us to head toward. These kneejerk reactions we have are temporary solutions that two or three or five
years from now we spend millions of dollars trying to correct.
Now, the program growth discussion, in my opinion, has to be com
bined with a larger discussion in our country on a comprehensive pub
lic policy of what disability programs should achieve. We have a lot of
excellent efforts that are going on right now that are looking at various
aspects of the disability program or disability in general. We have the
National Academy of Social Insurance Disability Panel, we have the
Childhood Commission, there are a lot of congressional efforts going
on, there is proposed legislation that will have even new committees
and new groups looking at the area of disability, and of course we have
internal efforts within Social Security Administration. I know that in
the private sector, private insurers are also struggling with this issue.
All of these efforts are very good, but all of them really need to be done
after a national decision is made about what it is we want to achieve
with disability policy. That way, all of our efforts, whether we are talk
ing about disability redesign, whether we are talking about doing more
CDRs, whether we are talking about program growth or childhood dis
ability, will all be working toward the same end and for the same
objective and hopefully for the betterment of everyone. Again, my
view from the trench, if I were still in the Michigan DDS, is that the
pendulum is still swinging and that five years from now we are going
to be spending millions of dollars and hundreds of work-years trying to
correct whatever problems we are correcting today.
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Now the people in the trenches don't have time to ponder why appli
cations have grown. In Michigan, when our caseloads were going up,
we didn't have time to think about what the reasons were. The issue
was how were we going to handle it, and how were we going to do it
with inadequate resources? The view from the trenches was also what
mess am I going to get blamed for and how am I going to clean it up,
because the policymakers were, once again, overreacting. One facet of
addressing program growth is to improve the process, and the other
trench that I am in is intended to try to do that. The disability process
redesign is not a panacea for the disability program; we need to decide
where we are headed with disability. But I think there are some fea
tures in the redesign that will help in this area of program growth. One
of them is our comprehensive public relations program, which is really
focused not on a "come on down and file" kind of a message, but on a
message that will give our customers better information and more real
istic information about the process. It is also focused on providing third
parties with information they need to get the information we need. We
want to couple that comprehensive public relations campaign with
working with and expanding the use of third parties.
Our experience in Michigan was very successful with this, and
despite the fact that we doubled the number of SSI applications and the
rolls increased because of a tremendous amount of advocacy and out
reach, the fact of the matter is that our application growth could have
been much greater had we not gone out and worked with other state
departments, advocates, and others who were helping people to file.
What we were able to do to was to prevent a lot of frivolous applica
tions from being filed, because the initial reaction of the Michigan
Department of Social Services to cutting off General Assistance was
going to be to tell all 83,000 to go file for social security disability. So
there are some benefits to having a very focused, a very tailored public
relations process that would get you "good claims." When I say "good
claims," I am not necessarily meaning to differentiate between good
claims and bad claims, but we have a very high allowance rates on our
SSI efforts in Michigan. There were a lot of reasons for that—prima
rily because we did go out and work with other people to focus on
those applicants who were most likely to be disabled—that saved
everybody time and money, and we think it was beneficial to the cus
tomers we were trying to serve.
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Another thing we are trying to do with the disability redesign is to
unify the process so the cases that should be allowed will be allowed as
early in the process as possible. We need to restore a sense of fairness
to the program and to eliminate the tremendous growth at the hearing
level. One observation that I do have about yesterday was that all the
discussion of growth focused on initial applications and not on recons
and hearings. I think this is also a very significant issue that needs to be
dealt with.
There are some other features in the disability process redesign that
I hope to be able to return and discuss with you in the future, but I
really do want to leave you with this thought: what is needed is a com
prehensive public policy debate and decisions regarding the goals that
we as a society want to achieve in assisting persons with disabilities.
Until that takes place, the vast majority of people who apply for dis
ability benefits, no matter what we do, are going to continue to remain
in that hole. And I am hopeful that through a lot of discussion and mak
ing some decisions about where we want to go, the next time we
approach a hole and someone is reaching out to us saying "Help me
out," that when we are past that hole we leave with that person travel
ing beside us and not still left in the hole.

11
Policy Responses
to Program Growth

The Perspective of a Public Trustee
Stanford G. Ross
Arnold & Porter
Washington, D.C.

I begin by describing in a very brief fashion how the policymaking
institutions are working today and, in particular, how this discussion
fits into that setting. Focusing attention on institutional issues can help
us to be more practical in our consideration of policy responses.
I served as a Public Trustee of the Disability Insurance Trust Fund
from 1990 to 1995. As shown in Figure 11.1, the Public Trustees serve
with the ex-officio Trustees (the Secretaries of the Treasury, Labor, and
Health and Human Services) on the governing board of the Social
Security Trust Funds and have an important oversight role in the man
agement of the system. In that regard, I have a certain sense of respon
sibility for the Lewin-VHI work product that is being discussed at this
conference. Also, from that vantage point, I offer some thoughts about
what should be done with the important information produced by that
study.
When the rapid expansion in applications and awards took place in
the early 1990s, the Trustees were called upon to issue a "Section 709
letter" to the Congress in April of 1992 informing them that the
reserves were projected to fall below 20 percent. This was the first time
that this alarm bell was set off since this provision was enacted in 1983
in response to the concern that there should be some institutionalized
early warning signals given to the Congress when trust funds were
approaching insolvency.
Then, when the proposal for reallocation from the Old-Age and Sur
vivors Insurance Trust Fund to the Disability Insurance Trust Fund was
made in late 1992, my co-Public Trustee and I refused to approve
unless a research agenda was pledged by the ex-officio Trustees, who
were then members of the Bush administration. We felt strongly that
the short-term palliative of a reallocation should not take place without
providing for the Congress and the public to gain information that

319

320

Ross
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would permit a more fundamental look at the program and hopefully
lead to some reform efforts.
In April of 1993, with new ex-officio Trustees from the Clinton
administration, we again had the commitment to a research agenda
renewed and took the position that the Section 709 letter should con
tinue to be issued until the conditions that called for it were corrected
by legislation. In other words, the Public Trustees provided continuity
in seeking a solution to the problem of the impending insolvency and
persisted in persuading the executive branch and the Congress to reach
a position where a substantive policy discussion would take place.
Legislative action to do the reallocation took place in 1994, some
what over two years after the Section 709 warning was issued. In fact,
it was very close to the last possible legislative moment, since funds

Growth in Disability Benefits

321

would have been unavailable to pay benefits sometime in mid 1995
without that action. As in 1983, there was procrastination, even on a
relatively noncontroversial way of acting to avert the crisis.
The combination of the 1994 reallocation and the delivery to Con
gress in 1995 of the study we are discussing sets the stage for the pos
sibility of a informed debate on the Social Security Disability
Insurance program and the companion Supplemental Security Income
program. I saw reallocation then, and I see it today, as providing time
and opportunity to address the substance of a program that is funda
mentally troubled and that clearly requires serious reconsideration. At
the same time, we must not lose sight of the great importance of the
social security programs to the social fabric of the nation and to the
many deserving people who rely upon them. The considerable achieve
ments of the Social Security Administration (SSA) over the years in
carrying out its responsibilities for administering the program must
also be acknowledged. As needed changes to the program are devel
oped, it is important that such changes be done in a careful and consid
ered manner.
A few basic points can provide perspective in considering the policy
aspects of the new study.
1. Looking across the entire spectrum of OECD countries, all
advanced industrialized countries have disability insurance pro
grams and all are more or less troubled. The United States is not
an isolated case and, indeed, its problems are not as severe as in
some other countries. I say this not to lower enthusiasm for
undertaking the necessary review and reform, but only to indicate
that we must keep a sense of perspective as we go about this task.
2. The problems of the disability program to date seem to go in
cycles, or, if not in cycles, at least in fits and starts. My first
hands-on experience with the program was as Commissioner of
Social Security in 1978 and 1979, when I worked on the legisla
tion that resulted in the disability reforms of 1980. That policy
reconsideration and legislative activity was produced as a result
of the unexpected expansion of the rolls in the mid 1970s. Then
as now, a rapid expansion was followed by a plateauing of the
applications and awards.
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3.1 believe that at least part of the reason for the fits and starts, if not
cycles, relates to administration of the program. This is not the
time or place to go into this subject in detail, but my conclusion
on this is that administration is as critical to the results of the pro
gram as the legal provisions. Unfortunately, the institutional
arrangements underlying the program are flawed and sometimes
unable to accomplish what the law requires or what any reform
laws are likely to require. This is not to say that all of the institu
tional arrangements are flawed, because indeed some work well.
But when the Disability Determination Services are allowing
some 30 percent of claims and administrative law judges allow 75
percent, basic issues of administration in both of these processes
are suggested. In short, unless the administration of the program
can be improved dramatically, no amount of informed policy
debate and reform legislation will truly be effective to meet the
challenges that this troubled program presents.
4. While the law is hard to change, the program in fact changes as
the society changes, but its shape today is not consistent with cur
rent thinking about such programs. When enacted in 1956, the
legal concepts were more a product of the 1930s than of the con
temporary society that then existed, much less the one we have
now. The Americans With Disability Act of 1990, which empha
sizes concepts of self-help and equal opportunity, is closer to cur
rent thinking. I recognized that anachronisms were present at
some level when I had hands-on responsibility in the late 1970s,
but the shift in underlying premises was just beginning to take
place at that time. A new paradigm is clearly present today and
needs to inform the policy debate and any reform legislation.
There are changes in the economy, new patterns of work, and
changes in the society that must be taken account of more fully
than has heretofore been the case.
5. Among the new directions that require greater consideration
today are employment strategies by which applicants for disabil
ity are given more help to return to work. Similarly, more effort
might be given to considering privatizing aspects of the process.
It is entirely possible that private contractors might do a better job
than government agencies at providing rehabilitation, training,
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and assistance with employment strategies. Recent experiences in
other areas such as workers' compensation, in which integrated
approaches to providing medical treatment, long-term health
care, rehabilitation, and return-to-work assistance, might well be
instructive. The SSA programs for too long have tended to be iso
lated from innovative changes that are taking place in the private
sector, and the use of privatization techniques might be a way to
better relate aspects of these governmental programs to those pri
vate sector developments.
6. Underlying much of the current debate is the question of whether
incremental changes can achieve a desired restructuring of the
program or whether more fundamental or radical change is
needed. I would submit that there is no reasonable alternative
here but to provide for all changes to be incremental, with ade
quate transition periods. It may be that far-reaching, "radical",
change is appropriate, but the way to achieve that goal is notthrough drastic, precipitous action, but by moving incrementally
in a measured and orderly way. We must constantly be aware of
the disruption that can be caused by sudden changes in policy for
which the affected people are not adequately prepared. Also,
administrative agencies such as SSA, even though well intentioned with many dedicated people, are inherently limited in their
ability to implement change. Political realism suggests that prob
lems of implementation be given careful consideration at the time
legislation is enacted and that the constraints imposed by the need
for effective and reasonable implementation be taken into
account in any reforms. There is a tension between more radical
proposals and the administrative capacity to make them feasible.
While there must be a presumption that needed new policies can
be effectively implemented, it also must be recognized that mak
ing changes may require that additional resources and adequate
time be provided to the agencies that are called upon to discharge
these responsibilities.
7. Bipartisan approaches are needed. We need to overcome the iner
tia of Washington lobbyists and others representing what they
think benefits their constituents, which is generally for maintain
ing as much of the status quo as possible. In our own limited area
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of responsibility, the two Public Trustees, by operating in a bipar
tisan, nonpolitical, professional way to stimulate research and
hopefully a substantive policy debate, show the benefits of this
approach.
Thus, I would urge that an open and candid discussion of alterna
tives is needed, and I hope we can all contribute to an atmosphere that
permits that today and in the many difficult days ahead as the process
towards reform continues.

Unsustainable Growth: Preserving
Disability Programs for
Americans with Disabilities
Andrew I. Batavia
Florida International University

The Social Security disability programs, which constitute the essen
tial safety net for people with disabilities in our country, are growing at
an unsustainable rate. If we are truly committed to meeting the needs
of people with disabilities, we must make the changes necessary to
ensure the long-term viability of these programs. I do not want my fol
lowing remarks to be misconstrued; while I have no commitment to the
status quo, I am deeply committed to developing well-designed dis
ability programs that provide income security while encouraging inde
pendence for people with disabilities.
I approach these issues from two different, but mutually reinforcing,
perspectives. First, I view them as a policymaker on Capitol Hill who is
responding to several national goals: to balance the budget and to get
the economy back on track, to make government run more efficiently,
and to assist people with disabilities to live productively and indepen
dently. Second, I look at them as a person with a disability, who was
once a recipient of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program,
NOTE: This chapter is based on comments delivered when the author was serving as
Legislative Assistant to Senator John McCain. Several significant program changes
have occurred since the time of that presentation, particularly with respect to the eligi
bility of legal aliens and proposals concerning treatment of children with disabilities.
The chapter should therefore be read not for current program content, but for concep
tual and historical insight into the programs from the perspective of a Senate aide who
has a disability and significant experience with the programs. Andrew Batavia is cur
rently associate professor at the School of Policy Management, College of Urban and
Public Affairs, Florida International University. The views expressed are solely those
of the author, and do not necessarily represent the positions of Senator McCain, or any
organization with which Mr. Batavia is or has been affiliated.
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and who has some serious concerns about the disability programs and
their effect on people with disabilities.

A POLICY PERSPECTIVE
From the perspective of a policymaker, the rapid rate of growth of
the disability programs in recent years is alarming. The number of
Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) beneficiaries alone increased
27 percent from 1989 to 1993, as compared with a 7 percent increase
in retired worker social security beneficiaries (DHHS 1994). Disability
benefit payments increased 51 percent over that period. Applications,
eligibility awards, and payments for the SSI program are also growing
dramatically.
Altogether, the federal government is currently spending about $70
billion each year for the social security disability programs, almost
twice as much as five years ago (Board of Trustees 1995; Committee
on Ways and Means 1994). If this upward trend continues, the pro
grams soon will be subject to increasing political scrutiny and criti
cism. Eventually, public support for them will dissipate. Because these
programs are so important, we must get them under control.
There has been a dramatic change over the past thirty years in the
way our society perceives people with disabilities (see articles by Ross
and by Weaver, this chapter). Previously, when an individual incurred a
permanent and significant disability, the general expectation was that
he or she would no longer be employable or even potentially employ
able. In recent years, as a result of the independent living movement,
improvements in assistive technology, and enhanced environmental
accessibility, there is an increased expectation that even people with
very substantial disabilities can work.
This social change is best evidenced by the enactment of the Ameri
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), the civil rights law that rep
resents a national consensus on the goals of our nation's disability
policy and the legitimate expectations for our citizens with disabilities.
Many of our disability laws that were established prior to 1990 are
inconsistent with the ADA's basic premise that people with disabilities
can be employable and must be given the opportunity to live full and
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productive lives. It is incumbent upon policy makers to ensure that all
disability policy is consistent with the premises and goals of the ADA
(DeJong and Batavia 1990).

A PERSONAL DISABILITY PERSPECTIVE
From my perspective as a person with a disability, I am concerned
about the "entitlement mentality" that the social security disability pro
grams impose on their recipients, particularly on young people with
disabilities. Beneficiaries, and even potential beneficiaries, are repeat
edly given the message that they have a right to benefits as long as they
can demonstrate an inability to work by virtue of a disability. Even
those raised with a strong work ethic begin to think about how they can
demonstrate their absolute inability to work. Once that mind set is
internalized, it is very difficult to alter.
To avoid this counterproductive self-fulfilling prophecy, people with
disabilities must be brought into the mainstream of the community as
soon as possible. This is why antidiscrimination laws such as the ADA
and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) are so
important. People with disabilities must obtain an expectation of
employability before they receive and accept the societal message that
they are "too disabled" ever to work.
In 1973, when my spinal cord was injured in an automobile accident
at the age of 16,1 was confronted with conflicting messages from the
people running our nation's disability programs. I was informed that,
because of the "severity" of my disability (C2-3 quadriplegia), I would
qualify for SSI and therefore be entitled to cash benefits and Medicaid
for the rest of my life. However, if I demonstrated the ability to earn a
small amount of money, I would be disqualified and all of these bene
fits would no longer be available to me. (This was before the various
work incentive provisions were enacted in the 1980s.)
I made a decision that was, in a sense, irrational. I decided to take a
great risk—to go to college, law school, and graduate school with the
support of vocational rehabilitation, and to thereby become employ
able notwithstanding my disability. To most Americans, this decision
may seem neither irrational nor risky. However, by doing so, I was
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potentially compromising tens of thousands of dollars of life-sustain
ing support for the rest of my life. Moreover, I was doing so without
any assurance that I would be able to earn comparable benefits through
employment. The likelihood of regaining eligibility once I had demon
strated the ability to work seemed remote.
I was fortunate. I have a supportive family and friends who encour
aged me to take that risk. I also had a vocational rehabilitation counse
lor named Joan Brown who believed in me and who provided advocacy
in obtaining the educational benefits I needed. Many people with dis
abilities do not have such supports. As evidenced by program statistics,
most make the low-risk decision to stay on the programs permanently.
Given the basic structure of the system, even with its current work
incentive provisions, this is not an irrational economic decision. Many
simply do not trust the government to allow them to regain their bene
fits once they have lost them.
This has convinced me that we need to alter the programs' structures
to create strong incentives for people with disabilities to seek gainful
employment and ultimately to leave the programs. I come to this con
clusion not because it will save the taxpayers money. In fact, it will
probably cost somewhat more in the short run to provide the opportu
nity for people with disabilities to work. I support structural reform of
the programs because it will improve the lives of people with disabili
ties by helping them to achieve their highest potentials.

THE STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS
The 104th Congress recently enacted major welfare reform. Inter
estingly, in a political climate in which almost all means-tested welfare
programs were being considered to be block granted to the states, the
disability programs have been largely exempt from the block-granting
debate. There appears to be a general consensus that these programs
are such an important part of the safety net that they should continue as
entitlements. However, that does not mean that they should maintain
their current structures and policies. The rapid growth of the disability
programs ensures that we will soon be engaged in a debate over what
changes should be made.
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The causes of the programs' growth is an extremely complex issue
and is not well understood (GAO 1994). Among the factors that appear
to affect the increase in program applications are economic conditions,
the policies of other social programs, state efforts encouraging people
to apply, and demographics (Stapleton et al., Chapter 2). However, all
of these factors interact with the policy structures of the disability pro
grams. There is a basic conflict between the fundamental premises of
these programs and the ADA. I believe that this incongruity explains
much of the reason that very few beneficiaries ever leave the disability
rolls.
The disability programs are based on an outdated premise equating
disability with unemployability. DI was initially structured as an early
retirement program, with the foundational notion that if a person had a
disability, he or she was basically unemployable; and there was there
fore no reason to expend substantial resources in a futile effort to get
the individual ready to work. In this stage of our history, we recognize
that this is simply not the case. There have been attempts over the years
to modify the programs' presumption of unemployability through the
various work incentive provisions. However, the programs still main
tain their self-defeating historical premise. Until we address this flaw,
we are not going to get beneficiaries to work.
Adults with Disabilities
The recent growth in the number of adults in the programs appears
to be largely a result of economic recessions and changes in state pub
lic assistance programs (Stapleton et al., Chapter 2). In addition, the
demographics of our aging population is expected to contribute signifi
cantly to future growth, as the large baby boom population becomes
more disabled and chronically ill.
While such factors have important implications and represent a
challenge to finite federal and state budgets, they should not be the pri
mary focus of program policy. Such growth could be constrained
through more restrictive eligibility criteria. However, to the extent that
this would disqualify individuals with significant disabilities that, at
least temporarily, preclude employment, it would ultimately increase
their vulnerability and interfere with their employment objectives. By
far, the more important policy considerations for addressing the growth
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of the adult beneficiary population are appropriate vocational rehabili
tation, education, and return to work.
Certainly, we should be developing better criteria and mechanisms
(e.g., functional assessment measures) to determine who should be eli
gible (Batavia 1992). The current eligibility system is based primarily
on a medical model of disability that equates impairment with the
inability to work. The Listing of Impairments used by the Social Secu
rity Administration (SSA) is a poor proxy for determining functional
deficits and inability to work. SSA's system of ongoing medical
reviews in which beneficiaries are categorized and reviewed periodi
cally according to expected medical improvement is also largely irrele
vant. Capacity to work is not necessarily associated with medical
condition or improvement in medical condition; the relationship is far
more complex, with the more important variables being functional
capacity and social (e.g., family) support.
Return to work is currently impeded by program policies that dis
courage beneficiary efforts to become rehabilitated and employed and
that do not encourage maintenance of any existing relationships with
former employers (Mashaw et al. 1996; Burkhauser and Haveman
1982). These policies range from the medical model definition of dis
ability (assuming a causal relationship between an impairment and the
ability to work), to a waiting period for eligibility that discourages
early rehabilitation, to a benefit structure that creates an enormous dis
incentive to work.
As suggested above, in response to a general consensus that these
disability programs impose substantial disincentives to work, several
laws were enacted by Congress in the 1980s to encourage SSI and DI
beneficiaries to seek gainful employment and leave the disability rolls
(NARF 1988). Yet, despite this legislation and indications that many
disability beneficiaries wish to work, few ever leave the programs vol
untarily (Muller 1989). In December 1993, only 35,299 of the 5.98
million disabled SSI recipients participated in the Section 1619 work
incentive program (DHHS 1994, Tables 7.F5 and 7.A3).
The unabated growth of the programs and the failure of the work
incentive provisions to curtail such growth have demonstrated that
incremental changes are not sufficient. We need substantial structural
reform to ensure the long-term viability of the disability programs. In
1991, when Susan Parker was Associate Commissioner for Disability
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of SSA and I was associate director of the White House Domestic Pol
icy Council in the Bush administration, we and our staffs developed a
proposal to fundamentally alter the premises of the disability pro
grams. It would maintain the entitlement status of the programs but
make them time-limited, thus creating a presumption and expectation
of employability (Batavia and Parker 1995).
Our proposal would create four categories of disability:
1. A Permanent Disability Pension, which would apply to individu
als with no capacity to work (e.g., people with severe brain
injury)
2. A Temporary Disability Benefit, which would apply to the vast
majority of beneficiaries, whose benefits would be limited to
three years but would be potentially expandable for education,
training, and other activities to become employable
3. An Early Retirement Benefit, which would allow people with dis
abilities 55 years of age and over to opt out of the job market and
accept early social security retirement
4. Provision Benefits, including personal assistance services, assistive technology, and training that would be provided to Tempo
rary Disability beneficiaries to become employable
In addition, the proposal includes several other provisions that are
geared to enhance administrative efficiency and encourage beneficia
ries to work. These include elimination of the current five-month wait
ing period for DI, expediting the paperwork, determining the
appropriate course of action through increased beneficiary and physi
cian responsibilities, using case management techniques to capitalize
on the beneficiary's functional capacity and relationship with former
employers, creating positive incentives to work, and establishing a con
tract between the SSA and the beneficiary in which both would have
responsibility to ensure that the beneficiary may become employed as
soon as feasible.
The overarching goal of the proposal is to alter the culture of the
programs by changing the expectations of all parties. However, the
proposal will only work if there is adequate funding for rehabilitation,
training and provision benefits, and if positive incentives to work are

332

Batavia

built in. Fear of losing health insurance and personal assistance ser
vices creates among the greatest disincentives to work for people with
disabilities (Friedland and Evans 1996; Batavia, DeJong, and Me Knew
1993; Burns, Batavia, and DeJong 1991). An array of policy options,
including reform of our in-kind benefit programs, are available to
reduce these disincentives (Batavia 1993, 1996).
Children with Disabilities
Much attention has been focused on the rapid growth in the number
of children in the disability programs after the Zebley Supreme Court
decision. That decision dealt with the legal standard for children's eli
gibility. At this time in the history of the programs, we should reexamine the policy rationale underlying that eligibility standard. With
respect to adults with disabilities, a cash benefit is clearly justified as
income replacement for individuals who, as a result of their disabili
ties, cannot work. This rationale applies to adults, at least for the period
of time that they are incapable of employment. It does not apply to
children with disabilities, who are not breadwinners and who therefore
have not forgone income as a result of their disabilities.
Consequently, some other rationale is needed for a cash payment to
children. Typically, the justification offered is that the child's disability
requires the parents to work less and earn less than they otherwise
would or to hire outside help to assist in addressing the child's disabil
ity-related needs. The needs of a child with a disability are often much
greater than those of a nondisabled child, and the costs of meeting
those needs are correspondingly higher for children with disabilities.
Because the policy rationale for a cash benefit is stronger with
respect to adults than children with disabilities, further policy consider
ation should be given as to which children justify a cash payment. It
may be that the needs of many children with disabilities can be
addressed entirely through in-kind benefits, including health care, assistive technology, and personal assistance services. Alternatively, a cash
benefit may be warranted in certain cases to allow one of the parents to
stay home and take care of the child. Analysis may reveal that some
children warrant higher payments than they are currently receiving.
Assuming that it is determined that a cash payment continues to be
justified for certain children, substantial research will be needed in
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assessing the appropriate eligibility criteria for identifying such chil
dren and in determining the appropriate amount of the payment.
Legal Aliens
Another issue that has received increasing attention lately is the
large increase in the number of individuals from other countries who
have entered the United States legally and who have become recipients
of the disability programs. It has been reported to Congress that
approximately 738,000 legal aliens currently receive SSI, up from
127,000 in 1982 (Rector and Lauber 1995; Matloff 1994). This consti
tutes a growth rate of 580 percent in just twelve years. The vast major
ity are elderly, and most apply for benefits within five years of entry
into the United States. This disturbing trend should not be occurring
under long-standing federal immigration policy, which precludes
aliens who may become a "public charge" from entering our country.
There is a tendency to scapegoat noncitizens for the problems of our
country. In fact, legal aliens have always played an important role in
our economy and have contributed significantly to the growth of our
nation. To the extent that they pay into social programs over an exten
sive period of time, they should be entitled to benefits, proportionate to
their contribution. However, there is evidence that many are attracted
to our country primarily by its generous social programs (Rector and
Lauber 1995). To the extent that this is occurring, policy changes are
needed. One approach might be to preclude benefits for a stated period
of time (e.g., three, five, or ten years) after the individual legally enters
the country.

CONCLUSIONS
There are those committed to the status quo who would argue that
the policy changes being suggested here, such as time-limiting disabil
ity benefits, lack compassion. They are wrong. What lacks compassion
is a system that convinces people with disabilities, and particularly
children with disabilities, that they are too disabled ever to work. Our
disability programs currently are fundamentally flawed. While incre-
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mental reforms have improved the programs, they have not corrected
the basic problems. We must fix the programs to ensure that the people
who rely on them will receive the benefits that they need, but in a man
ner that encourages and empowers them to be more independent and
productive.
Most important, for all people with disabilities, we must raise the
expectations of our disability programs. As much as any other factor,
including the work disincentives built into the current system, the pre
sumption that an impairment necessarily limits the ability to work has
handicapped generations of program beneficiaries. The experience of
hundreds of thousands of people with disabilities who are now work
ing, despite significant functional limitations, proves that this presump
tion is false. People with disabilities can become gainfully employed if
we expect them to become gainfully employed, and if they expect
themselves to become gainfully employed.
Adults with disabilities must be given the expectations, opportuni
ties, and incentives to seek and obtain gainful employment. Children
with disabilities must receive the education and training that they need,
alongside children without disabilities to the extent possible, to offer
them full opportunities throughout their lives. The programs should be
reformed to ensure that every dollar spent is invested efficiently in the
future of their beneficiaries. People with disabilities in our country
must be encouraged to seek employment to improve their personal sit
uations and to remove themselves from the dependency of the disabil
ity programs. Such dependency is neither in their interest nor that of
our country.
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Policy Implications
of Recent Growth in Beneficiaries
with Mental Illness
Howard H. Goldman
University of Maryland

I have taken as my task to comment on the analysis of the recent
growth in the social security disability rolls, especially with respect to
applications and awards due to mental impairments. I will review four
questions: Is the analysis correct? Are the increases in applications and
awards for mental impairments appropriate? Is this the correct set of
questions from a policy perspective? Given a redefinition of the prob
lem, what is the appropriate remedy?
1. Is the analysis by the Lewin-VHI team (Stapleton et al., Chapter 2)
correct? Is there anything to add or modify in their analysis? Gen
erally, the analysis seems both correct and consistent with the per
spective of street-level bureaucrats and policy makers. The vast
majority of the increase in awards is due to the tremendous
increase in applications. Applications have increased in response
to several factors, the most powerful of which appear to be eco
nomic in nature, particularly downturns in the economy for Social
Security Disability Insurance (DI) applicants and limitations in
General Assistance welfare transfers. The latter is an especially
important factor for applicants for Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) with a mental impairment as the basis for the application for
disability benefits.
The analysis further speculates that the increases have some
thing to do with changes in the mental impairment standards for
disability introduced in 1985. It seems likely that the changes in
regulations affected both applications and awards, as much by cre
ating a change in the "adjudicative climate" as by the content and
wording of the standards themselves. Although the new mental

337

338

Goldman

impairment regulations addressed a number of barriers to (appro
priate) awards, they also signaled a policy change at the Social
Security Administration (SSA), encouraging and facilitating
application and clarifying previous (inappropriate) restrictions. In
addition, the new standards reinforced the importance of data on
work-related functioning in combination with signs and symp
toms of mental disorders (rather than signs and symptoms alone).
It is worth noting, however, that the previous standards also had
functional criteria (similar in form and content to the newer stan
dards), but they most often were ignored in the assessment of
claims.
In addition, although there is little to suggest that rates of men
tal disorders are increasing, there have been efforts in recent years
to increase the recognition of mental disorders, especially in pri
mary health care settings. This is particularly true for the most
prevalent of the serious mental disorders, the affective disorders,
applications and awards for which have increased most dramati
cally. The same has occurred for substance use disorders, newly
uncloseted by SSA policy, permitting substance abuse claims as a
direct basis for award.
2. Are the increases in applications and awards appropriate? That is,
do they represent good policy or bad? To the extent that these
increases represent a correction of prior (misguided) policy, the
increases in applications and awards are to have been expected
and should be viewed as an improvement. Generally speaking,
that accurately reflects my view. If these trends represent an overcorrection, admitting individuals to the disability program inap
propriately, that certainly is a problem. I believe some of the sto
ries of occasional misrepresentation, fraud, and abuse by
applicants, but I believe that these cases are exceptions rather
than the rule. Furthermore, I have reason to believe that such mis
behavior occurs with claims involving other body systems, as
well. As for problems with discrepancies in decisions between
various levels of review and appeal, I believe that these represent
problems with policy implementation rather than with the poli
cies themselves—and that there are administrative remedies that
should be pursued before revising the standards.
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If the issue of the appropriateness of these trends actually
addresses the question of whether these impairments (e.g., affec
tive disorders) warrant such rates of applications and awards for
disability benefits, an affirmative answer can be found in the epi
demiology of mental disorders. Studies of the prevalence of
depression indicate that approximately 16 million Americans
each year meet the criteria for a depressive disorder, 2 million of
whom are considered to have severe depression (National Advi
sory Mental Health Council 1993). Furthermore, depressive dis
orders are among the most disabling of common chronic
conditions. Work-related disability is reported more commonly
for depression than for arthritis or obstructive lung disease and is
nearly as disabling as acute coronary artery disease. The workrelated disability persists, as well, for longer than for the other
conditions, even when it is symptomatically improved by treat
ment (Wells et al. 1989; Hays et al. 1995).
3. Are these the correct questions to ask from a policy perspective?
Is there a problem with the disability program with respect to
mental disorders? We have become concerned because of the rate
of growth in applications and awards without knowing what level
to expect. We do not know what is the "right" rate for mental dis
ability in the population, and we will not know until we conduct a
careful study, such as that proposed by SSA in their Disability
Examination Study. That investigation should begin to give us an
estimate of what the appropriate demand for benefits due to men
tal (and other) impairments ought to be, using several criteria
(signs, symptoms, physical exam and laboratory findings, lay
reports, and functional assessments). Our current alarm about rate
increases is this year's reaction (in the context of fiscal concerns)
to the same data praised last year as a correction of long-standing
barriers to access for claimants with mental impairments and sub
stance use disorders.
The Lewin-VHI analysis (Stapleton et al., Chapter 2) does not
tell us precisely what to expect in the future. It does hint at a pos
sible major problem with the SSI program in the wake of welfare
reform: given the experience with limited welfare reform and the
reactive cost shift of individuals with mental impairments from
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the general relief rolls to the SSI program, we should be prepared
(and not be surprised) when applications and awards continue to
rise (or increase at a faster rate).
Applications and awards, however, are not the only potential
problem. Although I can offer an explanation for the appropriate
ness of such increases, I am concerned about the duration of dis
ability status for many individuals with mental disorders. This is
especially true for the affective and anxiety disorders, which are
very amenable to treatment. If SSA does not do more to encour
age appropriate treatment and rehabilitation, then the large num
bers of individuals entering the front door of the disability
program will not be matched by a steady exit from the back door.
This is how I would characterize the real problem associated with
the mental disorders and the SSI and DI programs.
4. What are some potential remedies to a reformulation of the prob
lem? What might be done to reduce the duration of receipt of dis
ability benefits? Unlike some of my colleagues, I do not favor a
"time-limited benefit" to solve this problem. Current policy sup
ports the selective review of cases through the Continuing Dis
ability Review (CDR) process. Although it has been misused in
the past and is not very well implemented at present, the CDR
process represents a rational policy. One could reexamine the
issue of medical improvement and burden of proof. I prefer to
retain the current policy rather than experiment with a new policy
that threatens individuals who continue to be disabled with termi
nation of benefits, subject to the (incredibly slow) process of
reapplication at the end of a "time-limited" benefit period. If SSA
cannot effectively implement a current policy requiring periodic
case-by-case review, why should we introduce another new
approach with what may prove to be at least as burdensome an
administrative requirement? Some argue that people on a time
limit will not reapply in great numbers. I believe that current ben
eficiaries already believe they have a time limit and are afraid
they will lose their benefits with any "false move" (such as even
using a work incentive program to return to work). A time-limited
benefit might actually stimulate applications and increase awards
by adjudicators who may decide to just make an allowance,

Growth in Disability Benefits

341

"since it is only for a short time, anyway."
If the goal is to change expectations about the disability pro
gram, let SSA make clear its current policy regarding the dura
tion of benefits. There is no current policy suggesting that
benefits should be expected for life. The de facto policy may be
one of limited exits from the rolls, but this is not because of stated
policy. It is a problem of policy implementation and should be
addressed administratively, not by wholesale change in de jure
policy for which there is no better expectation of improved imple
mentation of the essential case-by-case review.
Perhaps the most important potential change in policy would
be to directly address the need for state-of-the-art treatment for
beneficiaries. I am certain that this problem is not unique to indi
viduals who are functionally limited because of mental impair
ments. There are special barriers to treatment of mental illness,
including stigma, lack of available treatment resources, and lack
of individual financing for such care. The need to encourage
treatment and rehabilitation, however, is a universal recommen
dation for improving SSA's disability program.
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Rethinking the Social Security
Disability Programs: Causes
and Options
Jane L. Ross
General Accounting Office

The Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) programs have been experiencing substantial
stress as a consequence of rapid growth in the number of program ben
eficiaries. 1 Several operational problems have also contributed to pro
gram stress. For example, the media have spotlighted several examples
of program abuse and inadequate management action, and policy ana
lysts have criticized the inefficiency of the disability eligibility deter
mination process as well as the lack of attention to assisting
beneficiaries in returning to gainful employment. Faced with this broad
range of problems and the increased scrutiny focused on these pro
grams, policymakers and the public seem to be open to considering
program changes.
At the same time, changes have occurred in the way society views
people with physical and mental impairments—changes that are lead
ing to a rethinking of the relationship between cash benefit programs,
such as DI and SSI, and the ability of people with significant impair
ments to engage in productive work.
These comments address some of the operational problems within
the DI and SSI programs and some of the societal changes that, in
combination, are resulting in a receptiveness to rethinking the purpose
and design of these programs. The comments also summarize some of
the proposals for change that are currently being discussed.
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OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS
Both DI and SSI currently have significant backlogs of cases await
ing decisions on eligibility. In particular, waiting time for those who
are appealing denials of their initial application now averages about a
year.
As the Social Security Administration (SSA) has struggled to pro
cess the tremendous number of applications for benefits, it has for
many years reduced the number of reviews of the disability status of
people already receiving benefits. Since the same workers are responsi
ble for initial determinations and these periodic reviews, SSA has had
to prioritize workloads and has done so by limiting its reviews of con
tinuing disability status.2
The net result of the eligibility determination backlogs and limited
review of continuing eligibility is that SSA has been giving poor ser
vice to its applicants and neglecting its responsibility for maintaining
program integrity.
A second operational problem involves Administrative Law Judges
(ALJs), who hear the appeals of applications that have been denied.
The ALJs are reversing decisions denied at the initial level in about 70
percent of the cases that they hear. This reversal rate is much higher
than it has been in years past and reflects the lack of a consistent systemwide process for determining eligibility. Adverse publicity about
SSI program abuse by drug addicts and alcoholics, the parents of some
disabled children, prisoners, and immigrants also signals that program
managers have not been sufficiently vigilant in determining eligibility
for benefits or monitoring people once they begin receiving benefits.
Finally, neither the DI nor the SSI program has a good record of
returning beneficiaries to work. While no one is certain what propor
tion of the beneficiary population can be expected to work, currently
about 1 in 500 DI beneficiaries leaves the benefit rolls to return to
work—a number that is generally agreed to be too low.
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SOCIETAL CHANGES
Society's view of the right of people with physical and mental
impairments to be accommodated in the work place has changed sig
nificantly. The public appears to believe that people with impairments
ought to be assisted in a variety of ways to lead economically produc
tive lives. More and more, we are coming to believe that categorizing
people as either disabled or not disabled can't be done accurately.
Rather, disabled people have a broad range of impairments with vary
ing levels of severity. Many can be assisted to increase their involve
ment with the workplace through adaptive technology and medical
advancements.
There is also greater appreciation that the link between medical
impairments and ability to work is a weak one. Several studies suggest
that medical criteria by themselves are poor predictors of work poten
tial, and many people who meet the DI and SSI eligibility criteria cur
rently are working.
Society in general also seems to think that people ought to work.
This view suggests not only that people ought to work if they are better
off financially when working than when not working, but that most
people have a responsibility to work. We have seen this view come to
the fore in the new welfare legislation that limits the amount of time
individuals can draw benefits. Such proposals are framed in terms of
numbers of years of receiving benefits, not in terms of income avail
able to the family. This same view is now being articulated with respect
to disabled people in proposals that would limit the amount of time that
they can receive DI and SSI benefits.
There is also a general concern about the overall size of the govern
ment sector and whether programs such as DI and SSI are including
larger numbers of people than is appropriate. In the case of the DI pro
gram, some people are also concerned that taxes used to fund DI bene
fits reduce the revenue that realistically can be raised for the retirement
and survivors' insurance programs.
These shifts in the way decision makers and the public think about
people with disabilities and about the size of the disability programs
have generated a great deal of discussion about how to ensure that

346

Ross

everyone who can work is assisted in doing so, while still ensuring
income support for those who are unable to work.

POLICY OPTIONS
The policy options currently being discussed can be described as fit
ting into one of three categories: incremental changes that modify spe
cific provisions to encourage work, leaving the structure of the DI and
SSI programs intact; changes that alter the current terms under which
benefits are received, such as imposing time limits for certain benefi
ciaries, but leave the current eligibility definitions in place; and
changes that fundamentally redefine program eligibility and the benefit
structure.
Regardless of whether incremental or more fundamental change
might occur, most participants in discussions about DI and SSI policy
changes agree that two actions currently under way at SSA must go
forward. The first and most ambitious of these is the disability redesign
project, the goal of which is to make the disability determination pro
cess more timely, consistent, and cost-effective. This effort includes
initiatives designed to reduce the time involved in making determina
tions to standardize the ways in which disability is evaluated at all lev
els of decision making, and to change the standards by which disability
is evaluated toward measuring one's ability to function in the work
place. Second, there also appears to be general agreement that SSA
should increase the number of reviews of continuing eligibility that it
performs, so that individuals with some likelihood of medical recovery
will be reviewed on a regular basis.

INCREMENTAL CHANGES
The main thrust of most incremental reforms is to increase the total
income and benefits of current beneficiaries who attempt to work. One
such measure would increase the amount that a beneficiary could earn
while still receiving benefits. Currently, most beneficiaries become
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ineligible to receive benefits when they earn more than $500 a month
for nine months.
Another proposal suggests reducing cash benefits gradually as earn
ings increase over time, rather than terminating benefits abruptly after
a certain time at work or after a certain earnings level has been
achieved, as is currently the case. (This proposal is targeted primarily
at DI, since SSI already has this more gradual benefit offset.)
A third suggestion is that beneficiaries who return to work be
allowed to retain their Medicare or Medicaid eligibility for much
longer periods than provided in current law. The fear of losing medical
coverage may be the most powerful barrier facing beneficiaries who
consider attempting to work.
Others have suggested a different type of work incentive—a tax
credit that functions as an earnings supplement for beneficiaries who
work. A credit would be designed to ensure that an individual's com
bined income from earnings and the tax credit would be sufficient to
encourage him or her to try to work and then to stay at work.
A final example of incremental change is a proposal to allow SSA to
use private rehabilitation firms to help beneficiaries develop skills that
will facilitate their return to work. Currently, almost all vocational
rehabilitation financed by SSA is conducted by state agencies. Many
people believe that expanding the capacity of rehabilitation services
and introducing competition among providers would be more effective
in returning beneficiaries to productive activity.

INCREMENTAL PLUS
Some participants in the current policy discussions are concerned
that the incremental options listed above will not provide enough
encouragement for current beneficiaries to attempt to work. They
believe that younger beneficiaries or those with certain impairments
should receive benefits only for a limited number of years, so that they
will have very strong incentives to try to work. Time-limited or tempo
rary benefits could be proposed in conjunction with several of the
incremental options.
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Another more substantial change to encourage more attempts to
return to work would be to provide vocational rehabilitation services to
people who have not yet been determined to be eligible for benefits.
This approach has been suggested by those who believe that rehabilita
tion would be much more successful if it were provided well before the
time an individual is determined to be eligible for benefits.

FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE
This category of suggested policy changes involves a fundamental
reorientation of the DI and SSI programs, with a shift in focus from
proving an individual's inability to work to enhancing and supporting
an individual's ability to work. The programs might run on two tracks.
One track would be reserved for those whose disabilities represent
much more profound functional limitations than the current DI and SSI
definitions. These individuals would be evaluated as the most unlikely
to return to work. The second track would be for those with some
remaining capacity to function in the workplace, but a level roughly the
same as the current DI and SSI definition of disability. The program
rules for this group would be quite different from those that exist today
and would allow for long-term receipt of both benefits and earnings.
The idea would be to encourage as much work as possible and allow
benefits to serve as a supplement. The underlying rationale for seg
menting the program in this way would be to separate the conflicting
goals in the current system, providing full benefits as long as an indi
vidual couldn't work while providing significant encouragement and
incentives to work.

CONCLUSION
The DI and SSI programs are being criticized because of operational
failings and because they appear to undercut the beliefs that people
with severe impairments ought to have more opportunity to work and
that cash benefits should be viewed as a last option. Policymakers and
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the public appear willing to consider changes in the DI and SSI pro
grams to address both of these types of problems. Many ideas for oper
ational changes are incorporated in SSA's disability redesign initiative,
but its focus does not extend to assisting and encouraging beneficiaries
to return to work. Proposals to encourage return to work range from
changes in the amounts that individuals can earn and still retain eligi
bility for benefits to restructuring the programs so that some individu
als receive both benefits and earnings while those who are unable to
work continue to receive cash benefits.
Those who support more fundamental reforms acknowledge that
they don't know what proportion of the DI and SSI populations can be
expected to work. Even if there is a shift in attitude toward much
greater emphasis on work, the DI and SSI definition of disability is
very strict, and most people receiving benefits have severe mental and
physical impairments. Supporters of these fundamental reforms point
out, however, that those who apply for benefits under new program
rules may be more open to the possibility of change than those who are
currently receiving benefits and who may not be able to adjust to these
new expectations.
Common to all of these proposals is the recognition that the charac
teristics of people receiving benefits are changing as are the societal
norms about the programs and their beneficiaries. In order to restore
wide public support, DI and SSI will need to response to these new
realities.

Notes
1.
2.

These comments were revised in September 1996 to reflect recent developments
in legislative provisions and in program growth.
In 1996, the Contract with America Advancement Act authorized over $4 billion
in separate funding for reviews of disability status in fiscal years 1996 through
2002. In addition, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia
tion Act authorized an additional $250 million total in fiscal years 1997 and 1998
for SSI reviews. These additional funds, as appropriated, will allow SSA to do
more disability status reviews without shifting resources away from competing
priorities.

Policy Changes to Improve
Market Outcomes
Carolyn L. Weaver
American Enterprise Institute

I appreciate having the opportunity to participate in this conference
and discuss the very important issues surrounding the rapid growth of
the social security disability programs. This conference really is a first,
as far as I know, in terms of bringing a significant analytical effort to
bear on this problem and trying to bridge the gap between the research
and the public policy worlds. This effort is important and long overdue.
I hope it turns out to be the first of other such efforts that might
broaden the base of our knowledge about disability and about the ways
the government can and cannot reasonably be expected to improve the
lives of people with disabilities.
Having said this, I will begin with a conclusion: The research pre
sented by David Stapleton and others confirms what we have known
for a very long time—disability is not an all-or-none condition, the
presence or absence of which can be readily discerned in some system
atic and reliable way. Disability is a complex and changing phenome
non; it exists on a continuum; and its presence (or absence) and
severity are extremely difficult to quantify or assess with precision.
There is not only a problem of assessing the medical severity of indi
viduals' physical or mental impairments, but also a problem of assess
ing the impact of these impairments on work ability or on labor market
or other outcomes. Moreover, the severity of work disabilities for peo
ple with any particular impairment can be affected mightily by the eco
nomic incentives and constraints they face.
Superimposed on these problems are all of the problems attendant to
decentralized, public decision making. Disability determinations are
made by literally tens of thousands of people in various bureaucratic,
political, and judicial roles—as well as medical and vocational roles—
who are subject to constantly changing rules and regulations and bud-
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getary and political pressures. Findings of disability, in other words,
can be affected mightily by incentives and constraints—in this case,
the ones facing decision makers (Weaver 1986).
One implication of all of this is that the federal government's largest
cash benefit programs for people with disabilities, Social Security Dis
ability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) can
grow—and shrink—rapidly and serve populations whose compositions
change dramatically, for reasons that are quite independent of underly
ing trends in public health or in federal legislation. While this may not
be news to program administrators or to researchers, it is nevertheless
cause for deep concern. The federal government makes a very large
commitment of tax dollars to the social security disability programs—
close to $70 billion this year ($100 billion including Medicare and
Medicaid), nearly double the level just five years ago (U.S. Govern
ment 1995; Committee on Ways and Means 1994; Board of Trustees
1995). Ensuring that these dollars flow to the people the programs were
intended to serve would seem to be the first test of their effectiveness.
Social policies cannot be deemed effective) and certainly not costeffective, simply because a lot of money has been thrown at a problem
and some of it seems to have stuck in the right place.
This brings me to a question: Who are the social security disability
programs intended to serve? It is easy enough to give a definitional
answer—the programs are intended to serve people so severely
impaired that they cannot engage in any substantial gainful activity
anywhere in the national economy (it says so right in the law!). But in a
world with modern technologies, therapies, and medical and vocational
interventions and techniques, this defines a small segment of the work
ing-age population with mental or physical impairments. Indeed, a fun
damental tenet of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is that
even people with severe disabilities can, if provided the right environ
ment, work and make lives for themselves and their families. One need
only consider the example of a person who is, say, blind or deaf—and
thus categorically "disabled" under social security law regardless of
educational or professional attainment—to appreciate the fact that the
social security programs provide ongoing cash support to a broader
population than implied by the general definition of disability.
The research findings presented at this conference bring into sharp
focus the extent to which the disability programs are not what they
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once were and do not serve who they once did. Gone are the days when
DI, for example, served people with physical disabilities who found
themselves out of work (or quitting work) late in life. Increasingly, DI
serves prime-age men and women with mental illnesses of some sort,
most of whom never leave the benefit rolls. Despite dramatic improve
ments in science and medicine, in technology and information, and in
the educational opportunities of young people with disabilities, which
have improved the quality of life of people with disabilities as well as
the job opportunities open to them, the number of people on the dis
ability rolls has never been higher (Weaver 1992; Koitz, Kollman, and
Neisner 1994).
This has many important public policy implications, not the least of
which is that the idea that DI is an "early retirement" program may die
hard, but die it must. The beneficiary population is getting younger and
the opportunities for rehabilitation, recovery, and return to work are
getting better. Work is the key determinant of economic well-being in
our society and a widely shared goal of working-aged Americans, dis
abled and nondisabled alike. Pursuit of this goal is undermined by the
government only at great fiscal and social cost.
In the spirit of some of the welfare reform proposals now under dis
cussion, there may be merit to reorienting the social security disability
programs toward transitional aid for people whose conditions are not
permanently disabling. The presumption underlying federal policy
should, in the main, be that people who are disabled can gain the skills
necessary to work; people who become disabled will recover and go
back to work. A practical change in current policy that might help
bring about such a reorientation would be to place a time limit on ben
efits. For example, benefits might be granted for a period of three
years. Individuals could reapply for benefits, and, if found unable to
work, be granted benefits for another fixed period, but the presumption
would be that work would follow. (This is not inconsistent with the
suggestion made by Stapleton, Coleman, and Dietrich [1995; and
Chapter 2, this volume] regarding the payment of temporary benefits
during economic recessions.)
More direct "work incentive" provisions, which have been added to
the programs over the years, have been largely ineffective (Muller
1992; Hennessey and Muller 1994). While the reasons, no doubt, are
many and varied, two stand out: first, work incentives and other poli-
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cies designed to promote work have typically been superimposed on
the back end of the disability process—after the individual has left the
labor force or made the transition from school to unemployment and
has begun drawing cash benefits; second, they have built a more and
more complex system atop the central (contradictory) policy—the def
inition of disability—which requires that the individual be unable to
work. Individuals who, in order to work, overcome the severe impair
ments that qualify them for benefits and take advantage of the work
incentive provisions ultimately find themselves ineligible for cash ben
efits and without the security of Medicare coverage.
Clearly, reforms intended to improve labor market outcomes for
people with disabilities must focus on the front end of the disability
process, keeping people at work or on the path to work so that—to the
extent possible—they never enter the system in the first place, a system
described by some disabled people themselves as a "trap." Research
suggests, for example, that employees who become disabled have bet
ter labor market outcomes, in terms of duration of employment, when
their employers work with them from the onset of the disability, main
taining the continuity of the employee-employer relationship throughout the period of hospitalization and rehabilitation, and
accommodating the workers' changing abilities and circumstances at
the workplace (Burkhauser, Butler, and Kim 1995). The employer is
critical to work recovery efforts.
The same message is echoed by rehabilitation counselors. Early
intervention—ideally before the individual has ever lost his or her
job—is critical to success.
More generally, reforms must address the employer side of the work
equation, which is now largely ignored by policymakers. Consider the
reasonable accommodation requirement in the Americans with Dis
abilities Act. This amounts to a mandated benefits program, the cost of
which is imposed on employers. Or consider the DI tax. Employers
who make accommodations and go the extra mile to hire or retain peo
ple with disabilities—thus sparing the social security system of at least
a portion of the potentially large cost of supporting these people for
life—must pay the same tax as all other employers. Or consider
increases in minimum wage laws and other mandated benefits pro
grams. These policies increase the cost of hiring low-skilled workers,
discouraging the employment of precisely the kind of people who

Growth in Disability Benefits

355

dominate the SSI rolls, people with poor educations and few job skills.
Enhancing the employment of these people—aptly described by
Burkhauser (1992) as the "doubly disabled"—will clearly require more
than work incentives and civil rights; it will require basic measures to
enhance the skills these people bring to the labor market, to reduce the
barriers to part-time or low-wage work, or to subsidize employer's
adjustment costs (Weaver 1991).
In the longer term, serious consideration should be given to privatiz
ing the supply of disability insurance—not for all risks faced by all
workers, but for the routine risks faced by workers who are not yet dis
abled. While private insurers do not, by any means, have the answers to
all or even most of the problems besetting the social security disability
programs, they do have the ability to respond quickly to changes in
knowledge and to new circumstances and opportunities—and the
incentives to do so are strong (Weaver 1986, 1992).
If private insurers were to cover the routine risks faced by the typical
worker, the federal government could turn to the question of how best
to target resources on, and to provide more adequately for, people with
special needs: people born with severe congenital abnormalities,
unemployed people who become disabled, people with terminal ill
nesses, people with catastrophic health expenses. DI provides the same
coverage for everyone and, as a result, cannot meet the needs of any
particular group particularly well. Some of the substantial resources
being devoted to providing income support to prime-age men and
women with substantial work histories could then be redirected to
other worthy causes—including meeting the needs of children and
adults with disabilities that leave them little hope of one day competing
in the job market, with or without civil rights protections.
To date, Congress has managed to side-step the issue of the very
rapid growth of the DI program—and obscure a very large (50 percent)
increase in the DI tax rate—by a so-called "tax reallocation" between
the social security retirement and disability programs (Board of Trust
ees 1995). Since both programs are in long-range deficit, this was a
stop-gap measure at best and, in my view, not well advised. The social
security disability programs cannot retain broad public support without
effective control over the beneficiary rolls, and effective control is
unlikely to be achieved until policymakers confront directly the finan
cial, economic, and social causes and consequences of rapid growth.
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Perhaps the next fiscal crisis will focus the attention of policymakers
and provide the impetus for considering revamping two programs that
provide much needed support to some and one-way tickets out of the
labor market for many others.
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Return to Work for SSI and DI
Beneficiaries: Employment
Policy Challenges
Susan M. Daniels
Jane West
Social Security Administration

Advances in medical treatments, technology, and civil rights policy
have created optimism that people with disabilities will increasingly
become a part of the labor force. Yet that optimism has not yielded
measurable outcomes in the employment rate of people with disabili
ties, which has consistently ranged between 23 percent and 45 percent,
depending on the definitions of "employment" and of "disability" used.
In addition, the number of people entering the Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) and Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) rolls has
increased notably in the last decade, from 4.2 million in 1985 to 11
million in 1996. The percentage of those leaving the rolls for the pur
pose of returning to employment persistently remains less than 1 per
cent.
Puzzled by this seeming contradiction between the improvements
that should lead to increases in employment for people with disabilities
and the steady increase on the SSI/DI rolls, the Social Security Admin
istration (SSA) set about to examine why the return-to-work rate (or
the rate of entering the workforce for the first time) is so low for bene
ficiaries with disabilities. We reviewed the literature, talked to the
experts, and dedicated ourselves to hearing from beneficiaries them
selves about the obstacles they face when they consider returning to
work. The following is a summary of what we learned.
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HIGH RISK OF LOSING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE
When people with disabilities become SSI beneficiaries, they gener
ally become Medicaid beneficiaries as well. After two years, DI benefi
ciaries are eligible for Medicare. In general, loss of cash benefits may
eventually lead to loss of health insurance as beneficiaries increase
work earnings, even though they may not have improved medically.
Between 1988 and 1992, the number of uninsured people grew by five
million people in the United States. In addition, limits on employerbased health coverage for chronic conditions expanded. People with
disabilities may find it difficult to access private health insurance
because of preexisting condition exclusions and waiting periods
imposed by carriers. Some people with disabilities need part-time
employment due to limitations imposed by their disabilities. Part-time
employment is rarely accompanied by health insurance benefits. Some
people with disabilities need personal assistance services, which in
many states are covered only by Medicaid. Thus, even if beneficiaries
were to replace their public health insurance with private health insur
ance, they would not likely receive coverage for all the services they
need.
In a survey of more than 1,200 disability leaders from every state,
the President's Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities
(1994) found that loss of Medicare and Medicaid was perhaps the sin
gle greatest barrier to employment. Another survey of disability pro
gram applicants found that 75 percent of DI applicants and 79 percent
of SSI applicants considered continued medical coverage as key to
encouraging work.
Several work incentives address this problem. DI beneficiaries can
continue Medicare coverage for at least 39 months following a trial
work period and purchase Medicare after that time. SSI recipients can
continue receiving Medicaid coverage up to a state-determined income
ceiling after their earnings become too high for them to be eligible for
cash payments. For example, in 1994 the cutoff point was $17,480 in
Pennsylvania.
These work incentives do not appear to have a significant impact on
the return-to-work rate of a large number of beneficiaries. Beneficiaries
are generally unaware of the provisions. One survey found that 80 per-
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cent of beneficiaries who returned to work were unaware of the incen
tives at the time they did so (Hennessey and Muller 1996). When
beneficiaries are aware of the incentives provisions, they rarely under
stand them fully; the incentives are complex, with different provisions
applying to SSI and DI. Social security claims representatives have a
difficult time explaining them and are generally focused on establish
ing the applicant's eligibility and inability to work rather than pursing
return-to-work goals.

WORK THAT PAYS THE BILLS
Some people with disabilities have enormous disability-related
expenses, such as assistive technology or personal assistance services,
for which there is rarely a subsidy, tax credit, or insurance reimburse
ment. Some people with disabilities require extra time to accomplish
daily activities, which means they may have less time and energy avail
able for work. Others may have recurring or cyclical health problems,
such as mental illness or multiple sclerosis, that require flexible work
situations enabling them to meet their intermittent disability-related
needs. Finding employment that is responsive to these needs and that
offers a living wage can be difficult.
In addition, people with disabilities are often less educated than peo
ple without disabilities and thus tend to have lower-paying jobs. While
people with disabilities who work have an average income that is
higher than people with disabilities who do not work, people with dis
abilities earn less than people without disabilities. One analysis found
the average earned income of workers with disabilities in 1995 to be
$15,556, while it was $24,667 for workers without disabilities (Yelin
1996).
In addition to receiving cash benefits and health care, people with
disabilities who have low incomes may be receiving other types of
public subsidies, such as food stamps, housing assistance, and energy
assistance. Returning to work may jeopardize the cash benefits, the
health insurance benefits, and all addition benefits. The loss of cash,
medical, and other benefits may total an irreplaceable loss to a lowskilled worker who is likely to be compensated at minimum wage.
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CUSTOMER CHOICE AND PROVIDER INCENTIVES
FOR RETURN TO WORK
While most recipients of disability benefits are unlikely candidates
for return-to-work programs, a significant percentage are. Thirty-five
percent of DI beneficiaries responding to a 1993 questionnaire indi
cated an interest in receiving return to work services (cited in U.S.
General Accounting Office 1996). Demonstration projects conducted
by SSA, such as Project Network, have enabled beneficiaries with
vastly different impairments to return to work. Yet the current system
yields few beneficiaries who do return to work.
The Social Security Act requires referral of disability applicants to
state vocational rehabilitation (VR) agencies. On average, state Dis
ability Determination Services offices refer about 8 percent of appli
cants who are awarded benefits. Less than 10 percent of those referred
are accepted by the VR agencies as clients. State VR agencies success
fully rehabilitate about 1 out of every 1,000 beneficiaries each year
(U.S. General Accounting Office 1996).
Because of the limited capacity and resources to serve all who may
benefit from VR services, many state VR agencies limit the referrals
they will accept to those they consider to be the best VR candidates.
SSI or DI beneficiaries are often perceived as less appealing candidates
because they may be seen as more difficult to rehabilitate. Although
SSA pays VR agencies for rehabilitation costs of beneficiaries success
fully employed for nine.months, the delay in payments and the risk
accepted by the VR agency are often cited as disincentives to rehabili
tate SSI/DI beneficiaries.
Customers assert that they know best which services would help
them return to work. They dislike becoming involved with yet another
government bureaucracy in order to access such services. Some need
training that employers can best provide. Some need personal assis
tance services or assistance with transportation. Customers want to
choose the service provider that will enable them to design their own
individualized rehabilitation services to meet their unique needs.
In 1996, SSA initiated a program to allow private rehabilitation pro
viders to be reimbursed for serving SSI/DI beneficiaries when the state
VR system does not serve them. SSA hopes that private providers will
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offer greater choice for beneficiaries who seek to return to work. They
also invited state VR agencies to create performance partnerships.
While only six agencies are participating, early results are promising.

YOUTH IN TRANSITION
The average age of SSI/DI recipients has decreased in recent years.
As of 1994 about 4.2 percent of SSDI beneficiaries and 19.2 percent of
SSI recipients were between the ages of 18 and 29. Today more than
one million beneficiaries are younger than 22. Many who enter the
rolls as children stay on the rolls through their adolescence and into
adulthood. The proportion of beneficiaries with long-lasting impair
ments, such as mental impairments, has increased in the last decade.
Thus, many recipients are coming on the rolls earlier and staying
longer.
DI, and to a lesser extent SSI, was originally constructed as an early
retirement program. The programs are intended to replace cash income
when a wage earner needs to retire before age 65. Therefore, in the eli
gibility process, the focus is on the limitations of people needing to
retire, not on their abilities. The programs were not designed for young
people with significant impairments who nevertheless have ambitions
and need to develop skills to achieve them. Too often they, and some
times their families, may become dependent upon cash benefits that
limit both their income and their potential. As the number of young
people coming on the rolls increases and the length of stay increases,
we must ask ourselves if a "retirement" model will best meet the needs,
ambitions, and potential of so many of our nation's youth with disabil
ities.

CONCLUSIONS
We believe the four key areas we have identified as obstacles to
return to work for SSI/DI beneficiaries—access to health insurance
(including personal assistance services), finding work that pays enough
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to live on, customer choice of return-to-work services, and the unique
needs of youth—must be addressed if we are to improve our employ
ment outcomes among beneficiaries. SSA is committed to supporting
all beneficiaries who want to work. However, many of the obstacles
people with disabilities encounter in seeking to work are beyond the
scope of cash benefit policy and programs. Our nation's employment
policy must accept and support people with disabilities as part of the
American workforce, not as ancillary to it. SSA is working with other
federal agencies to identify policy options that will remove employ
ment obstacles encountered by our beneficiaries. Our customers have
told us clearly that our federal return-to-work efforts need improve
ment. We have heard them and we are moving forward with our federal
partners seeking to address their concerns.
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Policies to Make Work Pay for
People With Disabilities
Richard V. Burkhauser
Syracuse University

The onset of a disability need not, and in the majority of cases does
not, mean the end of work for people with disabilities (see Burkhauser
and Daly 1996a, 1996b). The premise that most people with disabili
ties can work contradicts the image of people with disabilities as "vic
tims." Dedicated disability advocates have succeeded in getting an
increasing share of young people with disabilities on the Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) rolls. The question is, should this continue to be
the primary policy goal of our disability system?
Previous chapters in this book have documented that changes in the
business cycle and in policy variables account for more of the growth
in Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and SSI applications and
awards over the past decade than does a nationwide decline in health.
General economic conditions and the relative ease of access to and
generosity of benefits encourage some people with disabilities to apply
for benefits. Aarts, Burkhauser, and de long (1996) offer additional
evidence that this is happening internationally. They compare disability
transfer populations across countries and time periods and argue that
these differences cannot be explained by differences in underlying
health conditions alone. In 1994 the United States had about five work
ing-age people on disability transfers for every one hundred workers,
while in the Netherlands, which has an extremely generous and easily
accessible disability transfer system, there were fifteen working-age
people on disability transfers per one hundred workers. Policy matters.
But this does not imply that all persons with disabilities can work.
There is great diversity within the population with disabilities both
with respect to the severity of their disability and the skills they bring
to the workforce. Those with disabilities who also have poor work
skills are doubly disadvantaged in the labor market. Nevertheless,
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while severe disabilities or poor work skills limit market opportunities,
the previous chapters are heartening because they suggest that changes
in policy could result in more employment for people with disabilities.
To date, efforts to encourage disability transfer recipients off the
rolls via extending Medicaid benefits or lowering the implicit tax on
SSI benefits have not been successful. This is not surprising, given
Moffitt's (1992) study of exits from AFDC and his more recent study
(Hoynes and Moffitt 1996) of exits from disability transfer programs.
Both papers suggest that people on government transfer rolls are not
very sensitive to tax rate changes. In fact, Hoynes and Moffitt argue
that making eligibility easier for those with disabilities who do work is
likely to increase program participation rather than lower it, since a
large share of people with disabilities who work might become eligible
for benefits with a more relaxed work test. It appears doubtful that any
of the back-to-work incentives now being tried will succeed.
Furthermore, Bound (1989) documents that the majority of those
who go through the DI application process and are rejected do not
return to work. Initially, these findings suggest that policy variables
may not be important in the decision of people with disabilities to
work, since few applicants to DI and SSI, rejected or successful, return
to work.
But there is an alternative explanation. The timing of a work-based
intervention may be as important as the intervention itself. By the time
people with disabilities have gone through the long application and
appeals process, in which not working is critical evidence of an
"inability to perform substantial gainful activity," most of their links to
the labor market have been severed. Hence, interventions to return
them to work are much less likely to succeed than those applied imme
diately following the onset of a disability to reduce the likelihood of
their leaving work.
There is evidence that early intervention- helps to keep people with
disabilities in the workforce. Burkhauser, Butler, and Kim (1995) find
that accommodation by employers extends tenure on the job following
the onset of a disability. The average worker without accommodation
stayed 2.2 years with his employer after onset. The average worker
who was accommodated stayed 7.5 years with his employer after
onset. To put this another way, 75 percent of those who were not
accommodated were gone after three years. But it was nine years
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before 75 percent of workers who were accommodated left their
employer.
If the timing of an intervention is critical to its success, then there
may also be more effective strategies to reduce the disability rolls and
further increase work among people with disabilities than are currently
being tried. Below I suggest four such possibilities.

TAX-SUPPORTED SUBSIDIES TO KEEP EMPLOYEES
WITH DISABILITIES ON THE JOB
Employers are much more likely to accommodate workers who
become disabled on the job than to take on new workers with disabili
ties. Most employers have made some investment in their employees
and have better knowledge of their work capabilities than they do of
potential employees. Hence, it is not surprising that they are more will
ing to maintain such workers on the job after the onset of a disability
than they are to hire new workers with disabilities. But it is not obvious
that the stick of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 mandate is
the appropriate mechanism for increasing accommodation. The carrot
of tax-supported subsidies to pay for employer-provided accommoda
tions would be more effective. Moreover, it would get us out of the
habit of thinking that such accommodations, which we pay for in
higher prices for the products we buy, are costless just because the
costs do not show up on the federal budget.

TAX SUBSIDIES FOR RELATIVELY LOW-PRODUCTIVITY
WORKERS
A larger share of people with disabilities work full time in Sweden
and Germany than in the United States because Sweden, through direct
job creation, and Germany, through explicit quotas, directly intervene
in the labor market to make sure that people with disabilities are
employed. Neither of these interventions into the labor market make
political sense in the United States. But there is a uniquely American
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alternative to such direct market interventions: the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC).
The EITC, which currently uses the tax system to subsidize the
work of low-income families with children, could substantially
increase work by people with disabilities, especially those with low
productivity. In 1993, the Clinton administration, with bipartisan sup
port, dramatically increased the size and scope of this program. In
1996, workers with two children received 40 cents in benefits for every
dollar of their labor earnings up to a maximum of $8,900. For a mini
mum-wage worker, for instance, this tax credit transforms a $5.15 per
hour minimum wage into a wage of $7.21 per hour ($5.15 x 1.40 =
$7.21).
A variation on this program would offer a Disabled Workers' Tax
Credit (DWTC) to subsidize the labor earnings of people with disabili
ties who live in low-income households. This would especially target
the doubly disadvantaged, whose work skills yield them relatively low
labor earnings in the private sector. For instance, a 40 percent tax
credit on the wage earnings of those aged 18 to 25 with a disability
would 1) encourage children with disabilities reaching the age of tran
sition from school to work to choose work rather than SSI, and 2) off
set, to a large degree, the effective tax rate on current SSI recipients
who do work. The 1996 National Academy of Social Insurance's Dis
ability Policy Panel recommends such a credit for a broad range of
people with disabilities who have serious disabilities, whether or not
they are eligible for disability transfer benefits (Mashaw and Reno
1996). (For a broader discussion of the DWTC, see Burkhauser,
Glenn, and Wittenburg 1997.)
A great public policy tragedy occurred in 1993 when the Assistant
Secretary for Policy Evaluation, David Ellwood, convinced the admin
istration to push for an extension of the EITC but no one in the admin
istration or in the disability advocacy community seized that moment
to extend the credit to people with disabilities. I understand why Ellwood didn't do it. He, like most poverty policy experts, divides the
population into two groups: those who are expected to work and those
who are not expected to work. To him people with disabilities are not
expected to work. But where were the disability advocates? Why didn't
they push the message behind the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 to its logical conclusion and fight to extend the EITC as a means
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of further integrating the doubly disadvantaged into the labor market? I
believe in 1993 there would have been a bipartisan majority ready to
make that logical step if only someone had pointed the way. A biparti
san majority continues to support the EITC's role as the major federal
program aimed at making work pay. And I believe the passage of a
DWTC is possible. But to achieve this goal, policymakers need to be
convinced that most people with disabilities can work and should
therefore be expected to work. And, therefore, that people with disabil
ities should first be targeted for work-based programs, not transfer pro
grams. But to win over policymakers, it is first necessary that the
advocates of people with disabilities believe that work is possible.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
Previous chapters have documented how the Social Security Admin
istration's outreach efforts, together with state efforts to shift welfare
costs, increased applications for SSL This is further evidence that the
marching orders federal and state policymakers give to the frontline
gatekeepers of our disability system influence the work versus transfer
outcomes of people with disabilities. The Carter administration in 1978
sent word to state administrators that DI and SSI rolls were rising too
fast and that the eligibility process needed tightening. This moral, or
immoral suasion, depending on your point of view, greatly reduced
acceptance rates with no formal change in the law.
Aarts, Burkhauser, and de long (1996) compare work and transfer
aspects in the disability programs of several western industrial coun
tries. Those countries in which gatekeepers are given a clear signal that
return-to-work is the primary goal of disability policy—e.g., Sweden
and Germany—are the countries that best achieve this goal.
While the supply of disability applicants is influenced by the indi
vidual incentives they perceive, the "demand" for applicants by gate
keepers, which can be evidenced both by explicit procedures as well as
by attitudes, also matters. If the gatekeepers of our disability system
are signaled that successful placements into rehabilitation, training,
and jobs are their measure of administrative success, it is likely we will
see more such placements. But, unlike many European countries, our
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rehabilitation system is almost completely separate from our benefits
transfer system, and it would be much harder to achieve coordination
between the two.

TIME-LIMITED BENEFITS
To be eligible for permanent SSI or DI benefits, a person must be
unable to perform "substantial gainful activity" for at least one year. I
propose that those who meet this criterion but still may recover or be
able to return to work after one year be given only a temporary SSI or
DI benefit. After one year they would be fully reevaluated for perma
nent benefits. During this temporary benefit period, recipients would
have an opportunity to receive training and/or rehabilitation necessary
to put them back to work. This proposal is much more important now
that DI and SSI are shifting from bridges to early retirement toward
lifelong programs for younger workers.

CONCLUSION
For the majority of people with disabilities, onset of a disability
occurs after they have entered employment. Most people continue to
work for some time after the onset of a disability. The timing of poli
cies to prolong workforce participation may prove to be as important as
the implementation itself, policymakers should begin to make work
pay for people with disabilities through tax subsidies to employers, dis
ability tax credits, the use of temporary benefits as a mechanism for
trying rehabilitation before permanent transfers, and as a general signal
to gatekeepers that return to work is the primary goal of social policy.
The enactment of these pro-work reforms is likely to reduce the dis
ability transfer population and increase the employment of people with
disabilities.
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Private Sector Disability
Management Activities and the
Social Security Disability Program
Patricia M. Owens
UNUM Life Insurance Company of America

Social security is a work disability construct, and work disability is
a core concept for workplace disability managers as well. When a per
son is unable to work because of an illness or injury, an alternative
income stream may be made available from public and private sources
during the period of disability. Private sector disability management is
an increasingly important influence over how the various disability
programs interact. Studies done by insurers and academic researchers
reveal that employers spend up to 1 percent of payroll on disability
management. This includes a variety of programs to prevent disability
or minimize disability impact, such as wellness programs, employee
assistance plans, medical clinics geared toward minimizing disability,
employee safety programs, claims management activities, and returnto-work programs.
Thus, workplace disability management can be defined as services
and programs that involve providers, employers, and employees in pro
moting healthy workers and workplaces and that are believed to actu
ally reduce the impact and cost of disability to all parties. The field is
evolving in more sophisticated directions as its foundation becomes
more grounded in the multifaceted and evolutionary nature of disabil
ity and recognizes the various contributors to disability. Its activities
focus on both the employer or organizational level and on the individ
ual worker.
With its development, workplace disability management is helping
discover a host of contributors that affect why an individual cannot and
does not work. Medical factors are among many multidimensional
contributors that develop over time on a work disability continuum.
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The demands of work, changes in work environment, economic condi
tions, family issues, and education are just a partial sample of the
potential contributors or forces in each case. Given this circumstance,
determining disability status under any program designed to provide
income in lieu of work is as much art as science. As others have noted,
this complexity can cause various levels of functional loss to be com
pensated, depending on definitions and decision-making approaches.
Workplace disability management often focuses on people who are
unable to work because of a medical condition and, after a time,
recover function. However, this field also concerns itself with worsen
ing impairments and functional limitations that can be episodic.
Accommodation or return to work for current employees in these situa
tions, or hiring a person with this type of disability, raises a different
set of issues.
Clearly, the framework for accommodation or return to work is dif
ferent for a current employee (as distinguished from a job applicant).
Employers have legal and moral obligations relating to the health,
safety, and general welfare of employees. As a result, this is an area
where we can more readily see the impact of workplace disability man
agement and its relationship to Social Security Disability Income (DI).
The course of action for employees who become disabled is influ
enced by whether an illness or injury arose from work. The employer
has liability in workers' compensation, and the employee recourse to
litigation is more common. This can impact employment policy, both
positively and negatively.
Other issues will come into play when the injury or illness is not
work-related. For example, whether the employer provides health and
disability benefits and whether those benefits are insured or selfinsured will affect employment policy toward persons who become
disabled. Employers paying for health and disability benefits in lieu of
wages can be more eager to get the person back to work in order to
minimize these payouts. By contrast, if insurance pays and the
employer feels no direct or indirect costs that cannot be cost-benefit
rationalized, the employer's motivation might be to replace the dis
abled person with a more productive employee or downsize and abol
ish the job. Benefit programs are either seen as a bridge to return a
person to work or as a humane way to assist the person out of the
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workplace and both techniques can improve productivity. Often it is
the insurer advocating stay at work or return to work.
Disability management principles emphasize the costs of not man
aging disability. Potential savings sources range from the fundamental
benefit of prevention to savings produced by returns to work or integra
tion of health and disability benefits. The fact that the disability man
agement field has recognized and advanced these principles is having
an effect on employment policies. At one time, disability programs
focused on assisting a qualified person to secure social security bene
fits to offset any private benefits. This still happens, but more often now
as a last resort. The reason: disability managers have recognized that,
absent a full recovery, return to work is much less likely once a person
is receiving social security benefits. However, the last resort of secur
ing social security benefits is still driven by employment policies,
which do not focus on return to work. In this way, social security enti
tlement becomes a focal point in the increasingly complex interaction
of workplace disability management and employment policy.
Social security eligibility is linked to these dynamics in another
unique way. With its strict definition, often stricter than private pro
grams, social security payment becomes a benchmark that the person
truly cannot work. In effect, this relieves the insurer and employer of
return-to-work responsibility and of at least part of the liability, assum
ing there is no recovery.
The wide expanse of the economic environment affects the employ
ment of persons with disabilities. Employer cost-cutting caused by glo
bal competition, economic downturns, or shareholder demands are
among the issues that will act upon employment policies. Social secu
rity disability experience is influenced by the range of business climate
issues that affect employment policies.
Individual disability management outcomes are influenced by
employee and employer motivations. The genesis, nature, and timing
of the impairment will produce different outcomes, depending on
where a person is in his or her work cycle. Issues such as how workers
like their boss, their work environment, and whether they have worked
with a disability or impairment before can all be relative to whether
they seek disability payment. The employer's experience with the
employee—past performance and whether that performance has been
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poor because of attitude—will influence how the employer deals with
an employee.
The nature of the impairment is important too. For example, comorbidity of untreated depression with other impairments can prevent
a return to work. Work requirements may fit or accommodate well with
some and not other disabilities.
Presuming an enlightened employer, employment policy with regard
to persons with disabilities depends partly on persons wanting to work
and having more incentive to work than to stay at home. It also
depends on there being a job available that the person can do and wants
to do. This is not meant to be uncomplimentary. Too often it makes
more sense from the individual's perspective to stay home—there is
too much to risk in even trying to go back to work, especially if health
and cash benefits are at stake. Employers, for their part, may feel they
have done their moral duty by paying social security and private bene
fit premiums.
Private sector disability management works regularly with all of the
aforementioned incentives and disincentives. The field is having an
increasingly important impact on employment policies. These activi
ties become important considerations when addressing social security
disability policy.

The Promise and Limitations of
Employment Policies
for Current SSI Recipients
Craig Thornton
Mathematica Policy Research

I would like to use a specific example to illustrate some of the prom
ise and limitations of using employment support programs to assist
current Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients to obtain
employment and reduce their dependence on SSI. This example comes
from the Social Security Administration's Transitional Employment
Training Demonstration, which tested time-limited employment and
training services for SSI recipients with mental retardation.

THE TRANSITIONAL EMPLOYMENT TRAINING
DEMONSTRATION
The Transitional Employment Training Demonstration, which oper
ated from 1985 to 1987, was designed to help SSI recipients with men
tal retardation increase their economic and social self-sufficiency.'
Specifically, it sought to overcome a number of barriers that appeared
to prevent SSI recipients with mental retardation from obtaining and
holding jobs. In this way, the program attempted to help the recipients
by increasing their employment, earnings, level of community integra
tion, and total income while at the same time reducing government
expenditures for SSI payments.
Intensive Employment Support Services
Transitional employment as fielded in the demonstration consisted
of five core services intended to assist SSI recipients with mental retar-
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dation obtain and hold competitive jobs—that is, economically produc
tive jobs that are essentially undifferentiated from other jobs that exist
in the economy. The five core services were
• Outreach to all mentally retarded SSI recipients between the ages
of 18 and 40 to invite them to enter the demonstration programs
• Waivers to SSI regulations to ensure that any recipients who
chose to enroll in the demonstration could maintain their eligibil
ity for SSI benefits while they received training
• Placement in potentially permanent competitive jobs
• On-the-job training that was provided by program staff and was
gradually faded out over time so as to promote independence on
the job
• Post-placement support and follow-up as necessary for job reten
tion
The other distinguishing feature of transitional employment in the
demonstration was that services were time-limited. In the demonstra
tion, the core services were to be provided within one year from the
time the SSI recipient enrolled in the demonstration. However, there
was an expectation that arrangements would be made during that year
for any necessary job-retention services, although those services had to
be funded by a source other than the demonstration.
This approach to training and employment support was based on the
then-emerging literature on supported employment (Moss 1980; Rusch
and Mithaug 1980; Wehman 1981; Kiernan and Stark 1986; Rusch
1986). A key feature of this approach is the customization of services
inherent in using program staff to provide on-the-job training. This
training enables participants to learn their jobs in the actual work envi
ronment in which they would continue to work after the training was
completed. The training covers the production aspects of the job and
the equally important nonproduction aspects such as travel to and from
work, relations with supervisors and co-workers, and effectively man
aging the money earned from the job.
In general, the outreach, waivers, job placement, on-the-job training,
and job retention services called for in the demonstration model were
provided (Thornton, Dunstan, and Schore 1988). SSI recipients who
enrolled in the program stayed for an average of 10.5 months, during
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which staff provided each enrollee with an average of 114 hours of
direct service (that is, staff time spent working directly with a client or
on that client's behalf). It is estimated that it would cost approximately
$5,600 (in 1986 dollars) to provide these services in an ongoing pro
gram that was not part of a demonstration (this cost would be approxi
mately $7,400 per enrollee in 1995 dollars). There was substantial
variation across individuals, with some enrollees receiving services
costing less that $500 and others costing more than $25,000.
Active Outreach to Eligible SSI Recipients
Eligibility for the demonstration was limited to SSI recipients who
1) were between 18 and 40 years old, 2) had a diagnosis of mental
retardation in their SSI files, and 3) lived in one of the thirteen commu
nities served by the eight demonstration training organizations. The
case folders of over 30,000 SSI recipients were screened to identify
such recipients. Approximately 13,800 eligible recipients were identi
fied and were sent invitation letters that described the demonstration.
In addition, follow-up letters, telephone calls, and outreach to service
providers in the communities were also used to recruit recipients into
the demonstration. A total of 2,404 recipients expressed at least some
interest in the demonstration. Intake workers in the training organiza
tions described the available demonstration services to all interested
applicants and explained that participation in the demonstration was
strictly voluntary. If the applicant consented to participate and the
intake worker decided that the applicant could be served, the applicant
was formally enrolled in the demonstration. A total of 745 SSI recipi
ents with mental retardation (approximately 5 percent of the eligible
population) were enrolled in the demonstration: 375 of these recipients
were assigned randomly to the treatment group and the remaining 370
of the recipients were assigned to the control group.
Limitations of Demonstration Enrollees
The average IQ score for the mentally retarded SSI recipients who
enrolled in the demonstration was 57: approximately 84 percent had IQ
scores between 40 and 70, and 6 percent had scores below 40. 2 In addi
tion, 83 percent of the enrollees also had physical, social, or emotional
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problems that could be expected to impair their ability to function in
the labor market. Approximately a third of the persons who were
enrolled had no vocational activity during the year prior to their appli
cation, and another third had only worked in sheltered workshops dur
ing that time. Only 10 percent of the enrollees had held a competitive
job in the previous year.
Rigorous Evaluation Component
In order to assess the extent to which the demonstration accom
plished its goals, the demonstration included a formal evaluation com
ponent designed to produce accurate estimates of the impact of the
demonstration services on the key outcomes. The key feature of the
evaluation was the use of an experiment that randomly assigned eligi
ble volunteers to either a treatment group, which was offered transi
tional employment services, or a control group, which was precluded
from receiving the demonstration services but was free to obtain any
other available services. By comparing the post-randomization activi
ties of these two groups, the evaluation estimated the impact of adding
the demonstration services to the services and incentives characterizing
the status quo. Data for the evaluation came mostly from the Social
Security Administration's (SSA's) Supplemental Security Record files
and from an Intake Data Collection Form that collected information
about the characteristics of sample members at the time they enrolled.
In addition, enrollees at nine of the thirteen sites were interviewed in
the fall 1988 (approximately three years, on average, after they
enrolled in the demonstration). This survey provides a point-in-time
glimpse of the job characteristics, wages, and work hours of the sample
members.
Increased Services and Earnings for Enrollees
A comparison of the treatment and control groups indicates that the
demonstration was successful in delivering the transitional employ
ment services. The demonstration projects placed two-thirds of the
treatment-group members on jobs during the demonstration. Half of
those persons (or one-third of all treatment-group members) were suc
cessfully stabilized on a potentially permanent job, that is, they
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reached a point where project staff felt that the person was capable of
performing the work without the active ongoing support of the training
program. This placement rate is consistent with the rate observed for
other large employment programs for persons with disabilities (see, for
example, Kerachsky and Thornton 1987).
The evaluation also showed that the demonstration services had a
clear and persistent impact on the treatment-group members who were
offered the demonstration services (Decker and Thornton 1994, 1995).
The most important findings include the following points (many of
which are illustrated in Figure 12.1).
• The SSI recipients who enrolled in the demonstration differed
substantially from the eligible nonparticipants. Enrollees were
slightly younger, had been on SSI a shorter period, and were
more likely to have had recent earnings.
• Prior to enrolling in the demonstration, members in the treatment
and control groups were essentially identical.
• Average employment and earnings levels for the treatment-group
members rose quickly after enrollment, continued on an upward
trend for about four years, and then fell slightly over the next two
years.
• Average employment and earnings levels for the control-group
members also increased over time, but not nearly at the levels
observed for the treatment-group members.
• The impact of the services on average employment and earnings
levels (which is estimated by the treatment-control difference) is
statistically significant, proportionally large, and relatively persis
tent over the six-year follow-up period: average earnings for the
treatment group were 73 percent greater than for the controlgroup over this period.
• Despite the proportionately large impact on earnings, the absolute
change was small: average cumulative earnings rose $4,282 for
the six years (roughly $714 per year).3
• Many of the treatment-group members held part-time jobs with
relatively low wages: at the time they left the program, those
treatment-group members who had jobs worked an average of

Figure 12.1 Average Monthly Earnings for Demonstration Participants and Nonparticipants
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27 hours per week and earned an average wage of $3.95 per
hour; approximately three years later, less than a quarter of the
treatment group members earned more than $300 per month,
and only 43 percent earned more than the minimum wage.
The impact on average SSI payments was statistically significant,
but relatively small: over the six years, payments fell by an aver
age of $870 or about 5 percent.
Participants in the demonstration generally benefited from the
services, their total income rose and they increased their produc
tive activity and integration into society at large.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEMONSTRATION
This demonstration by itself is an extremely small foundation for
developing employment policy for all SSI recipients. Nevertheless, the
demonstration findings are quite relevant for efforts to assist SSI recip
ients obtain and hold jobs. Their relevance stems from the fact that per
sons with mental retardation make up approximately 30 percent of
current SSI recipients and 43 percent of the children receiving SSI
(Kochhar and Scott 1995). The results are also relevant because the
demonstration is one of the few rigorous evaluations of an employment
program for SSI recipients. Finally, when the demonstration findings
are combined with the available literature, several tentative conclusions
emerge.
First, it seems likely that the services required to move SSI recipi
ents into employment will be relatively expensive. In the demonstra
tion, the services had three characteristics that tend to make for an
expensive program: customization, intensity, and duration. The train
ing services were individualized to meet the specific abilities and inter
ests of each participant, and this included individualized placement and
on-the-job training provided by program staff. Participants tended to
need substantial supports, at least early in the training process. This led
programs to provide intensive services: in some cases, program staff
worked directly with a single client full time for several weeks to teach
the client the job. Once clients learned the job, the program support
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was gradually withdrawn to promote independence. However, this pro
cess might take several months. In addition, program staff worked to
establish ongoing job retention services from formal or informal
sources (parents, co-workers, supervisors, and friends). The need for
this ongoing support meant that many participants received 12 months
of demonstration services followed by less intense job-retention ser
vices.
As noted, it would cost about $7,400 per enrollee (in 1995 dollars)
to provide the Transitional Employment Training Demonstration ser
vice package. This figure is comparable to the costs estimated for simi
lar employment support programs serving persons with mental
retardation or other severe disabilities. For example, costs for a state
wide program in Illinois averaged $5,300 per person served, and costs
for a similar program in New York averaged $7,700 per person served
(both figures are expressed in 1995 dollars). While the costs for these
types of programs may decline as the training methods improve, it
seems likely that efforts to place, train, and maintain persons with men
tal retardation or similar severe disability will be much more expensive
than the average costs currently incurred by state vocational rehabilita
tion agencies. For example, Dean and Dolan (1991) estimated that
costs in the Virginia Vocational Rehabilitation program averaged
approximately $2,300 per client (when converted to 1995 dollars).
Second, it appears that a relatively small percentage of current SSI
recipients will enroll and obtain employment. The available evidence
suggests that relatively few SSI recipients work or seek employment
supports. In the demonstration, 5 percent of the eligible population
enrolled. Of the recipients who enrolled, two-thirds were placed on a
job and one-third were successfully training on a job where there was a
clear expectation of future independent work. Thus, less than 2 percent
of the eligibles made the program-assisted transition to work. The Dis
ability Policy Panel (1996) reports that for the Social Security Disabil
ity Insurance program, fewer than 2 in 21,000 beneficiaries leave the
rolls because of a return to work. Finally, Scott (1992) reports that
while 80 percent of working-age SSI recipients had worked prior to
receiving SSI benefits, only 22 percent ever work after benefits begin.
These figures suggest that voluntary employment support programs
are likely to attract a relatively small percentage of current recipients.
Even if more recipients did apply, it is not clear that the system has the
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capacity to provide supported employment services. Braddock et al.
(1994) report that after more than a decade of rapid growth in the avail
ability of supported employment and the inclusion of supported
employment as part of every state's vocational rehabilitation program,
approximately 90,000 persons are now receiving supported employ
ment services. While this is remarkable growth for a program that
existed largely as university-based prototypes in 1980, it is neverthe
less quite small when compared to the 4.8 million persons currently
receiving SSI disability benefits.
Third, the available evidence suggests that services like those pro
vided in the demonstration can increase earnings dramatically but still
not reduce SSI payment substantially. The demonstration services had
a huge proportional, but nevertheless a small absolute, impact on
employment and earnings. While the participants are clearly better off
in terms of income and work place integration, they generally remain
poor and eligible for SSI payments. SSI payments were lower for the
demonstration's treatment group, but the savings averaged only $870
per enrollee over the six years following entrance into the program.
This small impact seems to reflect a combination of factors, including
the work incentive provisions of the SSI program (particularly the
exclusion of half of earnings from countable income and the provisions
of Section 1619), the relatively low wages and work hours of many the
participants who entered the labor force, and the desire of participants
to keep Medicaid coverage. While the demonstration evidence does not
indicate whether the wage and hours patterns reflect the full ability of
the participants or decisions by the participants to limit their earnings
in order to retain SSI eligibility, the available evidence suggests that
the earnings increases are likely to be too small for recipients to earn
their way off SSI.
Fourth, a replication of the demonstration would generate better
results, but might still not generate net benefits to the SSI program.
Three of the eight demonstration programs produced better than aver
age impacts in the demonstration. These three programs seemed to
share some specific program elements that differed from those of the
other five. In particular, they tended to put more emphasis on careful
job matching and seemed to stick with their clients longer when initial
job placements did not work out (Decker and Thoraton 1994). In addi
tion, site-specific impact estimates indicated that one of the eight pro-
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grams reduced SSI payments sufficiently to offset more than a third of
the costs of the transitional employment services. These findings sug
gest that replication efforts might improve on the performance of the
demonstration programs. At the same time, replication efforts might
have worse performance. The demonstration programs were selected
from the eighty training programs that submitted applications in a
national competition. Efforts to implement transitional employment on
a national scale might not be as selective in their choice of providers
and therefore might have smaller impacts than those observed in the
demonstration. This seems to have been the case in Illinois as sup
ported employment programs expanded from small university-based
prototypes to a statewide program (Tines et al. 1990).
While more study is required, the currently available evidence sug
gests that employment support services can play an important role in
making people with disabilities better off, but a limited role in helping
SSI recipients earn their way off SSI. The demonstration tested one ser
vice model with a small group of recipients with a specific disabling
condition. As a result, it is a very slim reed for shaping rehabilitation
policy for the 4.8 million SSI recipients (or the'4 million disabled
workers receiving Old-Age and Survivors Disability Insurance bene
fits). Nevertheless, until the Project Network results are available, the
Transitional Employment Training Demonstration remains one of the
clearest pieces of evidence (Rupp, Bell, and McManus 1994). It sug
gests that it will be very difficult to move a large number of recipients
off the rolls: few current recipients may volunteer (and motivation to
work is probably a key ingredient to success), only a fraction of the
volunteers may make the transition to work, and many may still not
earn enough to become economically independent.4 Participants appear
to benefit from the services, but SSI benefits are not reduced suffi
ciently to pay for all of the program services.
The outlook may be better if replication efforts adopt the service
approach of the best-performing demonstration programs. The outlook
may also be better for employment-support programs that target other
subgroups of the SSI population, such as children who have been
allowed on the basis of an Individual Functional Assessment. By tar
geting children before they have entered the labor market, programs
may have success in shaping expectations and attitudes about work as
well as transmitting the skills required for work. Efforts to help chil-
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dren think of work and independence as their future rather than ongo
ing SSI receipt should help to reduce long-term SSI dependence. This
point is suggested by Scott's (1992) finding that young recipients who
began receiving SSI benefits before they were 18 years old were more
that twice as likely to work while receiving benefits as were persons
who entered the program at an older age. Similarly, the many schoolto-work programs serving students with disabilities offer some promise
(Wehman 1991). However, these programs are still emerging and a
dominant model has yet to emerge. Furthermore, there have been no
controlled studies that compare the success of participants with what
they would have done in the absence of the services.
With regard to employment support programs like those fielded in
the Transitional Employment Training Demonstration, at least three
possible funding plans deserve consideration: 1) to provide vocational
rehabilitation agencies with grants based on the number of SSI recipi
ents served in transitional or supported employment, 2) to provide
funding for ongoing job-retention services to agencies that have placed
and trained SSI recipients on jobs that are likely to enable them to earn
their way off SSI, or 3) to encourage SSI recipients to purchase
employment support services by expanding use of two current provi
sions of the SSI program—Plans for Achieving Self-Support (PASS)
and Impairment Related Work Expenses (IRWE). Grants to vocational
rehabilitation agencies could be based on formulas like the ones used
in SSA's Beneficiary Rehabilitation Program or the one suggested by
Berkowitz (1996). In either case, the funding could be based on the
estimated SSI savings attributable to the transitional employment ser
vices, so that funding could be kept in line with the expected reduction
in SSI payments. By allowing working SSI recipients to deduct work
expenses from earnings used to calculate their countable income and
SSI benefit amount, the PASS and IRWE provisions essentially enable
recipients to shift at least some of the costs of job supports back to the
SSI program without increasing costs to SSA (Prero 1993). Such sub
sidies could encourage greater use of employment supports and ulti
mately save money for the SSI program if the supports led to greater
earnings or economic self-sufficiency.
The overall assessment of transitional employment, however, should
not rest solely on the perspective of the SSI program. It seems likely
that transitional employment services could save money for the gov-
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ernment as a whole, particularly if those services substituted for facil
ity-based services now being provided to many people with mental
retardation. In addition, the program seems likely to generate net bene
fits to society as a whole. From this perspective the earnings gains of
participants would be balanced against the costs of the services. During
the six-year observation period, the average earnings gains of partici
pants offset approximately 75 percent of the gross cost of the services.
Savings from the shift in service use seem likely to offset the remain
ing social costs. In addition, the SSI recipients who received the transi
tional employment services not only gained income, but also gained
from their increased integration in the labor force. It is essential that
society keep track of these nonpecuniary benefits and the overall satis
faction derived from helping individuals with severe impairments par
ticipate more completely in society, because these aspects represent a
major justification for transitional employment services.

Notes
1.
2.

3
4.

Prero and Thornton (1991) and Thornton, Dunstan, and Schore (1988) describe
demonstration operations and the evaluation design.
The IQ scale used here has a mean of 100 and standard deviation of approxi
mately 15 points. Thus, many enrollees had scores that implied cognitive func
tioning at a level that was at least three standard deviations below the general
population mean.
These figures are in 1986 dollars.
The difference between the Transitional Employment Training Demonstration
control-group members and the eligible nonparticipants suggests that the motiva
tion implied by volunteering for an employment program is an important factor in
predicting subsequent earnings and employment.
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13 Summing Up: Reflections
on the Past and Future
of Disability Policy
Richard V. Burkhauser
Syracuse University

Readers of this book old enough to remember the rapid increase in
the disability rolls in the 1970s and the political response and counterresponse that followed have now witnessed a complete disability pol
icy cycle. Hence, in that sense, much of what has occurred in the first
years of the 1990s is not new. Further evidence ofdeja vu is provided
by the introduction of a now out-of-print book Disability and Work:
The Economics of American Policy Robert Haveman and I wrote in the
midst of the last great disability policy crisis brought on by rising dis
ability rolls.
Political currents during the early 1980s have challenged the role
of the federal government in American society ... No set of pro
grams offers a better microcosm of the political, moral, and eco
nomic debates that will result from this general rethinking of the
role of social policy than those comprising the United States dis
ability system . . . Clearly, a strong moral commitment to provide
some form of protection and compensation to the disabled exists
in this country. However, increases in public spending on pro
grams for the disabled and the network of regulations established
in an attempt to integrate fully the handicapped into society have
caused even the traditional supporters of government intervention
to pause. Concern with the rising costs of disability programs has
affected all recent administrations, irrespective of political party.
Any informed debate over the direction of United States disability
policy must take into account the complex nature of the existing
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system—its size, structure, recent growth, economic status, and
labor market effects. (Burkhauser and Haveman 1982, pp. 1-2).

It is a bit daunting to revisit work written over a decade and a half
ago. Having done so, I believe the general principles of disability pol
icy analysis described there are as valid today as they were in 1982.
But in some important ways I was quite wrong about how disability
policy would evolve.
While Burkhauser and Haveman (1982) has a chapter on the rise of
policies to provide equal access to education, employment, and mobil
ity, we did not expect accommodation to become as dominant a theme
as it is in current disability policy. We certainly did not foresee the
strength of the disability movement that helped pass the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, nor did we advocate as strongly as I
would now for the goal of full integration of people with disabilities
into the labor market. I was wrong about the future course of the debate
because in 1982 I believed that while it was possible that more people
with disabilities could work than were currently doing so, most people
with disabilities could not be integrated into the labor market.
As my discussion in Chapter 12 makes clear, I am now convinced
that not only are the majority of people able to work following the
onset of a disability but that they, in fact, are already doing so. Hence,
public policies that focus on encouraging work following the onset of a
disability are not based on daydreams or good wishes. (See Burkhauser
andDaly 1996a, 1996b.)
The following four propositions based on the research I have done
since Burkhauser and Haveman (1982) will reflect my perspective on
past and future disability policy and set the stage for the conclusions I
draw from the previous chapters.
1. Every person reading this book will die.

This proposition requires no additional evidence and, unfortunately,
will occur even if you don't turn another page.
2. Most of us will experience the onset of a disability before we die,
and many of us will do so while we are of working age.

Based on data from the Health and Retirement Survey, Burkhauser
and Daly (1996b) show that most people with disabilities aged 51 to 61
in 1992 experienced the onset of their disability during their work life.
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3. The most effective way to observe the importance of disability on
work and economic well-being is to track the labor earnings and
economic well-being ofpeople before and after onset of a disabil
ity.

Most comparisons of those with and without disabilities use crosssectional data. But simple comparisons of this nature can overstate the
importance of disability in explaining the difference between the two
groups. In Table 13.1, Burkhauser and Daly (1996b) use multiperiod
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to track the
work, labor earnings, and economic well-being of men and women fol
lowing the onset of a disability. Our definition of disability is that the
respondent reports that a physical or nervous condition limits the type
of work or the amount of work he or she can do. Since this is multiyear
data, the respondent must report this for two consecutive years to be
counted as having a disability.
Using event history analysis and PSID waves of data for 1970 to
1989, we first find all persons between the ages of 25 to 61 who experi
ence a disability and then look at what happens in the years prior to and
after this event. 1 As can be seen in Table 13.1 the median percentage
change in the labor earnings of men (women) from one year prior to
onset to one year after onset is a decline of 24 percent (41 percent); the
median decline two years after is 31 percent (62 percent). Clearly,
onset of a disability decreases labor earnings but does not end work,
and as Table 13.1 also shows, on average it is even less devastating to
the economic well-being of households.
We are able to look at the household size-adjusted income of people
with disabilities that comes from private sources by excluding all gov
ernment taxes and transfers. This "counterfactual," which assumes
people would not change their behavior in the absence of taxes and
transfers, is a crude measure of what would have happened, but it does
provide an approximation of the importance of government in reducing
the shock of disability.
What we find belies the notion that the onset of a disability is on
average a devastating economic event. For men the median change in
before-government household size-adjusted income is a drop of 10 per
cent. After two years the median change is a drop of 12 percent. For
women the median change is positive. Once government is taken into

Table 13.1 Economic Changes Following the Onset of a Disability among Working-Age Men and Women in the
United States, 1979-1989
Men

Women

Equivalent median 1991
dollarsb

Time point

Percent
working Median
Before
After
government government
positive
labor
hours earnings3
income
income

Equivalent median 1991
dollarsb

Percent
Before
After
working Median
labor
positive
government government
hours earnings3
income
income

Two years prior

90.4

21,215

17,347

16,224

67.3

5,063

18,247

16,842

One year prior

90.8

21,543

18,381

16,812

68.0

6,582

19,921

17,370

Year of disability event

87.2

18,760

16,434

16,160

70.0

5,995

19,827

17,923

One year after

72.3

13,220

14,567

15,739

63.6

3,277

18,446

17,859

Two years after

68.2

11,798

13,930

15,406

57.6

1,699

20,251

18,537

One year prior to one year
after disability

na

-24.0

-9.7

-2.6

na

^1.0

1.7

5.0

One year prior to two years
after

na

-31.0

-12.1

-3.7

na

-61.7

5.5

7.6

Median percentage
change from:

SOURCE: Burkhauser and Daly (1996b, Table 4, p. 71).
NOTE: The sample is based upon data from the 1970 to 1989 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The sample
includes household heads and spouses who report two consecutive periods of no disability followed by two consecutive periods of dis
ability, who were between the ages of 25 and 61 at onset. A period of disability is one in which the respondent reports that a physical or
nervous condition limits the type of work or the amount of work that he/she can do. Sample size for men in the first four periods is 725. It
is 677 in the fifth period (two years after). Sample size for women in the first four periods is 303. It is 236 in the fifth period (two years
after). The sample size is smaller for women because the PSID did not ask about spouses' disability status until 1981.
aMedian labor earnings includes zero earnings. Earnings are in 1991 dollars.
bBefore- and after-government incomes are adjusted for household size using the equivalence scale implied by the United States poverty
lines. Income-to-needs ratios can be computed by dividing equivalent median income by the 1991 one-person poverty threshold of
$6,932.
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account, the news is even better. After one year the median fall for men
is less than 3 percent and after two years less than 4 percent. Table 13.1
shows that our network of family and government does a reasonably
good job of protecting people from dramatic drops in economic wellbeing following a disability. In making these assessments we do not
simply look at the replacement rates of a given program to evaluate the
change in economic well-being following the onset of a disability; we
look instead at the change in overall household income. And we key on
the transition into disability as the critical event, rather than the transi
tion into a given program. While not perfect, on average our disability
system works to prevent serious economic losses to the households of
adults who experience the onset of a disability, at least in the short run.
Hence, if forced to label persons with disabilities as either heroes who
have coped with their disability and managed to offset its economic
consequences or as victims who have been overwhelmed by their dis
ability and suffered dramatic economic loss, the stereotype I would
choose is hero.
4. Sophisticated social insurance and welfare networks were created
in western industrial countries to offset the economic effects of a
disability, as well as other economic events (e.g., recessions,
depressions, plant closings, etc.) that threaten unemployment and
economic well-being.
Figure 13.1 puts disability-based insurance and disability-based
welfare programs in the context of overall social policy. In the next
sections I will use it as a means of putting the findings of the volume
into that same context. Figure 1 has its origins in Aarts, Burkhauser,
and de long (1996), which focuses on differences in social programs
across five western industrial countries—the United States, the Nether
lands, Sweden, Germany, and Great Britain.
Figure 13.1 conceptualizes attempts by government policy to ame
liorate job loss caused by economic or health factors in the context of a
series of paths that workers may take as they move from full-time work
to normal retirement. For workers who remain on the job over their
work life the path to retirement is a straightforward one. It is not until
they reach retirement age that they must choose between retirement
and continued work. But for a significant number of workers, job sepa-

Figure 13.1 Social Welfare Protection System

Work
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-Rehabilitation
-Job Protection Legislation
WorkPath

• Dismissal rules
•Union protection
• Anti-discrimination mandates
-Job Creation

Short-Term

Disability
Insurance Path

-Sickness Fund
-Temporary Disability
-Workers' Compensation

Unemployment
Insurance Path

-Unemployment
Insurance

Short-Term

Short-Term

Welfare
Path

-Welfare

Jobs

Long-Term

-Disability Insurance

Long-Term

-Unemployment
Insurance

Early
Retirement

Long-Term

-Welfare
-SSI

Early
Retirement
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ration before retirement is a reality for which social welfare policy
must prepare.
No single figure can show all the possible paths that workers with a
disability may take over their lifetime, especially one that is intended
to show how labor market and social welfare institutions influence
those paths across countries. But it is possible to show in a broad way
how the incentive structure built into a country's institutions affect the
average person in that country. In general one can imagine four paths
that workers may take following the onset of such a disability. The
first, which is defined as the work path, encompasses public programs
that provide or encourage rehabilitation in order to overcome the work
limitations caused by a disability. But it also includes more direct gov
ernment intervention into the labor market through the creation of spe
cific government jobs for people with disabilities, subsidies to those
who employ such workers, job quotas, job protection legislation—dis
missal rules, etc., or general antidiscrimination legislation requiring
accommodation for workers with disabilities. The intent of these poli
cies is to maintain those with disabilities on the job and in the labor
market, either through the carrot of subsidies or the stick of mandates.
The second, which is defined as the disability insurance path,
encompasses traditional disability insurance-based transfer programs.
They may include short-term programs that mandate employers to pro
vide replacement of lost wages during the first few weeks of sickness
or directly provide such replacement through short-term social insur
ance. In all European countries, they would include the provision of
health care at no marginal expense to the worker. After some point,
workers are then eligible to move to a long-term disability insurance
program. Often acceptance into this program requires meeting both
health and employment criteria. This path eventually merges with
social security retirement programs.
The third, which is defined as the unemployment path, encompasses
the short-term provision of unemployment benefits that to replace lost
wage earnings due to cyclical economic downturns. At some point
longer-term unemployment insurance is made available, often at a
lower replacement rate. Finally, this also merges with the social secu
rity retirement system at older ages. As we have seen, disentangling
exits from a job because of a disability and exits from a job because of
economic forces is in practice a difficult and often controversial task,
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especially since these exits can be influenced by the rules established
by a country's social welfare system.
The final path is defined as the welfare path. These means-tested
programs serve as a safety net for workers without jobs who are not eli
gible for disability or unemployment-based social insurance programs.
Such programs can be universal, subject only to a means test and/or
linked to an inability to work either because of health, poor job skills,
or child-rearing responsibilities. This track can continue past retire
ment age for those not eligible for social security retirement benefits.
The extremely simplified social welfare system pictured in Figure
13.1 provides some important insights for evaluating the disability
transfer system in any country. And it can be used to explain the impor
tant empirical facts uncovered in Stapleton et al. (Chapter 2) and Livermore, Stapleton, and Zeuschner (Chapter 8).
For persons who have a disability that begins to affect their ability to
work, important decisions about work often must be made. When mak
ing those decisions in conjunction with an employer, the social institu
tions of the country in which those persons work may also be
important influences. Such a worker is likely to look at the relative
rewards of continued movement along the work path versus entry onto
an alternative path. Similarly, a firm's willingness to accommodate
workers may also be influenced by the social institutions it faces.
Not all workers can or will transform themselves into candidates for
disability insurance benefits. But workers with a disability who are
having difficulty with their current job or who are no longer working
will be influenced by the relative rewards provided by the disability,
unemployment, and welfare paths in their country when deciding
whether to try to remain in the labor force or apply for transfer bene
fits. Nor do all those with disabilities have the ability to continue to
work. Some people's disabilities are so severe that continued employ
ment is impossible and a movement onto the transfer rolls is inevitable.
But for some portion of the population who suffer the onset of a dis
ability that affects their ability to work, the length of time they con
tinue on the job depends on the social institutions that are in place as
well as their specific health problems. These workers add to the supply
of candidates to disability transfer programs.
Countries with low or nonexistent welfare benefits, low unemploy
ment benefits, and little available rehabilitation and job protection are
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likely to have a large supply of applicants for the disability insurance
path. This supply increases as the replacement rate increases and the
period of time over which benefits can be received increases. Examples
of such countries are the United States and the Netherlands where
increases in applications for disability benefits put tremendous pres
sure on disability-based programs in times of serious economic down
turns. Alternatively, when the protection offered by the unemployment
path is similar to that offered in the disability insurance path, as in Ger
many, the supply of disability applicants does not increase significantly
during economic downturns.
In Sweden, where disability benefits are as generous as in the Neth
erlands, application pressure on disability programs is far less severe
because all persons with a serious disability who seek disability trans
fer benefits are first required to receive rehabilitation. Following reha
bilitation, it is government policy to provide jobs in the public sector if
private sector jobs are unavailable. In Germany a combination of lower
replacement rates and a quota system and nonactuarially reduced early
retirement benefits deflect much of the pressure away from disability
transfer programs.
Figure 13.1 shows how the incentive structure inherent in a coun
try's social welfare system influences the supply of disability candi
dates. But it can also be used to describe the demand for such
candidates. To enter any of the four paths described in Figure 13.1, it is
necessary to satisfy entry requirements. In a social security retirement
insurance program, entry requirements are usually straightforward. A
worker must have worked in covered employment for a given time or
have performed other easily verified activities (e.g., attend school, rear
children) and must be a given age. Such eligibility criteria are easy to
administer. This makes the task of the front-line gatekeepers routine.
They simply follow relatively objective criteria with little room for
individual interpretation.
Of course, the overall size of the population on the retirement rolls
will change if a higher benefit is paid or the age of eligibility is low
ered, but gatekeeper discretion will not enter into this change. They
will simply follow new criteria. Determining eligibility for the various
paths open to those who have a disability that begins to affect their
work but who are below early retirement age is not as clear-cut.
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Unlike age, which is relatively easy to verify, disability is a complex
concept that has both health- and work-related components. One easy
way to screen for benefits is to require a waiting period of around one
year between the onset of the condition and eligibility, and to record
how much the person is actually working. Then, either a private physi
cian or a physician employed by the system determines the seriousness
of the health condition with respect to the person's ability to work.
While the first two pieces of evidence are easily measurable, the third
is less so. Doctors can evaluate health conditions as they relate to a
norm, but there is no unambiguous way to relate a health condition to
one's ability to work. Hence, disability program gatekeepers' discre
tion in carrying out established criteria is much greater than it is for
retirement.
Access to the work path and the disability insurance path may be
closely coordinated, as in Sweden, where a centralized group of gate
keepers determines who can be rehabilitated and who goes directly
onto disability transfer rolls. But these paths may also be administered
in quite independent ways. In the United States, rehabilitation services
are administered by an entirely different group of gatekeepers with lit
tle or no coordination between them and the gatekeepers who adminis
ter the disability transfer system.
All of these factors then enter into the way that front-line disability
gatekeepers respond to changes in supply and to the voices of those at
higher levels of administrative responsibility who are attempting to
control the overall flow of people into the system. In periods of eco
nomic downturn, the number of workers who leave their jobs rises and
applications to transfer programs increase. In countries like the United
States and the Netherlands, with generous disability benefits relative to
other alternatives, tremendous pressure is put on the disability system
to provide income to those workers. The pressure may lead to a spe
cific easing of the rules or simply to a change in the interpretation of
the rules. In this way "demand" may shift to accommodate supply.
What Stapleton et al. (Chapter 2) have documented is that the busi
ness downturn of 1989-1991 had an important role in the upsurge in
disability applications, as Figure 13.1 would predict. But they also find
that entrance into the program is not inevitable. The major recession of
the early 1980s also had an important effect on applications but did not
result in additions to the rolls since the gatekeepers were signaled by
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Congress and the administration to resist. None of these ebbs and flows
in application and acceptance rates can be explained by changes in
underlying health conditions in the United States.
As Figure 13.1 suggests, countries with generous and easily accessi
ble unemployment and welfare paths are not as likely to see the impact
of major business cycle shifts on applications to their disability insur
ance path. But in the United States our unemployment system is not
particularly generous and is short term. And, unlike most European
countries, we have no universal income maintenance system. General
Assistance and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) are
the primary nonhealth-related sources of income for low-income peo
ple. As the eligibility criteria are tightened and the length of stay made
more limited on these two programs, Figure 13.1 suggests that this will
lead to increased pressure on SSI as an alternative to these two pro
grams. Bound, Kossoudji, and Ricart-Moes (Chapter 7) suggest that
this is exactly what happened in Michigan when their General Assis
tance program was cut. Several other chapters on the topic of applica
tion and growth (Stapleton et al., Chapter 2; Livermore, Stapleton, and
Zeuschner, Chapter 8; and Bordelon's comments on Chapters 6-8)
show that at the gatekeeper level there is a movement from General
Assistance and to a lesser extent from AFDC onto the SSI rolls.
In addition to the supply story emphasized in Figure 13.1, there is
the "cost-shifting" issue that is a generic problem of our multilevel
approach to social welfare policy in the United States. An important
message of this book is that there has been a systematic effort by state
governments to shift their welfare costs to the federal government,
which explains part of the upsurge in Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) applications. (See especially Livermore, Stapleton, and
Zeuschner, Chapter 8.) The welfare reforms of 1996, which require
states to pay 100 percent of the marginal cost of AFDC clients will
make SSI an even more inviting program for state administrators anx
ious to shift costs back to the federal government.
While Livermore, Stapleton, and Zeuschner have concentrated on
the importance of policy changes in General Assistance and AFDC on
the SSI rolls, another policy change already adopted will also affect the
Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and SSI rolls in the next
decade. To reduce the financial burden of the aging baby boom popula
tion on the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance system, the normal age of
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retirement is scheduled to increase from 65 to 67 in the next century. It
is likely that further increases in both the early and normal retirement
age will come. But Figure 13.1 shows that as we make the paths to
retirement longer, the populations on DI and SSI will increase, because
duration on the program will increase as will the incidence of new
enrollment at older ages. This notion of the importance of duration on
the size of the disability rolls is addressed by Rupp and Scott
(Chapter 4) as well as by Muller and Wheeler (Chapter 6).
A final issue related to disability program growth discussed in this
book is the shift in impairment trends among applicants and awardees
over the last decade. Stapleton et al. (Chapter 2) document that appli
cations and awards based on mental disorders and musculoskeletal
conditions have grown much more rapidly than applications and
awards based on other impairments. To paraphrase their arguments in
terms of Figure 13.1, they argue that this phenomenon is much more
related to changes in the actions of disability gatekeepers than in
underlying changes in conditions. Changes in the eligibility criteria
and the greater emphasis on functional criteria rather than on medical
evidence has led to more awards, not a change in underlying health
conditions.

GROWTH IN THE DISABILITY TRANSFER POPULATION: A
POLICY SUCCESS OR FAILURE
While Figure 13.1 is useful in providing a fuller policy context for
the rapid increase in the disability rolls documented in this book, it is
less useful in determining whether this increase was a policy success or
a failure.
While I am confident a consensus exists on the importance of eco
nomic and policy factors on recent disability program growth, I am
much less confident consensus exists on the appropriateness of this
policy outcome. This lack of consensus is best captured by the compet
ing views of Goldman and Weaver in Chapter 11. While Goldman sees
the growth in mental disorder awards as the expected consequence of a
society finally reaching out to an underserved population in need,
Weaver sees this as a substantial lowering of the gates with respect to
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our definition of disability. Likewise, the tremendous outreach
"achievements" discussed by Livermore, Stapleton, and Zeuschner
(Chapter 8) and Bordelon (comments on Chapters 6-8) can either be
seen as an appropriate attempt to provide deserved disability benefits to
people unaware of their rights or as further evidence of a concentrated
effort to shift the burden of general welfare assistance from the state to
the federal government.
Ultimately, policy outcomes of the 1990s will be judged by one's
overall view of the goals of social policy, and of disability insurance
and welfare programs within it. It is at this point that I must confess
that as a "poverty policy expert" of the 1970s, I and many of my col
leagues advocated and laid the groundwork for the system we have
today.
I was among the majority of academics who supported a Negative
Income Tax in the 1970s. In fact, it was then common in policy circles
to whisper that the passage of Supplemental Security Income effec
tively gave us a Negative Income Tax (NIT) not only for all older peo
ple but, with a broad enough definition of disability, most younger
people as well. Today many policy experts and most advocates for the
poor see the expansion of SSI as the best practical method of insuring a
universal federal government-financed minimum income floor under
all Americans.
Many things have changed about me in the last twenty years: first,
the length of my hair, which was the defining characteristic of my gen
eration, is shorter and has turned from brown to grey. Second, my faith
in the NIT as the basis for assisting poor people has been critically
affected by the very mixed results of thirty years of war on poverty pro
grams. I now more fully recognize the dangers to the human spirit that
permanent transfers bring. I am no longer a supporter of an NIT or any
other universal guaranteed transfer program that requires no quid pro
quo of its beneficiaries. I do not believe that residency or even citizen
ship confers an entitlement to a minimum benefit, and I believe it is
neither in the beneficiaries' interest nor in the interest of taxpayers to
provide such benefits. Third, and more to the point, I am not alone. I
doubt if even in the 1970s a majority of Americans supported universal
guaranteed welfare minimums. Otherwise, then why did we have to
hide the universal minimum in the guise of a disability program? But
today the political mood is much less supportive of federally imposed
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minimums. The passage of welfare reform legislation that ended the
open-ended guarantee of support payments for AFDC recipients by a
Republican dominated Congress and signed by a Democratic president
just before the presidential elections of 1996 is evidence of the political
consequences of this mood. To the degree that SSI is seen as a mecha
nism for supporting those who could work, its survival is also threat
ened. This is the real danger that people with disabilities should
recognize in their support of current DI and SSI eligibility criteria.
Fourth, what I believe is more in keeping with traditional American
values and what a majority of Americans will support are government
programs that subsidize work, not welfare, or, to borrow a phrase from
a current political leader—programs that make work pay. As general
transfer programs like General Assistance and AFDC are cut in an
effort to shift people into the workforce, there will be increasing efforts
to place these former beneficiaries on SSI as their benefits expire. Daly
(Chapter 5) shows that this is already occurring, and the 1996 welfare
reform legislation guarantees it will increase.
Finally, let me suggest why the defenders of our current system of
transfer payments should pause. It is often said by veteran activists that
while SSI is not a very generous program, at least it provides a safe
haven against the uncertainty of the work path. And advocates of peo
ple with disabilities have labored tirelessly in Congress and in the
courts to ensure that most people on SSI will never have to leave that
program. But there is evidence that the uncertainty of the work path
may in the long run be preferable to what appears to be the safety of
SSI and other welfare-based transfer programs.
In a series of papers (Burkhauser et al. 1996a, 1996b; Burkhauser,
Crews, and Daly 1997) look at how income distribution in the United
States changed over the 1980s and early 1990s. We then look at how
subpopulations within these countries fared over this period. 2
Figure 13.2 shows the distribution of real pretax, postransfer individ
ual household size-adjusted income in the United States in 1979, 1982,
and 1989. Since much of the discussion in this book has centered around
the importance of business cycles, it is important to recognize that 1979
and 1989 are peak years in the business cycle of the 1980s while 1982
is the trough year in that business cycle. Hence, one can see the powerful
negative effect the recession of the early 1980s had on the economic
well-being of the entire population, as it shifted the entire distribution to
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the left from 1979 to 1982. Over the next seven years, however, eco
nomic growth shifted the entire distribution back to the right.
Much of the discussion of the 1980s ignores the importance of gen
eral economic conditions on income distribution and simply compares
income distributions between two arbitrary years. Figure 13.2 shows
that the years chosen can greatly influence one's view of that decade.
But in looking at the 1980s it is most appropriate to choose points at
the same place in the business cycle. Figure 13.3, compares the two
peak years—1979 and 1989. 3 It confirms conventional wisdom that
inequality increased and the mass of people in the middle of the distri
bution fell. Note the shaded area. This is the "vanishing middle class."
Some of the mass fell to the left—the mass of people at the bottom of
the distribution grew. But the important news is that the vast major
ity—90 percent—of the mass in the middle shifted to the right. That is,
the majority of the "disappearing middle class" became better off
rather than worse off. Inequality grew, but it did so because people in
the middle became better off at different rates.4
We then divided the population into three broad subsets: persons liv
ing in younger households (all persons living in a household headed by
an individual aged 61 or younger, in which some household labor earn
ings but no social assistance benefits are reported; persons living in
older households (all persons living in a household whose head was
aged 62 and older); and persons living in younger social assistance
households (persons living in a household whose head was aged 61 or
younger in which some form of social assistance—SSI, AFDC or other
welfare transfers—was received). When we do this for young working
households the distribution mirrors Figure 13.3. Inequality grew, and
the middle mass fell. While there was some small growth on the left,
the majority of people in these households became richer. For older
households the entire distribution moves to the right between 1979 and
1989. There was an unambiguous improvement in the economic wellbeing of older people living in households in the 1980s, in large part
because of increases in social security retirement benefits and in the
prevalence and generosity of employer pensions over the period.
What I want to focus on is the third subgroup—persons living in
younger social assistance households. Figure 13.4 shows that the dis
tribution of household size-adjusted income of this population shifted
to the left between 1979 and 1982. That is, like other Americans, those
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persons in social assistance households were worse off in the business
cycle trough year of 1982 than in the peak year of 1979. But unlike
other Americans, seven years of economic growth was not able to
return them to their previous 1979 high, let alone shift the distribution
to the right of its 1979 position. While on average, persons on social
welfare assistance were slightly better off in 1989 than in 1983, they
were less well-off than in 1979. The overall economic well-being of
those on welfare actually declined.
In the 1990s the bipartisan groups that are "reinventing government"
and "changing welfare as we know it" show precious little support for
increasing the economic well-being of nonworking welfare recipients.
Thus, for young people with disabilities who are on the verge of mov
ing toward either the work or welfare paths, the future value of a life
time of SSI benefits is quite uncertain. Perhaps it is time for the
advocates of people with disabilities to shift their efforts from the lost
cause of defending and enlarging support for programs that subsidize
nonwork to programs that encourage work.
In fact, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, with its empha
sis on accommodation and the view that the majority of people with
disabilities can work, should be at the center of a set of policies that
begin to shift our collective energies from nonwork to work subsidies.
But this movement should recognize that with rights come responsibil
ities. If people with disabilities are able to work, then our public poli
cies should be built around this expectation and not around a
guaranteed lifetime of welfare transfers.
As I discussed in Chapter 12, accommodation, disabled worker tax
credits, rehabilitation, and training offer real alternatives for an impor
tant segment of the population with disabilities who would otherwise
be in the next wave of SSI or DI beneficiaries.
This book has established that economic and policy forces signifi
cantly affect the DI and SSI rolls. While we will always need SSI and
DI for some people with disabilities, for many others this is a poor sec
ond-best alternative. It is time to stop using SSI as a back door route to
universal welfare minimums. Rather, we should recognize that people
with disabilities have more in common with other Americans than they
have differences. Economic growth is the primary engine of growing
economic well-being for most Americans, including those with disabil
ities. People with disabilities who have good job skills are already able
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to integrate themselves into the American workforce; those with dis
abilities and poor work skills, the doubly disadvantaged, do need a
hand up, but we should first try to improve their economic well-being
through work programs before we push them onto the welfare path.

Notes
1.

2.

3.

4.

Burkhauser and Daly (1996b) also provide cross-sectional information on the
labor force participation of people with and without disability. We find the major
ity of men and women aged 25 to 61 who report a disability in 1989 (using the
same two-period definition of disability) worked at least 52 hours in that year and
about 40 percent of men worked full-time. As was discussed in Stapleton et al
(Chapter 2), the business cycle plays a role in the work lives of people with disabil
ities. The year 1988 was the sixth straight year of economic growth in the United
States and hence reflects work outcomes near the peak of the 1980s business cycle.
Using the same definition of disability and work, Burkhauser and Wittenburg
(1996) look at labor force participation rates of people with disabilities between
October 1990 and January 1992 using the Survey of Income and Program Partici
pants. Labor force participation of people with disabilities is lower during this
weaker economic period; yet, about one-half of men with disabilities worked.
The data used in these papers come from the Current Population Survey. As in
Table 13.1, the unit of analysis is the person, but within a household context in
which it is assumed that household income is equally shared using an equivalence
scale with an elasticity of 0.5. For the United States, household income is pre-tax
and post-transfer. In-kind transfers are not counted.
Burkhauser et al. (1996b) repeat this exercise using the trough-to-trough years
1982 and 1992. The results are similar to the peak-to-peak comparisons. Both these
results are quite different from those one would find by comparing a peak year—
1979—with a trough year—1992 (see, for instance, Danziger and Gottschalk
1995) Not surprisingly, comparisons of peak-to-trough years lead to a much worse
outcome but one that mixes changes along a business cycle with changes across
business cycles. For a fuller discussion of the sensitivity of across-year compari
sons of economic well-being see Burkhauser, Crews, and Daly (1997).
The definition of middle class used here is basically a statistical one. It is the mid
dle of the 1979 distribution, which is bounded by the upper and lower intersec
tions of the 1989 distribution—the "middle mass" of the distribution. Of course,
these "intersection points" do not reflect the political concept of the middle class.
In 1989 dollars the lower minimum is $4,725 for a single person ($9,450 for a
household of four), or 74.9 percent of the poverty line and the maximum of
$30,615 for a single person ($61,230 for a household of four—48.5 times the pov
erty line). Burkhauser, et al. (1996a) offer an alternative lower boundary of twice
the poverty line $12,622 for a single person ($25,244 for a household of four),
which more closely matches the lower boundary of the political middle class, and
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Burkhauser
reach the same conclusion—that the overwhelming majority of the middle class
became richer in the 1980s.
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